If God exists...

Human freedom and theistic hypothesis

Studies and essays

TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE KUL

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TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE
KATOLICKIEGO UNIWERSYTETU LUBELSKIEGO JANA PAWŁA II

LEARNED SOCIETY
OF THE JOHN PAUL II CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN

Źródła i monografie / Sources and monographs

479

SINCE 1934

If God exists...

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Studies and essays

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Translated from the Polish edition by
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Lublin
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JANA PAWŁA II

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Cover design
Szymon Strużyński

The project was financed by the National Science Center
as part of the OPUS 8 research project:
UMO-2014/2015/B/HSI/00406

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e-ISBN 978-83-7306-843-8
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/2019enIf_God_exists

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INTRODUCTION

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk

Strict determinism or fatalism as a theory of reality can be suggested by diverse considerations: natural, theological, ontological or logical. The logically generated problem of fatalism arises when the assumption is made that true propositions concerning temporal events remain always true regardless of how they are indexed with respect to time; in particular, propositions correctly describing future contingent events are true even before the described events take place; in fact they have always been and will always remain true, even though their tense index changes in the course of time. However, if this assumption is true, contingent temporal events appear to be have already been determined before their actual cccurrence, since it has always been true that they should happen thus and so and, consequently, they cannot happen otherwise. Yet if all apparently contingent facts are in fact predetermined, there is no true contingency in the world and thus no freedom (since contingency is a necessary precondition of freedom). The great concern of philosophers in various historical contexts was the question how to reconcile true, and not merely apparent, human freedom with the apparently plausible assumption that propositions correctly describing future contingent states of affairs possess the value of truth.

The problem of fatalism as logically grounded (often referred to as logical fatalism) becomes compounded and acquires a new dimension when placed in a theological context and related to God's eternal and infallible omniscience which necessarily extends to every minute events in the world, whether truly or only seemingly contingent. Thus the problem of theological determinism or fatalism includes the problem of logical determinism while adding to it new, specifically theological dimensions. Determinism

or fatalism can also be variously defined depending on what factor is regarded as the ultimate ground for all determination in reality, and thus we have a mechanistic (causal), physical (nomological), teleological and other kinds of determinism. Yet whatever kind of determinism may be in question, the paramount philosophical problem facing those who consider it is whether, given the presence of the determining factors in reality, we, humans, can still legitimately regard ourselves as free and responsible beings, endowed with true freedom of choice. The volume we present to the reader is a kind of record of a great debate that has been going on in history of philosophical thought, and is still continued in contemporary philosophical reflection, on whether and in what measure, in the face of nature's inflexible laws and all-powerful and omniscient God, before the tribunal of reason, we can affirm ourselves to be truly and not merely apparently free and to possess real freedom of choice, in a certain measure at least.

The present introduction to this volume consists of two parts. (i) In the first part the core problem of the debate on free will versus determinism in the specific context of the assumption of God's existence is restated in general terms. In this part also the key is provided to the organisation and division of the volume, which consists of two criteria: chronology (past — present) and the way the discussed problem is treated and a solution to it proposed, and in particular, the way the problem of future contingents, crucially involved in the question of determinism, is tackled: whether its solution is attempted or the whole question is dismissed as specious. (ii) In the second part various approaches to the problem of future contingents are briefly presented complete with examples taken from texts by some of the authors discussed in this volume.

I.

Naturalism is a theory affirming all events and facts found in the world to be natural states of affairs. What does it mean? Among other things it means roughly that the whole universe of things and events is empirically knowable (albeit with more or less adequacy) and ulimatelly explainable by means of methods and procedures used in natural sciences. The unquestionable successes of natural sciences in the domain of explanation and prediction of natural phenomena account for the fact that the naturalist conception of the Universe and all things contained therein (including hu-

man beings) has become so appealing to contemporary minds that in the eyes of many it has superseded and rendered anachronistic all other conceivable conceptions of the world. Thus some traditional philosophical problems and solutions thereof may appear to some as no longer relevant and of no more interest to the contemporary man than as relics of outmoded ways of thinking, a fit study for the archaeologists of human thought. And yet, there are gross oversimplifications involved in such an attitude, as exemplified by the theory of physical determinism which seeks to replace the classical conception of a plurality of kinds of causal determination with only one sort of causation: the physical determination.[1] However, physical determinism has proved itself unable to provide adequate explanation for human behaviour as well as for the assumptions crucially underlying the common institutions of social life. The existence of penal institutions in all countries rests on the assumption that the inmates thereof consciously did wrong where they really could have done right or at least hold themselves back from wrongdoing[2]; that is on the assumption that man can, at least in a certain measure, effectively choose between diverse proposed courses of action and, therefore, bears the responsibility for the way he actually acted. In other words, all penal systems appear to rest on the assumption that man is, in some measure at least, a free being possessed of real freedom of choice.

What does naturalism make of that apparent human freedom? Naturalism seems committed to the view that the apparent freedom of human choices results from the fact that a human being is a very complex conglomerate of physical causal chains which make up a unified system capable of consciously experiencing his own passions, desires and his own choices, nevertheless his inner experience of himself being the author of these choices must be wholly illusory: in fact all human decisions must be so many outcomes of physical causal processes of which human beings are not conscious. Yet if this interpretation of human behaviour is true, the conclusion seems obviously to follow, that charging anyone with responsibility for

[1] See S. Judycki, „Wolność i determinacja," in *Wolność we współczesnej kulturze (Materiały V Światowego Kongresu Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej: KUL – Lublin, 20–25 sierpnia 1996)*, Lublin, 1997, pp. 355–367, in particular p. 356.

[2] See M. McKenna and D. Pereboom, *Free Will. A Contemporary Introduction,* New York, London. 2016, pp. 1–3. The authors begin their presentation by an analysis of the case of a controversial sentence of death for the murder of two teenagers, which provides them with the occasion to ask the question concerning human responsibility for the acts human beings perform.

what they did is groundless; there are no reasons either to praise or blame anyone, since, in that naturalist conception all human responsibility is rendered null and void. Whatever a human being does, is not really decided by himself, but predetermined by an inexorable chain of causes and effects.

The naturalist determinism is far from being the only or the most problematic kind of fatalism: another threat of it seems to arise from some features of theistic outlook. In classical theism (as represented by orthodox Judaism, Christianity and Islam) God is the Maker of the Universe: the classical conception of creation attributed to God perfect knowledge of all aspects and elements of the world to be created: whatever is to happen or come to being in the world projected by the Creator is preconceived and predetermined by Himself; all things remain under His control. The God of Classical theism is "that, than which no greater can be thought,"[3] His perfection and power are absolute. In particular, He is (i) an omniscient being: He knows all that can possibly be known, He knows what is true and what is false with respect to past, present and future alike; He knows all that eternally and His knowledge cannot change; whatever He knows is eternally and infallibly true. (ii) He is also omnipotent: whatever can be made, which means; whatever is free from contradiction, lies within the scope of His power. (iii) Yet He is also perfectly good and benevolent: whatever He does, He does it in the best possible way, His objectives are always the best possible ones.

However, despite God being absolutely perfect in every conceivable respect, the actually existing world, the result of God's creation, is flawed: it contains evil, and in particular sin and voluntary evil, which we all suffer from and are guilty of.

The conception of divine omniscience and omnipotence gives rise to the question, how created human beings can act in a free, non-predetermined way and make decisions which are not already determined in advance, if God remains in perfect and infallible control and possesses the perfect and infallible knowledge of all the minutest particulars of the creation. Does the classical theistic conception of divine perfection leave any room at all for human free initiative? And, on the other hand, can this conception of God's perfection be harmonized with the obvious imperfections of the world,

[3] „id quo maius cogitari non potest." Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, c. 2. This formula is the principle of the so called "ratio Anselmi" or the "ontological proof" (so designated by Kant), that is the proof of God's existence based on the assumption of God's absolute perfection.

some of which are the result of the imperfection inherent in the nature of things, while others are the outcome of creatures' free initiative? How can man act in a free way, if God firmly directs everything that happens in the world? And, on the other hand, if God firmly controls human choices, how can they be regarded as free in any way? Finally, if God infallibly controls and, in fact, is the cause of all human choices, what can we make of sin, guilt, and moral responsibility in human beings?[4]

For if God is the ultimate and, as it may appear, the true cause of all actions performed by humans, and if He preordains both the conduct and the ultimate fate of every human being, there seems to be no room left for autonomy of reasonable creatures and theological fatalism becomes the only logically plausible theory.

Both these versions of determinism, although starting from radically opposed premises, turn out to end in the same kind of conclusions with regard to human freedom: there is no space for real freedom of choice, what we experience as our free acts of decision is no more than illusion. As for the naturalist determinism, let us quote a brief statement by Peter van Inwagen: "If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us."[5]

On the other hand, the same conclusion appears to follow if God's omnipotence and omniscience are assumed as the point of departure of our investigation: if we presuppose that God has complete knowledge about every particular aspect and detail of the world He creates, we must assume that He possesses complete and infallible knowledge about what appears to us as future contingent events, including all human seemingly free acts of decision. If God's foreknowledge of future contingents is necessarily true, the outcome of our apparently free decisions cannot be other than that eternally foreseen by God, but if this is so, our apparently free decisions are in fact predetermined by God's foreknowledge of them. As the absolutely perfect God cannot be wrong, His knowledge concerning future events ensures that these future events will be exactly as God foresees them to be. But this means that in point of fact we are not masters of our own deci-

[4] Cf. H.J. McCann, Hugh J. and D.M. Johnson, "Divine Providence," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/providence-divine/.

[5] P. van Inwagen, *An Essay on Free Will*, Oxford, 1983, p. 16.

sions: at the moment of making them they have already been decided by what God thought of them; and it is in no way up to us what God thought about future events before we were born, nor does it depend on us in any way that God's knowledge is necessarily true. In brief, it seems that just as in naturalist determinism, on the assumption of God's infallible foreknowledge future apparently contingent events, including our own seemingly free acts, are by no means up to us.[6] Both physical determinism and theological fatalism are extreme one-sided solutions which eliminate contingency and thereby deny any possibility of free actions by rational creatures.

But does the assumption of God's absolute perfection, including the infallibility of His knowledge of contingent events in the created Universe, necessarily rule out true contingency and genuine freedom within this created world? It is far from evident that this is in fact so, and the debate concerning the problem of free will and future contingents, vigorous at some instants in the past, is still continued in philosophy and theology, and various conceptions, more or less ingenious, have been advanced aiming at reconciling the classical conception of divine perfection with genuine contingency and freedom in the world. The measure of success of various theoretical proposals put forward in the past has been variously assessed.

The logical difficulties facing philosophers and logicians coming to grips with the problem of future contingents with the intention of overcoming the determinist or fatalist consequences this problem may suggest are formidable. The logical side of the problem of future contingents can be summed up as a conjunction of three theses: the thesis of at least partly open future (at least some events in the future are contingent), the thesis of completely closed past (all events in the past are necessary, though their necessity is qualified as temporal necessity), and the thesis affirming universal bivalence (every proposition in the logical sense is either true or false). Calvin G. Normore attempted to systematize the difficulties inherent in the problem of future contingents in formulating three rules or principles: the statements of the paradox of future contingents which must be adequately explained or proved wrong, if the contingency of future events is to be saved at the level of theory.[7] The first formulation of the difficulty is as follows:

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[6] See T. O'Connor and Ch. Franklin, "Free Will," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/freewill/.

[7] I present the following three principles according to C.G. Normore, "Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: an Overview," in *Divine Omni-*

> If p was the case in the past (p being a proposition describing some apparently contingent state of affairs), then, in the period of time preceding p, it had been necessary that p would be the case.

This principle is related to the affirmation:

> If p was the case, then necessarily p was the case.

This principle and the related affirmation jointly amount to the theory known as logical fatalism.

Another, equally awkward to handle, formulation of the paradox of future contingents runs as follows:

> If it is known (with infallible certainty) that p will be the case (at some instant of the future), then p will be the case (at the relevant instant of the future).

Another version of this formulation is as follows:

> If it is (or was) known that q is the case, then necessarily it is (or was) known that q.

This formulation of the paradox of future contingents is specifically relevant for theories assuming possibility of a foreknowledge of contingent events (knowing some contingent events before they actually happen in reality), for instance the divine infallible foreknowledge of the contingent (really or merely apparently) future. Naturally, it was usually in this shape that the paradox of future contingents appeared in the theological debates concerning divine predestination and human free will.

Another, more restricted in scope, formulation of the paradox is as follows:

> Necessarily, if it is prophesized that p will be the case (at some point in the future), p will be the case at the relevant point in the future.

Related to this formulation is the statement:

> If it is (or was) prophesized that p, then necessarily it is (or was) prophesized that p.

In the great logical, philosophical and theological debates in history of thought, the problem of future contingents appeared under one or another of these guises. The formulations identified by C.G. Normore were in particular known to Scholastic thinkers of the 12th to 17th centuries and typically analysed and solved with the help of the distinction between the *necessitas consequentiae* and the *necessitas consequentis.* This distinction served as

science and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives, ed. T. Rudavsky, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 2010, p. 3.

means od demonstrating that although the principle that whatever God knows to come about, infallibly comes about is necessarily true, the particular events and human free acts known by God to come about are not in themselves necessary and preserve the mark of contingency.[8]

Naturally, the problem of the antinomy: contingency/necessity with respect to future events is not the only problem related to temporal events, yet it is the central problem for solving the riddle of freedom of rational creatures and in particular human beings, and also for the correct understanding of the relationship of God's eternity and the temporal Universe and the way this temporal Universe is constructed.

As already mentioned above, one of the key intuitions that enter into the formulation of the paradox of future contingents and must be adequately dealt with in any attempt to solve that paradox is the apparently universal insight that the past is not contingent and, therefore, necessary, although its necessity is somehow qualified.[9] In the great debates of the past no one, as it seems, ventured to query this core insight. And yet, if a thorough analysis of the premises of the problem od future contingents is to be undertaken, the question must be asked, whether the apparently self-evident assumption that causality works in the direction from the past towards the future cannot be, at least in some context, suspended, and some kind of retroactivity, that is causal influence from what succeeds in time towards what comes earlier in time, admitted. Here, as in other context, there may be room to overcome some established paradigms, as has been the case in the past, when Christian philosophy and theology modified or even changed the philosophical orthodoxy bequeathed by the Greek classical philosophers.[10]

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[8] More on this subject in the present volume: A.P. Stefańczyk, "Will, Knowledge, Action — God's Grace: Thomas Aquinas on Divine Predestination and Divine Causality," footnote 34.

[9] This is probably what Aristotle assumed and those commentators and critics of Diodorus Cronus's so called Master Argument, whose views are known to us owing to Diogenes Laertius (*Lives of Famous Philosophers*) and Boethius (C*ommentary to Aristotle's Hermeneutics*). Interestingly, the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, the head of the Stoa immediately after Zeno of Citium may have questioned the necessity of the past. Such a surmise appears authorised by the preserved accounts of Cleanthes's discussion of the modalities of necessity and possibility. Cf. R.R. O'Toole, R.E. Jennings, "The Megarians and the Stoics," in *Handbook of the History of Logic*, vol. 1, ed. by D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods, Elsevier North Holland 2014, pp. 411–412.

[10] See C.G. Normore, "Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: an Overview," p. 4.

As already stated above, the problem of the future contingents can be restated as a conjunction of three theses: (i) the past is necessary in that it is irretrievably determined, (ii) the future is, in part at least, not yet determined, therefore non-necessary and open to diverse possibilities, (iii) every (meaningful) proposition is either true or false. In the theological edition of the debate the thesis (iii) is usually replaced with the affirmation of the existence of the omniscient God.[11]

In principle, two strategies are available to get rid of this aporia: One can either (a) reject at least one of the assumptions (i)–(iii) and thus eliminate the apparent contradiction, or (b) one can attempt a demonstration of the claim that the apparent antinomy implied by the theses (i)-(iii) is not real, which involves showing that the commonly approved proof deriving contradictory statements from (i)–(iii) contains a formal error. In the theological version of the debate, a successful application of the second strategy would be tantamount to establishing perfect compatibility of God's infallible foreknowledge of contingent events in the world with real freedom of reasonable creatures.[12] Thus the second strategy will be preferred by those seeking to prove that no contradiction is implied by an assumption of both the thesis of God's absolute foreknowledge of all temporal events and the thesis of irreducible freedom of choice enjoyed by rational and free creatures and, consequently, moral responsibility borne by these creatures for all their voluntary choices. Such an attitude may be described as compatibilism and its proponents referred to as compatibilists. By contrast, those claiming that the opposition between God's absolute foreknowledge and creatures' free initiative is insoluble (let us call them incompatibilists) will have to adopt the first strategy, that is to eliminate either God's perfect knowledge of the future, thus leaving the (partially) open future thesis intact, or reject the possession of true freedom by creatures, thus attributing the causation of apparently contingent acts of creatures to the necessary causality of God and eliminating both freedom and true contingency from the created Universe.

Incompatibilists could quote in support of their affirmation of the irreducible contradiction between the absolute nature of God's knowledge and at least some openness of the domain of the temporal[13] a syllogism formulated in St. Augustine's *On the Free Choice of Will* (*De libero arbitrio*), book 3, chapter 3. The reasoning is done by Evodius:

[11] See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, Lublin, 2015, pp. 11–12.

[12] Ibid. p. 197.

[13] See *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje...Wolność człowieka a hipoteza teistyczna. Wybór tekstów*, ed. A.P. Stefańczyk, Lublin, 2018, p. 12.

(i) If God knows beforehand that the person P will perform the act A, it is necessary that P perform A.
(ii) If it is necessary that P perform A, P is not free with respect to the performance of A.

Therefore:

(iii) If God knows beforehand that P will perform A, P is not free with respect to the performance of A.

The crucial terms of the debate concerning God's foreknowledge, predestination and human freedom were introduced and defined by St. Augustine, yet his own teachings on the relationship between omnipotent God and His grace and human free will notoriously lacked clarity and left the problems generated by his formulation without solution. This fact was decisive for the subsequent development of the Western philosophical and theological reflection and its consequences are felt even in contemporary debates on human freedom and its relationship to God's providence. It is within the philosophico-theological framework established by the bishop of Hippo and in an effort to provide a coherent and compelling interpretation of his teaching on these matters that the texts discussed in the first, historical, part of this volume were produced.

II.

All the conceptions discussed and referred to in this volume represent various attempts at overcoming the antinomy of future contingents, either, as already noted above, (i) by elimination thereof (rejection of one or more of the premises of the antinomy), or (ii) by proving that the apparent contradiction is not real. Elimination of the premise affirming the open nature of the future and, thereby, human freedom, produced theories like B. Spinoza's determinism and the theological fatalism of such authors as Gottschalk of Orbais and Thomas Bradwardine. The conceptions of the latter two authors have been included in the present volume as two, somewhat extreme, interpretations of St. Augustine's thought. Roughly, the doctrines and conceptions studied in the essays comprising the present volume could be divided into the following groups:

(1) Conceptions attempting to preserve both crucial premises of the aporia (the open future and God's infallible foreknowledge) and prove that the contradiction seemingly implied by these premises is not real but merely ap-

parent, in other words, conception based on an assumption of the compatibilist thesis. All these proposals, with the notable exception of J. Locke's theory, were intended as interpretations of St. Augustine's doctrine. In this category belong attempts undertaken by Boethius, Eriugena (although his position was complicated by the substantial influence of some Greek Fathers on his theory and is difficult to qualify), St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Luis de Molina and G.W. Leibniz.

(2) Conceptions proposing to get rid of the puzzle of God's absolute knowledge and human freedom by rejecting one (or more) of the premises of the aporia. Here belong the theories of B. Spinoza, Gottschalk of Orbais and Th. Bradwardine mentioned above as well as most of the contemporary attempts to deal with the difficulty of future contingents which typically involve efforts to modify, weaken or redefine the problematic premises in order to avoid contradiction. What undergoes revision and modification is usually the conception of God, as in the process philosophy of Ch. Hartshorne and in the theology of the so called open theism as represented by W. Hasker, but also the concept of freedom is sometimes redefined.

(3) The attempt at solving the riddle of future contingents undertaken by M. Tkaczyk stands quite apart and forms in itself a separate category. In brief, Tkaczyk's solution is based upon distinction of various kinds of necessity (causal, temporal and logical). The causal and temporal necessity need not correspond to logical necessity, hence it is possible and legitimate in metaphysics to introduce a very special kind of causal activity, namely retroactive causality, which consists in causal activity operating backwards in time. In other words, the effect in a retroactive causal relationship comes earlier in time than the cause. Tkaczyk applies the concept of retroactive causation to the riddle of future contingents; at a cost, however: the apparently self evident assumption of the closed past is rejected and replaced with the conception of the (partially) open past.

1. THE HISTORICAL PART: THE DEBATE ON HUMAN FREE WILL AND GOD'S PRESCIENCE AND PREDESTINATION

The volume we present to the reader contains studies and essays concerning the problem of human freedom within the context of theism; this volume is intended as a continuation of the research project to carry out an extensive survey of the philosophical and theological debate concerning the

problem of human freedom versus divine prescience and predestination that has been going on over centuries (beginning with St. Augustine) and is still continued nowadays. The present volume is a sequel to the first volume compiled as part of the said project, which contained original translations into Polish of classical and contemporary philosophical and theological texts within European tradition dealing with the problem of human freedom and divine providence.

As already mentioned above, the problem of future contingents formed a focal point of the debate concerning the larger issues of freedom, contingency, necessity, divine prescience and predestination: in fact the discussion of the aporia of future contingents provided the key to treatment and solution of these more general and more basic points. We also said that there are basically two ways of dealing with the puzzle of future contingents: to attempt an elimination of some of its sources (that is premises engendering the antinomy) or to attempt a proof of fundamental compatibility of apparently conflicting assumptions. The first part of the present volume contains studies of the thought of the authors who presupposed fundamental agreement between seemingly mutually incompatible factors of creatures' freedom and divine predestination and who, consequently, denied that there was any contradiction involved in the theory assuming the reality of either factor. In treating the problem of future contingents these authors attempted to present a proof of non-contradiction of the thesis of the open future (and, correspondingly, of human free choice) and that of the closed past (and, by extension, of God's infallible knowledge). It should here be observed, that throughout the debate concerning divine predestination and human freedom, the problem of future contingents was always invoked as the focal point in which various aspects of the discussed problems came together and lent themselves to analysis and treatment.

The common point of reference of the theories of the thinkers presented in the first, historical part of the volume is the teaching of St, Augustine concerning the crucial issues of freedom, prescience, predestination and divine causation (in the form of grace): all the presented theories purport to be faithful interpretations and explications of Augustine's ideas. Thus it makes sense in a brief survey of these theories to begin by outlining the doctrine of the bishop of Hippo and then to proceed to presentation of some interpretations of this doctrine.

According to Augustine man was created in the first human being, Adam, in a state of grace. Being in a state of grace, the first man was predes-

tined to eternal glory with no conditions attached, in particular, without any necessity to deserve his reward. However, having been created in the image of God, man was endowed with free will, that is the faculty freely to choose his own destiny; free will Adam possessed made him able either freely to persevere in his original condition of grace or to give up this original state and exchange it for something different: free will made it possible for man to follow any desire of his, since will is a faculty that is distinct from reason and capable of acting independently from the reason's guidance. Adam made bad use of his will, fell to temptation and acted in opposition to God's command. As a consequence of his transgression, Adam lost God's grace and plunged his whole posterity in the condition of sin: after the fall man is no longer fit to receive glory, but instead deserves God's just punishment. Every single human being born into the condition of sin naturally deserves damnation, however, God, being merciful, intervenes in human history in order to come to the rescue of and save at least some human beings. This rescue and salvation is exclusively the work of God's grace: no conceivable human efforts could procure it. It is God's sovereign and inscrutable decree that some sinful humans should be freed from damnation and destined for salvation, while others should be left to remain in the state of corruption and malice into which they have been born. Thus God Himself predestines His elect to the state of glory, which in itself does not imply that He positively predestines the rest of His human creatures to damnation. In Adam the whole of humankind became thoroughly defiled with sin and put in a state deserving and justifying its total damnation and rejection by God; humanity as such became *massa damnata.* This being so, there is no way man could achieve salvation by his own efforts, neither can he effectively cooperate in procuring it. No conceivable deserving act performed by a human being (save the sacrifice performed by Jesus Christ) can be of any use in bringing salvation within the reach of the performer. To be sure, there are deeds deserving divine recognition and reward performed by human beings, yet they are not the effect of purely human moral effort, but of grace donated to a human being in consequence of that human being having been predestined by God for salvation. However, given the state of perdition humankind has been thrust into as a result of original sin, God's refusal to extend His predestination to glory to some human beings is tantamount to condemnation of these beings to eternal perdition: without being predestined and given grace, they remain unable to perform a single act that might deserve God's recognition.

The essential message of this doctrine is clear: salvation, wherever it occurs, is solely and exclusively a gift of God and no achievement of any effort by humans. The elect will be saved owing to divine grace bestowed on them; that grace is wholly gratuitous in being unearned by any deserts on the part of human beings; on the other hand it is irresistible and efficacious: those endowed with grace cannot but perform meritorious deeds that will in the end secure for them reward in the form of God-given eternal beatitude.

Augustine's conception of predestination is uncompromising: predestination is neither caused nor even conditioned by any conceivable human merits: it is a "predestination before foreseen merits (*praedestinatio ante praevisa merita*), it is granted purely gratuitously, not even in view of the foreseen meritorious deeds to be performed by the receiver after the reception of grace. Neither does this absence of regard for actual or foreseen merits of human being suggest that God's foreknowledge of these is of little value or, possibly, imperfect and incomplete: in the classical theological theory God's act of will and God's knowledge are one reality in His simple essence. To God human history is not a sequence of events extended in time, it is rather a unified structure in which the sequence of elements is logical and intentional: *in ordine intentionis*, and it is known to Him, the whole and every part of it, eternally. Hence the conclusion seems to follow, that human merits (inspired by grace), being irrelevant *in ordine intentionis*, in so far as they have no part in procuring grace for a human being, may still have relevance *in ordine executionis*, in so far as they secure God's just recognition and make it fitting for the meriting human person to be given eternal reward.[14]

Augustine's teaching on grace and predestination, clear enough as it is in its general outline and tendency, left many points concerning the relationship between God and man, God's efficacious causation and human free initiative, without clear explanation. Moreover, there appeared to be tension between it and the established Church doctrine emphasizing the personal responsibility of every individual for his or her own actions; no wonder there emerged in time various interpretations of the teaching of the bishop of Hippo.

The first major crisis caused by clashing readings of Augustine took place in the 9th century AD, when Gottschalk of Orbais (803–868) proclaimed

[14] See *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, ed. M. Kaufmann & A. Aichele, Leiden, 2014, p. xviii.

his theory of double predestination, that is the view that God decrees by an act of His decision some of human beings to be predestined for the glory of salvation while others He condemns to eternal perdition. The philosophical core of this doctrine appeared to be formed by the strong conception of God's transcendence and His absolute simplicity on the one hand, while on the other, as a consequence of the presupposed divine simplicity, the affirmation of identity of God's (fore)knowledge and His will, that is predestination. The consequence of these assumptions and other concomitant affirmations was a doctrine being a crude expression of theological fatalism: man is helpless, a mere passive object in relation to God's all-powerful decrees, the disproportion between the Creator and creatures is so great, that beside God's freedom and power human freedom is reduced to nothing. This line of one-sided interpretation of St. Augustine would be later followed by Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290–1349), who had a more sophisticated conceptual apparatus at his disposal with the help of which to restate basically the same conception of theological fatalism. He affirmed that God, being absolutely free and infinitely powerful, makes absolutely free decisions and performs absolutely free acts. By His sovereign decrees God bestows His grace on some human beings, while others He predestines for eternal perdition. God is a co-author of all human acts and a co-maker of all human decisions. Despite some very obvious difficulties of radical theological fatalism (God being apparently responsible for evil in the world), this doctrine gained some following among theologians[15] and enjoyed great success in Protestant theology, especially in Calvinism.

More complex and mature discussions of the problem of predestination and human freedom were presented by St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, later by L. Molina and still later by G.W. Leibniz. All these thinkers based their work on the assumption that there is in reality no opposition between divine prescience and predestination and the freedom of man, in other words, these authors adopted the position which we called compati-

[15] Among the theologians who adhered to this predestinationist interpretation of Augustine let us name Bradwardine's contemporary Gregory of Rimini (died 1358) and John Wycliffe (ca. 1330–1384). Cf. A.P. Stefańczyk, "Doctrinal Controversies of the Carolingian Renaissance: Gottschalk of Orbais' Teachings on Predestination," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2017), 3, pp. 53–70. The history of the doctrines on predestination previous to and during the 16th century is extensively and competently presented in the excellent work by M. Biersack, *Initia Bellarminiana: Die Prädestinationslehre bei Robert Bellarmin S.J. bis zu seinen Löwener Vorlesungen 1570–1576*, Stuttgart, 1989.

bilist in the above. Let us here confine ourselves to brief descriptions of the doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.[16]

Aquinas's account of divine predestination and prescience focuses on the notion of the universal end of all rational creatures, which is eternal life of beatitude. Thomas affirms that predestination must be thought of as independent of the actual moral condition of predestined creatures; for once (i) the notion itself concerns the end *(terminus ad quem)* to which all rational creatures are aided by God, and not the particular circumstances of every recipient of grace in which his/her salvation is worked out, and secondly (ii) the term predestination is no generic term, it rather refers to a special kind of providence which manifests itself in the order and disposition of the whole of creation and in the case of rational creatures in their predisposition (being capable of and fit for) to eternal life. Man is predisposed to eternal life of beatitude, yet in his present condition he can scarcely be aware of that, since his present life and his whole experience develops within the framework of temporal reality, whereas his end is extra temporal. For this reason man is unable to achieve that end by his own effort alone, as his own powers are contained within the domain of the natural, and his ultimate destiny transcends the realm of nature and the powers operative therein. Thus, for a human being to achieve the end for which he/she has been created, God has to direct and assist his/her personal efforts, to dispatch *(destinare)* that human person as it were to fulfill his/her destiny. The order of the whole of creation has eternally existed in God's mind, every individual human being has had a place therein, so he/she has been predestined (*prae-destinatus est*) for his ultimate end "before," as it were, the temporal order of creation came to exist. Man has natural disposition or inclination towards his supernatural end, even though that end far exceeds his/her natural active powers; this natural disposition implanted in man is the first grace, which has been universally imparted by God to every human being, God being benevolently disposed towards every human being He creates in His "antecedent will" (*per voluntatem antecedentem*). As it turns out, however, it is not enough to implant in man predisposition towards a supernatural end for him actually to achieve that end, so in order to secure the salvation of a human being God has to give to the human person he predestines for salvation more special and active assistance, which is known

[16] In giving this outline of the doctrines of Aquinas and Duns Scotus I use information drawn from the relevant articles in this volume as well as from *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, pp. xviii–xix.

by the name of "efficacious grace" (*gratia efficax*). This second grace given to man is no longer universal and does not concern all human beings uniformly, but is conditioned individually, it is the effect of the disposition in God called "consequent will" (*voluntas consequens*). The consequent will is the cause of successive supernatural means of salvation granted to human beings according to each individual's response to the preceding gifts and enabling the receivers to perform actions that earn to them merit and make them fit to receive the final and ultimate reward. The process of the working out man's salvation is thus gradual and is realized in successive stages: there are degrees of grace as there are degrees of merit. On the whole, Aquinas's conception of predestination as particular providence related to particular rational individuals is an effort to reconcile, integrate and make coherent the faculty of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) in humans with divine predestination "before foreseen merits" (*praedestinatio ante praevisa merita*).

Although the meritorious deeds accomplished under the influence of the efficacious grace are actually performed by the human person, yet this person acts merely as a secondary cause, and the first cause of the accomplished deeds is God and His predestination: God's active support is necessary for the accomplishment of meritorious, salvific actions, yet the human person's active engagement is a necessary condition for that person's salvation. Aquinas's finalist conception is best illustrated by the famous metaphor of a flying arrow, directed to the mark by a purposefully acting archer. This conception, elaborate and nuanced as it was, left nevertheless a very important question without a clear answer, a circumstance that occasioned in the 16th century the controversy *de auxiliis*); this was the question concerning the actual efficacy of the "efficacious" grace and the corresponding efficacy of the human effort involved: is the effect of the human action inspired by grace totally the work of God's efficient participation or is at least some part of the effect contributed by the human being's own initiative and effort? For either: (1) the Divine Archer initiates His action whose effect is transmitted along the unbroken chain of secondary causes down to the extreme effect, leaving no room for any original contribution from any of the secondary causes, including human will and initiative, so that the final effect is wholly the work of the divine action and the human person involved is merely an instrumental cause in bringing about the execution of the divine eternal predestination (*praedestinatio ante praevisa merita*); on this construal it is hard to see how the ultimate salvation of human beings could be regarded as merited by them; or (2) the action of the Divine Archer does

not go unimpeded along the intermediary chain of secondary causes; there are factors the counteract the divine influence and it is human will and action operating on their own that are called to stop and remove these factors thus bringing in their own original contribution and earning true merit. This is the concurrence or synergistic interpretation of St. Thomas's theory, according to which the ultimate efficacy of grace still depends on human acceptance and cooperation that are caused by human free will and which somehow contribute to the very fact of the given person being predestined for eternal beatitude (*praedestinatio post praevisa merita*).[17]

A very particular solution to the problem of predestination and human free will was proposed by John Duns Scotus, who contends that (1) predestination that is God's decree concerning a person's election *(electio)* is eternal and decided before the Fall of man (this doctrine is called supralapsarianism), while reprobation, that is God's decision to reject a person is only made after the Fall (this is, in turn, called infralapsarianism). According to Scotus, God's antecedent will *(voluntas antecedens)* contains particular means of salvation (*antecedentia ad salutem*), which God prepared for and offers to every human person during his/her lifetime. Every created person has the power either to accept these gifts of divine mercy and respond to divine goodness by performing the meritorious deeds suggested by His inspiration and thus fulfilling and confirming His will, or to spurn them and thus contradict God's will. Man has his own free will and thereby the power to frustrate God's antecedent will and to prevent His consequent will *(voluntas consequens)* from being applied to himself. Sinful conduct of a human person is a sure sign of that person rejecting God's designs concerning him- or herself, whereas morally good behaviour shows that the person complies with the demands posed by the antecedent will of God. The acceptance of the divine antecedent will by a person means that that person has been predestined by God to salvation, in fact acceptance of God's will is the cause of predestination, for God foresees for every human being whether he/she will comply with or oppose His antecedent designs and shapes His consequent designs concerning every human person accordingly. God's antecedent benevolence, which extends to every person He creates, is logically, though not temporally, prior to His foreknowledge of the ultimate rejection of a person, as His original project for every human being includes no sinful traits, which only appear later on that human being's own initiative and always go counter God's antecedent benevolence. Thus Paul is predestined

[17] Ibid., p. xix.

to glory eternally; his election (logically) precedes the consideration by God of original sin and Paul's own potential for personal sin, by contrast, Judas is only rejected "after," as it were, original sin and his own personal sin, without having ever been predestined to glory.[18]

One of the most outspoken apologists of human freedom was Luis de Molina, whose concern as a theorist was to present an account of it that would unambiguously safeguard its prerogatives with respect to the powerful agencies of divine foreknowledge, predestination and grace. The way through which he sought to assert the reality of unimpaired human freedom was his theory of the nature of God's knowledge of possible (creatable) contingent event; the particular section of God's universal knowledge which concerned possible contingent events, their conditional consequences and in particular, human free acts and the conditional results thereof, he called "middle knowledge" (*media scientia*). In Molina's intention the doctrine of middle knowledge was a means of refuting theological fatalism and making it clear, that no knowledge, divine or human, can in fact cause a given real agent to perform any act just because it is known that such an act should be performed. The doctrine of middle knowledge was formulated in order to combine the biblical representation of God as the creator of the real world, a perfect, omniscient and omnipotent person and an absolutely powerful intellect comprehending all conceivable logical relationships. God, having knowledge of all things knowable, has to know also all counterfactual truths, whether (logically, not temporally) before or after His creative act. It was, however, clear to Molina, that if God's knowledge of counterfactual conditionals were to be conceived as (logically) posterior to His creative decree, it would provide no ground for any theory of human freedom conceived in libertarian terms: God's irrevocable decree would then determine all particular actions performable by created persons in all particular created circumstances. However, the Scriptures clearly indicate that human beings in reality possess real, and not merely apparent freedom, therefore, concludes Molina, it follows, through reduction to absurdity, that God must possess knowledge of all counterfactual conditionals that is logically antecedent to His free knowledge (knowledge of His own contingent act of creation). The universal knowledge of all possible conditionals is, from the logical point of view, situated between God's natural knowledge, which is knowledge of all necessities and all possibilities allowed by these and God's knowledge of the actually created world complete with all its contingencies (God's free

[18] Ibid.

knowledge). The limits of what intelligent creatures could do in given possible circumstances are set precisely by those circumstances while what actually created creatures freely do in the actually created world is conditioned by the circumstances freely determined by God in His act of creation.[19]

Another theoretical proposal that qualify as compatibilist (in the sense defined above) is the theory formulated by G.W. Leibniz, which, on the one hand, continues the strategy of his compatibilist predecessors, while on the other contains some original ideas. Leibniz approaches the problem of predestination and freedom in the larger context of his concern with the problem of the origin of evil in the best of all possible worlds.[20] Leibniz's position on the existence of moral evil is best approached via his theory of contingent truths, which, in his view, are largely determined by God's decrees.[21] In discussing the status of contingent propositions in Leibniz, Murray introduces distinction between prevolitional and postvolitional truths. The former are the necessary truths, which do not depend on God's decision, while the latter are all the other truths, which became truths as a result of God's supreme act of will.[22]

In his writing *Necessary and Contingent Truths* Leibniz explains his notion of truth and he defines it as follows:

> A truth is a statement whose predicate is contained in the subject; therefore in every proposition which states a truth, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in some way contained in the concept of the subject. (Transl. A.P.S.)[23]

In the subsequent sections of this writing the claim is made that necessary truths in the absolute sense are those truths whose proofs can be accomplished in a finite number of steps, while the contingent truths require

[19] See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina. The Life and the Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge*, Zondervan, 2015, pp. 103–104.

[20] In this section, which relates Leibniz's solution of the problem of the origin of moral evil, which is, in its essence, the problem of the relationship between God's omnipotence and supreme will and human freedom, I make use of some statements and reasonings contained in my own introduction to the volume *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje... Wolność człowieka a hipoteza teistyczna. Wybór tekstów*, pp. 494–495.

[21] See G.W. Leibniz, *Dissertation on Predestination and Grace*, translated, edited, and with introduction by M.J. Murray, Yale, 2011, p. xlix.

[22] Ibid.

[23] G.W. Leibniz, "Prawdy konieczne i przygodne," transl. A.P. Stefańczyk, *Roczniki Filozoficzne*," 56 (2008), no. 2, p. 395.

each of them infinite proofs (proofs consisting of infinite number of steps). Having made these basic assumptions, it becomes possible to argue, Leibniz claims, that God's foreknowledge of a contingent event does not imply His responsibility for that event, nor does it diminish the responsibility of the immediate agent freely causing that event to happen. Let us take Judas's betrayal of Jesus as an example: God knew from eternity that Judas will betray Jesus, yet His knowledge in no way was efficient in causing this event to happen; Judas's act as free and contingent is the sole responsibility of himself and in no wise of God.

> From the fact, that God infallibly knew beforehand that Judas will betray Jesus, it does not follow that Judas's betrayal was necessary. Judas betrayed Jesus not because God foresaw this event, but the other way round: God foresaw it because Judas was to betray Jesus. For God, in possession of the individual concept of Judas, had thereby sure knowledge that Judas would commit this act of betrayal. Still, neither God's certainty nor His infallibility creates necessity. If, therefore, Judas had not betrayed Jesus, this would not have been an impossible event in itself, although this would have been impossible given the individual concept of Judas. Therefore, let us repeat, from the fact that God knows infallibly that Judas will betray Jesus, it does not follow that Judas's betrayal is unconditionally necessary, since the opposite state of affairs (namely Judas failing to betray Jesus) contains no contradiction. For this reason, Judas's betrayal, despite God's foreknowledge, has no marks of unconditional necessity. Moreover, any possible proof of the connection between the subject of the relevant truth, which is Judas, and the predicate thereof, which is his act of betrayal requires an infinite proof. And everything which requires an infinite sequence of reasons is contingent by our accepted assumption.[24]

This shows that Leibniz's solution is intended as a theory claiming that moral evil as encountered in the world is contingent reality and is the responsibility exclusively of reasonable creatures and in no wise of God, even though God eternally knows that evil to take place. This solution, just as other compatibilist solutions, seeks to assert God's power, integrity and perfection and at the same time to safeguard undiminished human freedom.

In the above section we presented selected theories of some thinkers who will be dealt with more extensively and in greater detail in the essays contained in this volume; this brief survey gives some idea of the variety of possible approaches to the apparent antinomy of the combined theses con-

[24] P. Gut, "Komentarz do tekstu G.W. Leibniza *Prawdy konieczne i przygodne*," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 56 (2008), no. 2, pp. 393–394.

cerning divine prescience and predestination and human freedom, including the area of discussion where this antinomy is given particularly sharp focus: the problem of future contingents. The diversity of approaches in these theories is balanced by the unity of concern to present a compatibilist account of the discussed matters that would demonstrate, despite apparent aporias, basic agreement between the affirmation of divine prescience and predestination and the affirmation of free choice in human beings and real and not merely apparent contingency of human actions.

2. CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: THE OLD CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND A NEW IDEA OF GOD?

By contrast, the solutions to the problem of divine predestination versus human freedom proposed by contemporary thinkers and discussed in this volume presuppose an incompatibilist assumption: they seek to remove the apparent antinomy by essentially modifying one part of it, namely the conception of God and His providence. This modification typically consists in giving up the divine attributes most highly valued in classical theism: the omniscience (including prescience) and omnipotence of God, both taken in the strongest possible sense.

Widely exploited in contemporary philosophy of religion and theology are solutions drawing on the ontological assumptions made within process philosophy. The outstanding representative of this trend in philosophical thinking was Charles Harshorne (1897-2000), who proposed a new method of forming the philosophical conception of God. He believed that a metaphysician undertaking the task of construction of a metaphysical system ought to take into account what religion as such has to tell us about God. From the variety of conceptions of the divine found in the multitude of religious beliefs, one can distill one idea of God, namely the *religious* conception of God. This religious conception should subsequently be analyzed and transformed in metaphysics with particular regard paid to its inner coherence, its coherence with our own religious beliefs and scientific knowledge, and possibility of existence of its designate. Applying this approach and method to the construction of his own idea of God, Hartshorne arrived at the representation of God as community of temporally organized, although lacking both temporal beginning and temporal end, actual entities. Since God is a community, therefore a plurality, of elementary entities, He can be said to possess a body. However, in contrast to all other composite individ-

uals, the body of God is the whole world. Thus God has no neighborhood nor any outer environment, in the process of His actualization He comprehends the whole Universe, and in this He is unlike any other complex individual, since all other composite individuals are in touch with a limited set of neighbouring and preceding actual entities other than themselves.[25] Being identical with the Universe, God does not transcend the world temporally or with respect to power: His knowledge does not precede the actual development of the Universe neither does His power influence it from without. Thus the aporia of divine omniscience and omnipotence and freedom of reasonable creatures is removed in process philosophy, or better, it simply fails to appear. God is coextensive with the world, He develops in parallel with the Universe, he has neither the knowledge nor the power to enable Him to influence individuals, hence individuals in the world can exercise their freedom without being limited or circumscribed in any way by God's superior might.

Another attempt to modify the concept of God as inherited from classical theism is the one proposed by the current in theological thought known as open theism or free-will theism, whose outstanding representative is W. Hasker (born 1935). The main tenets of open theism are as follows: first of all, this approach radically transforms the classical concept of God by distinguishing in God's essence the necessary and immutable core and that which is in some way changeable and contingent. Consequently, all statements concerning God are divided into (1) those which concern God under the aspect of necessity and (2) those which regard His changeable features. The former are the following: (i) God is a necessary being, (ii) God at a given moment necessarily knows everything that is knowable at that moment, (iii) God of necessity can actualize every state of affairs that is free from inner contradiction and in agreement with His perfect goodness, (iv) necessarily, God chooses and performs only good actions. The theses concerning the mutable and contingent aspects of God are as follows: (i) God's knowledge undergoes changes corresponding to the changing facts within the world, (ii) God experiences emotions which change according to the changing facts in the world, (iii) God's activity changes in correspondence with the changes taking place in the world and in God's own knowledge and emotions.[26]

[25] Cf. in this volume: P. Gutowski, "The religious and metaphysical conception of God in Charles Hartshorne's process theism."

[26] See P. Kaszkowiak, "Teizm otwarty: poszukiwanie drogi środka w filozofii religii," *Diametros* no 18 (December 2008), pp. 18–40, in particular p. 26.

It follows from the quoted affirmations of open theism concerning God that in this conception God has perfect knowledge about the past and (probably) about the present, but He notably lacks insight into and infallible knowledge of the future, since His own knowledge depends on the changing states of affairs as they develop and take place in the world. In notable contrast to the classical conception of God, the God of open theism has no infallible notion of what will happen, the best He can achieve in the matter of knowing the future is to calculate and foresee what could happen in the future on the basis of His perception of the past and present. Yet this means that there is in Him no infallible prescience of future contingents, including human free acts, and, therefore, no danger that His infallible beforehand knowledge might render human free choice merely illusory. The libertarian nature of human freedom is thereby secured, the opposition between human really, and not merely apparently, free initiative on the one hand and God's overpowering might and insight on the other removed. By way of explanation let us mention the fact that open theism emerged in the course and against the background of discussion of the problem of theological fatalism and the precise objective of that current of thought was to provide an effective solution to the question of reconciling God's omniscience with the assertion of human freedom conceived in libertarian terms. The notion of alternative possibilities as a necessary prerequisite for free decisions was regarded as crucial for the definition of free will as construed in libertarian terms.

3. RETROACTIVE CAUSATION

A THEORETICAL PROPOSAL quite apart from the mainstream tendencies is M. Tkaczyk's attempt to solve the antinomy of future contingents by means of an introduction of the conception of retroactive causation. The main assumptions of Tkaczyk's essay have already been sketched above, now let me supply a few remarks outlining the main direction of his argumentation. The proponent of this original idea believes that it is legitimate to assume that the well-known principle "no effect precedes temporally its own cause" holds good in the physical world, but there is no necessity to extrapolate this affirmation upon domains of objects which are not subject to physical laws. In metaphysics it is legitimate to hold, that God, who is the creator of the Universe, and who totally transcends the limitations of the physical and temporal sphere, has the power to generate effects, as it were, backwards in time. On the other hand, the author of this conception argues that in order

to provide an effective solution to the problem of future contingents it is enough to assume a very weak restriction of the validity of the thesis "no effect precedes in time its own cause." To remove the antinomy between the necessary nature of God's knowledge of the future and the contingent nature of future contingent events it is enough to suppose that God employs His ability causally to retroact only for the purpose of eternally bringing to completion His knowledge of the created world; no other instance or occurrence of retroactive causation need be assumed. In particular, there is no implication involved that God has the power arbitrarily to change the already accomplished past, that He could, e.g. undo things that already happened.

This brief survey of conceptions and solutions proposed by the classical and contemporary authors selected for this volume provides only a general outline of the area of problems related to the idea of divine predestination in the context of human freedom and the dominant strategies of solving these problems, both over the past ages and today. For more incisive statements of the wealth and variety of the questions concerned, more detailed and reasoned accounts of the proofs, arguments and refutations and more complete presentations of the solutions proposed, the reader is referred to the essays within this volume. Careful study of these essay will introduce the reader to an area of fascinating metaphysico-theological and logical speculation and will allow him or her to appreciate the intrinsic interest of the discussed puzzles and relevance of the whole debate to our contemporary outlooks and thinking. It is to be hoped that the publication of this volume may help the reading public better to appreciate the importance of this seemingly removed and abstruse metaphysical speculation to the vital moral and intellectual concerns of our lives and make the intellectually minded aware of the undying value of the intellectual work done in the past by some of the outstanding minds of our cultural past.

Translated by Roman Majeran

Part One

History: From St. Augustine to John Locke

THE AUGUSTINIAN SOURCES OF THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING PREDESTINATION

Agnieszka Kijewska

1.

Jaroslav Pelikan in the first volume of his monumental *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*: *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)* wrote the following eulogy of saint Augustine of Hippo:

> In Augustine of Hippo Western Christianity found its most influential spokesman, and the doctrine of grace its most articulate interpreter. It has been said that although he may not have been the greatest of Latin writers, he was almost certainly the greatest man who ever wrote Latin. In any history of philosophy he must figure prominently, no history of postclassical Latin literature would be complete without a chapter on him, and there is probably no Christian theologian — Eastern or Western, ancient or medieval or modern, heretical or orthodox — whose historical influence can match his. Any theologian who would have written either *Confessions* or the *City of God* or *On the Trinity* would have to be counted a major figure in intellectual history. Augustine wrote them all, and vastly more. He was a universal genius.

Yet he immediately proceeds to dilute this eulogy with the characteristic observation that "genius is not so rare as all that — and, more importantly, not so pertinent as all that to the history of the development of Christian doctrine as that which the church believes, teaches, and confesses on the basis of the word of God."[1] We could develop this observation and applying it singularly to Augustine of Hippo say that the influence of his works and ideas was on more than one occasion ambiguous, whatever may have been his intentions behind writing them.

[1] Cf. J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600)*, Chicago, 1971, p. 292–293.

One of the points of Augustine's doctrine that excited much controversy was his teaching concerning grace; undoubtedly one of the central points of his doctrine.[2] Augustine, honoured with the title "Doctor of Grace" worked out his conception of grace as a free, undeserved gift from God, necessary for our salvation, against the background of his own personal experience, including the troubled history of his conversion, in the context of his pastoral duties, and in the turbulence of doctrinal controversies with Donatists and particularly with the Pelagian movement. Yet it was precisely his teaching concerning grace that gave his opponents and his followers alike opportunities to derive conclusions from his statements that Augustine himself did not foresee and probably did not intend. In this way doctrinal statements were formulated that claimed Augustine's authority as their source, although they were not found exactly in that shape in his writings and left ample room for doubt whether he would have approved of them. One of Augustine's doctrines that soon became the object of reinterpretation and continued to disquiet Christian minds for centuries on was his doctrine of predestination. Already during his lifetime it inspired controversy and after his death time and again reappeared, always at the center of a major disagreement in the Latin Christian community; suffice it to name the Council of Orange in 529, Gottschalk of Orbais and his opponents in the 9th century, and the teaching of the great Reformers: Martin Luther and John Calvin.

John Wetzel described Augustine's theory of predestination as a "theological dynamite" whose impact is to explode his thought from inside as it were.[3] How potentially disturbing the doctrine of predestination was, became clear when Gottschalk of Orbais (ca 808–867) came public with his own interpretation of it, namely the famous doctrine of two-fold predestination, claiming St. Augustine's authority in support of it. He taught that God, by granting undeserved grace to his elect, thereby preordains them for salvation, while his refusal to bestow grace on others automatically condemns them to eternal damnation.[4]

2 Cf. ibid., p. 294 f.

3 Cf. J. Wetzel, "Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in *Augustine and His Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner,* London, 2000, p. 123. Hans Urs von Balthasar expressed himself to the effect that Augustine changed the positive teaching on predestination into a confused and dark doctrine. Cf. G. Wainwright, "Eschatology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar*, eE. Oakes & D. Moss (eds), Cambridge, 2004, pp. 115, 123.

4 Cf. B.J. Matz, "Augustine in the Predestination Controversy of the Ninth Century. Part I: The Double Predestinarians Gottschalk of Orbais and Ratramnus of Corbie," *Augustinian Studies* 46: 2 (2015), p. 156.

The consequences of this doctrine were seen as disastrous and that in many respects. For one thing they appeared to introduce in a new form determinism and fatalism in matters concerning man's ultimate destiny: salvation or damnation, and determinism had been resolutely opposed as a doctrine by the whole Christian tradition, starting with Christian early apologists. Even more subversive was the influence of this thesis in the domain of dogma, Church life and ecclesiology: for indeed they amounted to a negation of the universal nature of Christ's work of salvation and a rejection of the Church's universal mission. They appeared to deprive the sacraments of their absolute effectiveness, by denying their foundation, that is universal value of Christ's saving sacrifice and the universal meaning of His incarnation. In the domain of anthropology and ethics the consequences of the double predestination were as acutely felt: they appeared to annihilate the freedom of human will or at least deprive it of any real significance,[5] and, as a consequence, they represented as meaningless all human effort directed at moral self-improvement and acquisition of virtues. The two-fold predestination view thus seems to represent man as a helpless object of inscrutable and arbitrary decrees of divine providence, lacking all autonomy and no longer a responsible subject of moral activity, capable of shaping his/her own moral profile.

Any discussion of predestination will naturally contain detailed references to other related matters, thus the total picture of the whole problem area is fairly complex and intricate. Indirectly involved in the problem of predestination is the theological inquiry into the nature of God and His relationship to the Universe. As we assert that God, by refusing grace to some human beings, makes it inevitable for them to do evil and thus purposely admits evil into the created world, we represent God as co-responsible, be it indirectly, for the evil in the world and thus modify significantly our conception of God. This shows that the way we treat the problem of predestination will have inevitable consequences for the way we represent God. The answer to the questions: who is God? Is He a benevolent and merciful Father, who extends his care to the sinner, like a woman searching for the lost coin, or a shepherd going after the lost sheep? Or does He look indifferently at the evil and suffering caused by those to whom he shaped as "vessels for less honourable uses"? And what possible reasons may lie at the root of the selection of some and omission of others for grace,

[5] It may seem paradoxical that many historians consider Augustine to have been the founder of the conception of the freedom of human will.

a choice that appears wholly arbitrary and, in the last analysis, devoid of justice? To respond simply that God's ways are inscrutable would sound like an excuse, a thin disguise of one's ignorance.

No less essential problem closely related to the problem of predestination is the one represented by the question; who is man? What is man's inner structure and what is the role of free will in man's ontological composition? An answer to the question concerning man's nature should include an account of the fundamental relationship obtaining between man and man's Creator, which means that any discussion of man should include consideration of the effect that an original transgression of the God imposed law, referred to as original sin, had upon human nature and personhood. There are other related questions, the answers to which will be implied or presupposed by a consideration of man and his sin, such as: what is sin in its essence? Has original transgression radically changed human nature so as to annihilate, possibly, the freedom of human will? If, as a result of original sin, man is no longer free in his actions, in what sense can he be held responsible for his actions? If man has lost his freedom an fell under the compulsion to consistently do evil, does God act according to justice when He metes out punishment to human beings for their wrongdoings? Does Adam's transgression and its consequences affect all the remaining part of humankind? In what way is original sin complete with its pernicious effects passed on to Adam's posterity? Does Christ's work of salvation set man free from the consequences of original sin? If so, then in what way and to what degree?

Another group of questions concerns another aspect of the relationship between God and man, namely that special relationship which is grace. What is grace in its essence and what influence does it exert upon man and the functioning and efficacy of his powers? Is it possible for a human being, given the availability of an aid in the form of grace, to attain to moral perfection in this life or can he/she only approach it without ever attaining it? Does the essential influence of grace reduce to nil human moral autonomy and, consequently, remove the responsibility of a human being for his/her acts?

These and like questions time and again surfaced in the course of debates focused upon predestination, answers given to these question defined the standpoints of participants in these debates.

Matthew Levering distinguished five fundamental kinds of approach to the problem of predestination that used to be adopted by Christian authors treating about predestination. These are as follows:

1) The first type of approach consisted in minimizing God's efficient contribution to the determination of the ultimate destiny of a human being: whether someone be saved or not is decided above all by the attitude and deeds of the human being concerned. The eternal perdition of a man is a possibility, but God does not contribute to it in any way, although He has a knowledge in advance of how a given human person will respond to God's grace given him/her. This kind of approach is represented, among others, by St. John of Damascus, John Scotus Eriugena, Ockham and Molina.

2) Another approach consists in laying stress on God's transcendent primacy in determining the ultimate result of a human individual life: God's positive contribution saves some human beings, whereas in the case of others God abstains from any saving intervention and thus allows them to remain in the state of permanent obstinate rebellion against God and His law. Thus some are saved, owing to the God-given aid, while others are left out to their own ways and devices and thus to eternal perdition. A noteworthy feature of that conception is the assumption: there is nothing in human persons themselves that necessitates, attracts or otherwise conditions God's helpful intervention: God's grace is wholly gratuitous. This kind of approach is found, among others, in St. Augustine, Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas.

3) Another distinctive group of thinkers, which, according to Levering includes John Calvin and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, represents what may be termed the third way of looking on predestination. The proponents of this way make God co-responsible for the evil emerging in the created world: to achieve a completion of the salvation of some human beings, God has a need of wrongdoings committed by others; more generally: to complete the harmony of the whole of the Universe He allows imperfections to occur in some parts thereof.

4) Still another group of thinkers includes St. Catherine of Siena and St. Francis de Sales, who laid emphasis on God's love and His wish for all human beings to be saved, although God allows for some humans to fail to respond to His love.

Finally, the fifth (5) identifiable theological attitude towards predestination inclines to a perspective of universal salvation at the end of times, when all creation will ultimately return to God. This attitude is found in Origen, Sergei Bulgakov, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar.[6]

[6] Cf. M. Levering, *Predestination. Biblical and Theological Paths,* Oxford, 2011, p. 10. Cf. Wainwright, *Eschtology*, p. 115.

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When viewed against this vast spectrum of conceptions of predestination, Augustine's own position appears fairly moderate, though open to diverse, more or less extreme interpretations. Henry Chadwick restates Augustine's teaching using strong formulas and gives it an uncompromising aspect, that makes it easier to see why this doctrine should become the center of so much controversy.

> Augustine thought that the primacy of grace leads to the conclusion that God could not allow his elect to forfeit grace. The doctrine of predestination must be based on the assumption that God's intended preordination will necessarily materialize. […] Nothing in a human being himself, in his past, present or future, can be the cause of the election by God. To the serious objection that this in fact amounts to regarding God as an unpredictable autocrat, Augustine responded that God not only preordains some humans for salvation, He also donates merit to those He has predestined. Augustine believed that Jesus Himself is the best illustration of his ideas […] "The whole Christ" is the destiny. Augustine granted, he even obstinately maintained, that the elect can never be sure whether they have in fact been chosen by God.[7]

This quote is a good illustration of the lengths to which an interpretation of Augustine's thought on predestination may go and what may be the consequences of that interpretation for our representation of God, man, and their mutual relationship. God is depicted as an "unpredictable autocrat," who, motivated by reasons that are wholly incomprehensible to human beings, irrevocably steers the course of human life, while man becomes a powerless puppet in God's hands, a passive object of God's decrees, whose initiative and personal effort are meaningless, being in fact mere illusions. Augustine, who in other contexts appears as the "discoverer" of the conception of free will as a faculty in its own right, not reducible to other powers,[8] in the context of his theory of predestination is made to pronounce the ultimate and irrevocable triumph of grace over freedom.[9] Is this really the direction in which his teaching inevitably drifts?

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[7] Cf. H. Chadwick, *Augustyn*, transl. into Polish by T. Szafrański, Warszawa, 2000, pp. 168–169.

[8] This is how A. Dihle views Augustine's position. Cf. A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1982, p. 123 f.; M. Koszkało, "Koncepcja woli według św. Augustyna — perspektywa antropologiczna," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 64 (2016), no. 3, pp. 5, 8.

[9] Cf. St. Augustine, *The Retractations* II, 27, 1, transl. M.I. Bogan, Washington, 2017,

James Wetzel observes that "when it has come to evaluating his complex theological reflections on grace and sin for their consistency with what we could normally wish to say about human autonomy and moral responsibility, Augustine is found wanting or simply unintelligible."[10] Yet Wetzel has made another very illuminating observation to the effect that every historical reconstruction of Augustine's philosophical and theological views on freedom is not interpreted merely as set within the historical context that helped to generate it. It was undoubtedly Augustine who inspired many strands of our contemporary debates on freedom, and at the same time his ideas in that area mount a challenge to our contemporary conceptions.[11]

Accordingly, I believe that any attempt at a reconstruction of Augustine's views ought to take into account the historical context of his teaching and not only the subsequent reception of his ideas. In this paper I will consistently attempt to set my reading of Augustine's position against the historical context that conditioned its formulation.

Augustine framed his statements on predestination in the context of his debate against Pelagius and his followers and the overriding concern that inspired all he wrote on this subject was to provide an adequate defence to the Catholic position on this and related themes[12]

Presumably, the earlier combat against the Donatist schism and his lifelong struggle to free himself from the conceptual shackles of Manichaeism was also not without impact on. It is an opinion of many scholars that Augustine's position on freedom of will and its relationship to grace underwent an evolution, particularly noticeable after the year 396, in which his former mentor Simplicianus addressed a series of questions to him related to St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans.*[13] Other scholars propose to shift the

p. 120: "In the solution of this question, I, indeed, labored in defense of the free choice of the human will; but the grace of God conquered."

10 J. Wetzel, "The Recovery of Free Agency in the Theology of St. Augustine," *The Harvard Theological Review* 80 (1987), p.102.

11 Ibid., p. 103.

12 Cf. J. Wetzel, *Predestination, Pelagianism and Foreknowledge*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, E. Stump, N. Kretzmann eds, Cambridge 2001, p. 49.

13 Cf. G. Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity. St. Augustine's Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom,* Washington, 2007, p. 118; L. Karfíková, *Grace and the Will according to Augustine*, transl. M. Janebova, Brill, Boston, Leiden, 2012, p. 2 ffr.; S.E. Schreiner, J.C. Thompson, "Predestination," in *The Oxford Guide to Historical Reception of Augustine,* K. Pollmann, W. Otten (eds), vol. 3, Oxford, 2013, p. 1592; J.M. Rist, *Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 171.

beginning of the evolution in Augustine's thinking to an even earlier date, the likely turning point being the time when he was ordained priest or consecrated bishop of Hippo Regius.[14] I refer to this debate as it provides some hints as to the context in which his thinking on the relevant issues came to be formed, the context, which, naturally, was not without some impact upon the solution he gave to the questions concerned. Thus it ought to be emphasized (1) that Augustine's position came to be formed in the context of controversy, which may have been significant for the distribution of stresses and the incisiveness of formulations of the principal theses in his writings. (2) Secondly, it should always be borne in mind that in his theoretical thinking Augustine remained constantly aware of his tasks related to the care of souls entrusted to him as bishop and teacher; throughout his polemical campaigns he never forgot the spiritual good of those who were at the receiving end of his addresses.[15] Augustine used noticeably to adjust the tone and style of his formulations; he responds in a different way to Simplicianus and to the monks of Hadrumetum, and in a still different spirit he forms his polemic against Celestius. (3) Last but not least, the constant factor always at work in the shaping of his intellectual biography was his personal experience, which involved, among other things, inner conflict and acutely felt weakness of will (*akrasia*). This deeply felt existential factor came to be amplified by his intellectual reading and subsequently transformed into an experience as a writer. Augustine read biblical and philosophical texts and wrote commentaries on them, and in this he once again drew on the fund of his lived experience, all in order to encourage his readers and listeners to make their own effort and undertake the work of many-sided exegesis.[16]

[14] Cf. W.S. Babcock, "Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 16 (1988), p. 36 ff.

[15] This is evident in the structure of the work *De libero arbitrio*, which Augustine began as a layman and finished as a bishop. Cf. S. Harrison, *Augustine's Way into the Will. The theological and philosophical significance of "De libero arbitrio,"* Oxford, 2006, pp. 18–20. Cf. I. Bochet, "Augustin, Disciple de Paul," *Connaissance des Pères* 113 (2009), pp. 32–33.

[16] M. Koszkało states ("Koncepcja woli według św. Augustyna," p. 6): "Augustine constructs an anthropology based upon inner experience and his conception of the soul is a result of this experience. Within the framework of such anthropology it is easier to form a conception of will. […] Augustinian psychology of inner life possesses also an existential dimension. It is based on the experience of such phenomena of the psyche as memory, cognition, willing, but also on the incisive penetration into the

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THE FIRST polemical combat Augustine came to be engaged in and the one that most profoundly shaped his thought was his debate with Manichaeism. Manichaeans embraced a radical ontological, theological and anthropological dualism which formed the basis for the simple and accessible solution to the disturbing problem of evil they claimed to offer[17] and which resulted in a kind of moral determinism. The evil found in the world is the emanation of the kingdom of darkness presided over by the God, Jehovah, of the Old Testament, the maker of the existing world. Man cannot but sin, compelled to do wrong by the working of that dark force of evil, whose particle he carries in his own constitution, being, insofar as an embodied human being, a mixed entity comprising both good and evil.[18] In the context of his struggle against Manichaeism, Augustine made up his mind on a number of points concerning evil. (1) First, he reduces most forms of evil found in the world to moral evil,[19] (2) second, in the explanation of the ontological nature of evil he adopts the Neoplatonic idea that evil in itself is mere privation (*privatio*) or relative lack of being, which enables him, (3) third, to remove from God all responsibility for the existence of evil in the world. (4) Four, moral evil is the effect produced by the activity of created free will, in particular the free will of human beings. Freedom of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility: any agent can only be held answerable for his or her actions if he or she is capable of choosing between different courses of action, if, at the very moment of making a decision, he/she could have decided otherwise than they did and if it was themselves, and not any other agent, that determined which one of the available options was to be adopted.[20] In Augustine's *Confessions* we find the following passage:

> And I strained to perceive what I now heard, that free-will was the cause of our doing ill, and Thy just judgment of our suffering ill. […] when then I did will or

nature of inner conflicts, enhanced by the congenial reading of similar descriptions in St. Paul."

17 Cf. A. Kijewska, *Święty Augustyn*, Warszawa, 2007, pp. 38–39. Cf. Saint Augustine, *Retractations* II, 8, 2, p. 32–33: "In this way, according to the error of their impiety-for they are the Manichaeans – they wish to introduce a kind of fundamental or natural evil, unchangeable and coeternal with God."

18 Babcock, "Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency," p. 30.

19 Ibid., p. 31.

20 Ibid., pp. 28, 33. Cf. Augustine, *Reply to Faustus the Manichaean* XX, 22, part 2..

> nill any thing, I was most sure that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.[21]

In a number of his works, above all in the dialogue *On Free Choice of the Will* (*De libero arbitrio*) Augustine undertook to define the place of the faculty od willing in the overall structure of the human soul.[22] Augustine's anthropology was profoundly stamped by his reading of Neoplatonist texts and one mark of that influence was his firm adherence to the conception of the soul as a simple (non-complex) spiritual substance which is immediately aware of its own existence and its own nature. The human soul is like its Creator in being His image; given that its Maker is in fact the Unity of the Three divine persons, the soul itself has to be triune: it is the unity of three faculties or powers, described sometimes as being -knowledge-will and in other places as memory-intelligence and will[23]:

> I would that men would consider these three, that are in themselves. These three be indeed far other than the Trinity: I do but tell, where they may practise themselves, and there prove and feel how far they be. Now the three I spoke of are, To Be, to Know, and to Will. For I Am, and Know, and Will: I Am Knowing and Willing: and I Know myself to Be, and to Will: and I Will to Be, and to Know. In these three then, let him discern that can, how inseparable a life there is, yea one life, mind, and one essence, yea lastly how inseparable a distinction there is, and yet a distinction.[24]

Man is immediately aware of his willing *(velle)* which is directed to some good, as, for example, honest and just life or wisdom. Particular acts of willing immediately manifest the activity of the faculty of willing or will (*voluntas*) of a human person, who is the author and the first efficient cause of these acts.[25] Some scholars (Rowan Greer, Jesse Couenhoven) quite rightly

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[21] Augustine, *Confessions* VII, 3, transl. E.B. Pusey. Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* I, 16, 35; III, 17, 48.

[22] The first book of this dialogue probably came to being in the years 387/388, after Augustine's return to his native country in Africa; the last two books were written after his ordination as a priest, Between 391 and 395. Cf. R. Teske, *Libero arbitrio, de*, in: *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia*, ed. A.D. Fitzgerald, Michigan, Cambridge, 1999, p. 494.

[23] In the latter way Augustine describes the triune structure of the soul in his great synthesis *On the Holy Trinity* X, xi, 18. Interestingly, different as both the cited triads are, the faculty of will is contained in either of them. Cf. Koszkało, "Koncepcja woli według św. Augustyna," pp. 8–12; Kijewska, *Święty Augustyn*, pp. 142–148, 168–174.

[24] Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, 11, pp. 389–390.

[25] Cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* I, 12, 25; II, 19, 51; cf. M. Koszkało, "Kon-

make much of the distinction found in Augustine's writings between the will (*voluntas*) and free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). The will is here conceived as the fundamental disposition of an intelligent subject, the faculty of willing, which produces particular, definite acts of willing and provides motivation for acts of free choice,[26] while the *liberum arbitrium* is the power freely to form particular and definite acts of choice based on the fundamental orientation of the will. This differentiation within the domain of the faculties of willing and choosing points to a certain complexity within Augustine's conception: there is some structure and likewise some hierarchy in the volitional apparatus of a spiritual being, in particular of a human being (this complexity will be of great importance for Augustine's teaching on grace). Naturally, such complexity presupposes a fundamental unity underlying all mental faculties of a human being, human will is sometimes described as a disposition of the human mind (*mens*). Thus the proper subject of human intelligent activity is the human spiritual soul as a whole, not the will or any other component element of a human person as conceived in abstraction from the spiritual subject in which it inheres. The human subject as such is immediately aware of his/her own willing and his/her efficiency in particular acts issued from and formed by his/her willing, as evidenced, among many others, by the following quote from *On the Free Choice of the Will*: "Accordingly, nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. Surely it is at hand with no delay as soon as we will."[27] Peter Brown and other scholars sharing his point of view observe how optimistic Augustine appears in the first book of that dialogue as to efficiency and facility (*facilitas*) attending the exercise of human will[28]:

> The upshot is that anyone who wills to live rightly and honorably, if he wills himself to will this instead of transient goods, acquires so great a possession with such ease that having what he willed is nothing other for him than willing it.[29]

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cepcja woli według św. Augustyna," p. 14 ff.; S. Harrison, *Augustine's Way into the Will*, p. 6.

[26] Cf. J. Couenhoven, *Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ. Agency, Necessity, and Culpability in Augustinian Theology*, Oxford, 2013, p. 79 (the author also discusses Greer's interpretation).

[27] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, 3, 7, transl. P. King, Cambridge, 2010, p. 78.

[28] Cf. Harrison, *Augustine's Way into the Will,* p. 6.

[29] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, 13, 29.

In a way clearly marked by intellectualism, Augustine emphasized the part played by intellect and reasoning in the formation of acts issued by the will; he readily admitted that once the intellect of a human being comes to dominate all the passions and desires afflicting the soul, that human person will not fail to act and behave in the correct way. This intimate cooperation of a human being's intellectual and volitional faculties is a strong indication of the substantial unity underlying the human "ego." The participation of the intellectual power in the shaping and motivating of human acts of choice does not deprive the will of the attribute of being the efficient factor and ultimately responsible for the production of these acts. It is an essential characteristic of the will that nothing save the will itself can induce it to action:

> Therefore, since (a) anything equal or superior to a governing mind possessed of virtue does not make it the servant of lust, on account of justice, and since in addition (b) anything inferior to it could not do this, on account of weakness, as the points we have agreed on between us establish, we are left with this conclusion: Nothing makes the mind a devotee of desire but its own will and free choice.[30]

Thus Augustine arrived at a conception of will as a power that is essentially part of a larger structure, namely the structure of an intellectual being, and, at the same time, is capable of self-determination; this conception enabled him to attribute the whole responsibility for a voluntary action of a subject to that subject him-or herself.[31] This conception was vital in the context of Augustine's anti-manichaean polemical campaign, as his opponents espoused a theory that shifted all the blame for evil committed by man to some alien element found in human beings, which, despite being part of human constitution in this life, lies totally beyond human control; according to this theory human beings bear no responsibility for the moral evil committed by themselves:

> For I still thought "that it was not we that sin, but that I know not what other nature sinned in us"; and it delighted my pride, to be free from blame; and when I had done any evil, not to confess I had done any, that Thou mightest heal my

[30] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* I, 11, 21; III, 1, 2.

[31] Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* III, 16, 46; III, 1, 3, p. 74: "For there is nothing I sense as firmly and intimately as that I have a will and that I am moved by it to the enjoyment of something. Surely I find nothing I might call mine if the will – by which I am willing or unwilling – is not mine! Accordingly, if I do anything evil through it, to whom should it be attributed but me?"

> soul because it had sinned against Thee: but I loved to excuse it, and to accuse I know not what other thing, which was with me, but which I was not. But in truth it was wholly I, and mine impiety had divided me against myself: and that sin was the more incurable, whereby I did not judge myself a sinner…[32]

Thus the gist of Augustine's conception, as against the Manichaean, is the recognition that the human subject him- or herself is the doer, the ultimate efficient cause of his or her moral actions; this means that, in order to stand in truth before God and oneself, one has to acknowledge one's own sin and accept responsibility for it. This recognition and acceptance is invited by unprejudiced reflection on one's own conduct.

In the third book of the dialogue *On the Free Choice of the Will* Augustine addresses the problem of the ultimate sources and the essence of sin; closely related is another riddle taken up by Augustine in this context, namely, given the fact of God's absolute foreknowledge of the facts of human conduct, can one not attribute at least part of the responsibility for transgressions committed by humans to God himself?[33]

Augustine has a clear conception of the solution to the difficulty of the apparent incompatibility between God's infallible foreknowledge of human spontaneous actions and freedom thereof; he reasserts that "our will would not be will, were it not in our power" and gives the following brief statement of his position:

> For although He has foreknowledge of our will, it is the will of which He has foreknowlege. Therefore, it is going to be our will, since He has foreknowledge of our will. Nor could it be our will if it were not in our power. Therefore, He has foreknowledge of our power. Hence power is not taken away from me due to His foreknowledge — it is thus mine all the more certainly, since He whose foreknowledge does not err foreknew that it would be mine.[34]

According to that position, the divine foreknowledge of a human spontaneous deed represents no compulsion for that action to be performed. An analogous situation occurs in purely human affairs, when we happen to know with certainty that someone is going to sin, and yet we do not think we exert any coercion upon that person to think by the mere fact of our knowing so:

> Unless I am mistaken, you would not force someone to sin as a result of foreknowing that he is going to sin. Nor would your foreknowledge force him to sin, despite the fact that he undoubtedly is going to sin, since otherwise you would

[32] Augustine, *Confessions* V, 10 (transl. E.B. Pusey)

[33] Cf. Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, 3, 6,

[34] Ibid., III, 3, 8, p. 79.

> not foreknow that it is going to be so. Therefore, just as these two things are not opposed, namely that you know by your foreknowledge what someone is going to do by his will, so too God, although He does not force anyone into sinning, nevertheless foresees those who are going to sin by their own will.[35]

Augustin readily admits that human ignorance is a serious negative factor standing in the way of our correctly choosing good over evil. Ignorance, difficulty (*difficultas*) in overcoming passions and misdirected inclinations, and mortality are all consequences of original sin[36]. Even the lack of moral knowledge that at present hampers our moral choices and seems not deserved by our conduct in this life is in fact a result of the original, fundamental choice made by human will at the beginning of its history. Thus we have to acknowledge our fundamental ignorance and moral impotence and ask for the indispensable aid from above; in the eyes of Augustine this is the correct way of overcoming our present miserable condition. In his own statement:

> No human being has been deprived of knowing how to investigate advantageously matters of which it is disadvantageous to be ignorant, or the need to confess humbly his weakness, so that He Whose support is unerring and effortless support the person who investigates and confesses.[37]

Augustine's point is that in reflecting upon one's own situation man can be made to acknowledge his own limitations and his fundamental impotence, which in turn can induce him to appeal to God for help. In this way the theme of grace finds its way into Augustine's considerations; grace having always been viewed by him as the indispensable condition for the moral cleansing and progress of man, even before the appearance of Pelagius's teaching brought it to the focus of his theological and moral concerns. Augustine himself observed in his *Reconsiderations*: "Even before the heresy of Pelagius came to being and much earlier, I already discoursed as if I were writing against him."[38]

[35] Ibid., III, 4, 10, p. 80–81.

[36] Cf. ibid., III, 20, 55.

[37] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* III, 19, 53, p. 109.

[38] Augustine, *Reconsiderations* II, 8, 6,

4.

The centrality and indispensability of grace in Augustine's conception is the point which shows the essential difference between the approaches of himself and Pelagius, whose position amounted to a *sui generis* humanism. Augustine, in the last two decades of his life, came to lead a prolonged and intense combat against Pelagius's doctrine that was defended also by the latter's pupils, Caelestius and Julian of Eclanum, who sometimes took a more radical position than their preceptor.

According to Rafał Toczko Pelagius came to Rome in the nineties of the IVth century, where he established himself as a spiritual adviser of aristocracy and where he propagated his views in a literary form.[39] The most significant fruit of his literary activity was his *Commentary on St. Paul's epistles*, known to us owing to quotes and references in St. Augustine.[40] Pelagius was successful in Rome as a teacher, his ideas found ready reception there. Roman aristocracy, while embracing Christianity, was sensitive to calls for ascetic morality, which were consonant with the precepts of ancient "spiritual exercises." Pelagius's message appears to have fitted well the climate of spiritual and ascetic humanism prevailing among the cultured elites of the late empire.[41] Nevertheless, the institutionalized Church was not long to realize the dangers of this sort of independent attitudes that fostered radicalism, individualism and a sense of personal superiority with respect to the community of the faithful, and created fertile ground for generation and development of views that were not at one with orthodoxy. Pelagius appeared to be one of the instigators of that spiritual unrest.[42]

Pelagius himself came to the province of Africa Proconsularis when fleeing in 410 the Visigothic invasion in the company of of the family of the Valerii, yet Augustine, at the moment preoccupied with the Donatist controversy, failed to meet him. It was only in 412 that count Marcellinus, the emperor's representative in North Africa, let Augustine know the ruling of the council of Carthage of 411 which condemned Caelestius, the foremost

[39] Cf. R. Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem. Przypadek Pelagiusza*, Toruń, 2012, p. 25.

[40] Cf. ibid., p. 26.

[41] Cf. Ibid., p. 11 ff.

[42] Cf. ibid., p. 17: "He was no anchorite nor a member of a monastic community; he taught in narrow circles, while travelling in the company of his patrons who were his disciples. Thus to the eyes of the ecclesiastical officials he was very much like a troublesome monk."

follower of Pelagius[43] and asked the bishop of Hippo Regius for his own assessment of the teaching of the last named.[44]

At that very moment Pelagius was already in Palestine, where he assembled, with the approval of John, the then bishop of Jerusalem, a significant group of followers who admired his ascetic views. At the suggestion of Augustine's friend and pupil, Paulus Orosius, who came to visit St. Jerome in Bethlehem in 415, the episcopate of Palestine questioned Pelagius twice on dubious points of his doctrine: once at Jerusalem on 28 July 415, and the second time at Diospolis in December of the same year.[45] Pelagius had to answer questions concerning 29 theses attributed to him by his critics and thought to be heretical; he acknowledged having taught some of them while disowning others, made a confession of faith and reaffirmed his unity with the Church.[46]

The main points of disagreement in Augustine's confrontation with Pelagianism are the following: (1) the conception of original sin and the effects of original sin upon human nature;

(2) the conception of the human free will, its autonomy, and its capacity (or lack of capacity) of independent action; the point neatly summarized in the question whether man is able on his own to fulfil God's commandments; (3) the problem of divine grace and its relationship to human free will (as captured in the question, whether the presence grace takes away real efficiency from the will); (4) the question of a human being's responsibility for his or her own deeds and misdeeds and consequently, for the evil present in the world as considered against the conception of God's co-responsibility therefor.

The importance of all these points for man's understanding of himself and the relationship in which humanity stands to God contributed to the animation and emotional tension of Augustine's debate with the Pelagians and made him formulate his statements and arguments with incisiveness, force and clarity.

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[43] Possibly this was no condemnation proper of the doctrine but merely a refusal to ordain Caelestius priest. Cf. Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem*, p. 38.

[44] Cf. K. Obrycki, *Wstęp*, in: *Grzech pierworodny. Augustyn, "Dzieje procesu Pelagiusza,"* Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków, 1999, p. 194; cf. Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem*, p. 30 ff.

[45] Ibid., p. 42 ff. Cf. Obrycki, *Wstęp,* p. 198.

[46] Cf. Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem*, p. 48 ff.; Obrycki, *Wstęp*, p. 199.

5.

The fundamental differences between the outlooks of Augustine and Pelagius appear to follow in a large measure from different conceptions of sin, and especially of that root of human sinfulness that Augustine calls original sin (*peccatum originale*) and its consequences for human nature in its present state. Both conceptions of sin are in turn intimately related to the theory of the origin of human soul. As for this question, Pelagius upheld the conception known as creationism; this theory affirms that every individual human soul is immediately created by God and it is only the human body that is passed on by the parents; thus the human individual soul, being independent of all human inheritance, cannot come to a human being as burdened with Adam's sin.[47] Consequently, according to Pelagius, Adam's sin represents no more than a negative example of moral conduct, its harmful influence on human life being that of an enticement to a kind of conduct that introduces a sort of spiritual death:

> For Adam — Pelagius writes — failed to reveal the great justice, he rather destroyed it by the example of his conduct; by contrast Christ, through his grace, destroyed the sins of many; Adam only made the pattern of sin, whereas Christ did both: remitted sins for free and gave the model of perfect justice.[48]

The upshot of Pelagius's position is the assumption that original sin produced no essential changes in the internal structure of the entity that is man, in particular it left no harmful traces in the human will. For this reason Pelagius saw no difficulty in maintaining that man on his own, unaided by any external help whatever, is able to fulfil God's commandments. If this were not the case, why should God give His commandments to man, whom He knew to be incapable of fulfilling them?[49] In his works, Pelagius quoted a number of examples of Biblical personages distinguished by their sanctity, yet above all he referred to Jesus Christ as the principal *exemplum.*[50] As this evidence shows, Pelagius's was a very optimistic view of human nature, its value and possibilities, which wholly corresponded to the conception of humanity upheld by ancient humanism. Yet it was precisely ancient humanism

[47] Cf. Obrycki, "Koncepcja grzechu pierworodnego u Pelagiusza," in *Grzech pierworodny*, p. 182.

[48] Pelagius, C*ommentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans* 16; Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem,* p. 124 ff.

[49] Cf. Toczko, *Jak zostać heretykiem*, p. 122 ff.

[50] Cf. ibid., p. 124 ff.

in its very principles, that Augustine challenged in his teaching as a whole and in particular in his polemical writings against Pelagius and Pelagianism.

Augustine had a very different and sombre view of the impact of original sin upon human nature in its present condition; to him the essence of sin is the turning away by human will from God as the supreme good and turning towards lesser good.[51] Human will, as well as the other faculties of the human soul, is classed as a middle good by Augustine, that is a sort of goods that, although good in themselves, as coming directly from God, can nevertheless be turned to bad use. Will as a faculty is placed higher in the hierarchy of goods than purely corporeal goods, yet lower than some spiritual goods, as, for instance, virtues, which by their essence cannot be used in an improper way.[52] By contrast, it is the essential property of will, related to its position in the middle of the hierarchy of goods, that it can be used well or badly, yet without the ability to choose evil, it would also lack the ability to embrace good. It is precisely this property that forms the source of will's self-determination and efficiency: "So do not be surprised — Augustine says — that even if we use other things by free will, we are able to use free will through free will itself."[53]

Augustine undertakes in the dialogue *On the Free Choice* an investigation into the profoundest root of evil. It was the will of creatures that, directed as it was towards the perfect, unchangeable Good, nevertheless chose to turn away from it and turn instead towards lesser, perishable good, and it is precisely this turning away that constitutes the essence of sin. But what caused the will itself to commit this perverse movement?

> But perhaps you are going to raise the question: Since the will is moved when it turns itself away from the unchangeable good towards the changeable good, where does this movement come from? It is surely evil, even if free will should be numbered among good things on the grounds that we cannot live rightly without it. If this movement, namely turning the will away from the Lord God, is undoubtedly a sin, then surely can we not say that God is the author of sin? Therefore, this movement will not be from God. Then where does it come from? If I were to reply to your question that I do not know, perhaps you will then be the sadder, but I will at least have replied truthfully. What is nothing cannot be known. […]. Thus see what the movement of "turning away" pertains to. We

[51] Cf. Augustin, *On the Free Choice of the Will* II, 19, 53.

[52] Cf. ibid, II, 19, 50; idem, *On true Religion* XX, 40; idem, *Eighty three Different Questions* 2; cf. W.E. Mann, "Augustine on Evil and Original Sin," in *The Cambridge Companion*, p. 46.

[53] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* II, 19, 51.

> admit that this movement is sin, since it is a defective movement, and every defect is from nothing.[54]

Augustine's answer to that question points toward nothingness, the original evil cannot be explained nor justified by anything pertaining to positive being: defect as such is no part of the ontological structure of reality. The proper inexplicability of sin, which is situated on the side of defect (which is non-reality) throws into even sharper relief the absurdity, and, consequently, perversity of sin.[55]

Sin as such was at all possible, because spiritual creatures, including man, have been created out of nothing. Thus there is some irreducible, ontological imperfection in them, which makes it possible for inexplicable evil desire to appear in them.[56] One cannot ask about the cause of evil in the proper sense of the principle of being, for properly speaking, evil is no being and it is not possible to point to the cause of that which is not. Or, given the definition of evil as the privation of good, one could say that evil has a special cause of its own, namely a "deficient cause " (*causa deficiens*).[57] In his magnum opus *The City of God* Augustine affirms the following:

> Let no one, therefore, look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being, — this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections, — causes, as I have said, not efficient, but deficient, — is as if someone sought to see darkness, or hear silence. Yet both of these are known by us, and the former by means only of the eye, the latter only by the ear; but not by their positive actuality, but by their want of it[58] .

This distinctive conception of evil espoused by Augustine has been subjected to a good deal of criticism by many authors over centuries, yet it is undeniable that it possesses considerable explanatory value. It corresponds

[54] Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* II, 20, 54, p. 71; Cf. Augustine, *The City of God* XII, 6.

[55] J. Couenhoven, "Augustine's Rejection of the Free-Will Defence: an Overview of the Late Augustine's Theodicy," *Religious Studies* 43, no. 3 (2007), pp. 288–289.

[56] Plotinus wrote about a lawless impulse, *tolma,* which is the origin of the separation of hypostases emerging from the One. Cf. A.H. Armstrong, "Plotinus," w: *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, p. 242 ff.

[57] Cf. Couenhoven, "Augustine's Rejection of the Free-Will Defence," pp. 289–290.

[58] Augustine, *The City of God* XII, 7, translated by Philip Schaff; Cf. A. Stefańczyk, *Wprowadzenie*, in Anzelm z Canterbury, *O prawdzie*, Kęty, 2011, p. 35 ff.

to the affirmation, so frequently reiterated in Augustine's writings, that reality, including created reality, is good in itself; if reality is good as such, evil can only be conceived in terms of absence of appropriate good; if it were to be thought of as something positive, it would be made into a distinct substantial force, an essential element of the world and a constitutive part of creation.

The upshot of this theory is the affirmation that evil can only have a secondary and dependent reality, it can only exist and be conceived of as essentially related to some good, from which it draws all its being in the manner of an ontological parasite. Thus, in this theory, good is represented as ontologically absolutely primary reality and evil as secondary and dependent one.

Moreover, if we think of original sin as an inheritance we get from Adam, it is easier to conceive of this legacy in terms of a flaw marring the otherwise good human nature than in terms of some accretion (some sort of a cancerous growth). The conception of sin as a privation of the due good also seems to make it easier to explain the process of the formation of bad habits, which in Augustine's psychology are an important factor contributing to the weakness of human will (ἀκρασία [*acrasia*]).

6.

In his dialogue *On the Free Choice of the Will* Augustine made much of the supposed facility with which the will carries out its decisions. This emphasis on the easiness of putting one's will into effect (somewhat surprising in the light of his later views) can be explained by the context in which this dialogue was written, that is his polemical debate with Manichaeism. Against the Manichaeans and their creed Augustine tried to demonstrate in this work, that man himself (and not any force beyond man's control) carries the full responsibility for his acts. Nevertheless some of the statements he made in it were seized upon and used against himself by the Pelagians against whom he struggled in the last two decades of his life. He referred to this in his *Retractations:*

> Hence, the new Pelagian heretics who treat free choice of the will in such a way as not to leave a place for the grace of God, for they assert that it is given according to our merits, should not boast as though I have pleaded their cause, be-

> cause, in these books, I have said many things in defense of free choice with the purpose of this disputation required.[59]

As his anti-Pelagian polemics gathered momentum, Augustine laid ever stronger emphasis on the importance of divine grace and this especially in the context of the discussion of such phenomena as inner dilemmas (internal divisions) of the will, weakness of the will and the encumbrance thereof resulting from a bad habit (*consuetudo*). The term *consuetudo* — habit, acquired way of behaving - usually occurs in Augustine with derogatory connotation and is often accompanied by the adjective "carnal" (*carnalis*) which, however, does not necessarily refer in this context to the sphere of material reality as such, but rather points to that element in reality which seduces man into succumbing to moral evil, which, as it were, drags man down. He wrote in *Confessions* with reference to his inner struggle: "[I] was borne up to Thee by Thy beauty, and soon borne down from Thee by mine own weight, sinking with sorrow into these inferior things. This weight was carnal custom."[60]

Formation of carnal habit is directly related to acts of will which result in sins being committed. The first impulse towards a sinful act is some idea suggesting itself to the mind; this suggestion (*suggestio*) may come either from outside (as the snake in Paradise) or from inside (e.g. from memory); it is followed by pleasure/delight (*delectatio*), which may induce the will to give its consent (*consensio*) to the suggested sinful act.[61] If this pattern of suggestion followed by consent is frequently repeated, the habit is formed of systematically performing the relevant sinful act, which imposes limitation upon the freedom of the subject's will and darkens his/her perception of the truth. Augustine compares these pernicious effects of sinful habits to a night in his *Exposition on Psalm 5:*

> For they carry about with them their night, that is, not only the habit, but even the love, of sinning. But if this night shall pass away, that is, if they shall cease to sin, and this love and habit thereof be put to flight, the morning dawns, so that they not only understand, but also cleave to the truth.[62]

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[59] Augustine, *Retractations* I, 8, 3, p. 33.

[60] Augustine, *Confessions* VII, 17; Cf. Kijewska, *Augustyn*, pp. 104–105.

[61] Cf. Augusine, *Sermon on the Mount* I, 12, 34; cf. Couenhoven, "Augustine's Rejection of the Free-Will Defence," p. 283 ff.; idem, *Stricken by Sin*, p. 82; A. Fitzgerald, "*Habit (consuetudo)*," in *Augustine through the Ages*, p. 409.

[62] Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms* 5, 6 (translated by an anonymous scholar, edited by Philip Schaff)

Yet habits have great power over ourselves, they are our second nature and overcoming them is very difficult. This difficulty Augustine mentions in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, when speaking about the habit of excessive swearing: "[…] no one learns, unless he has had experience, how difficult it is both to get rid of a habit of swearing, and never to do rashly what necessity sometimes compels him to do."[63] In his *Confessions* he recalls in a picturesque way his struggle with his own habits that kept him from definitively embracing Christianity:

> The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities, my ancient mistresses, still held me; they plucked my fleshy garment, and whispered softly, "Dost thou cast us off? and from that moment shall we no more be with thee for ever? and from that moment shall not this or that be lawful for thee for ever?" And what was it which they suggested in that I said, "this or that," what did they suggest, O my God? Let Thy mercy turn it away from the soul of Thy servant. What defilements did they suggest! what shame! And now I much less than half heard them, and not openly showing themselves and contradicting me, but muttering as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was departing, but to look back on them. Yet they did retard me, so that I hesitated to burst and shake myself free from them, and to spring over whither I was called; a violent habit saying to me, "Thinkest thou, thou canst live without them?" [64]

The condition of remaining in the power of one's own carnal habits is, metaphorically, referred to by the phrase "being under the fig-tree." This, of course, is an allusion to John 1, 46-50, the scene of Jesus meeting Nathanael and mentioning having seen him under a fig-tree. The common interpretation of this scene was that Nathanael had remained under a fig-tree, that is in the power of his own fleshly desires, until Jesus called him and set him free from his carnal habits.

Life under a fig-tree is barren and hopeless: a human being has no power to liberate himself of his own efforts from the prison of the flesh. It is only Christ that, by bestowing grace on the human being, can liberate him from the enslavement to low pleasures and the fetters of carnal habits:

> Under the fig-tree was he, under the condition of flesh was he. If he was under the condition of flesh, because he was holden by original sin, under that fig-tree was he wherein one groaneth […] But He, who came with grace saw him […]. What is it so great, to see a man under a fig-tree? If Christ had not seen under that fig-tree the human race, we had either withered away wholly, or been as the

63 Augustine, *Sermon on the Mount* I, 17, 51.

64 Augustine, *Confessions* VIII, 11, pp. 217–218.

> Pharisees, in whom was guile [...] there would be found in us leaves only, no fruit.[65]

The fact that carnal habits in a large measure restrict the field of our freedom points to the necessity of grace for our liberation, for it is grace alone that can break the shackles of our habits. This is made clear enough by Augustine's thought, yet unanswered remains the question as to the relationship of grace and human efficiency: is grace compatible at all with human freedom and responsibility? Is it not the case, that the irresistible action of grace limits, perhaps to the point of annihilation, a human being's own efficient agency? Does the conception of human activity in these terms not amount simply to a reintroduction of theological determinism and fatalism?

7.

Such interpretation of Augustine's intended meaning seems suggested by his commentary on chapter 9 of St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*. In this chapter St. Paul quotes the story of Jacob and Esau. Augustine's reading of that story came to be the model of the conception of double predestination that is best epitomized by the quote:"I have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated." The *Epistle to the Romans* with its apology of grace provided a suitable context for the discussion carried out by the bishop of Hippo. In his response to the question addressed to himself by his mentor and friend Simplicianus Augustine wrote:

> Often and in many places scripture testifies to that, preferring the grace of faith over works, without, however, spurning works altogether; but in order to show that works do not precede grace, but follow it, so that nobody would think he received grace because he acted well. But it is not possible to act well, unless grace is received through faith. And man begins to receive grace when he begins to have faith in God, whether he is moved internally or is by an external admonition impelled to faith.[66]

Augustine's clearly stated position is that grace is a necessary condition for properly good conduct and grace itself is received through faith, faith itself being a kind of grace. It ought to be observed that the immediate re-

[65] Augustine, *Expositions on the Book* of *Psalms; Psalm* 32 (2), transl. J.H. Parker; cf. Kijewska, *Augustyn,* p. 114 ff.

[66] Augustine, *To Simplicianus on Diverse Questions* 2, 2. Cf. E. Stump, "Augustine on Free Will," in *The Cambridge Companion*, p. 139.

sult of the grace that is faith in a faithful man is trust in God, that is trusting surrender to His guidance that expresses full acceptance of the gift of faith. Grace is always freely and undeservedly granted to human beings, there are, however, different ways of bestowing grace on human beings. Augustine distinguishes here between common grace, that is given universally to all human beings, which is not sufficient for salvation, from the grace given in a congruous way (*congruenter*), which effectively brings about the realization of the call to salvation:

> But in some people's case, the grace of faith is not sufficient to obtain the Kingdom of heaven (e.g. catechumens, and Cornelius) before they are incorporated into the church through participation in the sacraments. In some other people' case, the grace of faith is so great, that they can already be allowed into the temple and the Body of Christ.[67]

Whatever are the differences in the way grace is granted and whatever the significance of the fact that some human beings were given it and some other refused, they follow in no way from merit earned by human beings' own efforts, nor are they a result from God's anticipation of the future deserving conduct or the future virtue of faith of a given person. In his comments on the story of Jacob and Esau Augustine lays emphasis on the fact that Jacob had been chosen even before his birth, when there were no good works to his credit, nor did he have any faith leading to justification. Jacob and Esau were conceived in the same moment of time, they came from one and the same sexual encounter, thus there cannot possibly be any difference between them as to the degree of merit. The fact that they had the same parents indicates also that neither of them inherited any merit from their begetters.

Augustine makes all these points in order to highlight the character of grace as an absolutely free, totally unmerited gift of God. Grace has its foundation in God alone, in His love and mercy, and not in any features or achievements of the man to whom it is granted.[68] In order to underscore the absolute nullity of any conceivable human contribution to the earning of grace, Augustine goes so far as to question the appropriateness of the term 'election' as applied to Jacob, who, before being born, had nothing to distinguish him from Esau and provide any reason for him being preferred to his brother. In fact, when God's decision was made, neither brother was,

[67] Augustine, *To Simplicianus on Diverse Questions* 2, 2.. Cf. Wetzel, *The Recovery*, p. 110 ff.

[68] Cf. Augustine, T*o Simplicianus* 2. 3.

as yet, in existence, and it is hardly possible to make a choice between non-existent things.[69]

Augustine was aware, that His conception of grace and the way it operates was not without problems; he himself formulated some of the doubts apparently arising from his own theory in his *To Simplicianus on Diverse Questions.* He asks: granted the assumption that God shows mercy to whom He wills, why should He "lack mercy for Esau so that Esau, too, might be made good thanks to mercy, just as Jacob was made good through mercy'?[70] Does not God's refusal to grant His grace to Esau lay Him open to a charge of injustice? Augustine answers this question in the negative using the words of St. Paul (Rom. 9, 18): "Impossible! […] one ought to believe tenaciously and firmly that **God shows mercy** to **whom He wants**, and **He** hardens **whom He wants**." In fact all human beings sinned in Adam and all deserve punishment; if God, moved by His goodness, decides to save some sinners from deserved torment by bestowing grace on them, this is not an act of justice, but of unmerited mercy. Thus it is by no means fair to blame God for showing undeserved goodness to some, while "He does not grant His mercy and justification to other sinners, and so it is said that He hardens some sinners by not taking pity on them."[71]

Whatever the merits of the above reasoning, it does not remove the fact that God's decision to grant mercy, albeit unmerited, to some while withholding it from others appears wholly arbitrary, in fact this was the way Augustine's thought was interpreted over centuries. God's ultimate decision concerning a particular man being totally unpredictable, no one can be sure whether he/she is going to end up in the "company of Jacob" or in the "company of Esau." Given this assumption, some kind of theological fatalism seems inevitably to follow. Moreover, Augustine affirms that the number of those preordained for salvation has been fixed in advance by God, but nobody can be sure that he/she falls within that number:

> This number is strictly determinate, since no one gets the crown unless someone else has forfeited it. These words, which were addressed also to the saints who are predestined to persevere to the end, were nevertheless said to them, as though their perseverance was not yet assured. And they should understand them in no other way, for it is not suitable for them to be proud but walk in fear (cf. Rom. 11, 32). For who from among the multitude of the faithful, so long as he

[69] Cf. ibid, 2. 4.

[70] Ibid., 2. 9.

[71] Ibid., 2, 16

> remains in this condition of mortality, can be sure that he is of the number of the predestined?[72]

8.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to argue against such deterministic reading of Augustine when the historical context of Augustine's works is taken into account. In order to grasp the true meaning of Augustine's position, it is important to realize what exactly, to him, meant the statement that God has hated Esau. Augustine himself explains that in his work addressed to Simplicianus:

> God is the Artificer of all creatures. And every creature by God is good and every man in so far as man is a creature, although, of course, not in so far as a sinner [...] Man's sin is a transgression against order and a breach of faith, that is a turning away from the magnificent Creator and towards lower creatures. Thus God does not hate Esau the man, but only Esau the sinner.[73]

Whatever is God's work, is good in itself and this truth concerns both man as a whole and man's free will. Free will acts according to its nature when it turns to God, whereas by turning away from Him it destroys the order of the work of creation, which becomes "flawed" as a result. By constant repetition of wrong choices, in the wake of the first, original wrong choice, man forms bad habits, which will become so many fetters hindering his freedom, which will ultimately become his second nature, as it were. This second nature, not created by God, is not good any more, it is rather an "unnatural growth" on the original, good nature of man.

The condition of living in the chains of bad habits, which can be compared to so many addictions was something Augustine knew all too well by his own painful experience.[74] He also knew from experience that man cannot break free from his prison by his own unaided efforts. Thus the only hope for a man having fallen in such predicament is to expect efficient help

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72 Augustine, *On Rebuke and Grace* XIII, transl. R.M.

73 Augustine, *To Simplicianus* 2. 18.

74 Possibly this was the reason why to his mind embracing Christianity meant also adopting celibacy as a way of living. As he himself stated in *Confessions* (X, 31): Placed then amid these temptations, I strive daily against concupiscence in eating and drinking. For it is not of such nature that I can settle on cutting it off once for all, and never touching it afterward, as I could of concubinage. (E.B. Pusey's translation)

coming from outside, and that is precisely what grace is to a human being. Augustine never tired of reaffirming the necessity of grace for liberation of man from the enslavement to his own carnal habits.

It is precisely at this point that the problem arises concerning the relationship of this supernatural aid coming from outside and man's own intelligent and free nature, created and made good by God. Does the powerful action of grace nullify, or at least restricts, the human subjects's own natural activity?

Without attempting to solve this formidable question, let us point out, that the necessary condition for grace piercing the shell of a man's habits is the accomplishment of some act on the side of man: a human being, to open him- or herself to the influence of grace, has to acknowledge his/her own impotence and helplessness. This act of recognition of one's own misery and a call for help resulting from it, is some form of the subject's own activity which is an indispensable first step along the road to freeing the subject from the shackles of his/her bad habits. This, however modest, activity on the part of the subject means that grace can collaborate with a human being's own efforts, according to his/her needs, rather than simply supersede them.[75]

To Augustine, the predicament of a human being should be defined in terms of the state in which he/she is found. He distinguishes four such states: (1) the state before the (Mosaic) law (*ante legem*), (2) the state under the (Mosaic) law (*sub lege*), (3) the state under grace *(sub gratia),* and, finaly, (4) in the state of peace (*in pace*). He gives the following description of these four states

> In the stage preceding the law we are not aware of sin and we follow carnal desires. Under the rule of the law we are already forbidden to sin, yet despite this, we succumbe to the habit and continue to sin, for grace does not support as yet. In the third stage we put our whole trust in our Liberator and ascibe nothing to our own deserts; having embraced with love his mercy, we no longer give in to our pleasure in bad habits, when these habits work to lead us into sinning; though they still trouble us, we no longer succumb to them. In the fourth stage, there is nothing left in man that would resist spirit, but all things, conjoined to one another and coordinated, preserve unity in durable peace.[76]

In the phase of human development before the revelation of the law, the only motives for human actions are human beings' desires, which they fol-

[75] Cf. W.J. Abraham, *Divine Agency ad Divine Action*, vol. II, Oxford, 2017, p. 90 ff.

[76] Augustine, *Eighty Three Different Questions*, 66, 3,

lows without reflecting on them. Harry Frankfurt called these unreflected drives first order desires/volitions, which humans have in common with entities other than man, e.g. animals. What according to that philosopher distinguishes man from other beings and constitutes him as a person, are second order desires/volitions, which define a human being's ability to assess and evaluate his/her emotional impulses and thus allow him/her to reflect on and exercise a certain measure of control over them. The essential quality of being a person lies, according to that thinker in the ability to will and to form the second order volitions using critical reflection on them. Naturally, critical reflection on one's own drives and motives cannot take place without participation of reason.[77]

In the stage of development which is distinguished by the possession of the law, man begins rationally to define his wishes (second order volitions), to subject them to critical reflection, to order them by establishing a certain hierarchy of wishes, yet still remains incapable of single-mindedly embracing the good he knows because of his still remaining in the power of his low habits.[78]

Human life under the law is the scene of the internal conflict between the first and second order volitions: human subject in that stage often find themselves in situations in which they can repeat after Ovid: "I see and approve the better things but I follow the worse."

This situation of disunity within human faculties and the agonizing struggles resulting from it is a consequence of the weakness (ἀκρασία [*acrasia*]) of human will. It manifests in an acutely felt form the difference between the will (*voluntas*) as the general orientation of the human self towards the good and concrete acts of willing, which we mentioned above in this paper.[79]

When grace takes over as the leading agency governing the human self and the human subject enters the third state (*sub gratia*) of its development, the armour of carnal habits is broken and a human being is enabled to act according to the recognized good and to follow what he finds, should

[77] Cf. H.G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68, n. 1 (1971), pp. 6–12.

[78] Cf. Wetzel, *The Recovery*, pp. 113–116.

[79] This distinction also lies at the root of another distinction, namely the one between "conversion of the intellect" and "conversion of the will," which was introduced by Pierre Courcelle. Cf. P. Courcelle, *Recherches sur les 'Confessions',* Paris, 1968, p. 157; cf. A. Kijewska, " 'Conversión del intelecto' y 'conversión de la volundad' en las *Confesiones* de San Agustin," *Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico. Serie universitaria,* 214 (2009), pp. 51–70.

be willed (second order volitions) and not what he/she merely desires (first order volitions). One can, therefore, say that in his second stage, in the condition of being subject to the law, man acquires enhanced awareness of how he/she ought to act, which is accompanied by an acute awareness of the clash between the good one ought to follow and what one really follows, being irresistibly driven by the inertial force of one's habitual way of behaving. At this stage forming a concrete act of willing that would be in full accord with the recognized precept of the law appears to be an impossibility.

At the third stage, the one subject to the governing influence of grace, a human beings strives to overcome the *acrasia* that encumbers his/her will, and recognizing his/her own impotence, turns towards grace. Strengthened by grace, man not only knows what should be done according to the law, but increasingly acquires the power to fulfil the demands of justice. In his analysis of the story of Jacob and Esau addressed to Simplicianus, Augustine wrote:

> So Esau did not like to and did not run. But even if he had liked to and had run, this would only have been with God's help, who calling him would have given him the grace of willing and of fulfilling his will.This would have been the case unless Esau scorned his vocation and was rejected. For God works otherwise in making us wish for something and otherwise in making us fulfil our wish with our action. For our wishing for something is both His and ours: His insofar as He calls us, ours when we respond to and follow that call. In fulfilling our wish, He effects alone that we can do good and always live a saintly life.[80]

If we formalize Augustine's idea in the following scheme: God's call — our response (will) that produces a wish — concrete particular choice (in order to fulfil the wish) — concrete action, we see that all the elements of this scheme are subject to the influence of grace: God calls and gives us the strength to respond to and fulfil His calling. Man is only asked to wish for what God calls him to fulfil, that is to bring his will into full agreement with God's calling. Nevertheless this bringing one's will into full agreement with God's will may be a demanding task, as human will is fettered by carnal habits, and therefore "incomplete" or "lame," and split between conflicting wishes at the level of second order volitions.

Augustine depicts this situation in a very suggestive way in his *Confessions*:

> The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will, and yet it doth not. Whence this monstrousness? and to what end? It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command, unless it willed, and what it commands is not done. But it

[80] Augustine, *To Simplicianus* 2. 10.

> willeth not entirely: therefore doth it not command entirely. For so far forth it commandeth, as it willeth: and, so far forth is the thing commanded, not done, as it willeth not. For the will commandeth that there be a will; not another, but itself. But it doth not command entirely, therefore what it commandeth, is not. For were the will entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is therefore no monstrousness partly to will, partly to nill, but a disease of the mind, that it doth not wholly rise, by truth upborne, borne down by custom. And therefore are there two wills, for that one of them is not entire: and what the one lacketh, the other hath.[81]

The overcoming of that profound split within the will, this bringing one's own will into full agreement with God's calling is the crucial moment in one's life. It is precisely the moment of conversion, the act of turning towards God, the act of accepting God's grace and opening the process of collaboration between divine and human agencies in one's life. It is also the acceptance of one's liberation and coming together with one's Liberator; finally, it is the beginning of a life of complete trust in God.

Augustine left a memorable description of his own act of conversion in a Milan garden in his *Confessions.* In his case the conversion of the will was mediated by his discovery of Jesus Christ as the Mediator and Saviour: the text he believed himself invited to read during this experience including the words "…clothe yourselves with the Lord Jesus Christ…"[82]

The instant of conversion means reorientation of one's will, a step towards restoration of the primeval order, the order that existed before sin wrought disruption. As Dominique Doucet observed, the Augustinian conception of freedom is not opposed to the idea of a necessary order of reality, its area of concern is the dynamics of the inner life of a person in the process in which the person achieves its liberation from diverse forms of enslavement and subordination.[83]

9.

Augustine's reinterpretation of the meaning of the story of Jacob and Esau revolves around the question whether some kinds of merit may "justify" the election of Jacob and the rejection of Esau. In my opinion, central in his

[81] Augustine, *Confessions* VIII, 9 (transl. E.B. Pusey)

[82] Cf. Kijewska, *Święty Augustyn*, p. 118 ff.

[83] Cf. D. Doucet, *Augustin. Experiénce du Verbe*, Paris, 2004, p. 130.

discussion of this problem is his conviction concerning absolutely gratuitous nature of grace and the related belief that no human merits are of any account in earning grace. Whatever "merits" there may be, all can only be attributed to God alone, consequently, no man is entitled to take any pride in being given grace and the fruits thereof. The problem of pride/boasting is always present in the nearer or the more remote context of Augustine's discussions of freedom, volition, moral goodness and salvation in his different texts.[84] Pride is a vice that is particularly dangerous because it makes us attribute to ourselves the good effects of our willing and, as a result, we again focus on ourselves and flounder in our habitual ways instead of collaborating with grace. Pride drags us down, as it were, from the level of self-reflection concentrated on our conduct (second order volitions) to the primitive level of simple, thoughtless pursuit of our desires, which characterizes man being in the state before the law.Whatever we gain through grace, we lose through pride. For this reason, I think, Augustine puts such a strong emphasis on the role of grace, its primacy and its nature as a gratuitous gift. Grace does not remove the efficiency of the human subject, nor this subject's responsibility for what he/she has intentionally done, just as carnal habits do not render man unanswerable for the actions performed under their influence. In fact, the formation of the moral character of a human being remains always that human being's responsibility. It belongs to man to 'will' (form the act of willing) and this is enough to make him responsible for the whole process of willing. Only so little belongs to man, yet this little is really so much, for entailed in this is the fact that man is a self-aware being, capable of self-reflection; not merely having desires and able to follow them, but also capable of reflecting on them, forming and evaluating them. Human will wills, but human will also wills to will, and such will, ca-

[84] Cf. Augustine, *EightyThree Different Questions* 66, 4: The words "Sin seized the opportunity through the commandment, deceived me, and killed me" mean either that pleasure more violently drives one to sin, when there is an explicit prohibition, or that a man, if he did something according to the commandments of the law, yet he lacks faith, which only comes with grace, wants to attribute his good deed to himself and not to God, and thus he sins even more gravely because of his pride.

Cf. Augustine, *Sermones in traditione symboli* I (212), 1: "On the foundation of this faith you preserve a hope for grace in which all your sins will be remitted.. *For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God; Not of works, lest any man should boast himself.* (Eph. 2, 8–9)." Cf. A. Żurek, "*Początkiem grzechu pycha* — geneza grzechu Adama według św. Augustyna," in *Grzech pierworodny*, p. 102 ff.

pable of turning towards itself is a distinctive feature of man. The crucial significance of this is not diminished by the fact that human will, being weakened as a result of original sin, may lack the strength to carry into effect what it wills.

I am convinced that Augustine's insights into the nature of human will, grace, freedom and related issues were inspired by many contexts of his life and activity, not just one. His struggle against Pelagianism was certainly crucial in that respect, but so was his polemic against Donatism and the fact that as a bishop, he must always have had his pastoral tasks in view. As a minister charged with care of souls he was anxious to show that the weakness of our will does not invalidate God's promises, nor does it deprive of their efficacy and meaning the Sacraments administered to us or through our ministrations. The weakness of our will is "intransitive" as it were: Sacraments administered by a minister afflicted with *acrasia* are no less valid than those administered by a person endowed with iron strength of will. For this last affirmation there may well have been practical reasons: suppose that the efficacy of sacraments depended on the moral worth of the minister, then the problem would arise how to discern worthy ministers from unworthy ones in practice. Augustine's position in the debates concerning will, sin, grace, moral action and responsibility indicates his unswerving committment to the unity of human self in all its varied acts and the continuity of actions generated by humans. Whether in sinful acts or in those inspired by grace, the human subject preserves its identity; it is ourselves, who sin, and not any alien agency operating through us, it is also ourselves who conceive second order volitions and, to make our willing efficient, open ourselves to the influence of grace.

10.

Undoubtedly it was Augustine's works, often difficult to interpret, sometimes lending themselves to divergent, even conflicting, readings, that over centuries of European intellectual history, became the source of passionate, often stormy debates on predestination. Augustine, as has many times been observed, was so rich a personality and so prolific a writer, that almost everyone coming to study him is able to find in his biography something corresponding to his or her own experience.

I believe that his personal experience, the historical context of doctrinal controversies, and his preoccupation with his pastoral duties form the

proper background of his intellectual quest, his struggles and his insights. It is against this background, and through the prism of later interpretations and doctrinal quarrels that his thought should be studied in the first place.

Dominique Doucet in his study on Augustine analysed the famous youthful episode described in his *Confessions,* the theft of pears from a neighbour's tree, as a many-layered expression of "alienated freedom."[85] A complete act of human freedom, as fully a human act, should find its complement in the form of an achieved result that completes and justifies that act. The theft of the pears that were later thrown to pigs is a vain and empty act, since it has no complement in the form of a concrete result, but what results from it are "fictions feigning to be real things."[86]

Another reason why the act of theft described in Augustine's *Confessions* can aptly be described as alienated is the fact that it makes no contribution to the ultimate fulfilment of a human being, to its perfect realization, since it turns man away from that, which is man's principle and ultimate purpose and fulfilment, that is from the Supreme Good. This turning away from the Highest Good is precisely the essence of alienation. Augustine's teaching on human free will and the collaboration of will and grace in an act of concrete willing is part of his unceasing effort to overcome this alienation and to guide man along the path, at the end of which he will be able to attain the complete fulfilment of his being.

Translated by Roman Majeran

[85] Cf. Doucet, *Augustin*, p. 131 ff. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* II, 4,

[86] Augustine, *Soliloquies* II, IX, 17 (transl. R.E. Cleveland); cf. Doucet, *Augustin*, p. 131.

SCANDAL OF EVIL:
"IF THERE REALLY IS A GOD, WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF EVIL? BUT WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF GOOD IF THERE IS NOT?"[1]

Agnieszka Kijewska

1. OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, who once held the highest offices in King Theodoric's state, now unfairly accused, found himself in prison and expresses his pain in a song, and in this abandonment he is accompanied only by the Muses of lyric poetry. In the opening Meter of the *The Consolation of Philosophy* we read:

> Pain gave the order; its years now must be added to mine.
> Now from the top of my head flows down snow-white hair, quite out of season;
> Barren, my body is sheathed, in shivering, limp, nerveless skin […].
> While faithless Fortune was partial to me with ephemeral favors,
> A single, deplorable hour nearly plunged me in my grave.
> Now that she's darkly transformed her appearances, ever deceitful,
> Must then my unholy life drag out this ghastly delay?[2]

This literary lament is interrupted by the appearance of a woman in his prison cell, whom the prisoner-narrator recognizes as Lady Philosophy.[3]

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1 H. Usener (ed.) *Epicurea*, frg. 374, Leipzig 1887, after: Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* I, 4, transl. J.C. Relihan, Indianapolis, Cambridge 2001, p. 1[2].

2 Boethius, *Consolation* I, i, p. 1–2; cf. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii *Philosophiae consolatio* I, I, ed. L. Bieler (further: Bieler), CCh 94, Turnholti 1957, p. 1: "Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus / et dolor aetatem iussit inesse suam. / Intempestiui funduntur uertice cani / et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis […]. Dum leuibus male fida bonis fortuna faueret / paene caput tristis merserat hora meum ; / Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubile uultum/ protrahit ingratas impia uita moras."

Her appearance indicates that she is the embodiment of Platonic/Neoplatonic philosophy, which Stoics or Epicureans unrightfully wanted to appropriate ("the hands of certain violent men had torn this same robe"). Lady Philosophy's attire suggests that the practicality of ethical schools has become secondary, because at the bottom of her robe there is an embroidery depicting the letter pi, suggesting practical philosophy, and from there a staircase leads upwards to the letter theta. The summit of Platonic philosophy is θεωρία [*theoria*] — a contemplative view of the highest reality, to which philosophical considerations are to lead, taking practical philosophy as a starting point.[4] Theta may also mean the Greek word θάνατος [*thanathos*] — death, and Lady Philosophy, as the "figure of death," is the one that carries out "the exercise in dying,"[5] which essentially determined Platonic philosophy, understood — according to the phrase from *Phaedo* (64a-b) - as a meditation on death.[6]

Lady Philosophy, as befits an uncompromising Ruler, Mistress and Doctor, chases the the Muses of poetry away from the prison cell ("leave him to my Muses") and proceeds to diagnosing the condition of her patient in order to start the therapy process, whose most important element is dialogical persuasion. This is how the conversation between Boethius-prisoner with Lady Philosophy begins, a dialogue taking place on the pages of five books of this extraordinary and elaborate work, in which verse fragments intertwine with prose (*prosimetrum*).[7]

Lady Philosophy poses questions that inspire her interlocutor to confidences. Boethius describes "the cruelty of fate's rage" towards him, and yet

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[3] I think that the character of Boethius-prisoner appearing in the text cannot be fully identified with Boethius-author. Although the text of this work, especially fragment I, 4, is the most important source of biographical information about his life, in *Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius' position is represented in both parts of the text by both Boethius-prisoner and Lady Philosophy.

[4] Cf. A.J. Festugière, *La contemplation et la vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1975, p. 14 i f.

[5] Cf. A. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy. Antropologia Boecjusza – jej źródła i recepcja*, Kęty 2011, p. 270–271. Cf. J.C. Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy. Life and Death in Boethius's 'Consolation'*, Notre Dame 2006, p. 59 f.

[6] Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 64 a-b. The female character visiting Boethius in a dream, foretelling his death, is also a figure of death. Cf. Plato, *Crito* 50 a.

[7] Por. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, s. 47–50. Cf. Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy*, s. 47 f.; cf. A. Kucz, *Dyskurs z Filozofią w "Consolatio Philosophiae" Boecjusza,* Katowice 2005, p. 55 f.

he, following the premises of Platonic political philosophy, which modeled the structure of the state on the construction of the cosmos and the structure of human existence, always acted in accordance with the instructions of his teacher. The prisoner states:

> Was this my appearance, was this my countenance, when I would investigate with you the hidden things of nature, when you would with your measuring rod plot out for me the paths of the stars, when you would mold both my actions and the principles of life in general accordance with the model of the heavenly order? […] Yet you were the one who through the mouth of Plato decreed this inviolable axiom, that states would be happy and prosperous if either those devoted to wisdom should rule them, or if it were to happen that those who did rule them devoted themselves to wisdom […]. So it was in accordance with this authoritative pronouncement that I desired to put into action what I learned from you in the course of our private and leisurely sessions — that is, the action of public service. You and the God who planted you in the minds of the wise are my witnesses that no enthusiasm brought me to high office other than the enthusiasm for the community of all good people.[8]

Boetius-prisoner is embittered that although he was motivated by such lofty motives, not only did he not receive recognition and gratitude, but he was accused of the most serious crimes: ungodliness, witchcraft, insult to majesty.[9] Thus, he comes to the conviction that evil triumphs in the world: there are no punishments for the wicked, and for the good people there are huge, undeserved calamities. This "scandal of evil" makes him turn in the song to the "Creator of the sphere bearing the fixed stars" with the demand that this order, which is clearly visible in the functioning of the universe, also includes human matters:

> Now, now have regard for pitiful nations,
> Whoever you are who bind the world's concord.

[8] Boethius, *Consolation* I, 4, p. 9; Bieler, s. 7: "Talis habitus talisque uultus erat, cum tecum naturae secreta rimarer, cum mihi siderum vias radio describeres, cum mores nostros totiusque uitae rationem ad caelestis ordinis exempla formares? […] Atqui tu hanc sententiam Platonis ore sanxisti beatas fore res publicas si eas uel studiosi sapientiae regerent uel earum rectores studere sapientiae contigisset. Tu eiusdem uiri ore hanc sapientibus capessendae rei publicae necessariam causam esse monuisti, ne improbis flagitiosisque ciuibus urbium relicta gubernacula pestem bonis ac perniciem fervent. Hanc igitur auctoritatem secutus quod a te inter secreta otia didiceram transferre in actum publicae amministrationis optaui. Tu mihi et qui te sapientium mentibus inseruit deus conscii nullum me ad magistratum nisi commune bonorum omnium studium detulisse."

[9] Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 29–33.

We are no poor part of this vast world,
We mortals, storm-tossed on Fortune's salt ocean —
O helmsman, make calm the swift-running sea swell,
Make stable the earth in the same concord
With which you pilot the limitless heavens.[10]

Lady Philosophy, entering into a therapeutic and consolatory dialogue with the prisoner, wants to influence the change of his beliefs, which she considers to be false. Boethius — the narrator — will come a long way with Philosophy, to come to the point, when he tacitly accepts the final words of his interlocutor, which are also an echo of the discussions held earlier:

> And since this is the way things are, this remains unchanged for mortals: (5) an inviolate freedom of independent judgment. Laws are not unjust, and they assign rewords and punishments to wills that are free of every necessity. (4) God also remains unchanged, looking down from on high with foreknowledge of all things; the ever-present eternity of his vision keeps pace with the future qualities of our actions, dispensing rewards to good people and punishments to the bad. (3) Nor are hopes and prayers placed in God in vain; they cannot help but be effective, provided that they are blameless. Therefore, all of you: (2) Avoid vices, cherish virtues; raise up your minds to blameless hopes; extend your humble prayers into the lofty heights. (1) Unless you want to hide the truth, there *is* a great necessity imposed upon you — the necessity of righteousness, since you act before the eyes of a judge who beholds all things.[11]

Lady Philosophy wanted to convince Boethius-prisoner that (1) people should lead "righteous life" expressing itself in (2) combating vices and nurturing virtues. It is possible, however, only when man ceases to cheat himself, when he gets rid of false imaginations about himself, about his place in the universe, the laws governing the world and, above all, when he meets the One

[10] Boethius, *Consolation* I, v, p. 15; Bieler, s. 12: "O iam miseras respice terras, / quisquis rerum foedera nectis! / Operis tanti pars non uilis / homines quatimur fortunae salo. / Rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus / et quo caelum regis immensum / firma stabiles foedere terras."

[11] Boethius, *Consolation* V, 6, p. 150; Bieler, s. 105: "Quae cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni necessitate uoluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator desuper cunctorum praescius deus uisionisque eius praesens semper aeternitatis cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit bonis praemia malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque, quae cum rectae sunt inefficaces esse non possunt. Aversamini igitur uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectas spes animum sublevate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite. Magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uultis, necessitas indicta probitatis cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis."

who is his creator. An important element of this new worldview is the correct concept of God-the-person, the Father, who (3) cares for his children and enters into a dialogue with them (prayer). This God is (4) Providence, and not a ruthless Fate-destiny, and though God's foreknowledge also includes human future and contingent (free), actions, it does not impose any form of necessity on them. (5) Lady Philosophy affirms, therefore, the freedom of human will, which is the basis of man's responsibility for his own actions.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

Lady Philosophy, wanting to convince Boethius-prisoner of the obligation to lead a "righteous life," which is not easy in the light of his personal experience, must try to change his view of the world and the view of the place of man (Boethius-prisoner) in the universe. Philosophy describes Boethius-patient's current state as lethargy, forgetting about oneself, exile, which clearly indicates the fact that it is a state of alienation, an inauthentic form of existence.[12] She states: "Now, I know that there is another, and it is possibly the greatest, cause of your disease -you have ceased to know who you yourself are (*quid ipse sis*)."[13] It seems, therefore, that one should first present the Boethius' concept of man, then to answer the question whether Boethius-prisoner is able to wake up from lethargy to authentic and full existence. The importance of this self-knowledge is shown in Lady Philosophy's dramatic question:

> Is the order of things so upside-down that an animal that is divine by virtue of its reason never seems to itself to be radiant except by the possession of its inanimate possession? Everything else is satisfied with its own, but you mortals! — though you are like God by virtue of your minds you try to acquire from what is bottommost thing on which to pride your superior nature; you do not realize just how great an insult you offer to your Creator. It was his desire that the human race stand above all earthly things […]. This happens deservedly, for this is the condition of human nature: only then does it surpass all other things, when it knows itself; but that same nature is degraded, brought lower than the dumb animals, if it ceases to know itself. It is merely a part of their nature that other animate creatures are unaware of themselves, but for human beings this is morally reprehensible.[14]

[12] Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 163 f.

[13] Boethius, *Consolation* I, 6, p. 19.

[14] Boethius, *Consolation* II, 5, p. 37; Bieler, s. 28: "Sic rerum uersa condicio est ut diuinum merito rationis animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis

In order to extract from this passage what is essentially characteristic of a human being, one should also refer to other Boethian texts. In the Neoplatonic hierarchy of beings, which includes what is, what is alive and what thinks, the highest being is that which contains all these elements in its structure, and it is undoubtedly a human being.[15] Referring to the shaping of human existence, it must be stated that man consists of the body (material sphere) and soul, which by its nature is a non-corporeal, rational, but variable and experiencing substance, which distinguishes it from angels or God.[16] It is in the soul of man, which contains the entire cognitive-volitional sphere, that God's similarity is realized ("in mind similar to God") and here lies the source of the specific dignity of man and the basis of his immortality.[17] Describing the structure of the human soul Boethius, in a typically Neoplatonic manner, synthesizes elements of Plato's and Aristotle's anthropology, however, paying attention — after St. Augustine — to the active role of the soul through its various powers.

According to Platonic anthropology, the internal structure of the human being includes three mutually interpenetrating parts, namely the rational (λογιστικόν [*logistikon*]), the affective (θυμοειδές [*thymoeides*]) and the lustful (ἐπιθυμητικόν [*epithymetikon*]).[18] Boethius synthesizes this division with the Aristotelian vision of the three powers of the soul, presented in the *Second Commentary on Porphyry's "Isagoge,"* showing that in man we can see

possessione uideatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt, uos autem deo mente consimiles ab rebus infimis excellentis naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis quantam conditori uestro faciatis iniuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis omnibus praestare uoluit, uos dignitatem uestram infra infima quaeque detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusque bonum eo cuius est constat esse pretiosius, cum uilissima rerum vestra bona esse iudicatis eisdem uosmet ipsos uestra existimatione summittitis. […] Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est ut tum tantum ceteris rebus cum se cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur si se nosse desierit ; nam ceteris animantibus sese ignorare naturae est, hominibus uitio uenit."

15 Cf. A. Kijewska, *Neoplatonizm Jana Szkota Eriugeny. Podmiotowe warunki doświadczenia mistycznego w tradycji neoplatońskiej*, Lublin 1994, p. 42–49.

16 Cf. Boethius, *A Trease Against Eutyches and Nestorius* I, in: *The Theological Tractates,* transl. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, London, Cambridge Mas. 1968, p. 73 f.; cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 129 f.

17 Cf. Boethius, *Consolation* II, 4, p. 32–33.

18 Cf. Plato, *Republic* 436a-b; 439d; cf. Ch. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy. The Self in Dialogue*, Oxford 1996, p. 250 f.; S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2004, p. 7 f.

the action of the vegetative power that sustains the existence and development of the organism, sensory power and rational power.[19] Aristotelian anthropology is an organic vision in which the human body is an essential component of human existence. For this reason, when speaking about the cognitive powers of the soul, Boethius starts with sensory perception (*sensus*), founded on the five senses, and then comes reason and intellect or intelligence. While reason is the power typical for human existence, intelligence is God's property, and man can only ascend — or be lifted — to this way of understanding in special circumstances and after fulfilling certain conditions:

> On the other hand, reason is the property of the human race only, just as understanding alone is the property of the divine; and so it is that that particular way of knowing excels all the others which, by its own nature, perceives not only what is properly subject to it, but the subjects of all the other ways of knowing as well.[20]

The element of human existence, which is of particular importance here, is the covetous and volitional aspect. In animated beings, this sphere manifests itself in the form of a natural desire, focused on preserving life and persistence. In this aspect, animated beings are subject to a certain form of natural necessity which directs these beings towards their natural ends. However, man escapes the shackles of this necessity.[21] The postulate that man should lead a "righteous life" assumes that man is able to choose and implement this life, and therefore that he has free will, which makes free choices (*liberum arbitrium*). The term free choice does not specify any desire or spontaneous pursuit of something or avoiding something, as it is in the case of animals, but it is a wish that is realized through judgment (*iudicium*) and examination (*examinatio*).[22] If rational research and judgment are an essential, constitu-

[19] Cf. Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta* II, I, 1, ed. S. Brandt, CSEL 48, Vindobonae-Lipsiae 1906, p. 136: "Triplex omnino animae vis in vegetandis corporibus deprehenditur. Quorum una quidem vitam corpori subministrat ut nascendo crescat alendoque subsistat, alia vero sentiendi iudicium praebet, tertia vis mentis et ratione subnixa est, quarum quidem primae id officium est, ut creandis, nutriendis alendisque corporibus presto sit, nullum vero rationis praestet sensusve iudicium. Heac autem est herbarium atque arborum et quicquid terrae radicitus adfixum tenetur"'

[20] Boethius, *Consolation* V, 5, p. 142; Bieler, s. 99: "Ratio uero humani tantum generis est sicut intellegentia soli diuini: quo fit ut ea notitia ceteris praestet quae suapte natura non modo proprium sed ceterarum quique notitiarum subiecta cognoscit." Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 141 f.

[21] Cf. Boethius, *Consolation* III, 11, p. 78 f.

[22] Cf. Boecjusz, *Komentarz do "Hermeneutyki" Arystotelesa* III, transl. T. Tiuryn, Kęty 2010, p. 422.

tive element of free choice, then freedom of the will belongs to man as a rational being. You can indicate two conditions in which free choice is fulfilled. The first one is undoubtedly the freedom from any external coercion and, consequently, the autonomy in making decisions. Staying along with the Aristotelians in opposition to the Stoics, Boethius states:

> We assume that free choice takes place when nothing external creates coercion. We see its operation in a situation where someone uses their judgment and wonders whether something should be done or not, and then, after making a certain decision, he goes on to do the thing. In this situation, what is happening has its beginning in us and in our judgment, provided that nothing forces us, nor does it create obstacles in a forceful way.[23]

Human decisions are therefore free when taken autonomously, without any external pressure, which would have a certain impact on the choice. The second factor limiting the freedom of choice is the lack of knowledge, which means that not in every case free choice is a fully rational wish. An important factor that intervenes here is, on the one hand, the lack of sufficient knowledge, and on the other, the obscurity of judgment through feelings and passions escaping rational control. For this reason, the scope of freedom is subject to gradation, depending on the degree of cognition and independence from any other factors hampering free choice. Lady Philosophy states:

> However, it is my determination that this freedom is not the same in all of them. For substances that are ethereal and divine have at their disposal a penetrating discrimination, a will that suffers no decomposition, and a true power capable of effecting the things they have chosen. Now it is necessarily the case that human souls are indeed at their freest when they preserve themselves intact within the contemplation of the divine mind; but they are less free when they fall away toward bodies, and still less free when they are tied to limbs of earthly matter. At their furthest remove there is slavery, when they have fallen away from the possession of the reason that belongs to them because they have surrendered themselves to vices. For once they have cast their eyes down from the light of the highest truth to the lower and shadowy realms, they are soon darkened over by the cloud of unknowing, they are caught in the whirlwind of destructive passions. By yielding to these passions and agreeing with them they help along the slavery that they have brought down upon themselves and, in a certain sense, they are the captives of their own liberty.[24]

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[23] Boecjusz, *Komentarz do "Hermeneutyki" Arystotelesa* III, 195, p. 420–422 (transl. B. Kulicka).

[24] Boethius, *Consolation* V, 2, p. 129; Bieler, s. 90: "Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio inest etiam uolendi nolendique libertas, sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse con-

The statement that a man who makes wrong choices becomes a "prisoner" of his own freedom shows clearly that the cooperation of all these elements has a significant impact on the "efficiency" of accomplishing the acts of will. Only the choice of the good increases the field of human freedom and provides adequate efficiency in making further decisions (virtues), and ultimately helps in taking control of one's own life to the point that man by his own will can even oppose the natural urges inscribed in his biological nature.[25]

3. THE THERAPY OF EMOTIONS

One of the elements that effectively obscure the clarity of vision and block the work of the mind are the feelings that, in the current situation, are constantly tossing Boethius-prisoner. The structure of emotions includes — as an important component — the cognitive element, emotions are, in fact, founded on certain beliefs: judgments about reality, which is why one of the ways of freeing yourself from harmful feelings can be the change of beliefs on which they are based.[26] As a starting point of the therapeutic dialogue, Lady Philosophy takes this conviction, with which the prisoner, even in the present state of his mind, can agree, namely that the world "it is not subject to the randomness of chance occurrences but to divine reason" (*divina ratio*).[27] This fundamental thesis on the rationality of the world will allow Philosophy to carry out a reasoning regarding the structure of reality, its functioning and the cause(s) of the creation and the place of the human being in it. However, in order to be able to introduce the right beliefs, you must first

stitutio. Nam supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae speculatione conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam cum terrenis artubus colligantur ; extrema uero est seruitus cum uitiis deditae rationis propriae possessione cecid-erunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce veritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiacerint, mox inscitiae nube caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus, quibus accedendo consentiendoque quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria libertate captivae."

25 Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 152–153.

26 Cf. M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton 1994, p. 45 f; 366 f.

27 Boethius, *Consolation* I, 6, p. 20.

remove false beliefs that do not allow you to see the truth.[28] False beliefs / opinions (*falsa opinio*) arise when, on the basis of an incorrect vision of the world, people form judgments, which are an expression of the disturbance of the balance between the various components of the internal structure of a human being. In the final Meter of the first book of *Consolation of Philosophy* Lady Philosophy concludes: "Where these have dominion, / Mind is beclouded, / Reined in, imprisoned."[29]

Lady Philosophy, as the embodiment of the Platonic concept of man, believes that although the three parts of the soul are interconnected, the rational part (λογιστικόν [*logistikon*]) should control the affective *(*θυμοειδές [*thymoeides*]) and the lustful part (ἐπιθυμητικόν [*epithymetikon*]) to ensure the harmonious functioning of human being.[30] Intra-psychic activity of a person often takes the form of a struggle reflected in the internal dialogue, whose image in *The Consolation of Philosophy* is the conversation between Boethius-prisoner and Lady Philosophy, a dialogue that is in essence a form of the author's search for effective integration of his own self.[31] The process of restoring internal balance begins in a natural way from the affective part, the one that is able to enslave the man the quickest, and that is why it is compared by Philosophy to tyrants who take power thanks to their apparent strength. Revealing this illusory power of feelings is the beginning of the process of freeing oneself from their rule and entering the path of restoring man's autonomy (ἐγκράτεια [*enkrateia*]):

> Tell me, why are the weak in awe of tyrants,
> Feral, violent, but without true power?
> If you hope for and fear for nothing ever
> Then you've broken the sword of the madman's anger.
> But a coward who dreads or longs for something,
> Who cannot stand his ground upon his own rights,
> Has discarded his shield; out of position,
> He has fashioned the chain he'll wear in slavery.[32]

[28] Cf. Boethius, *Consolation* I, 6, p. 20: "I shall try for a time, by means of gentle and routine poultices, to dispel this darkness of confusing emotions, which arises from these false opinions and which dazes the true vision." Cf. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, s. 78 i n.

[29] Boethius, *Consolation* I, vii, p. 21.

[30] Cf. Plato, *The Republic* 436a-b; 439d, p. 230; cf. Ch. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic,* p. 250 f.

[31] Cf. Plato, *The Republic* 443d–444a. Cf. Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy,* p. 63–69.

[32] Boethius, *Consolation* I, iv, p. 8; Bieler, s. 6: "Quid tantum miseri saeuos tyrannos / mirantur sine uiribus furentes? / Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas, / exarmaueris

Lady Philosophy makes conversation with Boethius-prisoner and, along the way, objectifies his emotional state in a poetic form (I, ii; I, iii, I, iv) by pointing to its further consequences, such as inner weakness and disintegration, enslavement, alienation, being controlled by someone else. She applies appropriate treatment ("milder remedies") to these contradictory and violent feelings (pain, anger, sadness) that jerked him about. Then, in the second book, she moves into the sphere of desire and aspiration (ἐπιθυμητικόν [*epithymetikon*]) to show his interlocutor that his views on what the goal (good) and the driving force of human life are incoherent and inappropriate. She states at the outset:

> If I have understood the past causes and current condition of your illness completely, you are wasting away from a desire and a longing for your former good Fortune; after it changed (or so you pretend to yourself that it had) it led so much of your mind astray. I understand the ever-shifting deceits and disguises of that monster; I understand too her sweet-talking intimacy with those whom she strives to seduce, continuing all the way to the point at which she abandons them against their expectations and bewilders them with grief that they cannot endure. But should you remember her nature, her behavior, and her true worth, you will realize that in her you neither possessed nor lost anything that was beautiful.[33]

Lady Philosophy, adapting to the current condition of her interlocutor, introduces the figure of Fortuna, a guardian of the Roman nation, whose temple was on the Quirinal, and whose statue decorated Capitol. The goddess Fortuna, often portrayed with a blindfold ("you saw the variable face of a blind deity"), was also a symbol of chance, a blind destiny, the equivalent of the Greek goddess Tyche. In this context a certain incoherence in the views of Boethius is immediately apparent, who on the one hand claims that "God the creator presides over his own creation" and on the other hand thinks that human matters are removed from divine protection and there is confusion and injustice.[34]

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impotentis iram; / at quisquis trepidus pauet uel optat, / quod non sit stabilis suique iuris, / abiecit clipeum locoque motus / nectit qua ualeat trahi catenam."

[33] Boethius, *Consolation* II, 1, p. 22; Bieler, p. 17: "Si penitus aegritudinis tuae causas habitumque cognoui, fortunae prioris affectu desiderioque tabescis; ea tantum animi tui sicuti tu tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intellego multiformes illius prodigii fucos et eo usque cum his quos eludere nititur blandissimam familiaritatem, dum intolerabili dolore confundat quos insperata reliquierit. Cuius si naturam, mores ac meritum reminiscare, nec habuisse te in ea pulchrum aliquid nec amississe cognosces."

[34] Cf. Boethius, *Consolation* I, 6, p. 18.

Lady Philosophy's therapeutic discourse is therefore steered in two directions: (1) she first tries to demonstrate the falsehood of Boethius-prisoner's beliefs on the nature of Fortuna's goods, and then (2) restore the proper hierarchy of these goods. Blaming Fortuna's changeability for the unexpected loss of goods, Boethius thereby succumbs to her laws. Changeability belongs to Fortuna's nature and if she gives certain goods to someone, she has the right to take them away. The whole reasoning is meant to convince Boethius that all the so-called Fortuna's gifts do not really belong to man, they are not subject to his power, so they are forfeitable. This passage of *Consolation of Philosophy* makes us think of the distinction made by Epictetus between "what depends on us" and determines the area of freedom and "what is independent of us":

> On the one hand, there are things that are in our power, whereas other things are not in our power. In our power are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is our own doing. Things not in our power include our body, our possessions, our reputations, our status, and, in a word, whatever is not our own doing. Now, things that are in our power are by nature free, unhindered, unimpeded; but things not in our power are weak, slavish, hindered, and belong to others. Remember, therefore, that whenever you suppose those things that are by nature slavish to be free, or those things that belong to others to be your own, you will be hindered, miserable and distressed, and you will find fault with both gods and men.[35]

These words also perfectly describe Boethius's situation: his illness was the result of a "confusion of goods" and regret for what did not belong to him and which does not lie in the area of his freedom of choice. Lady Philosophy points out that he has lost only what was really owned by Fortuna, while his own real goods are still with him. Sorrow for the past happiness is fueled by ignorance and lack of moderation, which is an obvious sign of the lack of inner harmony. "Therefore, if you have mastery over yourself, you will possess a thing that you yourself would never want to lose and that Fortune could not ever take away from you."[36]

In the third book, Lady Philosophy analyzes various types of goods that are usually the subject of human strivings, reflecting on whether they belong to external goods, independent of man's will, or to the kind of goods that can rightfully be called his property.[37] First, she discusses riches (II, 5,

[35] Epictetus' *Handbook* and the *Tablet of Cebes. Guide to Stoic Living* I, 1, transl. K. Seddon, London/New York 2005, p. 31.

[36] Boethius, *Consolation* II, 4, p. 32.

[37] Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 172 f.

II, v, III, 3; III, iii) and shows that they belong to the class of purely external goods, which do not offer a real satisfaction to man. The next group comprizes dignities, power and offices (II, 6, III, 4, III, iv), which — according to Philosophy — are also something external to man, do not realize his good, because if it were otherwise, they would not be bestowed to the worst people. Then Lady Philosophy analyzes human desire for publicity and fame (III, 6), which also remains vain, because it is unmet, since fame, even deserved, has limited territorial and temporal scope, as its duration is nothing compared to eternity. The last of the goods, the goals of human endeavors, is pleasure, especially carnal pleasure. This type of goods is not something specifically human, because it is also inherent in animals, and "the most comfortable of carnal pleasures," which is "joy given by wife and children," can quickly turn into its opposite, namely the pain of losing them.[38]

Even before discussing the last type of goods, Lady Philosophy reminds us that the human race "originates from one," namely from God, and this fact is the source of the specific dignity of a person: "If you look to your beginnings, / And to the the God who created you all, / there is no one who has fallen."[39] When does a man betray his origin and choose vanity?

4. GOOD AS THE GOAL OF HUMAN STRIVINGS

The analysis of various types of goods, which man usually aspires to, was to lead to the emergence of this good, which could be considered an absolute good and whose possession is able to provide real happiness to man. Such a good should meet certain criteria, namely, it should be the source of the greatest power, arouse respect, give glory, provide a decent pleasure and, above all, be a source of self-sufficiency (*sufficientia*).[40] William J. Asbell believes that following the translation of the Vulgate and some of the Church Fathers, Boethius conveys the meaning of the Greek term *autarkeia* through the term *sufficientia.*[41] Asbell distinguishes two essential contexts

[38] Boethius, *Consolation* III, 7-vii, p. 63–64. Cf. J. Megee, *The Good and Morality: "Consolatio 2–4"*in: *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius,* ed. J. Marenbon, Cambridge 2009, p. 187–188.

[39] Boethius, *Consolation* III, vi, p. 63; Bieler, p. 46: "Si primordia uestra / auctoremque deum spectes, nullus degener exstat / ni uitiis peiora fouens propriam deserat ortum."

[40] Cf. Boethius, *Consolation* III, 8, p. 65; Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 176 f.

[41] Cf. W.J. Asbell, jr., "The Philosophical Background of *sufficientia* in Boethius's *Consolation,* book 3, in: *New Directions in Boethian Studies*, ed. N.H. Kaylor jr., P.E.

in which the word appears in the text *The Consolation of Philosophy*. In the first, narrower sense, *sufficientia* indicates a state in which man lacks nothing (subjective aspect). This state is a source of happiness expressed in the full realization of strivings and the lack of any needs, and this understanding clearly has Aristotelian roots: "And so it happens that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum total, the center point, and the cause of all the things that are to be pursued."[42] At this point of the considerations a specific "Platonic shift" in the dialogue appears. This Supreme Good, which is the source of fulfillment, is identified with God, and all goods that make up happiness become aspects of God's Goodness (objective aspect). The Supreme Good can be realized only in God, from whom there is nothing "better" and therefore it must be assumed that it is the highest and the most primal good:

> But reason shows that God is good in such a way that it also proves that the perfect Good exists within him. For if the good in him were not of this sort, he could not be the ruler of all things; for there would then be something more excellent than God, possessing the perfect Good, a thing that would seem to be prior to an more ancient than God; for it has been made clear that all things that are perfect are prior to things that are less whole. And for this reason we must agree, to keep this line of reasoning from regressing to infinity, that God is highest and is most full of the Good that is highest and perfect; but we have established that true happiness is the highest Good; therefore, it is necessary that true happiness is located in this highest God.[43]

Identifying God, the creator of the universe, with the Supreme Good, the goal of human endeavors, that is, combining the objective aspect and the subjective idea of self-sufficiency (*sufficientia*), appears in the 9th Meter of Book III, which — by many researchers — is considered the climax of the

Phillips, Michigan 2007, p. 3–7.

42 Boethius, *Consolation* III, 10, p. 77; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1097b.

43 Boethius, *Consolation* III, 10, p. 73–74; Bieler, p. 53: "Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit; erit enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum ; sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus: ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo deo sitam esse necesse est." Marenbon describes this conception as "a monolithic view of the Good and Happiness." Cf. J. Marenbon, *Boethius,* Oxford 2003, p. 106 f.

work.[44] In the words immediately preceding the meter, Boethius, referring explicitly to Plato's *Timaeus* (27c), asks the "Father of all things" for "where he to be omitted, there could be no starting point that is properly grounded."[45] Meter 9 was often called the "summary of *Timaeus*," although in fact the vision of the universe presented there contains–in the Neoplatonic way–numerous references to the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy. It depicts the image of God, the creator of the universe, who–motivated only by good–models all things upon ideas, which makes the world beautiful and good, and brings order and harmony both in the material world and in the human world. Man, however, having oftentimes a darkened vision, does not see either this harmony or its creator, and that's why Lady Philosophy expresses an ardent request:

> Grant to the mind, Father, that it may rise to your holy foundations;
> Grant it may ring round the source of the Good, may discover the true light,
> And fix the soul's vision firmly on you, vision keen and clear-sighted.
> Scatter these shadows, dissolve the dead weight of this earthly concretion,
> Shine in the splendor that is yours alone: only you are the bright sky,
> You are serenity, peace for the holy; their goal is to see you;
> You are their source, their conveyance, their leader, their path, and their haven.[46]

The sense of injustice that is born in the confrontation with the alleged change of fate-Fortuna, is the result of an incorrect view of reality and its source. If a man gets rid of false imaginations about the world and its creator–for which this poetic rise and look at reality from the God's point of view was meant–he will see that God is not only the beginning, but also the goal of every being's endeavors, especially human endeavors. Man, desiring to achieve happiness, which is a derivative of the state of having the true, Supreme Good, should turn to God and thus become God by virtue of participation: "Since people become happy by securing happiness for themselves, yet true happiness is divinity itself, it is obvious that they become just by the securing of justice and wise by the securing of wisdom, it is nec-

[44] Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy, p*. 254 f.; J.R. Fortin, "The Nature of *Consolation of Philosophy*," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 78/2/2004, p. 295 f.; J. Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy*, p. 73; J. Marenbon, *Boethius*, p. 108.

[45] Boethius, *Consolation* III, 9, p. 71. Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 27b.

[46] Boethius, *Consolation* III, ix, p. 72; Bieler, p. 52: "Da, pater, augustam menti conscendere sedem, / da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta / in te conspicuos animi defigere uisus. / Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis / atque tuo splendore mica; tu namque serenum, / tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, / principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem."

essary, by a similar line of reasoning, that those who have secured divinity for themselves become gods."[47]

Thus man "betrays his race" when he chooses a lower good instead of turning to the Highest Good. This fatal "mistake of choice" and incorrect orientation of aspirations is, as shown by St. Augustine, the essence of the original sin. In his dialogue *On Free Choice of the Will*, Augustine states:

> Therefore, when the will adheres to the common and unchangeable good, it achieves the great and fundamental goods of a human being, despite being an intermediate good. But the will sins when it is turned away from the unchangeable and common good, towards its private good, or towards something external, or towards something lower. The will is turned to its private good when it wants to be in its own power; it is turned to something external when it is eager to know the personal affairs of other people, or anything that is not its business; it is turned to something lower when it takes delight in bodily pleasures. (…) Even this life is ruled by the oversight of divine providence, which puts all things in order in their appropriate places and distributes to each what is due according to his deserts.[48]

Boethius, who in his theological treaties wrote that in his writings he only wanted the "seeds" of thought (*semina rationum*) of St. Augustine to bring some fruit, knew this teaching perfectly well.[49] It remains, therefore, to ask what are the conditions of this right choice. If the world is directed by Providence, "which puts all things in order," is man really free? If there is no freedom of will, then what the basis of human responsibility for actions is? Was then Boethius-prisoner right stating, at the beginning of the conversation with Lady Philosophy, that criminals are unpunished, and "the innocent are not safe and have no defense"?

5. THE POWER OF GOOD AND THE WEAKNESS OF EVIL

These problems will be discussed primarily in Book IV of *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Boethius-prisoner convinced about the vision of the world and the role of its Creator, which Lady Philosophy unrolled before his eyes, cannot accept the fact that "evil things can exist at all, or that tey can pass

[47] Boethius, *Consolation* III, 10, p. 75. Cf. there III, 12, p. 84 f.

[48] St. Augustine, *On the Free Choice of the Will* II, 19.53, transl. P. King, Cambridge 2010, p. 70.

[49] Cf. Boethius, *The Trinity is one God not three Gods,* prol., in: *The Theological Tractates,* p. 4–5.

unpunished, when the helmsman of all things is good."[50] Lady Philosophy, following the conclusions from previous considerations and asking for help from God, intends to show Boethius that "good people are always powerful, while evil people are always disreputable and unable to sustain themselves; that vices are never without punishment, and virtues never without reward; that things worthy of rejoicing always happen to good people, and disasters always happen to the evil."[51] Accepting the belief in the truth of this sentence that "the calm one steers the speeding wagon, the clear judge of the universe," Philosophy describes as the "return to the homeland" about which Boethius-prisoner forgot.[52]

Lady Philosophy's argumentation is an echo of the conversation between Socrates and Polos in Plato's *Gorgias* (466b and f.),[53] although it is significantly enriched with Neoplatonic elements. Its most important thesis can be presented in the following way:

(A) "There are two things on which the outcome of every uman act depends: These are will (*voluntas*) and power (*potestas*), and if either one of the two is missing, there is nothing that can then be created. After all, if the will should fail, a person does not even attempt what is not desired; but should power be absent, the will would be in vain."[54]

(B) Man "must be thought to be powerful in regards to that which he can do, but must be thought to be incapable in regards to that which he cannot."[55]

(C) "All the Strivings of human nature […] directs itself eagerly toward true happiness," and "that true happiness is the Good itself."[56]

(D) People acquiring goodness become good (virtuous) and therefore are powerful in achieving their ultimate goal (happiness), while the bad ones — though they want to be happy — do not achieve good, guided by the changing desires or ignorance, and therefore they are weak.[57]

50 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 1, p. 91.

51 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 1, p. 92.

52 There IV, i, p. 90.

53 Plato, *Gorgias* 466 b i n.; cf. J. Marenbon, *Boethius*, Oxford 2003, p. 115 f.

54 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 2, p. 94; Bieler, p. 66: "Duo sunt, quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet ac potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicari queat. Deficiente etenim uoluntate ne aggreditur quidem quisque quod non uult, at si potestas absit uoluntas frustra sit."

55 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 2, p. 94.

56 There, p. 95.

57 Boethius, *The Consolation* IV, 2, p. 97 f.

(E) Bad people, abandoning goodness, not only lose their strength, but also the existence: "those who abandon the common goal of all the things that are also quit existing as well. Now this is a fact that may seem paradoxical to some, that we say that evil men, the majority of mortals, do not exist; but that is the way it is. To be sure, I do not reject the statement that evil men are evil men; but I do deny that they exist in the pure and simple sense."[58]

(F) "Evil is nothing." Those who are bad "can not do anything," especially they can not do what they want: "they fail, they do not gain good," they do not get to happiness.

(G) "There is nothing more powerful than the highest Good," "he who has power only to do good things has the power to do all things."[59]

Boethius refers here (F) to his privative concept of evil, which — rooted in Platonic-Neoplatonic philosophy — was developed by Augustine. It was Augustine, especially in his polemic with the Manicheans, who repeatedly stressed the unexplainability and absurdity of evil and sin, which is nothing.[60] Boethius connects this thesis with the conviction about the gradability of being (E), which leads him to claiming that bad people "do not exist in a clean and simple way." Furthermore, the concept of human action presented here determines that its sources are two equal elements (A), namely, will (*voluntas*) and potency, strength, power *(potestas)*. This points to the fact that man is a potential being that is shaped and realized through his actions. Man's strength is measured through the effectiveness of his actions (B). Power and strength are in a sense dependent on the subject of action and should lead to proper habits (virtues) being formed in the acting entity as a result of a systematic good acting. This will allow for more efficient achievement of goals in the future and for achieving this ultimate goal, which is the highest good, that is happiness (C). The highest good is not only the goal of human endeavors, but also the fullness of power (G).

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58 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 2, p. 97; Bieler, s. 68: "Nam qui communem omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt, eosdem non esse dicamus ; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt eos malos esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque simpliciter nego."

59 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 2, p. 98. Cf. Marenbon, *Boethius*, p. 117 f.

60 Cf. Kijewska, "The Augustinian Sources of the Controversy Concerning Predestination," in this volume.

Meter III of Book IV takes up the theme of metamorphoses, which Odysseus' companions were subjected to by Kirke, the witch, "till turned to swine instead of bread they fed on oaken mast." In spite of the changed external form, they retain their previous consciousness, which fills them with unspeakable suffering:

> There are poisons with far more strength
> Which can strip from a man his self,
> Passing horribly deep within,
> Leaving body unharmed alone,
> Brutalizing with mental wounds.[61]

This fragment summarizes the considerations from the previous chapter, in which a process is described which could be called a "moral reincarnation."[62] The basis of this view is a belief that man is a dynamic being, developing through his choices and his actions. By attaining goodness, man attains happiness at the same time, and thus elevates his nature to the level of divinity. For bad people, the very evil of their deeds is a punishment, because it is a form of powerlessness and degrades them to the level of animals. Having the outer form of man, they lose their human nature as soon as they turn to evil:

> But since it is righteousness alone that has the power to promote anyone beyond the realm of human beings, it is necessarily the case that unrighteousness deservedly tramples down below what a human being deserves those whom it has cast down from the human condition. And so it comes about that anyone whom you see metamorphosed by vices you can no longer judge to be a human being. One man, a savage thief, pants after and is ravenous for the goods of other people — you can say that he is like a wolf. Another man, vicious, never resting, has his tongue always in motion in lawsuits — you can compare him to a dog […]. And so it is that anyone who has ceased to be a human being by deserting righteousness, since he has not the power to cross over into the divine condition, is turned into a beast.[63]

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[61] Boethius, *The Consolation* IV, iii, p. 103–104; Bieler, p. 73: "Haec uenena potentius / detrahunt hominem sibi / dira quae peniuts meant / nec nocentia corpori / mentis uulnere saeuiunt."

[62] Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 273f.; cf. M.V. Dougherty, "The Problem of *Humana Natura* in the *Consolatio Philosophiae* of Boethius," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 78/2 (2004), p. 273 f.

[63] Boethius, *The Consolation* IV, 3, p. 102; Bieler, p. 71–72: "Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit infra homines merito detrudat improbitas; euenit igitur ut quem transformatum uitiis uideas hominem aestimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum

The suggestion that good people become gods by virtue of participation shows how important the value of properly directed aspirations is, which, by achieving their goal, goodness, are rewards for themselves. Further reasoning carried out by Lady Philosophy is meant to point out that, analogously, evil people, realizing their evil aspirations, are subject to punishment. And the punishment which apparently bypasses evil people is much more severe, because the evil of their deeds is not lessened by the suffering caused by punishment. This seemingly paradoxical reasoning is entirely in the spirit of Platonic-Socratic moralism, for which it is more evil to do harm than to experience it:

> immoral conduct is corrected by retribution and led back to the right path by fear of punishment, and that for other people as well this is a deterrent that they should run away from things that would bring them reproach. No; it is in another way that I think that the unrighteous are unhappier when unpunished, even if correction is not taken into account, even if there is no consideration for deterrence […]. Therefore the unrighteous do indeed have some good added to them when they are punished; namely the punishment itself, which is good by reason of its justice. These same people, when they are free of punishment, have within them some further evil, which is impunity itself, a thing that you have agreed was evil by virtue of its injustice.[64]

In the light of these paradoxical views on reward and punishment for human actions, contrary to common understanding, Boethius-prisoner once again wishes to address the question of whether or not God's rule of the world is a matter of chance and that it is impossible to understand the principles of the order prevailing in the world.

opum uiolentus ereptor: lupi similem dixeris. Fero atque inquires linguam litigiis exercet: cani comparabis […]. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in beluam."

64 Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 4, p. 105–106; Bieler, p. 74–75: "…corrigi ultiones prauos mores et ad rectum supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi; sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi nulla ratio corretionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli […]. Habent igitur improbi cum puniuntur quidem boni aliquid adnexum, poenam ipsam scilicet, quae ratione iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent inest eis aliquid ulterius mali, ipsa impunitas, quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus es."

5. REIGN OF PROVIDENCE OR WHIMS OF FATE

Boethius-prisoner does not yet have clear views on the "true reason for order." In this state of mind, however, he should accept as a temporary assumption which will draw a line on doubt, namely that the world has a purpose and is guided by a good, intelligent ruler:

> It is not paradoxical that something is believed to be random and confused if the principle behind the order is not known. But even though you do not know the cause of this great arrangement, please have no doubt that all things happen in the right way; indeed, the one who is the helmsman, who balances the world, *is* good.[65]

Only after adopting such an assumption one can continue to ask questions about the relation of Providence to Fate, the existence of coincidence, the question of God's knowledge and freedom of will. In chapter 6 of Book IV of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Lady Philosophy draws a specific comparison of the concept of Providence and fortune/fate. Her argument can be schematically presented as follows[66]:

1.1. Providence is identified with God because it is the very divine reason, the plan of things viewed from the point of the pure supreme God's knowledge.
1.2. Fatum/fate is "the arrangement that inheres in the things that have motion."[67]
2.1. Providence includes all things, even the varied and the infinite ones (*quamvis diversa quamvis infinita*), in its unity and simplicity and beyond the time frame.
2.2. Fatum organizes a separate movement of each individual thing depending on its place, form and time. What exists in the simplicity of Providence as a unity, Fatum develops in the order of time (sections), encompassing individual things.
3.1. Divine Providence is unchangeable ("… is the unmoving and simple form of the things that are to be carried out").

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[65] Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 5, p.111 ; Bieler, p. 77–78: "Nec mirum, inquit, si quid ordinis ignorata ratione temerarium confusumque credatur ; sed tu quamuis causam tantae dispositionis ignores, tamen, quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recte fieri cuncta ne dubites."

[66] Cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, p. 276–280; cf. Marenbon, *Boethius*, p. 118–121; Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 6, p. 102–108.

[67] Boethius, *Consolation* IV, 6, s. 114.

3.2. Fatum "is the interweaving in motion and the ordering in time of those things that divine simplicity arranged so that they could be carried out").[68]

4.1. Providence is the sole and exclusive cause and purpose of all things.

4.2. Fatum/fate can use subordinate, secondary causes ("Fate is driven by certain divine spirits that are servants of Providence; whether the sequence of fated events is woven together by the World Soul or by all of nature in service to it, or by the heavenly motion of the stars, the power of angels, the multiform resourcefulness of demons, or by some of them or all of them together"[69]).

5.1. Providence, being God Himself, is a derivative of the God's way of existence and cognition, which radically exceeds human cognitive abilities ("After all, man can neither completely comprehend nor explain in words the hidden God's ways").

5.2. Fatum's/fate's field of action is determined by human visual perspective, in which the course of events often appears chaotic and without a proper cause ("Thus, although people may think that things are in confusion and chaos, because they are not able to recognize order in them…").

6.1. Consequently, the area under Providence's influence determines the sphere of freedom.

6.2. Fatum's/fate's action is marked by necessity, determinism resulting, among others, from the fact that fate realizes its actions in material reality.

One can deduce from this that Fatum/fate is the tool of Providence's action, depends on it, and implements its orders. Lady Philosophy illustrates the relation of Providence to Fatum by means of comparing them to a moving circle, in the center of which is the axis of unchanging Providence. Human assessment of events, their course and significance depends on the perspective we adopt: from the point of view of the center (Providence) or from the point of view of the circumference of the circle (Fatum):

> For example: Of all the circles that turn about the same center point, the one which is innermost approaches the simplicity of the middle, and for all of the other circles that lie outside of it it exits as a kind of center point about which they turn. However, the outermost circle, set in rotation in a greater circumference, is unfolded in areas that are ever greater the greater is its remove from the central indivisibility of that point. (…) By a similar line of reasoning, that which is at a further remove from the first mind is entangled in greater meshes of Fate; a thing is free from Fate to the extent that it seeks to gain ever more closely that

[68] There.

[69] There.

> center point of things. And should it cling to the stability of the mind that is above it, then, free from motion, it transcends the necessity of Fate as well. Therefore: As is the relation of rational argument to knowledge; of that which comes into being to that which is; of time to eternity; of the circle to its center point — such is the relation of the moving sequence of Fate to the unchanging simplicity of Providence.[70]

Only now, when we rise to the point of view of Providence, the original assumption turns out to be justified, namely that the world is not a chaotic conglomeration of events, but that a good ruler directs it by directing things to the right end. However, one more problem remains to be solved, namely that if Divine Providence, which — identical with God's Intellect — manages all things with the help of the tool, which is Fatum, does not deprive man of his freedom of choice. It is a problem which Boethius-prisoner presents to Lady Philosophy in the following words:

> That God has foreknowledge of absolutely everything and that there is any freedom of independent judgment — these things seem to me to be set against each other, and to be at odds with each other, far too much. For if God sees all things in advance and cannot be mistaken in any way, that thing must necessarily happen that Providence foresees will happen. And for this reason, if Providence has foreknowledge from eternity not only the actions of mortal men but of their deliberation and of their wills as well, then there would be no freedom of independent judgement.[71]

This section of *The Consolation of Philosophy* has recently been, as shown by John Marenbon, the subject of many analyzes, especially present-

[70] Boethius, *The Consolation* IV, 6, p. 115; Bieler, p. 80: "Nam ut orbium circa eundem cardinem sese uertentium qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis accedit ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam circa quem uersentur exsistit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus quanto a puncti media indiuiduitate discedit tanto amplioribus spatiis explicatur, si quid uero illi se medio conectat et societ in simplicitatem cogiur diffundique ac diffluere cessat: simili ratione quod longius a prima mente discedit maioribus fati nexibus implicatur ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est quanto illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit; quodsi supernae mentis haeserit firmitati, motu carens fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series mobilis ad prouidentiae stabilem simplicitatem."

[71] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 3, p. 130–131; Bieler, p. 91: "Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia uoluntatesque pranoscit nulla erit arbitrii libertas." Cf. Marenbon, *Boethius*, p. 125 f.

ed by philosophers of analytic formation.[72] The structure of this text could be presented as follows:

(1) What happens from necessity excludes freedom.
(2) God has prior knowledge of what will happen.
(3) This knowledge is necessary and unchangeable.
(4) Future events as predicted by God are necessary.
(5) A future event, being necessary, excludes freedom.

The key point here, as shown by Marenbon, is point (3), stating that God's knowledge is necessary and unchangeable. And the consequence of this thesis is the conviction that "there is no freedom in human intentions and actions, because the Divine mind, predicting everything flawlessly, reduces everything and limits it to one consequence. When it is accepted, human matters will be broken with all the obviousness."[73] It will turn out however, that the existence of future contingencies is not possible, but all that is included in God's knowledge is necessary. The question arises, however, whether the "necessity" of God's knowledge and thus the necessity of future events comes from (a) the very events that are necessary, which would suggest determinism and some influence of these events on God's knowledge, or (b) is the result of God's way of cognizing?[74] Lady Philosophy tries to show her interlocutor that "foreknowledge exists, but it does not impose any necessity on things happening," therefore "full and absolute freedom of will is preserved."[75] (1) God's presence is not causal, it does not necessitate the occurrence of what it concerns. (2) The attribution of the characteristics of necessity and immutability to God's foreknowledge is not the result of the object of this cognition, but a feature of the knowledge itself. The character of cognition is conditioned mainly by the nature of the cognizing subject, in this case God, and not the object being cognized.[76] (3) God's way of cognition is conditioned by His way of existence, which is simple, eternal and unchanging, and so God's knowledge is also like that.[77]

[72] Cf. J. Marenbon, *Le temps, la prescience et le déterminisme dans la* Consolation de Philosophie *de Boèce,* in: *Boèce ou la chaine du savoir,* A. Galonnier (ed.), Paris 2003, p. 531 ; cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy* p. 282; Marenbon, *Boethius,* p. 127 f.

[73] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 3, p. 118.

[74] Cf. Marenbon, *Le temps, la prescience,* p. 532–533.

[75] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 4, p. 120.

[76] Cf. Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 4, p. 138.

[77] Cf. R. Sharples, "Fate, prescience and free will," in: *The Cambridge Companion to Boethius*, p. 216.

The object being cognized does not impose any necessity of God's knowledge, and God's knowledge is not the cause of the necessity of occurring events, but rather captures it as contingent.[78] The necessary assumption of this claim is the belief that God's existence is an eternity which is a category transcending time or even everlastingness. Eternity is therefore not related to time, but it is a way of God's existence:

> Eternity is a possession of life, a possession simultaneously entire and perfect, which has no end. This becomes clear in a more transparent way form a comparison with temporal things. For whatever exists in time proceeds as a present thing from the things that have happened into the things that are going to happen, and there is nothing that has been established in time that is able to embrace the entire space of its own life at one and the same time (…). That which grasps and possesses the entire fullness of a life that has no end at one and the same time (…) is rightly held to be eternal.[79]

God's existence is therefore an eternal 'now" for which future and past things are constantly present. God encompasses all things with his knowledge without imposing any necessity on them. Boethius distinguishes two kinds of necessity, namely a simple necessity which originates in the nature of things and, for example, by virtue of this necessity, all people are mortal, and a conditional necessity.[80] Conditional necessity refers to a certain state of affairs, on which, however, no form of necessity is imposed. This type of necessity occurs when "whatever anyone knows cannot exist in any other way than it is known to exist, but this condition does not at all draw along with it that other, simple necessity. For it is not the thing's own nature that makes this necessity but only the addition of condition."[81]

[78] Por. A. Galonnier, "Boèce et la connaissance divine des futurs contingents," in: *Boèce ou la chaine du savoir,* p. 588 f.

[79] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 6, p. 395; Bieler, p. 101: "Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quiquid uiuit in tempore id praesens a praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitutum quod totum uitae suae spatium pariter possit amplecti, sed crastinum quidem nondum apprehendit hesternum uero iam perdidit […]. Quod igitur interminabilis uitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet, cui neque futuri quicquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse iure perhibetur idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper assistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem."

[80] Cf. J. Evans, *Boethius on Modality and Future Contingents*, "American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly" 78/2 (2004), pp. 251 f.; cf. Kijewska, *Filozof i jego muzy*, pp. 284 f.

[81] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 6, p. 148.

Therefore, God's foreknowledge does not entail the necessity of what it involves, because it is not its direct cause. God includes in his foreknowledge future events as contingencies, and therefore those, that will be the result of human free action.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Lady Philosophy entering into a therapeutic dialogue with Boethius-prisoner who was inflicted with very strong, negative feelings, tried to transform the cognitive element that is their foundation. The starting point of this dialogue was the conviction that (1) the world is governed by God, a good governor. Philosophy tried to show that He is at the same time (2) the Supreme Good and the goal of all endeavors. As the Supreme Good, God is the source (3) of true and full happiness of man (*beatitudo*). (4) The strength of man lies in his ability to achieve this good, and when he cannot achieve it, he is powerless. (5) Evil and the possibility of committing it is therefore a form of powerlessness. (6) An evil act, as a manifestation of powerlessness, is a punishment for itself, while an inflicted punishment, as if it reduces the burden of responsibility. (7) Man follows good or evil as a free creature and is responsible for his actions. (8) God's Providence does not impose any necessity on human actions.

In the final part of the dialogue Boethius-prisoner tacitly agrees with Lady Philosophy's last words: "Unless you want to hide the truth, there is a great neccessity imosed upon you — the neccessity of righteousness, since you act before the eyes of a judge who beholds all thins."[82]

And this "necessity of righteousness" is in fact the only form of necessity binding a man.

Translated by Barbara Kulicka

[82] Boethius, *The Consolation* V, 6, p. 150.

GOTTSCHALK OF ORBAIS' TEACHING ON PREDESTINATION

ANDRZEJ P. STEFAŃCZYK

THE PRESENT PAPER aims to outline the main areas of disagreement within the controversy over predestination which developed in the 9th century and electrified the whole intellectual milieu of Western Christianity at that period. This controversy has been perceived as the most serious doctrinal crisis afflicting the Latin Christian environment since late antiquity. In the first section of my article I sketch in very general terms the consequences of widespred study of St Augustine's writings in that time as well as the renaissance of intellectual life in the Carolingian empire and in particular the new vigour attending the renewal of theological and philosophical reflection. This revitalisation of scholarly life resulted in the formation of new solutions to some classical theological problems as well as new aporias within the domain of Christian doctrine, which in turn gave rise to public debates and controversies, such as the Eucharistic controversy or the debate over the conception of *trina deitas*. In the second part of my study, which constitutes the main body thereof, I focus on presentation of the four main points of disagreement which marked the particularly vigorous debate of that period, namely the debate concerning predestination. This controversy, in which the foremost intellectuals and ecclesiastics of the day came to be involved, was occasioned by the very independent conception of the Christian doctrine originated and spread by the recalcitrant monk of Orbais, Gottschalk.[1] One can identify four

[1] Gottschalk was born about 803 in Saxony, in the family of a count named Bernus, and died in October 868. He was delivered as an oblate child, together with his inheritance, to the monastery of Fulda in Charlemagne's lifetime. Fulda was an important educational center, especially after 803, when Hrabanus Maurus (784–856), Alcuin's pupil, became the head of its school. In Fulda Gottschalk studied Latin, the Bible, the fathers, and the basics of the classical literature. Before 840, deserting his

principal points around which the debate focused and which constituted the source of disagreement. These were as follows: (i) conception of God, (ii) notions of grace, nature and free will, (iii) the problem of the relationship between divine prescience and divine predestination, (iiii), the doctrine of redemption and the related question of the relationship between divine justice and divine mercy. This paper is intended essentially as an attempt at new reading and interpreting the basic source texts related to the predestination debate, mainly those by Gottschalk himself and his adversary Hincmar of Reims.[2] In the third and concluding part, I point out the difficulties faced by some of the solutions offered to the problem discussed and briefly present the perspective of debates on this problem and proposed solutions in subsequent ages.

I.

The phenomenon of the Carolingian Renaissance is usually defined as the restoration within the empire of Charlemagne and his immediate followers of some cultural patterns that functioned in late antiquity, in particular

monastery, he went to Italy, and preached there his doctrine of double predestination; Gottschalk of Orbais taught that God's predestination is twofold, that is, before the creation the Creator predestined some men to salvation and others to hell. Reaction of his former abbot Hrabanus Maurus and his metropolitan Hincmar of Reims started the 9th century predestination controversy, which was made even more acute by the intervention of John Scot Eriugena. Though many defended Gottschalk's thoroughly Augustinian theology (among others, Lupus of Ferrières, Ratramnus of Corbie, Prudentius of Troyes and Florus of Lyons), Gottschalk was imprisoned at the monastery of Hautvilliers where he later died having several times refused to renounce his views. The theological works of Gottschalk in Latin are the following: *Confessio brevior, Confessio prolixior, De trina deitate, De praedestinatione*. Poetry of Gottschalk: *Ut quid iubes, Ad Ratramnum, Christe mearum lux tenebrarum, Spes mea Christe, O Deus miseri miserere servi* and many others. See *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, ed. and transl. V. Genke and F.X. Gumerlock, Milwaukee, 2010, pp. 7–63.

[2] Hincmar of Rheims (806–882), from 845 Archbishop of Reims, was the main opponent of Gottschalk in the dispute about predestination and in the controversy about trina deitas. His criticisms led to the condemnation of Gottschalk's teachings and his imprisonment. Hincmar was the author of several works directed against Gottschalk, including: *De una et non trina deitate* (PL 125, 473–618*), De praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio* (PL 125, 65–474), *Epistola ad reclusos et simplices suae dioceseos*. See *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 169.

some important aspects of ancient education. This brought about new flourishing of schools in the Carolingian state and, as a consequence, a renewal of theological studies, especially of the Scriptures, as well as philosophical inquiries. Especially notable in the early phase of the Carolingian Renaissance was the reforming activity of Alcuin of York and the establishing of the course of the seven liberal arts: *septem artes liberales* as divided into *trivium* and *quadrivium* as the obligatory curriculum in all the major cathedral and monastery schools. The towering authority in that period, in both the theological and philosophical domains, was unquestionably St. Augustine of Hippo. However, the assiduous study of Augustine's writings, as well as those of other Church Fathers, led the scholars of the nineth century to query the traditional theological synthesis (which was predominantly augustinian) and attempt new interpretations of certain issues. However, these fresh attempts to modify the received augustinian synthesis or even to go beyond it, resulted in disagreements and controversies. Consequently, strange as this may seem, it was Augustine's classical texts that were at the root of all the major theological quarrels of that epoch. The three main areas of the theological disagreement were the Eucharist, the problem of the Trinity: *trina deitas*, and, last but not least, predestination.

1. The Eucharist. The reason for this controversy was provided by the vagueness of Augustine's formulations concerning the real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharistic species.[3] The immediate occasion for the debate was afforded by emperor Charles the Bald, who addressed in 843 the monks of Corbie with the question, whether the eucharistic change of bread and wine into Christ's Body and Blood respectively, takes place *in mysterio,* that is only symbolically, or *in veritate,* that is in reality. In the exchanges that followed, two of the monks of Corbie took part, namely Ratramnus of Corbie and Paschasius Radbertus. Both theologians responded in the affirmative to the question whether Christ's body and blood were really present in the Eucharistic species, however, they differed in their explanations of how this real presence is realized. Paschasius gave an explanation in terms of gross material realism, asserting the non-qualified identity of Jesus's historical body with His Eucharistic body in his tract *De corpore et sanguine Domini*. Ratramnus came up with a more subtle explanation of this sacrament, empasizing the spiritual and symbolic aspects of the real presence. In his own words, the Eucharist is "salutary nourishment for the

[3] J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, Chicago and London, 1978, p. 74.

soul, yet in order for it to be able to fulfil that role, it must be free from all contingecies related to space and time and from destructibility attendand on matter."[4] The controversies concerning the Eucharist would continue into subsequent ages: in the 11th they would return and spark off the confrontation of dialecticians and antidialecticians, again involving the foremost scholars of the time: Berengarius of Tours and Lanfranc of Pavia; later on they would mark out one of the chief areas of disagreement among theologians in the epoch of the Reformation.

2. *Trina deitas*. The quarrel over the legitimacy of the term *trina deitas* (threefold Godhead) was in a way linked to another theological debate, started in the second half of the 8th century in Spain by two Spanish bishops: Elipandus of Toledo and Felix of Urgel, who propounded a form of adoptionism,[5] it also contained references to the great christological discussions of Christian antiquity and the christological heresies of monophysitism[6] and

[4] G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, vol. 2, transl. W. Szymona OP, Kraków 2005, p. 91.

[5] The Spanish adoptionism or *hispanicus error* goes back to the 8th century and provided the occasion for a lively theological debate in the West at the late eighth and early nineth century. The chief proponents of it were archbishop Elipandus of Toledo and another bishop, Felix of Urgel. Elipandus of Toledo, from the Catholic teaching on two natures in Jesus Christ drew an unorthodox conclusion to the effect that Jesus born of Mary was not the Son begotten by God the Father, and this purely human Jesus only became Son of God by adoption that is by divine grace that was conferred on him. From this Elipandus further concluded that Jesus Christ was not the only and unique Son of God, although he was the first-born one among a multitude of adopted sons. Felix in turn reportedly asserted that Jesus Christ was only God by name, and not in reality, hence his formula *deus nuncupativus*. The opponents of this "Spanish error" were Alcuin and Agobard of Lyons. The condemnation of the Spanish adoptionism as a heresy came from the pope Hadrian I and from the councils of Regensburg (794), Frankfurt on the Main (794), Friuli (796) and Aachen (799). Cf. K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, *Mały słownik teologiczny*, p. 2; also J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, p. 52 ff.

[6] Monophysitism is a theological position according to which Jesus Christ does not exist in two natures: divine and human, because his human nature has been completely absorbed and dissolved in the divine element. The fundamental doctrine of monophysitism held that the union of the divine Logos with humanity resulted in the production of one nature: *physis*, in which human nature came to be completely assimilated to the divine *physis*; humanity was dissolved in divinity like a drop of wine or honey being lost in a sea of water. See K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, *Mały słownik teologiczny*, p. 248; also cf. J.N.D. Kelly, *Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej*, transl. J. Mrukówna, Warszawa 1988, pp. 246–248.

nestorianism.[7] In this nineth century phase of the trinitarian debate the role of the antagonist was assumed by Gottschalk of Orbais, who was seconded by Ratramnus of Corbie. The immediate object of the argument was whether the formula *trina deitas*: "threefold Godhead" could legitimately be used with reference to God. It seems that Gottschalk's objective was to come up with a formula which permitted to speak about unique God in the Trinity of Divine Persons without inevitably suggesting the conclusion that "humanity had been assumed not only by the Son, but simultaneously by the Father and the Holy Spirit, since obviously Godhead as such assumed humanity."[8] The formula advanced by Gottschalk implied an unfortunate consequence in the form of a conclusion stating that each Person of the Trinity possessed its own Divinity and its own Godhead, a statement perilously smacking of the heresy of tritheism. This aspect of Gottschalk's idea was eagerly seized on by his adversaries, chief of whom was archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, who led a campaign against Gottschalk and finally engineered the condemnation of the objectionable doctrine at the council of Soissons in 853. The council issued a ruling forcefully affirming inadmissibility of ascribing any multiplying attribute to the substantive *deitas*, as *deitas* signifies one and unique Divine substance.[9]

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[7] Nestorianism was a theological doctrine originated by Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople 428–431, died ca. 451. Nestorius wanted to emphasize the reality and completeness of the human nature in Jesus Christ and he spoke of it as a reality that was distinct and separate from the nature of the *Logos in Christ.* He did not accept the theological principle known as *communicatio idiomatum*, according to which both the divine and human attributes of Christ are jointly predicated of either nature in Christ. The consequence of the radical separation of both natures in Christ was the denial of the tenet deeply ingrained in the faith and practice of the Church, namely that Jesus Christ was born of Mary of Nazareth as true God (*Logos*) and |Mary thus deserved the title of Mother of God (*Theotokos* in Greek)*:* according to Nestorius the only legitimate title of Mary was Mother of Christ (*Christotokos*)*.* Following Nestorius's rigid logic, God, being eternal, could not have been born of a human mother, nor could he die in truth, as it is only man, a finite, created being, that undergoes birth and death. Thus this doctrine concluded that Jesus Christ was but an ordinary human being, in whom God-Logos came to dwell. The divine Logos spoken about in the prologue of St. John's Gospel (John 1, 1–18) was divine spirit only accidentally united to the man, Jesus of Nazareth. See J.N.D. Kelly, *Początki doktryny chrześcijańskiej*, pp. 232–237; also cf. K. Rahner., H. Vorgrimler, *Mały słownik teologiczny*, p. 270.

[8] J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, p. 60.

[9] See G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, vol. 2, p. 90.

3. Predestination. The controversy over predestination that raged through much of the 11th century was a distant echo of St. Augustine's teaching from the period of his combat with pelagianism and pelagians. Favourable ground for a renewal of discussion of predestination had been prepared by the council of Orange in 529, which reaffirmed the teaching of St. Augustine on original sin and the necessity of grace for salvation, yet left unexplained some statements found especially in the late writings of the great doctor, which lent themselves to divergent interpretations and even could appear dubious from the point of view of strict orthodoxy.

The 9th century debate over predestination was started and sustained throughout its duration by the recalcitrant Benedictine monk, Gottschalk of Orbais, who also figured prominently in the quarrel over the formula *trina deitas* and thus assumed the dubious role of the chief antagonist in the theological debates of his time. Gottschalk's main adversary and the self-appointed leading champion of orthodoxy in these controversies was archbishop Hincmar of Reims; yet the whole intellectual world of he Frankish empire came to be involved.[10]

According to Hincmar: "Gottschalk was wont to invent new and unheard of things that contradicted the ancient conception of orthodoxy"[11] and he added: "It is no wonder that he speaks such outrageous things, as from his childhood he has been intent on inventing new ways of expression and is still incessantly looking for ways of saying things that nobody else says."[12]

[10] Gottschalk's invoking the authorities of Augustine (in particular), but also of Gregory the Great and others in support of his own teaching on double predestination earned him backing of many prominent Frankish intellectuals and ecclesiastics, as, for example, Loup of Ferrières, the learned humanist and philologist, bishop Prudentius of Troyes and Ratramnus of Corbie, a distinguished theologian and a student of the liberal arts. The party opposed to the double predestination theory comprised, among others, Hincmar of Reims, Hrabanus Maurus, Pardulus, the then bishop of Lyon, and John Scotus Eriugena, whose doctrinal support of the cause of single predestination against Gottschalk's teaching had been requested by Hincmar and the king Charles the Bald. Cf. G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, vol. 2, pp. 86–87.

[11] Hincmar Rhemensis, *De una et non trina deitate*, PL 125: 475: "Haec autem audiens Gothescalcus, Orbacensis manasterii Rhemensis Ecclesiae pseudomanachus, tam invidia mei, quem in Ecclesia cantari trinam deitatem vetuisse audierat, quam more suo, qui nova et antea inaudita, canaeque ortodoxorum intelligentiae contraria adinvenire, ac proferre ab ineunte atetate suae vitiosae indolis delectabiliter studuit, et in eodem studio permansit inde plurima scribere, et ad quoscumque potuit, primum latenter deinde quantum sibi licuit, aperte mittere procuravit."

[12] Hincmar Rhemensis, *De una et non trina deitate*, PL 125, 588: "Et non est mirum, si

Now, Gottschalk's part in the predestination controversy briefly recapitulated was as follows.

Amply quoting Augustine, Gottschalk taught the doctrine of the infallible efficacy of the divine judgment, which having been issued from eternity, must needs predetermine all human beings in their ways of conduct: those predesigned to be saints will of necessity become good in their ways, while those predestined to be reprobates will necessarily become evil. Essentially, this was the doctrine of theological determinism in its classical formulation, yet it was rendered particularly awkward owing to the quotes of St. Augustine invoked in its support. Gottschalk version of theological determinism was first condemned by the council of Mainz in 848 at the instigation of Hrabanus Maurus, the abbot of Fulda, where Gotschalk had once resided as a monk and the incumbent archbishop of Mainz at the time of the council. Gottschalk, having undergone the censure of the council was sent under the surveillance of Hincmar of Reims, under whose jurisdiction Gottschalk belonged, since the monastery of Orbais was situated within the diocese of Reims. Hincmar put Gottschalk under house arrest and confined him to the monastery of Hautvillers. Despite the confinement, however, Gottschalk must have enjoyed considerable freedom, since it was in Hautvillers that he composed his writings and sent them to his followers thus confirming and disseminating his doctrine. In these writings he not only defended his affirmations on predestination but also accused his opponents of heresy. These writings include *Confessio brevior, Confessio prolixior* and *De praedestinatione;* they contain the fundamental theses of his doctrine, explaining, to use his own words, "how the unity of divine nature suffers no harm because of the diversity of the effects of God's will."[13] In *Confessio prolixior* he lays down the foundations of his theory of double predestination, while in *De praedestinatione* he develops this theory in detail and presents arguments in defence thereof.

talia ut praemisimus dicit, qui ab ineunte aetate semper vocum novitates exquisivit, et adhuc semper inquirit, quatenus talia dicens, quae nemo aliud dicit, innotesci et si non de bonis vel pessimis possit."

[13] G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, t. 2, p. 86.

II.

Now, let us take a closer look at the problem generated by the concept of predestination, what difficulties seem inevitably to follow once predestination is accepted. Put in more general terms, the question of predestination comes down to the problem of the inevitable implications for the image of man and the Universe following from the assumption of the classical theism, that is the assumption of there being a God as Christianity represents Him, with the necessary attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and, at the same time, infinite goodness and benevolence. The problem of squaring the idea of the divine all-power and human freedom and responsibility is one of the puzzles pregnant with far-reaching consequences that Christian philosophy and theology had to face right from the beginning. This apparent contradiction between free initiative and consequent responsibility of human beings and the divine omnipotence that in advance decides and settles all temporal events appeared all the more acute for at least two reasons: 1) firstly, this problem in exactly the form in which it appeared to Christian theologians had never been set or even approached by the classical ancient philosophy and hence resulted the necessity of working out entirely new analytical and conceptual approaches to find a perspective in which to envisage both human freedom and God's prescience and predestination (it is precisely in this context that the problem of future contingents in the theological version comes in); 2) secondly, a failure to find out an adequate solution to that problem would result in far reaching and pernicious consequences for Christian consciousness and the life of Christian community. In particular, the predestinarian error would: a) eliminate free will in man, and consequently b) reduce to naught moral responsibility of an individual human being; these two points in turn would be tantamount to contradicting the free nature of Jesus Christ's action of redemption of human sins.[14] On the first approach to the problem, it may seem that the assumption of effective divine predestination in the created universe would eliminate any real freedom from the domain of creation, while, on the other hand, reality of freedom in the created world would amount to eliminating predestination from this world and thus reducing God's causal efficiency in the domain of creation and especially in matters concerning man. Neither of these two solutions could be unqualifiedly accepted by Christian theologians without

[14] Cf. M. Michałowska, "Spór o predestynację w renesansie karolińskim — *De praedestinatione Dei* Jana Szkota Eriugeny," *Etyka* 2004, 37, pp. 49–68.

exposing them to objections from strict orthodoxy. Hence, since as early as Christian antiquity there has been an awareness among Christian theologians and philosophers of the necessity to work out a position that would provide a safe passage between the Charybdis of theological determinism and the Scylla of diminishing God's knowledge and His all-power and representing them as less than absolute in order to save the reality of human freedom. No wonder that the problem of predestination has ever since been considered and debated in Western theology and, consequently, the conceptual grid and vocabulary relative to it has been much developed and complicated, particularly since the Protestant Reformation.[15]

It is thus evident that crucially involved in the very essence of the problem and the debate is the Christian doctrine itself, that is the very dogma of faith. Of paramount importance in the definition of the terms of the problem and its vocabulary was undoubtedly St. Augustine, whose authority and influence upon the subsequent centuries proved decisive for the development of Western theology and religious consciousness. It was Augustine that perceived with clarity and discussed the problem of the seeming incompatibility of human freedom and God's foreknowledge,[16] first in the dialogue *De libero arbitrio* and then, having enlarged his perspective to include also the issue of predestination, in his treatises from the period of his debate against pelagianism, in which the Doctor of Hippo put forward the first attempts at a solution of the problem.

Augustine's influence on the Carolingian epoch and its theological and philosophical thought was paramount and it was himself that set the scope and the terms of the debate on predestination in the Carolingian milieu. The whole issue of predestination is consequent, in Augustine, on the doctrine of the centrality of grace in the work of salvation and the primary place accorded to it in his theological teaching. Yet from St. Augustine's statement that God acts toward "damnation of those who have justly been assigned for punishment and salvation of those who have been mercifully set aside for grace"[17] there is only a small step towards drawing conse-

[15] See V. Genke, http://www.lectio-divina.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=feature.display&feature_id=7

[16] True, the very beginnings of the discussion of the problem of free will go as far back as the time of the Apologists, to name Irenaeus of Lyons and his polemic against gnosticism in *Adversus haereses*, however the profound and systematic treatment of the problems related to freedom would only appear in St. Augustine.

[17] Augustine of Hippo, *Enchiridion*, 26, 100 (CCSL 46, 103).

quences in the form of an open affirmation of the thesis that it is effectively God who predestines the elect for salvation and the reprobates for eternal death. This thesis was inferred and openly proclaimed by Gottschalk,[18] and then defended with more subtlety by Gottschalk's followers. It is a fact beyond doubt that the doctrine of the so called double predestination can be, in a way, traced back to some formulations of St. Augustine, which proved to be sufficiently imprecise or even unclear to give rise to divergent or even conflicting construals. This was hardly surprising, given the breadth and multiplicity of contexts of Augustine's discussion of the problem, as well as the novelty and originality of his treatment. However, another point must be borne in mind in discussing the Carolingian predestinarianism: it has been shown beyond any controversy that the texts by Gottschalk and Ratramnus of Corbie on double predestination and the conclusions contained therein have more affinity with the formulations of Isidore of Seville than with those bequeathed by Augustine himself.[19]

> On this St. Isidore also speaks in this manner: *Predestination is twofold, either of the elect to rest or of the reprobate to death*.[20] For he does not say that there are two predestinations, because there are not. But he says "a twofold," that is, a bipartite one, because you, Lord, spoke once of how by one, but still by a twofold predestination, you both gratuitously justify and eternally save the elect and also rightly reject and justly condemn the reprobate…[21]

God's predestination, consisting in giving grace to the people of his choice, entails two assumptions:

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18 J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, p. 97.

19 B.J. Matz affirms the thesis, backing it with solid documentary evidence, that the immediate source of the Carolingian predestinarianism were less the texts by St. Augustine himself than those by St. Isidore of Seville. See B.J. Matz, "Augustine in the Predestination Controversy of Ninth Century. Part I: The Double Predestinarians Gottschalk of Orbais and Ratramnus of Corbie," *Augustinian Studies* 46, 2 (2015), pp. 155–184, p. 156.

20 Isidorus, *Sententiae*, 2. 6 (CCSL 111, 103; PL 83, 606A).

21 "Sanctus etiam Isidorus inde sic dicit: *Gemina est praedestinatio, siue electorum ad requiem, siue reproborum ad mortem*. Non enim ait: duae sunt quia non sunt, sed gemina id est bipartita, quia semel tu domine locutus es, qualiter una quidem sed tamen gemina praedestinatione et electos gratis iustifices ac perpetim salues et reprobos quoque merito refutes iusteque condemnes." *Confessio prolixior*, 10, in *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc d'Orbais*, ed. Dom C. Lambot. Leuven: Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense, 1945, p. 67, v. 2–8; *Gottschalk & a Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 86.

1) eternal life of beatitude is predestined for the elect,

2) the elect are predestined for eternal life of beatitude.

Likewise, His predestination in its negative aspect of the rejection of the reprobate entails two points:

1) eternal punishment is predestined for the damned

2) the damned are predestined for eternal punishment.[22]

In either case the first assumption did not raise any doubts, as it perfectly agreed with the doctrine of faith to the effect that God's bestows good things by his mercy and judgment. However, the second point in either case appeared to entail very awkward consequence: they seemed to introduce some necessity into God's action: if God predestines the elect to eternal life, He appears, by the same move, necessarily to condemn the non-elect to eternal damnation; in fact, from a certain point of view, God's actions with respect to both the chosen and the rejected may appear dictated by necessity. This was already theological determinism: God's activity appeared to be marked by necessity that eliminated all freedom from the realm of creation.[23]

Now, the elimination of freedom struck at the heart of the very doctrine of redemption and salvation whose core assumption was free action by God and freedom of man. This consequence paradoxically undercut the premises of Gottschalk's own project.

What very characteristically strikes one in Gottschalk's writings, and what his opponents did not fail to point out, was a very peculiar kind of theocentrism, his exclusive concentration on God's simplicity and immutability, combined with total neglect of the human aspect of the problem, that is of the freedom of man. This was briefly summarized by Hincmar in his objection that Gottschalk, while teaching a doctrine of grace, fails to take into account the doctrine of free will.[24] In Gottschalk's case, the theory of double predestination may have resulted from one sided treatment of the problem, in particular from his exclusive focus on God's simplicity, all-power and absolute immutability, that remained unchecked by consideration of man's freedom and responsibility. From this perspective it appeared obvious that God must act according to His eternal design, otherwise He would have to undergo some changes. This somewhat simplistic approach may have lain at the root of Gottschalk's other awkward positions, such as

[22] See B.J. Matz, "Augustine in the Predestination Controversy of Ninth Century. Part I," p. 158.

[23] Ibid.

[24] See J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, 82 ff.

identification of God's prescience with predestination and of grace with God himself.[25]

Another characteristic feature of Gottschalk's theological discourse is the way he builds his arguments. Gottschalk seems to have been well acquainted with the rules of dialectics and deductive reasoning, as well as with the devices of rhetoric, yet he most willingly employs arguments based on the grammar of natural language[26] . Why ? The reason is to be sought in the form of crude platonic realism accepted by Gottschalk. According to this position there obtains exact correspondence between the *ordo rerum* and the *ordo idearum,* in other words, between things in the world and the concepts forming our language. This isomorphy seemed to result from the the fact of both the order of the world and the grammatical rules of languages ultimately deriving from one source which was God, the maker of both the world and the language. The perfection and immutable stability of the world are exactly reflected in the language and its immutable grammatical rules. "The richness of the structure of that cosmic *ordo* is far from merely formal, as included in it is the unchangeable and eternal network of correlations between all possible actions and their corresponding repayments fixed by God, which implies that also included is the cosmos of moral values and the concrete destinies of individual human beings."[27]

These assumptions appear to lie behind Gottschalk's case for double predestination (*praedestinatio est gemina*) and the highly controversial phrase "threefold deity" used by himself (*trina deitas*). The attribute "double" (*geminus)* points to the twofold aspect of divine predestination, which, nevertheless, remains one and single reality, as being rooted in the unity of the divine undivided will, while the divisive numeral "threefold" (*trinus*) is meant to express the trinity or triplicity of divine persons that exist in numerically one substance. Always at the core of these formulations and the arguments based thereon is the assumptions of the strict parallelism obtaining between language and the world of things. Hence also Gottschalk's unlimited confidence in the power of reason and reason's instrument: the art of reasoning. He is always ready to use an Aristotelian syllogistic scheme in proving his point, as for instance in *De praedestinatione,* alluding to Jerome's *In epistulam ad Galatos*:

[25] See *De praedestinatione*, VII [8].

[26] Gottschalk devotes a whole chapter in his *De praedestinatione* to a discussion of the syllogism. See *De praedestinatione*, „De syllogismis," IX [5], pp. 206–207.

[27] G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, vol. 2, p. 86.

> *If righteousness comes through the law, then Christ died in vain*. (Gal 2:21).
> But Christ did not die in vain.
> Therefore, righteousness does not come through the law.[28]

Or in a similar vein:

> If the reprobate have not been predestined to death, they are not destined for it. However, they are destined for it, for it is written: *But you, God, will bring them down into the pit of destruction* (Ps 54:24).
> Therefore, they have already been predestined to it.[29]

One way of presenting Gottschalk's doctrine of predestination in a systematic way would be to discuss in turns the main areas of controversy and criticism that his theory gave rise to. These could be summarized under four headings, the first of which is:

1. God's simplicity and immutability as related to predestination.

> For you would of course have predestined the punishment of eternal death for them without reason unless you had also predestined them for it. For they would not go to it unless they were destined, and they would not of course be destined unless they had been predestined, since you always existed before all ages, because you cannot be mutable in any way even for a moment. And you would be shown to be mutable through all ages thereafter, if — God forbid! — any of the reprobate were destined for that, who had not been predestined.[30]

This quote clearly shows that for Gottschalk the issue of predestination was closely bound with the issue of God's immutability: since God exists eternally, with His will and knowledge eternally unchangeable, Gottschalk reasons, we can by no means admit that his eternal decision with respect to either the elect or the rejected has not been absolutely immune to any con-

[28] *De praedestinatione* IX [5], in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 207, v. 1–3; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 123.

[29] *De praedestinatione* IX [5], in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 207, v. 23–25; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 124.

[30] "Non enim irent nisi destinati neque profecto destinarentur nisi essent praedestinati, quippe cum ipse et ante omnia saecula semper esses, quod ne ad momentum quidem modo quolibet esse potes mutabilis, et per omnia postmodum saecula probareris esse mutatus, si uel ullus quod absit reproborum illuc esset destinatus qui non fuisset praedestinatus." *Confessio prolixior*, 2, in Godescalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 56; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 75.

ceivable alteration. Were we to admit that, and consequently admit that someone eternally preordained in the divine thought to salvation could nevertheless end up as damned, or someone eternally thought by God as a future reprobate could ultimately find himself among the saved, we would thereby introduce some change in the divine will. Yet it is precisely God's eternal thought which ordains predestination, thus not admitting predestination and its predetermining function is tantamount to questioning God's nature as unchangeable Absolute.

By the same token, the difference between God's prescience and His predestination is reduced to naught: God's foreknowledge of a human being's future sinful behaviour is a suffcient basis for predestination of that human being to damnation.[31] It is so, since God's knowledge is always in agreement with predestination which you "had immutably decreed by your irrevocable preordination."[32]

2. Grace, nature and free will.

> If you look at these texts, then you certainly can also see that, just as no one can say that a creature is greater than the creator or something made is greater than its maker, so no one who thinks healthy thoughts can ever say that nature is greater than grace, since grace is of course God and therefore always omnipotent, but nature without grace is altogether powerless. Is not grace God and omnipotent, which gratuitously sets free and saves whomever it wants?[33]

[31] Very telling is Gottschalk's statement in the earliest of his writings – the kind of manifesto titled *Confessio brevior*, where, at the very start he makes the following declaration: "I believe and confess that omnipotent and immutable God has beforehand been possesed of the knowledge of all the future and that He predestined the saint angels and people of his choice to eternal life while He preordained to eternal death the devil himself, the head of all daemons with all the apostate angels and all the rejected people because of his foreknowledge of their future demerits with the verdict of his most just judgment." ("Credo et confiteor deum omnipotentem et incommutabilem praescisse et praedestinasse angelos sanctos et homines electos ad uitam gratis aeternam, et ipsum diabolum caput omnium daemoniorum cum omnibus angelis suis apostaticis et cum ipsis quoque uniuersis hominibus reprobis membris uidelicet suis propter praescita certissime ipsorum propria futura mala merita praedestinasse pariter per iustissimum iudicium suum in mortem merito sempiternam." *Confessio brevior*, in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 52).

[32] "…in praedestinatione quam disposuisti incommutabiliter inretractabili praeordinatione." *Confessio prolixior*, VII [6], in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 61, v. 33 – 62, v. 2.

[33] "Ista si perspicis, profecto simul etiam perspicere potes quod sicut nemo potest dicere maiorem creatore creaturam siue factore facturam sic omnino dicere nemo

In this passage, Gottschalk draws a comparison between the Creator and creature and, correspondingly, between grace and nature, only to point out the absence of any proportion between, respectively, the former and the latter terms of the comparison. He directly invokes the identity of grace and God, with His attributes of omnipotence and omniscience, and this with a consequence: the lack of proportion between grace and nature leads to acknowledging that nature in relation to grace is powerless and in essence almost non-free. The distance between God's power and freedom and that of reasonable creatures is so great in Gottschalk's teaching that it seems to annihilate free initiative and choice on the part of man.

> Therefore, let nature that is being vitiated, wounded, debilitated, corrupted countless times, even thousands of times fall silent, because nature that is uncorrupted cannot be truly compared nor corrupted nature — God forbid! – preferred to the creator. But neither can the incorruptible nature of the sort that is in the most blessed angels and that will at some time be gratuitously in us through grace be so compared or preferred.[34]

Thus in Gottschalk's doctrine, the universe clearly falls into two parts: God, who is the all-poweful and immutable, and nature, which is corrupt and subject to change. Man, with his freedom, is part of that enfeebled nature, the restitution of the fallen human nature can only be effected by some action on God's part, namely that divine action which is grace. Grace, by definition, is a gift which is non-deserved, it is bestowed as a result of a free and autonomous decision on the part of God. In the eschatological perspective grace is the necessary condition of salvation, it is the essential element of the restitution of the cosmic order that has been spoiled by sin, including the restitution of the nature of man. For, as Gottschalk affirms:

> clearly that the grace of God undoubtedly is God. For just as the hand of the Lord, the arm of the Lord, and the mercy of God is God the Son, and just as the

sanum sapiens potest ullo modo gratia maiorem esse naturam, quippe cum gratia sit deus ac per hoc semper omnipotens at natura sine gratia penitus impotens. Annon est gratia deus et omnipotens quae quoscumque uult liberat gratis et saluat?" *De praedestinatione* VII [8], in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 184, v. 28 – 185, v. 7; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, pp. 110–111.

[34] "Conticescat igitur innumeris uicibus immo milibus uitiata uulnerata debilitata corrupta natura quia reuera creatori non potest incorrupta conferri nedum corrupta praeferri quod absit creatura, sed nec incorruptibilis qualis est in beatissimis angelis et quandoque per gratiam erit gratis in nobis." Ibid. p. 185, v. 25 – 186, v. 3; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 111.

> finger of God, the gift of God, and the heart of God is the Holy Spirit, so the grace of God is either God the Son or God the Holy Spirit. Both the Son and the Holy Spirit are called grace because each of them is given to us by God the Father gratuitously.[35]

Thus well founded appears the objection of Hincmar of Reims to the teaching propounded by Gottschalk, that while expatiating on grace, Gottschalk's teaching suffers from lack of consideration of the free will of man.[36]

3. Prescience and predestination.

> […] it is certainly evident and sufficient clear and obvious to anyone with sound wisdom that you have foreknown and predestined instantly, that is, without any interval, that is, at one and the same time before the ages, each and every one of your works, for according to what was said by Isaiah: You have produced the things that will be.[37]

For Gottschalk, prescience and predestination are identical. This follows from the fact that, according to Gottschalk, what God knows is that which was, is, or will be in future, and all these things come to exist as a result of God's act of will, and God knows what He wills to be. All divine acts existed, those of knowing and willing existed eternally as an eternal and immutable project in the mind of God.

> Therefore, Lord, since your will is everlasting along with your foreknowledge […] and since with your omnipotence, to foreknow is the same as to will, at least concerning your works […] and since for you to will is also the same as to have done […] it is undoubtedly clear that whatever is going to be externally in your works has already been done by you in predestination…[38]

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35 "[…] gratiam dei sine dubio deum esse. Sicut enim manus domini dextera domini brachium domini et misericordia dei deus est filius, et sicut digitus dei donum dei et calor dei deus est spiritus sanctus, ita gratia dei uel deus filius est uel deus spiritus sanctus est. Ob id autem tam filius quam spiritus sanctus gratia uocatur quia gratis uterque nobis a deo patre datur." Ibid., p. 185, v. 18–24; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 111

36 J. Pelikan, *The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300)*, vol. 3, p. 82.

37 "[…] liquet prorsus euidenter ac cuiuis sanum sapienti claret omnino satis patenter praescisse et praedestinasse te mox absque ullo scilicet interuallo utpote simul et semel ante saecula, tam cuncta quam singula opera tua, quippe qui iuxta quod dictum est ab Esaia fecisti quae sunt futura." *Confessio prolixior* 3, in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 56, v. 26–31; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, 75.

38 "Igitur cum sempiterna sit domine cum praescientia uoluntas tua […] et apud omnipotentiam tuam de operibus duntaxat tuis hoc sit praescire quod uelle […] mani-

Gottschalk seems to leave out of notice the fact that God's knowledge has greater extension than divine predestination, since God's knowledge includes also the pure possibilities, that is states of affairs that are intrinsically possible, yet are not, destined for realization. Equating divine foreknowledge and predestination necessarily results in making God responsible for all the evil in the existing world. This point was one of the principal objections to Gottschalk's doctrine put forward by his opponents: Hincmar of Reims and Hrabanus Maurus. In the letter to the faithful of Hincmar's diocese entitled *Ad simplices et reclusos suae dioecesis,* the archbishop directly lays his finger upon the absence in Gottschalk's work of the basic distinction between God's prescience and predestination.[39] While God's foreknowledge encompasses equally God's notion of good and evil present in the world, the latter known, but not intended by God, predestination is God's disposition to restitute the order in the world that has been destroyed by man's sin; thus the purpose and ultimate objective of predestination is redemption of creatures from the ties of evil and sin and its final effect is salvation of the just. The punishment of the rejected is not the outcome of predestination, the reprobates are themselves responsible for their damnation.[40]

4. The doctrine on redemption — justice and mercy.

> Let him hear this, who proudly preferred or perhaps still prefers nature to grace. That antiphon that you sing with due reverence concerning the holy cross: "O admirable cross, removal of the wound, restoration of health," overthrows more clearly than daylight and dispels the error that is fabricated as it were concerning the baptized reprobate having been redeemed by it. For since it is certain that this cross neither ever was nor ever is a "removal of wound" or "resto-

festum est procul dubio quicquid foras futurum est in opere iam factum esse a te in praedestinatione…" *Confessio prolixior*, 3, in *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc d'Orbais*, p. 57, v. 5–12; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 76.

39 "[…] confudens praescientiam et praedestinationem dei, docens praedestinatos ad poenam quam nullus praedestinatus quicquid libet vel quantum libet boni agat potest evadere, et nullus praedestinatus ad gloriam quicquid agat mali potest decidere, qui, si sciret et voluisset inter praescientiam et praedestinationem secundum sacras scripturas et catholicam patrum doctrinas discernere non debuisset errare." Hincmarus Archiepisopus Remensis, *Epistola ad simplices suae dioecesis*, in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 8, v. 13–19.

40 Cf. G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii. Epoka średniowiecza*, t. 2, p. 87.

> ration of health" for any of them, it is certainly clear that the redemption of none of them was brought about on it, but only of the elect who alone are believed and recognized to be the world redeemed by Christ's passion, that is, as they as supplicants say to their redeemer.[41]

> For that God did not suffer for the baptized reprobate is clearly seen from the fact that the devil conquers them and subjects them to himself.[42]

Gottschalk's standpoint concerning redemption is clearly unambiguous: 1) Christ died exclusively for the elect, and this follows from the consideration that were He supposed to have died for the damned as well, his death would have to be regarded as futile, at least in part; 2) baptism cleanses away only the sins committed in the past. but not those to be committed in future, thus the redeeming virtue of baptism does not extend to the personal sins through which the baptized damned deserve their destiny; 3) the restitution of the order of creation through redemption is operated through the salvation of the elect and damnation of those justly rejected, because

> that redemption that has been produced by the blood of Christ's cross is proper to and special for the elect only. It is not temporal like the other, but undoubtedly everlasting […] Only the elect were redeemed by this redemption, that is, only those foreknown and predestined to eternal life, those called, justified, and glorified.[43]

To sum up: the controversy surrounding Gottschalk's teaching was set off not by any immediate assumption of his to the effect that God settled in advance the outcome of judgment, but from his attempts logically to devel-

[41] "Audiat istud ille qui nimis tumide naturam praetulit siue fortasse adhuc praefert gratiae. Illa quam de sancta cruce antiphona debita ueneratione cantatis: O crux admirabilis euacuatio uulneris restitutio sanitatis clarius luce subuertit et pellit errorem qui confingitur quasi de redemptis in ea reprobis baptizatis. Namque cum constet quod nullatenus ipsa crux fuerit uel sit ullius illorum euacuatio uulneris uel restitutio sanitatis, patet profecto quod eorum nullius ibi sit facta redemptio sed electorum solummodo qui soli redemptus mundus Christi passione creduntur […]." *De praedestinatione* VII [3], in *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 181, v. 13–12; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 108.

[42] "Quod enim deus non sit pro reprobis baptizatis passus claret illic patenter quod diabolus uincit et sibi subicit eos." *De praedestinatione* XI [5], in Godesalc d'Orbais, *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godesalc d'Orbais*, p. 218, v. 19–21; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, 131.

[43] "Illa uero redemptio quae facta est per sanguinem crucis Christi propria solorum atque specialis electorum est. Non est temporalis ut est illa sed sine dubio sempiterna […] Hac non sunt redempti nisi tantummodo electi soli scilicet ad uitam praesciti et praedestinati uocati iustificati et glorificati." Ibid. [XII], p. 226, v. 22–227, v.7; *Gottschalk & A Medieval Predestination Controversy*, p. 137.

op the obvious assumption that the judgment necessarily implies two consequences, namely a) that punishment is preordained for the rejected. b) the rejected are preordained to punishment. The first implication follows from the very nature of judgment, the other is entailed in the assumption that God's prescience and his predestination are identical. If God's foreknowledge is the predestination, this consequence appears to be necessarily true.[44]

Thus the fundamental problem with Gottschalk's doctrine, the one which resulted in the collision with the catholic orthodoxy and generated all the trouble with the catholic authorities in Gottschalk's own lifetime was the failure to draw a clear distinction between divine prescience and the predestination decreed by God, or perhaps even purposeful identification of the two. Gottschalk often underscores in his writings the close relatedness and simultaneity of the two; this leads him, in the final outcome, to draw inferences resulting in the thesis of double predestination.

CONCLUSIONS

It seems evident that the western theologians of the 9th century suffered under the disadvantage of lack of proper conceptual instruments and vocabulary subtle enough to tackle, analyze and adequately solve all the intricate problems related to the concept of predestination. The failure of the 11th century controversy to produce a clear and well reasoned settlement of this theological problem area left room open for the theologians who came later. To the lot of Anselm of Canterbury in 11th/12th century fell to once again come to grips with this problem and offer a new solution thereof in the perspective of the divine plan or economy of salvation. The relationship between the divine justice and divine mercy and the way both of these relate to the redemption worked by Christ and his death came to be one of the subject matters of Anselm's famous theological treatises, where it formed part of his general theory of salvation. This is mostly discussed in the works *Cur Deus homo* and *De concordia praescientiae, praedestinationis et gratia Dei cum libero arbitrio*.

Anselm's treatment of predestination did not settle the debate: the ever recurring problem of reconciling human freedom with divine prescience and predestination would come up time and again in various Christian

[44] Cf. B.J. Matz, "Augustine in the Predestination Controversy of Ninth Century. Part I: The Double Predestinarians Gottschalk of Orbais and Ratramnus of Corbie," p. 164.

thinkers, as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and later in Luis de Molina and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz; in these later thinkers the complex problem of predestination versus human freedom found more professional treatment and discussion and a solution that was more satisfactory, at least from the point of view of catholic orthodoxy.

On the other hand, the line of thought deriving from late writings of Augustine and gravitating towards the idea of double predestination was perpetuated in the thought of such thinkers as Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290–1349), Gregory of Rimini (died 1358) and John Wycliffe (ca. 1330–1384).

Translated by Roman Majeran

JOHN SCOTUS ERIUGENA: AN ADHERENT OF AUGUSTINE OR PELAGIUS?

Agnieszka Kijewska

1. INTRODUCTION: ERIUGENA'S METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTIVES

Eriugena became involved in the debate with Gottschalk of Orbais on divine predestination by Hincmar, the then archbishop of Rheims and Hincmar's coadjutor Pardulus of Laon.[1] At this juncture he was still a relatively fresh man in the Carolingian context, a newly arrived Irisch scholar who established himself at Charles the Bald's court as head of the famous palace school in 847 and already gained renown as a teacher of liberal arts.[2] Both his expertise in the arts and his familiarity with the patristic literary tradition, especially with the writings of Augustine and Boethius, ensured that his approach to the controversy he had been commissioned to take part in was novel and ingenious. He began by outlining the broad field within which the debate was to be carried out; and, to his mind, the outlines of this field were traced out by the liberal art most concerned with truth and finding thereof, namely the art of disputation — dialectic:

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1 Cf. Eriugena, *Treatise on Divine Predestination* (further: *On praed.*), pref., transl. M. Brennan, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1998, p. 3: "I cannot express the quantity or the quality of the thanks I owe you for having deigned in your generous and great affection to choose e as your collaborator as one having some ability to defend the salvation of us all, namely the catholic faith." Cf. A.P. Stefańczyk, "Doctrinal Controversies of the Carolingian Renaissance: Gottschalk of Orbais Teaching on Predestination," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2017), 3, p. 56 ff.; cf. A. Kijewska, *Eriugena*, Warszawa 2005, p. 19 ff.; A. Kijewska, *Wstęp*, in Jan Szkot Eriugena, *Periphyseon. Księga I*, transl. A. Kijewska, Kęty 2009, p. 21 ff.

2 Cf. M.W. Herren, "Cultures of Grace: Eriugena and Irish Christianity," w: *Eriugena and Creation. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Eriugenian Studies, held in honor of E. Jeauneau*, ed. W. Otten, M.I. Allen, Turnhout: Breopols, 2014, p. 53.

> No man instructed in the art of disputation has any doubt that it is indeed by means of those four parts, as by some useful and honourable fourfold method of human reasoning, that the very art of disputation, which is truth, is arrived at.[3]

Dialectic, according to the definition well established within platonic tradition is the art of composing and dividing concepts (the art of composition and division). Eriugena, following Boethius's directions concerning the procedure of dialectical reasoning, thought it appropriate to precede the controversy by a clarification of the terminology involved and by giving correct definitions to the concepts central to the debate. Evident already at this early point in his career are those characteristic features of his approach which will find the full expression later on, in his *Periphyseon,* especially noteworthy is his concern with precision of reasoning and discussion as a guarantee of arriving at the truth regarding the matter under discussion. Eriugena maintained that the way the debate was carried out essentially predetermined the chances of solving the problem under discussion; only owing to a strict adherence to the rules of the "art of disputation which is truth" we can hope to refute the errors and falsehood of that "propagator of heresy" and "lover of turpitude," Gotschalk. He supported his claim with Augustine's authority stating that the art of disputation provides the best weapon for the task of combatting heresy and for confirmation of the true faith. This double role defines the function of dialectics in the sevice of Christian faith.[4]

The essence of Gottschalk's standpoint is captured by John the Scot with remarkable clarity in the opening section of is *De preasestinatione* in the following words:

> The unavoidable and operative cause of all the just is […] established in one predestination; similarly the cause of the wicked in the other. For one predestination, as he says is of the just, the other of the wicked, so much so that no one, except by the immutable necessity of the one predestination, can either attain to his just reward or to his highest end, that is eternal life, nor anyone, except by an equal necessity of the other, be compelled to sink into the punishment his wickedness merits, or into the eternal torment which is its end.[5]

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[3] Eriugena, *On praed.* I, 2, p. 8; cf. E. Mainoldi (ed.), Giovanni Scoto Eriugena, *De praedestinatione liber. Dialettica e teologia all'apogeo della rinascenza carolingia* (further on: Mainoldi), Firenze 2003, p. 8: "His enim, tanquam utili quodam honestoque humanae ratiocinationis quadriuio, ad ipsam disputandi disciplinam, quae est ueritas, omnis in ea eruditus perueniri non dubitat."

[4] Eriugena, *On praed.* I, 4, p. 10.

[5] Eriugena, *On praed.* I, 4, p. 10; Mainoldi, p. 12: "Iustorum omnium […] ineuitabilis effectiuaque causa constituta est in praedestinatione una, impiorum uero similiter in

This position can be concisely stated by means of the following series of theses; (1) divine predestination is the "unavoidable and operative cause" of all things, those conforming to justice as well as those running counter to what is godly and just; (2) predestination is twofold: one for the just, the other for the godless; (3) hence it follows that divine predestination is the necessary cause of all actions: good and just as well as impious and wicked. Other consequences that obviously follow, although they have not here been openly stated, are: (4) human free will has no meaningful role to play in deciding the course of human action, and this either as concerns good and just deeds or unjust and ungodly ones; (5) God, in consequence, bears the full responsibility for what counts as human deeds: both just and godless. Eriugena's comment on this position is brief:

> This foolish and merciless lunacy is in the first place refuted by divine authority; secondly it is annulled by the rules of right reason.[6]

This concise statement can be seen as containing the methodological creed which guided Eriugena's approach to the problem of predestination as well as other theological and philosophical questions. In dealing with problems having a bearing on matters concerning faith, Eriugena would begin by referring to the scriptural and patristic sources of the matter under discussion and then he would proceed to an analysis of the relevant solutions in the light of "right reason." In the case of the predestination controversy he would first try to point out his opponent's errors in quoting and interpreting the relevant passages from the Scriptures, as well as the authoritative statements by the Fathers, especially St. Augustine. In order to arrive at the correct interpretation of these authorities, Eriugena would employ the whole range of the linguistic (rhetorical) devices at his disposal and then reinforce his rhetorical analysis with dialectical considerations and support his point with suitable reasoned arguments. By means of all these devices he would attempt to prove that at the root of Gottschalk's position there lie erroneous theological and anthropological conceptions (representation of God as bearing responsibility for the evil in the world and of man as a being whose will is not free).

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altera. Vna quippe, ut ait, iustorum est, altera impiorum, in tantum ut nemo nisi necessitate inmutabili unius neque ad iustitiae meritum neque ad finem eius, uitam uidelicet aeternam, possit peruenire, nemo nisi alterius necessitate pari nec in meritum impietatis nec in eius terminum, aeternum quidem supplicium, compellatur cadere."

[6] Ibid.; Mainoldi p. 12: "Quae stultissima crudelissimaque insania primo auctoritate diuina refellitur, deinde uere rationis regulis annullatur."

2. ERIUGENA AND PELAGIAN INFLUENCES IN IRELAND

The title of this chapter has been suggested by Michael W. Herren's considerations as contained in his masterly text *Cultures of Grace: Eriugena and Irish Christianity*, in which the author explores the sources of Eriugena's mind as found in the traditions of his native Ireland, including those preserving some ideas taught by Pelagius.[7] That Pelagius's teachings had been present in Ireland before and in Eriugena's time is known from the letter from the newly elected pope John IV to the church of Ireland written in 640, in which the pontiff voices his concern about the "Pelagian poison" spreading in Ireland.[8] Michael Herren shows how the tradition of Pelagius's writings and doctrines may have survived in Ireland over the 6th and 7th centuries, possibly in the version modified by the council of Orange in 529 and known as semipelagian, and how Eriugena may have gained access to them. Widespread in the Irish milieu was the thesis, ascribed to Pelagius and his followers, that man is capable of living sinless by virtue of his free will alone, while divine grace was reduced to the natural law implanted by God in the structure of the human being. Given these assumptions, it was natural for this interpretation to lay the stress on the inherent goodness of human nature which has not been spoiled in its essence by original sin. Consequently, sin as such was regarded as a matter of individual transgression whose consequences only concerned the individual who committs a sinful act; so Adam's sin was thought to affect his progeny only as a bad example, an example of a breach of the divine law. Thus human beings are not drawn to sinful acts by any necessity resulting from some corruption inherent in their nature since Adam's transgression, if they commit sinful acts, they do so by voluntary misuse of their free will. The fundamental difference between the two diametrically opposed conceptions of original sin: the Augustinian and the Pelagian was graphically expressed in the controversy concerning baptism of infants. While St. Augustine advocated baptism of infants as a means of removing the stigma of original sin inherited from Adam by all human beings and thus opening the way to eternal life for the baptised individual; Pelagius believed that baptism involved conscious

7 Cf. M.W. Herren, "Cultures of Grace," p. 51–83.

8 Cf. ibid., pp. 51, 64.

acceptance of the full committment to Christian life and for this reason should above all be administered to adults.[9]

According to Michael Herren, the Pelagian ideas on Adam's sin and baptism were present in the Irish culture of these ages through Julian of Eclanum's commentary on the Psalms, Pelagius's *Letter to Demetrias* and his commentaries on St. Paul's *Epistles.*[10] Eriugena was in all probability familiar with these works, although he did not quote Pelagius directly in his *On Divine Predestination.* Nevertheless some of Eriugena's critics, such as Florus of Lyons and Prudentius of Troyes, were able to detect hidden Pelagian influences in his work. Prudentius wrote a response entitled *De praesestinatione* (*On Divine Predestination*) to Eriugena's treatise, where he marked with the Greek letter 'theta' (the first letter of the word *thanatos* meaning death) all Scotus's views which he considered heretical.[11]

Michael Herren attempts to show that Eriugena's effort in his *On Divine Predestination* was to find a middle way between Gottschalk's view of divine predestination which he himself attributed to Augustine and the semipelagian stress on the integrity of human will, its freedom and its essential ability to follow the divine commandments. It was in this semi-pelagian spirit that Eriugena viewed the sin of Adam, which, to his mind, had not corrupted human nature as such.[12] Herren believes that in the course of his Irish education Eriugena had the opportunity to become familiar with certain Pelagian ideas which subsequently found expression in his *On Divine Predestination,* including the assumption of "natural good" (*bonum naturale*)[13] which God implanted in human nature, the assertion of freedom of human will which remained undiminished despite Adam's sin and the affirmation that no man is ever punished for sins committed by other human beings (in particular, for Adam's transgression). Eriugena went

9 Cf. ibid., pp. 62–63.

10 Cf. ibid., pp. 68–69.

11 Cf. Prudentius Trecensis, *De praedestinatione* 1012 B, PL 114: "Verba quoque eiusdem Ioannis ut ab eo digesta sunt pluribus locis inserui, praeposito etiam nomine ipsius cum praecedente illud nota quae Graece dicitur *theta* quam sententiis capitalibus damnandorum aliqui praescribere solebant." Cf. ibid., 1045 D, 1046 A, B; 1055 D, 1105 D.

12 Cf. M.W. Herren, "Cultures of Grace," pp. 71–76.

13 Cf. J.C. Thompson, "God's Own Dwelling Place: Oppositions of Nature in the Ninth-Century predestination Debate," in: *Eriugena and Creation*, p. 102 f.

so far as to apply Pelagius's "exegetical technique" to Augustine's texts: when he found there a passage which appeared unacceptable to his way of thinking, he devised an interpretation of it which could be brought to line with his ideas.[14] These heterodox, Pelagian or semi-Pelagian views imbibed by him in his Irish education and inserted into his *On Divine Predestination* were, according to Herren, subsequently reinforced by Eriugena's study of Christian Neoplatonists.[15]

While accepting these observations concerning the sources of the ideas of John Scotus Eriugena and the diverse influences he underwent and came to incorporate, I would like to point to a different context that had its impact on the shape of his work. In the article *Eriugena's "De Praedestinatione": The Project of Rationalisation of Faith and Its Critics* I argued that the disagreements and misconceptions that accompanied the reception of Eriugena's *On Divine Predestination,* and which lead to the condemnation of his work at the councils of Langres (855) and Valence (859) resulted in large measure from the failure of his contemporaries to appreciate the novel conception of scientific study represented by the Irish master, which was based on the program of the seven liberal arts.[16]

Scotus's approach to scientific matters was formed by his extensive studies, and one of the most significant works he came to absorbe was Martianus Capella's textbook *On the Marraige of Philology and Mercury* (*De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*) which contained a brief exposition of all the seven arts; even of more importance was probably his reading of Boethius's textbooks, his theological treatises, his *Introduction to Arithmetic* (*De institutione arithmetica*) and, naturally, his *Consolation of Philosophy* (*De consolatione philosophiae*). As Michael Herren convincingly argued, Eriugena probably studied Capella's textbook in Ireland, before coming to France, since this work only became an obligatory study in the schools on the Continent only in the course of the 9th century, and this probably due to the influence of John Scotus.[17] At least some copies of Boethius's works he probably found in the library at Charles the Bald's court, for instance the

[14] Cf. M.W. Herren, "Cultures of Grace," p. 79.

[15] Ibidem, p. 82.

[16] Cf. A. Kijewska, "Eriugena's *De Praedestinatione*: The Project of Rationalisation of Faith and Its Critics," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2017), 3, pp. 71–98.

[17] Cf. M.W. Herren, "Cultures of Grace," p. 51; cf. I. Ramelli, *Saggio introduttivo*, in: Scoto Eriugena, Remigio di Auxerre, Bernardo Silvestre e Anonimi, *Tutti i commenti a Marziano Capella*, Milano, 2006, p. 57 f.

beautifully illuminated manuscript of Boethius's *Institutio arithmetica* containing an allegorical representation of the arts of *quadrivium* as forming the fourfold road to heaven. The arts of *quadrivium* open for the mind the way to heaven since they study the number in its fourfold aspect and the number ultimately refers to the divine, as the exemplar patterns of all creatures that subsist in the Divine Mind have a numerical aspect.[18] The link between the temporal and the heavenly provided by the study of numbers, that is of the arts of *quadrivium* is represented in Capella by the allegory of the nuptials of Philology, who is an earthly being, and the god Mercury: Philology is divinized by the services of the personalized liberal arts. Eriugena famously grasped this idea of divinization by means of the study of liberal arts in his oft-quoted adage: "No one enters heaven unless through philosophy" ("Nemo intrat in caelum nisi per philosophiam").[19] In much the same vein, in his *On Divine Predestination*, he affirms, closely following Augustine: "… true philosophy is true religion and conversely, true religion is true philosophy" ("… veram esse philosophiam veram religionem conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam").[20] Drawing support from textbooks by Boethius and Capella, which provided essential inspiration for the reform of studies carried out as part of the Carolingian renaissance, Eriugena proposed a novel approach to theological studies, combining respect for authoritative tradition with reliance on philosophically based speculation. Philosophy, which in the 9th century was in fact coextensive with the liberal arts, was, in Eriugena's approach, a prerequisite for any serious theological discussion. The complete set of the liberal arts comprised, in Eriugena's time, the arts of the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and dialectics) and the arts of the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy). The order established by the course of the liberal arts (the *trivium* preceding the *quadrivium*) should be observed in any serious consideration of matters based on authoritative texts. Mindful of this directive, Eriugena, like his model Boethius, would begin any discussion by clarifying the terminology concerning the discussed matters, starting from enumeration of the simplest and most basic concepts or "common

[18] Cf. L.E. Cochrane, "Secular Learning and Sacred Purpose in a Carolingian Copy of Boethius's De Institutione Arithmetica (Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Msc. Class 5)," *Peregrinations: Journal of Medieval Art and Architecture* 5 (2015), 1, pp. 10–14.

[19] Cf. Eriugena, *Annotazioni a Marziano* II, 57, 15, in: Ramelli, *Tutti i commenti a Marziano Capella*, p. 207.

[20] Eriugena, *On praed.* I, 1, p. 7; Mainoldi, p. 6.

conceptions" (*conceptiones communes*), then proceding to introduce suitable distinctions, in this way laying the foundation for consideration of the matter in hand according to the rules of reason. True to the spirit of the liberal arts, in accordance with the precepts of the art of rhetoric, he would take into consideration diverse ways of speaking on the matter under consideration in order to ascertain the correct meaning of the relevant texts. Finally, in the light of the universal conception of reality he would proceed to the statement and solution of the discussed problem.

With this methodology in his mind, in his treatise *On Divine Predestination*, Eriugena undertakes his polemic against Gottschalk starting by clarifying the fundamental notions involved in the debate: the conceptions of God and man and, in particular, the notion of free will. He firmly believes that particular problems can only be solved in a satisfactory way in a perspective embracing the whole of the matter concerned, and ultimately, within the theoretical framework encompassing the whole of reality.

3. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

Already in the opening chapters of his *On Divine Predestination* Eriugena places his discussion of the predestination problem in the context of the more fundamental problem, namely that of the correct conception of God, being aware that different solutions of that problem imply and depend upon different conceptions of God.

If divine predestination be construed both as the expression of God's will and as a form of necessity ruling the occurrence of definite phenomena, Eriugena observes, what will result therefrom is contradiction, since "where there is inevitability there is no will." So there can be no predestination setting limits or otherwise ruling the divine will and no one can truly say that what comes about by God's will, comes about by (absolute) necessity:

> God made all that he made of his own will and out of no necessity. For what could compel God to create anything? But if some cause did compel him to create, we would be right in believing that it is greater and better than he. And for that reason it, and not he, would be worshipped as the supreme cause of all things and as God. But if we devoutly believe and correctly understand that the one and Chief cause of the entire universe is the will of God, it is vain to imagine that necessity is either in that will or prior to it. Come now: if all that is in God is God, and if the will of God is in God, the will of God is, therefore, God. For him there is no distinction between being and willing; rather for him being is

> identical with willing. Accordingly, if the will of God is free- and to believe otherwise is wicked — and if the free will is devoid of all necessity, then no necessity has hold of the will of God […]. But all necessity is excluded from the divine will. Therefore it is excluded from his predestination.[21]

Thus if predestination is the expression of the Divine Will, and the Divine Will (A) is identical with the Divine Substance, then we ought to reject any necessity prior to the divine predestination, since such necessity would be incompatible with the freedom of the Divine Will. Eriugena anticipates possible objections to the line of reasoning adopted by himself: it is possible to claim that divine predestination is no attribute of the Divine Nature as such, in other words, divine predestination is nor predicated of God substantially, but only relatively. The distinction between substantial and relative predication of God used by John Scotus to formulate this objection to his thesis derives from one of Boethius's theological *opuscula*, where substantial predication of God is distinguished from that which is said of God in respect of something else.[22]

In his response to this anticipated objection Eriugena adopts Augustine's description of divine predestination as "preparation and arrangement" of all temporal beings:

> For divine predestination is, as Augustine says, the preparation and arrangement before time began, when nothing existed except God alone. If, then, we believe and understand that before time began nothing existed except God alone — but that God's predestination existed before all creation no sane person disputes — the inference is that God's predestination is God himself and belongs to his nature.[23]

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[21] Eriugena, *On praed.* II, 1, p. 11–12; Mainoldi, p. 14: "Deus quidem omnia quae fecit sua propria uoluntate, nulla uero necessitate fecit. Quid enim cogeret deum ut aliquid faceret? Quod si aliqua eum causa compelleret ad faciendum, ea merito maior meliorque eo crederetur […]. Si uero una et principalis totius uniueristatis causa uoluntas dei et pie creditur et recte intelligitur, frustra in ipsa vel ante ipsam necessitas fingitur. Age iam! Si omne quod in deo est deus est, uoluntas aute dei in deo est, deus est igitur dei uoluntas. Non enim aliud est ei esse et uelle ; sed quod est ei esse, hoc est et uelle. Proinde si uoluntas dei liber est – aliter enim credere impium est – libera uero uoluntas omni caret necessitate […]. Expulsa est autem omnis necessitas a diuina uoluntate; igitur expulsa est ab eius praedestinatione."

[22] Cf. Boethius, *Whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be substantially predicated of the Divinity,* in : *The Theological* Tractates, transl. H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, Cambridge, Mas., Harvard, 1968, p. 37 f.

[23] Eriugena, *On praed.* II, 2, p. 12; Mainoldi, p. 14: "*Est enim diuina praedestinatio,* ut ait augustinus, *omnium quę deus facturus est ante saecula praeparatio atque dispo-*

Eriugena readily embraces Augustine's view that predestination, which is a special form of divine prescience, must be an attribute belonging to the Divine Nature (rather than something attributable to God only in respect to something else). Since God is the Supreme Intellect (B), in which all things intelligible exist, therefore all knowledge (including prescience) and wisdom belong to His substance. To conceive of God first and foremost in terms of mind is a mark of Eriugena's intellectualism in his approach to theological matters, which in the course of time would be ever more accentuated, with the impact of his reading Christian Neoplatonists (Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor) coming to reinforce his original attitude.

God's knowledge and foreknowledge (*praenotio, praescientia*), which are essentially the same thing (as God is not subject to the flow of time) are more extensive categories than the category of predestination; in fact the latter is included in the former: all predestination is foreknowledge (prescience), though not all foreknowledge is predestination. The (divine) knowledge is "…only then aptly called predestination, when it is seen in God's actions." this location of predestination within God's mind is enough reason for Eriugena to conclude that "predestination in God is present according to substance, and by no means can it be present (in God) in a relative way."[24]

In his work Eriugena repeatedly lays strong emphasis on the fact that the categories related to time and space do not really concern God as he is in Himself and can only be referred to Him metaphorically and not properly.[25] If things were otherwise, some measure of mutability would have to be admitted in God, yet one of God's essential attributes is His absolute immunity to any change whatever (C), a point already forcefully made by St. Augustine in his teaching.[26] If, nevertheless we frequently employ this metapho-

sitio. Si ergo ante saecula nihil creditur et intelligitur praeter solum deum fuisse, praedestinationem autem dei ante omnem creaturam esse nullus sanus ambigit, colligitur praedestinationem dei ipsum deum esse atque ad naturam eius pertinere." Cf. St. Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* XVII, 41, in: St. Augustine, *Four Anti-Pelagian Writings*, ed. Th. P. Halton, Washington, 1992, p. 310.

[24] Eriugena, *On praed.* II, 5, p. 14–15; Mainoldi, p. 20: "Huius ergo ratiocinationis conexione conficitur praedestinationem in deo secundum substantiam esse, relatiue autem fieri non posse." Por. Eriugena, *On praed.* XI, 7, p. 76.

[25] Eriugena will systematically develop this topic in his *Periphyseon,* where he will systematically treat, among other problems, the question in what sense the Aristotelian categories can be predicated of God. Cf. A. Kijewska, *Wstęp*, in: *Periphyseon. Księga I*, pp. 39–50.

[26] Eriugena, *On praed.* VIII, 6, p. 54.

rical way of speaking and refer to God our notions related to time and space, we do this to compensate for the poverty of our comprehension relative to God. Thus, reduced to our spatio-temporal way of representing things to ourselves, we cannot help using spatio-temporal metaphors with reference to God's knowledge and so we speak about divine *fore*-knowledge or *pre*-science and *pre*-destination, whereas what we refer to is in reality the highest, the simplest and entirely a-temporal form of knowledge: the divine knowledge:

> For in that regard it might be said that God has foreknowledge of something by foreknowledge, or foreordains by predestination, when to him nothing is in the future, because he awaits nothing, nothing is past because for him nothing passes. In him, just as there are not distances of places, so there are no intervals of times. And because of this no right reasoning permits such terms to be understood of God with the claim to be literal.[27]

The next essential attribute of the Divine Substance to come under Eriugena's consideration in his *On Divine Predestination* is the divine essence's absolute unity and indivisibility (D). True, man applies to God various names and descriptions, yet this is only the result of the imperfection of human comprehension and by no means of any complexity found in the Divine Nature.[28] The realization of this fact has momentous implications for the solution of the problem of predestination: on the strength of this constatation it can be argued that no double form of predestination can be allowed in God, on pain of destroying the perfect unity of the Divine Substance:

> Then if it is irreverent to teach that there are two essences in God, or two wisdoms, knowledges, virtues; and that all the other qualities attributed to God are doubled or trebled ore heaped up in some kind of multiple fashion, anyone who is proved to have stated that there are two predestinations in God is involved in the charge of ungodliness. For there is one divine predestination, just as there is one divine operation, on divine wisdom, one divine substance, one divine will. Say then, Gottschalk, where can one find those two predestinations which you affirm?[29]

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[27] Ibidem, IX, 5, p. 62; Mainoldi, s. 94–96 : "Qua enim ratione diceretur deus praescire aliquid prescientia uel praedestinare praedestinatione, cui nihil futurum, quia nihil expectat, nihil praeteritum, quia nihil ei transit. In eo enim, sicut nulla locorum spacia sunt, ita nulla temporum interualla. Ac per hoc nulla recta ratio permittit talia de deo iure proprietatis intelligi."

[28] Cf. ibid., II, 3, p. 14.

[29] Ibidem, II, 6, p. 15; Mainoldi, s. 22 : "Deinde si impium est duas essentias in deo doceri, uel duas sapientias, scientias, uirtutes, ceteraque omnia quae de deo dicuntur, geminari uel triplicari uel quacunque multiplici specie cumulari, quicunque du-

The unity of divine substance thus becomes for Eriugena the starting point for his arguments against double predestination. Another argument against God preordaining some creatures for eternal condemnation takes the unity of the Divine Substance as the principal assumption, but in contrast to the one quoted above, proceeds "from effects to cause." The most important premise of this argument is the statement that opposed effects require opposed causes, so one and the same cause cannot produce effects that are mutually opposed. If one predestination is responsible for evil, sin and death and another kind of predestination is the source of justice and beatitude, both of these cannot dwell in God, who is perfect unity, and being perfectly one, cannot be the cause of mutually contrary effects. Thus there is no logical possibility for there being in God two predestinations, if these "can produce different and mutually opposed effects."[30]

John Scotus proceeds to enrich his arsenal of arguments with one more significant element, well known in Platonic tradition, namely the privative ontology of evil. The supposed effects of the predestination to damnation are: evil, sin and suffering, but all these things belong in the category of that "which is not," so it is impossible for God, the supreme being, to be the cause thereof. Eriugena states this as follows:

> But God is the cause of those things that are. Therefore he is not the cause of those things that are not. Sin and its effect, death, to which unhappiness is conjoined, are not. Of them, therefore, neither God nor his predestination, which is what he himself is, can be the cause.[31]

Eriugena is keen to throw light on the remoter and less obvious consequences of the double predestination thesis. On the assumption of double predestination: one to salvation, the other to damnation, and given that divine predestination imposes necessity upon the events it projects that no finite agent can escape, we end up with the unavoidable conclusion that

as in deo praedestinationes asserere conuincitur, reatu impietatis ligatur. Vna est enim diuina praedestinatio, sicut una est diuina operatio, diuina sapientia, diuina substantia, diuina uoluntas. Dic ergo, g[otescalce], ubi possunt inueniri duae praedestinationes tuae, quas astruis?"

[30] Ibidem, III, 2, s. 18; Mainoldi, p, 28: "Relinquitur ergo in deo duas non esse praedestinationes quae inter se discordantia et efficiant et fieri cogant."

[31] Eriugena *On praed.* III, 3, p. 19; Mainoldi, p. 28 : "Est autem deus eorum causa quę sunt. Igitur non est causa eorum quae non sunt. Peccatum eiusque effectus, mors profecto cui adheret miseria, non sunt. Eorum igitur nec deus nec eius praedestinatio, quae est quod ipse est, causa esse potest."

God is the sole agent ultimately responsible for the evil in the world. Yet this conclusion is manifestly false, as John Scotus resolutely affirms:

> Evil, then, neither is God nor from God. And for this reason, just as God is not the author of evil, so has he not foreknowledge of evil nor does he predestine it.[32]

In this Platonic context it is assumed as a self-evident truth that God is the first and the only ultimate cause of everything that can be said to be (E), although it is only God Himself that can be said to be in the absolute sense, all other existent things have their being from God and thus their being is derivative. Privations and negations, including evil, are non-being and, therefore, contrary to God, who alone is being without any qualification:

> And this is not surprising since nothing is contrary to God except non-being, because he alone it is who said: "I am who am"; but other things also that are said to exist do not entirely exist, because they are not what he is, and they do not entirely not exist, because they are from him who alone is being.[33]

All this is a modification of the Neoplatonic and Augustinian ontology. In his mature work, the *Periphyseon*, John Scotus would go one step further in highlighting the absolute difference between the Divine Nature and the nature of created things and, not shrinking from paradox, would affirm that if a creature is said to be a being, that is some definite and thus finite and circumscribed substance (*diffinita substantia*), then God must be said to be "Non-being because of its excellence" („Nihil per excellentiam").[34]

Gottschalk's errors as brought to light by Eriugena's discussion result from combined misconceptions, erroneous interpretations and misattributions. The double predestination thesis attributed by Gottschalk to St. Augustine is supported by him with quotes derived in fact from Isidore of Seville.[35] The

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[32] Eriugena *On praed.* X, 3, p. 67; Mainoldi, p. 102 : "Malum igitur nec deus nec a deo est. Ac per hoc, sicut deus mali auctor non est, ita nec prescius mali nec praedestinans est "; cf. ibid. XV, 4, p. 195.

[33] Eriugena, *On praed.* IX, 4, s. 61; Mainoldi, p. 94 : "Nec mirum, cum nihil deo contrarium sit, nisi non esse, quoniam ipse solus est qui dixit : *Ego sum qui sum,* cetera uero quae dicuntur esse nec omnino sunt, quia non sunt quod ipse est, nec omnino non sunt, quia ab ipso sunt qui solus est esse." Goulven Madec draws attention to the Augustinian background of the passage. Cf. St. Augustine, *Confessions* VII, 10. Por. G. Madec, "L'augustinisme de Jean Scot dans le *De praedestinatione*," in *Jean Scot Erigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, R. Roques (ed.), Paris 1977, p. 188.

[34] Cf. A. Kijewska, *Eriugena,* pp. 52–60; A. Kijewska, *Neoplatonizm Jana Szkota Eriugeny*, Lublin 1994, pp. 109–114.

[35] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* III, 4, p. 20. Cf. B.J. Matz, "Augustine in the Predestination

supposed double nature of divine predestination is illustrated with the example of the two-fold nature of the commandment of love, which is divided, as it were, between the love of God and the love of one's neighbour. Yet Gottschalk has got his illustration all wrong, he mistook the doubleness of the prescribed object of love for an alleged double nature of the love itself:

> Indeed, nothing is loved in all respects, except love, which is you, single, undivided and immutable substance, and nothing loves completely except you, the indissoluble bond by which all things are held together. Therefore you love; you are loved; and so your commandment is called twin, since partly you command that you be loved in yourself with no nature intervening, partly that you be loved in our neighbor with created nature interposed. It is on this account, then, o undivided unity, that we must believe you to be twin?[36]

All in all, Eriugena, by various arguments, succeeds in vindicating his point: there cannot be but a single predestination and this is the only solution compatible with the conception of God as received from the Patristic and Neoplatonic tradition. According to this conception God is the Supreme Intellect (B), which comprehends (prescience/*praenotio*) all things that exist or can exist, and it is through this act of supreme comprehension (predestination) that things receive their being. Predestination is a form of knowledge which is combined with a kind of "action" by God and thus we rightly say it is the result of the Divine Will (A), which in itself is absolutely free and subject to no necessity of whatever kind. The unity of predestination and knowledge in God is a consequence of the unity of the Divine Substance (D), in which there is no plurality or diversity, and no form of mutability (C). Divine predestination is the efficient cause (E) of the existence of all things (except God Himself) and so it extends only to things that are, and by no means can extend its efficient action to things that are

Controversy of Nine Century. Part I: The Double Predestinarians Gottschalk of Orbais and Ratramnus of Corbie," *Augustinian Studies* 46 (2015), 2, p. 156; cf. M. Michałowska, "Spór o predestynację w renesansie karolińskim: De praedestinatione Jana Szkota Eriugeny," *Etyka* 37 (2004), p. 51.

[36] Eriugena, *On praed.* III, 6, p. 22, Mainoldi, p. 32: "Nihil enim amatur in omnibus, nisi dilectio, quae tu es, simplex, indiuidua, incommutabilisque substantia, et nihil perfecte diligit nisi tu, uinculum insolubile, quo continentur omnia. Tu itaque diligis, tu diligeris; ideoque preceptum tuum geminum dicitur. Partim siquidem iubes ut nulla interposita natura diligaris in temet ipsa, partim interposita creata natura diligaris in proximo. Nunquid propter hoc, indiuidua unitas, debemus te credere esse geminam?" Cf. M. Michałowska, "Spór o predestynację," p. 54 f.

not. The results of the efficient power of divine predestination encompass rational beings, capable of understanding and contemplation, as John Scotus states in the following:

> For it is the willing cause and the causative will of all creatures, among which it created a rational creature to understand it, in order that it could enjoy its own highest good, that is, the contemplation of its creator. And it bestowed upon it its gift, namely that of free choice of its will, so that by using that gift well, that is by obeying dutifully and humbly the command of its creator, it would always justly and happily live. But if it used the same gift badly, that is, to abandon the highest good, namely its creator, and to cling with perverse will to corruptible goods, unhappiness would duly follow as punishment.[37]

With this quote the problem of predestination is related to man, who is the creature possessed of free will. The purpose of human life is voluntary contemplation of the Creator and the fruit of this contemplation is happiness. Yet voluntary contemplation would not be possible without free will and thus the true conception of human nature and destiny must include freedom and free choice. So it is worthwhile to take a closer look at Eriugena's anthropological conception and the place the faculty of willing occupies in the structure of man.

4. THE NATURE OF MAN

Conception of human nature lies at the center of the debate between the Pelagian and Augustinian positions. Eriugena is clear about it, as the following quote shows:

> In short, this new sect agrees with the Pelagian in that it declares that a gift of freely given grace is of no advantage to man in the exercise of justice, but only the necessity of predestination is of advantage; it disagrees with it in that it has totally ruled out the power of free choice as having no force either for doing good or committing sin, shamelessly placing all these acts within the necessity of predestination. But, in that it strives to remove the desire for free choice, it

[37] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 5, p. 28–29; Mainoldi, p. 44 : "Est enim omnium creaturarum causa uoluntaria et uoluntas causatiua; inter quas rationalem creaturam condidit ad se intelligendam, ut summo sui bono, hoc est creatoris sui praecepto pie humiliterque oboediendo, iuste atque beate semper uiueret. Si uero eodem munere male uteretur, quod est summum bonum, creatorem uidelicet suum, deserere corruptibilibusque bonis uoluntate sua peruersa inhaerere, debita miseria poenaliter sequereretur."

> appears to side with those opposed to the Pelagian, to which it again reverts when it agrees that gifts of divine grace are of no profit to man.[38]

Eriugena represents Gottschalk's position so as to show that it is opposed both to the conception of man as a being endowed with free will and to the conception of God as not only the Maker of man, but also his supporter and helper bestowing gifts of grace on him. The necessity implied by predestination takes away human freedom of choice and, consequently, destroys autonomy of human activity. Seen from God's perspective, necessity imposed by predestination removes possibility of grace, which presupposes freedom of will both on the part of God and on the part of man, and denies an efficient influence of grace upon man.

> For freedom, either of grace or of will, has no place where there is an unchangeable captivity of nature.[39]

To reject decisively the necessity of predestination and thus vindicate both freedom of human will and divine grace Eriugena turns to a sure thesis belonging to faith (fortress of unshakeable faith), on the basis of which he carries out an apodictic reasoning (*apodeiktike*) proving that "grace is of God and has power to save the world."[40] This recourse to an article of faith as the starting point for his argument means that John Scotus follows the path traced out by St. Augustine, who believed that in matters concerning the abstruse questions concerning God and human salvation faith should have temporal precedence before intelligence, as he repeatedly stated: *credo ut intelligam* and *Nisi credideritis non intelligetis*.[41] The article of faith taken by Eriugena as the ground for his reasoning states that the salvation of the

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[38] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 2, p. 26; Mainoldi, p. 38: "Hec igitur noua secta pelagianę consentit in eo quod donum gratiae gratuitę nihil homini prodesse asserit ad faciendam iustitiam, sed solam praedestinationis necessitatem; ab ea uero dissentit eo quod uires liberi arbitrii penitus euacuauit, neque ad bene facere neque ad mala comittere praeualere, omnia haec in necessitate praedestinationis inpudentissime ponendo. Ast in eo quod appetitum liberi arbitrii laborat auferre aduersantibus pelagiane uidetur consentire, cui iterum resultat, dum dona diuine gratie nihil homini proficere commendat."

[39] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 4,p. 28; Mainoldi, p. 42: "Non enim locum habet aut gratie aut uoluntatis libertas, ubi est nature inmutabilis captiuitas."

[40] Eriugena, *On praed.*, IV, 3, p. 26; Mainoldi, p. 40: ...gratiam dei esse et ad mundi salutem praeualere."

[41] Cf. E. TeSelle, "Faith," in *Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia,* A.D. Fitzgerald (ed.), Cambridge 1999, p. 347; G. Madec, "L'augustinisme de Jean Scot," p. 190.

world has been worked by means of divine grace, whose reality, therefore cannot be denied. Another, closely related, article of faith concerns the idea of the Last Judgment, which presupposes free choice on the part of man, since the Last Judgment is thought to be the ultimate triumph of justice over wickedness, which would be unthinkable without the assumption of free will and on the presupposition of the necessity imposed by predestination. These assumptions provided by Christian faith define the fundamental perspective for Eriugena's discussion:

> Accordingly the conclusion is that both the choice of man and the gift of grace are free, because it is conceded that the salvation of the world has come and there will be judgement. The king's highway must then be trodden with no turning aside to right or left, which means that free choice must not be defended in such a way that good works are attributed to it without the grace of God; nor must grace be so defended that, as it were from the safety afforded by it, evil deeds may be habitually performed.[42]

Eriugena clearly shows that on the presupposition of Christian faith, the only acceptable interpretation of divine predestination is the conception of it as a free, and thus not necessary, efficient action of God which carries into effect God's designs with respect to man. The beatitude of man is the purpose of God's project, yet even man's ultimate happiness does not come into effect of necessity, since man is free to reject the means for its achievement offered by God. God, having made man in His own image and likeness and having endowed him with free will, does not compel him to follow either the way of beatitude or that of damnation. The higher beauty and order of the Universe can only be achieved by removing the ties of absolute necessity from it and making room for freedom on the part of creation.

Yet what conception of man is called for to suit and support this conception of predestination?

In his anthropology Eriugena follows Augustine in affirming that in his innermost ontological structure man is an image (*imago*) of God, who is both Unity as far as His nature is concerned and Trinity of persons. In an analogous way the human substance is constituted by three distinct though

[42] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 3, p. 27; Mainoldi, p. 40–42: "Conclusum est igitur et liberum hominis esse arbitrium et gratię donum, ex eo quod concessum est et salutem mundi uenisse et iudicium esse futurum. Via igitur regia gradiendum nec ad dexteram nec ad sinistram diuertendum, hoc est, ne sic defendatur liberum arbitrium ut ei bona opera sine dei gratia tribuantur, nec sic defendatur gratia, ut, quasi de illa securi, mala opera diligantur."

inseparable elements: being, knowing and willing: "For he is and he wills and he knows; he wills to be and to know, he knows that he is and that he wills."[43] This terse formula, reminiscent of Augustine's anthropology, is intended to grasp the innermost structure of the human essence, which represents a special case of unity realized through plurality. The identified component elements of human essence can only be separated by thought and not in reality, which allows Eriugena to speak of human will as rational: "rational will," as essentially related (though not absolutely identical) to intellect and reason. The essential features of this "rational will" are: freedom, rationality and mutability.[44] Eriugena would subsequently, in his *Periphyseon,* develop his representation of human mind into the conception of *cogito*, which, in my opinion, looks forward to Husserl and his conception of the constitution of the object in the mind as well as backwards to Augustine's theory of human mind. In Eriugena's *Periphyseon*, human intellect is regarded as the place, the "workshop" (*officina*), where the created reality is constituted.[45] No doubt, however, that Augustinian influence is strongly resonant in *On Divine Predestination*: self -knowledge is seen as an essential feature of man: a human being is immediately aware of his/her being, knowing and willing, and the fact of his/her own being is indubitable to him/herself, just as is the case in Augustine (cf. "si enim fallor, sum").[46]

Eriugena makes much of the fact that human essence, consisting as it does of the three essential elements (being, knowing, willing), is nevertheless an essential unity and none of these elements can be lost without the whole human nature being destroyed. This statement turns out to be of essential importance for the discussion of the problem what consequences resulted from original sin for the human nature and the way it functions. This problem received different solution from the opposed traditions: Pelagian and Augustinian. The latter tradition emphasized the catastrophic nature of original sin and its consequences for humanity which inherited from Adam the corruption of human nature resulting therefrom. By contrast, Pelagians believed that Adam's sin did not essentially weaken human nature

[43] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 6, p. 29; Mainoldi, p. 46 : "Est enim et ult et scit, uult se esse et scire, scit se esse et uelle."

[44] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* VIII, 6, p. 54.

[45] Cf. A. Kijewska, "Human Mind as Manifestation of God's Mind in Eriugena's Philosophy," *Anuario filosófico* 49 (2016), p. 361 f.

[46] Cf. St. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans* XI, 26, transl. R.W. Dyson, Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 484.

and Adam's transgression was no more than a "bad example," an instance of morally improper behavior.[47]

> What, then, did the first man have before sinning that he lost after sin? For up to then he did not have the life of happiness which was to have been bestowed on him if he kept the commandment. If we say it was free will he had, then he lost his nature. But if reason points out that no nature can perish, we are forbidden to say that he lost free will, which without doubt is a substance.[48]

Eriugena, thus, cannot accept the conception that original sin should have caused essential damage to human nature and its constitution, in particular, Adam's sin did not result in a loss of will or freedom of human will, since free will is an essential feature of human nature and thus its loss would mean destruction of that nature. Nevertheless, Scotus is willing to admit that man did lose something as a consequence of original sin, what was lost in fact was facility and effectiveness of the execution of decisions made by human will. In order to understand this statement correctly we must refer to John Scotus's distinction between free will and free choice. To Scotus, free will is a power of human soul, whereas an act of free choice is an action of a human soul caused by a power contained within that human soul, so it can be said that an act of free choice is an effect that depends solely on the human being that performs it and does not depend on anything outside that human being. This point is developed in the *Periphyseon,* where Eriugena, using the terms of Neoplatonic ontology, affirms that there are three constitutive elements distinguishable in every created nature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which are inseparable from one another and indestructible (so long as that nature exists). These elements are *ousia*/*essentia, dynamis*/*virtus* and *energeia*/*operatio.*[49] Using this termi-

[47] Cf. A. Kijewska, "The Augustinian Sources of the Controversy concerning Predestination," in this volume.

[48] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 6, p. 29; Mainoldi, p. 46: "Quid ergo primus homo habuit ante peccatum, quod perdidit post peccatum? Non enim adhuc habebat uitam beatam quae ei tribuenda fuerat, si praeceptum seruaret. Si dixerimus liberam uoluntatem, perdidit igitur suam naturam. Si autem ratio edocet nullam naturam posse perire, prohibemur dicere liberam uoluntatem perdidisse, quae sine dubio substantialis est."

[49] Cf. Eriugena, *Periphyseon* I 490 A-B, transl. J.J. O'Meara, Bellarmin, Dumbarton Oaks, Montreal, Washington 1987, p. 82: "For there are these three things which in every creature, whether corporeal or incorporeal […] are incorruptible [and inseparable]: *ousia*, as we have often said, *dynamis, energeia*, that is, Essence, Power, its natural Operation."

nology we can say that one of the constitutive elements of the essence (*essentia*) of man is free will, whose power (*virtus*) is the ability to perform acts (*operationes*) of free choice. In Eriugena's own words:

> Into our nature too he introduced a cause by which we could ourselves move freely, reasonably, voluntarily, towards the pursuit of those ends to which it had been intended that we should attain. That motion is rightly called the free choice of our will because it is subject to our control. For we would be able, according to our judgment, to direct it on the right course; we would also be able to restrain it.

Further on in his work he adds:

> To him we owe it to return inexpressible thanks not only for creating, by the abundance of his goodness, the nature of our mind as rational, free, voluntary and mobile, but also because by the favour of his bounty he arranged that we could move at our own pleasure rationally, freely and voluntarily. This movement is granted to no living thing apart from man.[50]

As is made evident by these quotes, human will and its ability to move freely, that is its freedom, are integral elements of the essential structure of man and cannot be lost without destruction of the human nature as such. There is, however, another feature involved in human action, certain facility and promptness in the use of his will and in performing his acts of choice, which is referred to by Eriugena with the terms of "power" (*potestas*) and "vigour" (*vigor*), and which is no part of human nature, but a certain gift of the Creator. By sinning, that is by turning his will away from God, man did not lose anything that belonged to his nature, in particular he did not lose the freedom of his will, but he did lose the facility in the use of his will, which was no essential feature of his nature, but a gift of grace. Eriugena again seeks support for his affirmation in Augustine, in particular he refers to the latter's *On the Gift of Perseverance* where it is stated that the strength/power of free will was part of the dignity of man in his original

[50] Eriugena, *On praed.* VIII, 7, p. 55; Mainoldi, p. 84: "Nostrae quoque naturae inseruit causam, qua nosmet ipsos possemus mouere libere, rationabiliter, uoluntarie, ad ea quae nobis sequenda fuerant assequenda. Qui motus merito uocatur liberum arbitrium nostrae uoluntatis, quoniam potestati nostrae subiectus est. Possemus quippe pro nostro iudicio recto cursu eum dirigere, possemus cohibere. […] Cui debemus ineffabiles gratias reddere, non solum quod naturam nostrae mentis bonitatis suae copia condiderit rationalem, liberam, uoluntariam, mobilem, sed quod nobis largitatis suę munere concesit, proprio nostro nutu rationabiliter, libere, uoluntarie posse nos mouere. Qui motus nulli animalium praeter hominem concesus est."

state and was lost as a result of man's fall; yet this strength of will is still evident in angels.[51] John Scotus states this as follows:

> Or perhaps by sinning he lost the strength of free will and power by which on its own he could keep the commandment if he so wished? And in this way, the strength and the power of free choice was not in the first man by way of substance but by grace of the creator; he lost that great gift by wrongly exercising the free choice of will.[52]

As we can see from the above, there are two kinds of features in man: some of them belong to the substance of man, and these cannot be lost without that substance ceasing to exist, while other features belong to man only accidentally and can be removed without destruction of the substance. Whatever belongs to the substance of man is the effect of the action by Divine Goodness (*Bonitas*), while all the non-necessary attributes with which human nature has been decorated are the work of Divine Largesse (*Largitas*).[53] In contrast to the essential features that make up human nature and cannot be taken back by the Creator, the gifts of Divine Largesse, which form what is called grace, can be withdrawn from man for some reason or other. Human will and the freedom thereof are part of human nature and are, therefore, irremovable, not even as a result of Adam's fall. What has been lost as a result of Adam's transgression is the divine gift consisting in the facility and the effectiveness of action by the faculty of free choice. If man had not sinned, this easy and effective freedom of choice would have become an ability to avoid sin altogether, a perfection that now is a feature of angels granted them by grace. Before original sin, human will was able to carry out its decisions with ease, yet as a result of the fall this facility of execution has been lost, although the will's ability to make choices has been preserved, since, being an integral part of human nature as such, it could not have been lost without destruction of man.

This line of thinking suggests, that John Scotus's concern was to propose a theory that would both preserve the integrity of human nature even after the fall of Adam and at the same time concede that some deplorable consequences for man and the way he acts nevertheless resulted from the

[51] Cf. St. Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance* VII, 13–14, p. 281–282.

[52] Eriugena, *On praed.* IV, 6, p. 30; Mainoldi, p. 46: "An forte liberę uoluntatis uigorem potestatemque, qua sola potuit custodire praeceptum, si uellet, peccando perdidit? Ac per hoc uigor et potestas liberi arbitrii non erat in primo homine ex substantia sed ex creatoris gratia. Quod magnum munus amisit male utens libero uoluntatis arbitrio!"

[53] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.*, IV, 3, p. 26–27.

first sin. In this way he attempts to steer a middle way between the proponents of the Pelagian doctrine and the followers of Augustine. To quote his own statement:

> From this, one is given to understand that the first will of man was created naturally free so that something nevertheless should be added to it if it wished to keep God's commandment. And just as the animal body was capable of dying because it was not yet perfect, so the free will, hitherto rightly animal because mortal, could sin since it was not yet perfect. Which perfection of freedom would assuredly be fulfilled after keeping of the commandment, when that will to sin would be totally taken away, forming a will like that future will which our lord Jesus Christ will give to those who love him.[54]

One more question seems to arise here: would not human nature have been made more perfect, if it had right from the beginning been given the ability to remain clear of sin, like the ability that the angels have been granted and now possess. To answer this query Eriugena once again invokes Augustine and quotes his *On Free Choice of the Will* (*De libero arbitrio*). According to this text, the faculty of willing is not a pure or absolute good, that is a kind of good that by no means can be made bad use of, but it is only a middle good. Free will, just as the art of dialectics, which allows one to discern truth from falsehood, can be used for wrong purposes.[55] The freedom of the faculty of choice, which can result in the will being directed either to evil or to good, is an essential feature of that faculty and thus cannot be removed from it. There is no "compelling cause" that would precede and determine the act of will. Whatever action issues from the will, it flows from that will alone and from no other cause. The will is the only and "voluntary" *(voluntaria)* cause of its own acts, for if that was not the case, man would not be held responsible for his/her actions and would

[54] Ibid. VIII, 5, p. 53–54; Mainoldi, p. 80 : "Hinc datur intelligi primam hominis voluntatem liberam naturaliter fuisse creatam, cui tamen aliquid adderetur, si praeceptum dei seruare uellet, ut, sicut animale corpus potuit mori, quia adhuc non erat perfectum, ita uoluntatis libera adhuc animalis merito, quia mortalis, potuit peccare, quoniam adhuc non erat perfecta, quae utique perfectio libertatis post mandati custodiam impleretur, dum ea peccandi uoluntas penitus auferretur, qualis erit illa futura, quam dominus noster ihesus christus daturus est diligentibus se." Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* V, 4, p. 36: "But human nature is not only a will but also a free one […] although that freedom is so vitiated after sin that its punishment impedes it from either willing to live righteously, or should it so will, from so doing."

[55] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* VII, 1, p. 45–46; por. St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II, xix, 53, PL 32, 1269.

deserve neither punishment nor reward. In that case all the responsibility for human deeds, good as well as evil, would have to be shifted to God, a suggestion that clearly is unacceptable:

> One must, then, in no way concede that any compelling cause either good or bad precedes the will of man or of any other rational nature, lest the reward of its freedom be taken from it, whether good, if one has lived well with the assistance of divine grace, or bad if one has lived badly in one's own irrational and perverse manner. Hence no cause constrains man to lead a good or a bad life. For God in neither the necessary cause of all good things […], nor the compelling cause.[56]

Were it the case, that human will was subject to some compulsion, be it compulsion to good, and thus lacked free choice, all the commandments and prohibitions, the commandment to live according to justice and to avoid sin would be meaningless; the very idea of moral life and moral progress would be void of sense. For God only commands man to do what a human being can perform, so that all actions by man should depend on man's own will.[57] Statements of this sort may have certain Pelagian flavour, but they are backed by quotes from St. Augustine's *On True Religion* (*De vera religione*) to the effect that man bears the responsibility for his/her sins, which implies that human beings must have freedom of choice.[58] Freedom of human will and the impairment of the effectiveness of human action as a result of original sin are two conditions for divine grace being effective, they indicate the importance of divine grace as an aid to human moral efforts:

> God the creator of the universe has given man free choice, that is the option either of good or of evil, and that he could not fittingly have given it otherwise than totally free. Thus he would demonstrate what efficacy nature had in man without grace, what power grace had in nature, what the reward of justice, what of sin, what finally the gift of his ineffable generosity.[59]

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[56] Eriugena, *On praed.* V, 5, p. 36; Mainoldi, p. 56: "Non ergo ullo modo concedendum aliquam causam compulsatiuam siue bonam siue malam praecedere uoluntatem hominis seu alterius rationalis naturę, ne ab ea meritum sue libertatis auferatur, sive bonum, si bene uixerit, cooperante diuina gratia, siue malum, si male uixerit, suo motu irrationabili peruersoque. Proinde nulla causa constringit hominem seu bene seu male uiuere. Non enim deus omnium bonorum causa est necessaria."

[57] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* V, 8, p. 38: "Or on what account would he be commanded not to sin, if he was in no way able to sin? For God had to command what man was capable of doing."

[58] Cf. there V, 9, p. 38–39.

[59] Eriugena, *On praed.* V, 9, p. 38; Mainoldi, p. 62 : "…deum uniuersitatis conditorem dedisse homini liberum arbitrium, id est electionem siue boni siue mali, nec aliter

Eriugena, backing his claims with relevant texts by Augustine,[60] affirms that divine predestination only concerns works produced by God, its object is created good and so predestination prepares the ground for divine grace which is the work of divine generosity.[61] John Scotus arrives here at the unambiguous conclusion concerning the correct interpretation of the teachings on predestination: he concludes that both the relevant authoritative texts from the Scriptures and the Fathers, and the reasoning based upon evident premises unambiguously point to the fact that "there is no predestination except of the elect."[62]

5. ANTI-PREDESTINATIONIST READING OF ST. AUGUSTINE

There is, however, still a question that remains unsolved, namely how to explain those passages in both the Scriptures and in St. Augustine which appear literally to affirm theses implying predestination to sin, punishment and death.

Confronted with this challenge, Eriugena resorts to semantic analysis and invokes various ways of interpreting the meaning of given statements. In particular propositions concerning God can be read either on the basis of the similarity of what is stated to God and things divine or, alternatively, on the basis of the dissimilarity and contrariety between what is said and what is signified. For whatever we state about God, there is always some similarity and at the same time some contrast between what we literally state and the reality this statement refers to. Hence statements concerning God can be read both ways: "from the similar" (implied is namely the degree of similarity that obtains between temporal and changeable things and the a-temporal and unchangeable God), that is taking into account the

eum dare debuisse nisi omnino liberum, eo scilicet monstraturus quid in homine praeualeret natura sine gratia, quid gratia posset in natura, quid iustitię meritum, quid peccati, quid deinde suę ineffabilis largitatis donum."

60 Eriugena quotes not only statements from Augustine's dialogue *On Free Choice of the Will*, but also from late works by the bishop of Hippo, namely those in which he undertook the debate against Pelagianism, such as: *The Gift of Perseverance, On Rebuke and Grace* and *On the Predestination of the Saints.*

61 Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* XII, 2–4, p. 77–79.

62 There XII, 5, p. 80; Mainoldi, p. 126 : "Nulla praedestinatio nisi electorum est."

part of the meaning of the relevant proposition that can be taken to state something positively about God, or "from the contrary" (namely from what in temporal and changeable things is contrary to the a-temporal and immutable God), that is taking into account that part of the literal meaning of the relevant proposition that surely cannot be referred to God as He is in Himself). The statements affirming that God foresees and foreordains sins, penalties therefor and (eternal) death should understood and interpreted "from the contrary," so that "the heretical distortion originating from the misuse of such words may not lead us astray."[63] For the words "sins," "punishments" and "death" refer to what can be described as evil, and evil is merely privation and destruction of some good, so in itself evil is nothing or non-being. And there can be no knowledge of non-being, since non-being does not exist, and thus there can be neither prescience (foreknowledge) nor predestination concerning evil:

> For if knowledge is nothing other than the understanding of the things that are, by what reasoning should there be said to be knowledge or foreknowledge in the case of things that are not? […] Evil, then, neither is God nor from God. And for this reason, just as God is not the author of evil, so has he not foreknowledge of evil nor does he peredestine it.[64]

Naturally enough, at this precise point Eriugena backs his affirmations with quotes from the anti-Manichaean treatises by St. Augustine, as, for instance *Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental* and from the *City of God*. Eriugena describes St. Augustine as a "learned founder of the Christian theory of eloquence," "proficient investigator of truth," "teacher of the literal and metaphoric sense (of Scripture)." His method of studying Augustine's texts is very elaborate: he selects from the body of the works by the bishop of Hippo statements that appear to contradict one another and then he proceeds to interpret them in such a way as to show that they in fact corroborate the theory he regards as true. This method he also applies to his scrutiny of Augustine's statements concerning predestination: after careful examination of the relevant texts he succeeds in arriving at the interpretation thereof which supports the theory of predestination that he regards as the

[63] Eriugena, *On praed.* X, 2, p. 66; Mainoldi, p. 100: "…ne nos heretica prauitas seducat quae talibus uerbis male utens originem sumpsit."

[64] Eriugena, *On praed.* X, 3, p. 66–67; Mainoldi, p. 102 : "Si enim nihil aliud est scientia nisi rerum quae sunt intelligentia, qua ratione in his que non sunt scientia uel praescientia dicenda est? […] Malum igitur nec deus nec a deo est. Ac per hoc, sicut deus mali auctor non est, ita nec prescius mali nec praedestinans est."

only correct one: namely the interpretation of predestination as preparation (in the divine mind) of God's works to be accomplished (creation and salvation).[65]

Eriugena undertakes analysis of the passages in Augustine, which Gottschalk invoked in support of his own theory as well as other key texts by the bishop of Hippo and as a result he reaches the conclusion that both St. Augustine and unprejudiced reason show that "God in no way predestined sinners for punishments."[66]

The case Eriugena develops here to make his point is complex and contains many steps. His pivotal assumption, repeatedly stated in the course of his argument is the claim that God has nothing in common with evil, for He is good in Himself and is the Maker of nature which is good throughout; whatever is not good cannot have been made by Him: "Sin is against nature and therefore not from the Truth, and hence neither from the foreknowledge nor the predestination of it."[67]

Nature, that is all things that exist outside God is the work of the Divine Goodness. Whatever exists, is, therefore good, for God is the author of that which is, and by no means a cause of that which is not. Whatever is privation, destruction and imperfection in itself, is something that is not, and thus sin, death, punishment are of the number of things that are not: they are privation of justice, well-being and life respectively.[68] This is reason enough, in Eriugena's eyes, for them not to have possibly been foreseen and even less foreordained by God:

> For they are recognized as being known not in definitions of their forms, but as being not known in the lack of those forms. Why! Does 'nothing' signify anything other than the thinker's conception of the absence of being. What do darkness and silence signify except the thinker's conception of the absence of either light or sound? […] These, therefore, and all such images demonstrate only the concept of the absence or deficiency of things that are.[69]

[65] Eriugena, *On praed.* XI, 6, p. 74–76.

[66] Ibid. XIV, 5, p. 193; Mainoldi, s. 144 : "…deum uidelicet ad poenam nullo modo peccantes praedestinasse, sed suis meritis supplicia condigna praedestinata eis ab eo esse." Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* XVII, 1, p. 111: "Accordingly, it is established by reason and authority that it must be firmly held that God, in a word, is not in any way the author of the punishments by which proud wickedness will be racked by eternal torment."

[67] Eriugena, *On praed.* XV, 5, p. 96; Mainoldi, p. 150 : "Peccatum contra naturam est ; non igitur ex ueritate ; ac per hoc nec ex eius praescientia nec praedestinatione."

[68] Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* XV, 8, p. 97–98.

[69] Ibid., XV, 9–10, p. 98–99; Mainoldi, p. 156 : "Non enim in diffinitionibus formarum

It follows that whatever truly exists and is a work of the Divine Goodness, in other words, every single created entity, cannot as such be subject to any punishment. The substance of that which has been made by God always remains intact, what undergoes punishment is precisely that which God has not authored, that is the sinful, perverse motion of will, to be more precise, of an individual will.[70] At this point Eriugena considers the hypothesis suggested by St. Augustine to the effect that all human individuals existed in Adam and thus all effectively participated in Adam's transgression.[71] John Scotus does not think this conception poses a threat to his theory: to him every sin is an individual act and affects only the individual that committed this act: "it was not the generality of nature that sinned [scilicet in Adam] but the individual will of each one" and so human nature as such did not lay itself open to punishment, what deserved to be punished instead was the individual motion of a will.[72]

When touching on the subject of punishment for sin Eriugena recalls the idea going back to Plato's *Gorgias*, which he came to know from Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* or, possibly, from some passages in Augustine echoing some theses of Plotinus.[73] According to this idea, moral evil carries with itself its own punishment, in fact sin itself is the punishment for its own evil. Eriugena says:

> Augustine thus with beauty and clarity defines it that the instruments for the torture of the wicked are none other than that wickedness itself […]. But there is no sin that does not punish the sinner. For in every sinner the original emergence of the sin and the punishment of it are simultaneous; because there is no sin which does not punish itself, secretly in this life, but openly in the other life which is to come.[74]

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sciri, sed in defectibus earum nesciri nosocuntur. Quid enim? Nunquid aliud significat nihil nisi notionem cogitantis defectum essentię. Quid significant tenebrę uel silentium nisi notionem cogitantis uel lucem uel uocem deesse? […] Haec ergo et huius modi signa non nisi rerum quę sunt notionem absentię aut defectus ostendunt."

70 Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* XVI, 2, p. 102–103.

71 Cf. M. Przyszychowska, *Wszyscy byliśmy w Adamie. Jedność ludzkości w Adamie w nauczaniu ojców Kościoła,* Poznań 2013, p. 109 f.

72 Eriugena, *On praed.* XVI, 3, p. 103.

73 Cf. Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae* V, 4; Plato, *Gorgias* 508e.

74 Eriugena, *On praed.* XVI, 6, p. 107; Mainoldi, p. 170 : "… pulchre quidem atque praeclare diffiniens non esse alia instrumenta torquendę impietatis pręter illam ipsam impietatem […]. Nullum autem peccatum est quod peccantem non puniat. In

The punishment contained within sin itself consists in misuse of gifts with which God endowed man to make him able to pursue happiness, in particular of the gift of free choice. Eriugena goes on to affirm that the place in which the punishment for sins is meted out is not any particular region within the Universe, but solely the awareness of the sinner. He illustrates this point with an example of a lord who has erected a magnificent residence, a source of joy and pride for his children, but a torture for the servants or the jealous.[75] The very essence of punishment for sin is the turning away from the Highest Good implicit in sin, the choice of a lesser good, forfeiture of truth[76]:

> Therefore God predestined the ungodly to punishment or destruction, that is, he circumscribed them by his immutable laws by which they are prevented from attaining to what they wantonly strive after, which becomes for them penal ruin and the just torment of their wretched passions.[77]

This remarkable conception of punishment as inherent within evil itself serves to highlight the magnificent vision of the Universe with which Eriugena concludes his work. The Divine Wisdom in its eternal art, constructing the harmonious Universe has drawn intransgressible limits for every creature and the creatures endowed with intellect and reason have been enabled to respect these limits of their own accord. If these reasonable creatures perversely contravene the laws imposed by the Maker of all things, their own perversity becomes punishment for them, and this without any disturbance or change in the order set up by God's eternal decrees.

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omni enim peccatore simul incipiunt oriri et peccatum et poena eius, quia nullum peccatum est quod non se ipsum puniat, occulte tamen in hac uita, aperte uero in altera, quae est futura."

75 Cf. Eriugena, *On praed.* XVII, 5, p. 113–114.

76 Cf. ibidem XVII, 8, p. 115–116.

77 Eriugena, *On praed.* XVIII, 7, p. 121; Mainoldi, p. 196: "Prędestinauit itaque deus impios ad poenam uel interitum, hoc est circumscripsit eos legibus suis incommutabilibus, quas eorum impietas euadere non permittitur; ad poenam profecto suam, ea quippe difficultas – ut est dictum – qua prohibentur peruenire ad ea quę libidinose appetunt, efficitur eis poenalis interitus et suę miserrime cupidnis iustissimus cruciatus."

6. CONCLUSIONS

So, to come back to the question indicated in the title of this article: is Eriugena a follower of Augustine, or of Pelagius? This question is inscribed in the more general and extensively debated problem of "Eriugena's Augustinianism,"[78] at an even more basic level it concerns the problem of reading and interpreting the thought of Augustine himself.[79] To be sure, Scotus's *On Divine Predestination* is saturated with quotes from works by St. Augustine, and not only clear quotes, expressly indicated by the author, but also linguistic and conceptual allusions, which, however, would be perfectly transparent to his readers, familiar with St. Augustine, probably more obvious to them than they are to us.[80] John Scotus refers to select works by Augustine, to *On Free Choice of the Will* in the first place and subjects the relevant passages in these works to analysis and interpretation. His interpretation is very personal, which is not to say, as Goulven Madec, a distinguished expert in both Augustinian and Eriugenian studies, observed, that it distorts or falsifies the meaning of the analyzed texts. And indeed, when Eriugena insists that some Augustinian statements and formulas on predestination should be read "from the contrary" rather than "from the similar," we readily admit that he is probably right at this point.[81]

Eriugena shares the principal metaphysical assumptions of Augustine, like the bishop of Hippo he is sure that Supreme Being is God on whom everything else depends for existence as well as for essential content, like Augustine's, his approach to created reality is based on a dialectics of being and non-being.[82] He is at one with Augustine in maintaining that everything that exists in its own right is good and cannot pass into nothing. And nothing, or non-being, is what precisely is evil and sin, whose essence is absence of required being rather than anything positive. Eriugena's metaphysical conception undoubtedly provided the framework on which his position in the controversy on predestination was based, even though for its full development this conception would have to wait until the composition of *Periphyseon.* Nevertheless, already in *On Divine Predestination* Eriugena proposed a systematic and original approach to the complex of problems relat-

78 Cf. G. Madec, "L'augustinisme de Jean Scot," p. 180.

79 Cf. G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs. Annotations érigéniennes*, Paris, 1988, p. 147 ff.

80 Cf. Madec, "L'augustinisme de Jean Scot," p. 186.

81 Cf. ibid. p.185.

82 Cf. ibid., pp. 188–189.

ed to predestination, an approach that was more speculative and philosophical than anything found in his milieu, and yet firmly grounded in the Augustinian tradition. Goulven Madec showed remarkable perspicacity in observing that the fundamental objective of Eriugena's *On Divine Predestination* was to replace the Augustinianism of some of his contemporaries with its emphasis on predestination, with another kind of Augustinianism, namely the Augustinianism of divine simplicity. In my opinion, it was Eriugena's original approach to the highly sensitive theological problem of predestination, as well as his non-standard use of Augustine's thought that surprised his intellectual opponents with its novelty and courage. This fresh and original approach also enabled him to go beyond the one sided treatment of this matter both by the proponents of the predestinationist interpretation of St. Augustine and the defenders of Pelagius's superficial humanism.

Translated by Roman Majeran

THE POWER OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF RATIONAL BEING: THE CASE OF A DEVIL – IS THE DEVIL'S FALL FREE OR NECESSARY?

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk

The question formulated in the title requires defining and clarifying at least two elements: who God is and what freedom is. The explication of these two concepts will allow to determine the core of the whole problem precisely, that is, whether the fall of the devil was a necessary or free act. The key problem here is whether it is possible to give a consistent explanation of God's immediate production of free behaviour without Him constraining the free nature of it. If so, how can this be explained? In this article, I would like to present Anselm's answer to those questions. I will proceed in three steps. Firstly, I will explain the concepts of God and freedom; I will look at how Anselm defends the power of a rational being (an angel) for self-initiated and self-determined action, in connection with the doctrine of divine omniscience and omnipotence. Secondly, I will explore Anselm's understanding of freedom, with the focus on the key concept in his doctrine — the concept of *rectitudo* (righteousness). These two steps will help to gain a proper understanding of Anselm's reasoning and argumentation regarding the fall of the devil. Finally, I will attempt to reconstruct Anselm's reasoning by applying modern logic. I will focus mainly on how the devil's free action is initiated and analyse this with the help of reduction inference, which seems to adequately reflect Anselm's reasoning.

I. GOD

In Anselm's system, God is the God of classical Christian theism, and thus He is a perfect, simple and spiritual being. Anselm attempts to prove the existence of God once in *Monologion,* and then in *Proslogion*. Anselm's argument for the existence of God in *Monologion* is essentially based on his

attempt to understand the concept of "the supreme good," "the supreme great"; he tries to clarify the concept in detail by specifying what it includes. This analysis requires stating the existence of the designatum of the word "God." This course of argument shows that it is even impossible to negate the existence of what the term "God" denotes. In *Proslogion,* Anselm demonstrates another proof for the existence of God. Here, his argument is reduced to one simple act of thought which contains its premise, i.e. the identity of God as that than which nothing greater can be thought (id quo maius cogitari non possit). Therefore, what we have here is a proof expressing a certain form of negative theology, according to which God excludes the lack of any perfection, or possession of a perfection to a degree lower than in other beings possessing such perfection. So if in *Monologion,* reason searched for ways to understand what God is, then in *Proslogion* we are at the end of the negative path, so if God really is God, then He cannot not exist.

> Assuredly, this [being] exists so truly [i.e., really] that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought — [a consequence] which is contradictory. Hence, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist.[1]

Defining God as "something beyond which you cannot think of anything greater" is an attempt to demonstrate rationally the non-contradictory attributes that God is necessarily entitled to, and therefore also the property of foreknowledge and omnipotence. The property of (fore)knowledge involves at least two of its features: necessity and reliability or certainty; for omnipotence, the necessary condition seems to be effectiveness, that is, the absolute effectiveness of acts of will of the subject possessing this property.

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[1] *Proslogion,* in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, transl. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, Minneapolis, 2000, p. 94. "Quod utique sic uere est, ut nec cogitari possit non esse. Nam potest cogitari esse aliquid, quod non possit cogitari non esse; quod maius est quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id quo maius nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: id ipsum quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitari nequit; quod conuenire non potest. Sic ergo uere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse." *S. Anslemi Cantuarensis Archepiscopi opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, pp. 102–103. A reference such as "S I, 94, 16" indicates "F.S. Schmitt's edition of the Latin texts, vol. I, p. 94, line 16."

1. GOD'S (FORE)KNOWLEDGE

God's knowledge is a reflection of His mode of existence, because the nature of knowledge depends on the manner of the existence of a a knowing entity. Therefore, God's knowledge or cognition must be attributed with the essential properties of the divine mode of existence, that is, eternity, immutability and the consequences of these attributes. Therefore, the questions arise whether God's knowledge is the cause of things, or vice versa? Does God's knowledge also apply to what does not exist, or to what is only possible? Finally, does God recognize sin, or evil, which is nothing? In God, to exist and to cognize, or rather to know, are one, and thus it is obvious that God, i.e. His thought, becomes the cause of things. God is the cause of things if His will gets attached to His knowledge. The existence of things has its cause in God's knowledge coupled with the act of His will. The second question concerns the knowledge of God about what does not exist at present, so it concerns, for example, the past, or refers to what does not exist, but can exist, which, in turn, is associated with the future. It has been proved above that, according to Anselm, God is not the cause of non-existence; here, in turn, the problem arises whether God knows or can know what is not there, that is, past events that no longer exist, and future events that do not exist yet. This aporia arises as an inevitable consequence of the claim of divine knowledge as the cause of things, because what does not exist has no cause - for there is no cause for non-existence. From this it could be reasonably derived, based on the previous findings, that God has no knowledge of what does not exist. So, does God *really* have no knowledge of what does not exist?

> Now, God (who knows all truth and only truth) sees all these things as they are — whether they be free or necessary; and as He sees them, so they are. In this way, then, and without any inconsistency, it is evident both that God foreknows all things and that many things are done by free will. And before these things occur it is possible that they never occur. Nevertheless, in a certain sense they occur necessarily; and this necessity (as I said) derives from free will.[2]

[2] *The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice*, in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, p. 537. "Haec omnia deus, qui scit omnem ueritatem et non nisi ueritatem: sicut sunt spontanea uel necessaria uidet; et sicut uidet, ita sunt. Hac ergo consideratione palam est quia sine omni repugnantia et deus praescit omnia, et multa fiunt ex libera uoluntate, quae antequam sint fieri potest, ut numquam sint, et tamen quodam modo sunt necessitate, quae necessitas — ut dixi — descendit de libera

In the quoted passage, three things are pointed out, namely: (i) true and therefore infallible knowledge of God; (ii) the possibility of the existence of events that occur necessarily and those that occur through the freedom of will; (iii) God's knowledge may also concern such events that "before they occur it may happen that they will never occur," so divine knowledge includes non-existing events that are only possible, i.e. those that will potentially occur, but it is also possible that they will not come into existence at all. The issue that requires a more detailed explanation is the problem of events conditioned by the freedom of will and the directly related issue of possible facts, that is, those that are in the power of God or the power of free entities. It can be presumed that whatever a rational and free subject can do, think or say, is also the object of God's knowledge, and therefore, in this sense, God knows also about what does not exist at the moment. For these possible events or the possibility of the occurrence of acts and or thoughts or statements — which, after all, God's knowledge also encompasses — may not appear or will not appear (with certainty). Therefore, it is the knowledge about what is possible, what can exist, what God sees in his essence as potential, to which, however, He does not attach his creative will. What is possible, is, however, what can indeed come into existence, although it will never do — the necessary condition for the possibility of existence is the lack of internal contradiction. God, therefore, from a certain spectrum of possibilities, that is from what lies in the unlimited power of God as the omnipotent,[3] by an act of will, chooses certain things that exist, existed or will exist — God sees these things in his essence as being in the present. On the other hand, God's knowledge includes all possibilities, including those that have not been, are not and will not be realized, in this way God knows

uoluntate." *De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio*, 1,3 (S II, 251, 28–252, 5).

[3] Three meanings of omnipotence are usually mentioned: a) universal rule, power over all beings, b) the power to create and preserve the world in existence - God is then understood as the cause and principle of the created order, c) the ability to realize all possible states – God here in turn, is understood as a power that is able to bring every being into existence. These three meanings of omnipotence are complementary to each other, but the most inspiring was the third meaning, whose author is Saint Augustine. See G. van den Brink, *Almighty God. A Study of the Doctrine of Divine Omnipotence*, (Studies in Philosophical Theology, 7), Kampen, 1993, pp. 48–67; also Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Issues discussed on the power of God*, vol. 1, ed. M. Olszewski and M. Paluch, Kęty 2008, pp. 20–21.

what does not exist.[4] So everything that was, is or will be, and what is only in the state of possibility, but it will never exist, God sees simultaneously in its eternity.

God not only knows the sin, but his knowledge is directly translated into the fact of sinning or non-sinning, that is, the fact that God's prior knowledge of the state of affairs in a certain way determines human activity in a specific direction. So if God has the knowledge of sin or evil, is evil something? "Evil" is, after all, a name, and therefore has meaning, and this in turn indicates the existence of some designatum of that name. Although on the basis of the word "nothing" its meaning cannot be determined beyond the conclusion about its pure negativity,[5] but perhaps the notion of "evil" may give a positive result? Such is, more or less, the student's reasoning in Chapters 10 and 11 of *De casu diaboli*. Anselm, however, quickly corrects this view of his interlocutor, proving the existence of a close correlation between the terms "nothing" and "evil." In fact neither *malum* nor *nihil* express any designatum possessing something positive and realistic, but only constitute a negation of the relevant positive reality, such as "blindness" is "lack of sight" and "darkness" — "lack of light." Hence, both "evil" and "nothing" are the lack of good and the lack of existence.[6] Irresistibly imposing here is the impression that this way of treating nothingness and evil has its source in *Proslogion*, only somehow *a contrario*, that is, as the possibility of thinking of "something that you cannot think of anything greater" forces the mind to adopt the necessary existence of being corresponding to this concept; so evil regarded as "what cannot be thought of as good" determines its pure negativity, a definition completely devoid of *rectitudo*, i.e. no reality wanted by God can correspond to this concept, hence the necessary conclusion of the non-existence of what it designates.[7] So it is *privatio*.

> For "nothing" signifies only not-something, or the absence of things which are something. And evil is only not-good, or the absence of good where good either

[4] Anselm's views on God's knowledge resonate with the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, who divides God's knowledge about what does not exist into the knowledge of insight or seeing (*scientia visionis*) and the knowledge of pure understanding (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*).

[5] See *De casu diaboli,* cap. 9.

[6] Cf. *Monologion,* cap. 8.

[7] See G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii*, vol.. 2: *Epoka średniowiecza*, transl. W. Szymona, Kraków 2005, p. 176.

> ought to be or is advantageous to be. But that which is only the absence of what is something is surely not something. Therefore, evil truly is nothing, and nothing is not something.[8]

The above analysis can be summarised by stating that God recognizes evil through good — a being opposed to the lack that evil is. God, therefore, has the knowledge of sin, that is, evil as what is opposed to the effects of His creative power and goodness which He knows in their essence. By acknowledging the results of His actions, He simultaneously acquires the knowledge of evil — the lack of due good.[9] Anselm perfectly illustrates this principle of cognition by contrasting the opposites with the example of justice and injustice. Injustice can be known as the lack of justice, and thus as a breach in the ontic structure of what should be, that is good - justice.

2. GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF PREDESTINATION

Does the fact of God's omnipotence necessarily result in the absolute effectiveness of all His actions? For omnipotence implies that everything that is logically possible, that is, consistent, lies in His power. If this is the case, then the question arises where moral evil comes from? In human matters, the evil of sin appears, the wilful malice which we are all victims of and sometimes perpetrators. How then is it possible that man acts in a free way,

[8] *The Fall of the Devil*, p. 234. "Nihil enim non aliud significat quam non-aliquid, aut absentiam eorum quae sunt aliquid. Et malum non est aliud quam non-bonum, aut absentia boni ubi debet aut expedit esse bonum. Quod autem non est aliud quam absentia eius quod est aliquid, utique non est aliquid. Malum igitur uere est nihil et nihil non est aliquid." *De casu diaboli* 11 (S I, 251, 5–9). The analysis of the names "evil" and "nothing" presented above is given after the Introduction, in St. Anselm of Canterbury, *On the Truth. On the freedom of will. On the fall of the devil,* translation, introduction and comments by A.P. Stefańczyk, Kęty 2011, pp. 38–39.

[9] A similar solution is found in St. Thomas' *Sth* I, q. 14 art. 10, ad 2, 3, 4: "*Ad secundum* dicendum, quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. *Ad tertium* dicendum, quod licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Die, quos per essentiam suam cognoscit; et eos congoscens mala opposita cognoscit. *Ad quartum* dicendum, quod congoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est per se cognoscibile; quia de ratione mali est quod sit privatio boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per bonum."

and God manages everything reliably and has infallible knowledge about everything that happens in the universe? Does God's higher determined nature leave room for human freedom?

For the reconciliation of God's omnipotence, and therefore also predestination, with free will, two main aporias, which appear at the stage of formulating the problem itself, need to be solved; namely: (i) the problem of God causing good things, as well as God's participation or the lack of it in creating evil things; (ii) and the issue of the relation of foreknowledge to predestination.

Regarding the first issue, Anselm states that in the case of good things — which also includes the actions and deeds of people — God causes them and causes them to be good, while in the case of evil things and deeds God only causes them, i.e. they actually do exist, but God is not the cause of them being evil.[10] Hence, it is legitimately said that God is the cause of all things, but it is not correct to claim that he is the cause of all their properties.[11] For God is the cause of all things, but only with their positive properties. In the case of sin and moral evil, God is not the cause of the rejection of justice. The question of predestination, i.e. the causal activity of God in relation to future events, can be solved as a derivative and an element of a broader metaphysical perspective concerning the nature of God.[12]

The other difficulty results, in turn, from an unjustified distinction in relation to the Supreme Nature, into His foreknowledge and His predestination, that is, the activity of God's will. In God, these elements are one, and so what God knows He causes at the same time, in the sense that He creates and sustains in existence everything that has some ontic status. The foreknowledge, or rather the knowledge of God, necessarily entails the necessity of God's predestination, because in reality knowledge and predestination are the same in God's one simple nature. Predestination is therefore God's causal omniscience.[13] The identification of foreknowledge and pre-

[10] *De concordia* 2, 2 (S II, 261, 8–10): "Sed bona specialius praescire et praedestinare dicitur, quia in illis facit quod sunt et quod sunt bona; ac in malis autem non nisi quod sunt essentialiter, non quod mala sunt […]."

[11] See K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, Oxford 2008, p. 119 and 120.

[12] Cf. *Monologion,* cap. 15–25.

[13] *De concordia* 2, 2 (S II, 261, 10–12): "Sciendum quoque est quia sicut praescientia non in Deo dicitur proprie, ita nec praedestinatio; quia illi nec ante nec post aliquid est, sed omnia sunt illi simul praesentia." Cf. also K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, Oxford 2008, p. 119.

destination allows Anselm to use the same set of arguments to prove the conformity of predestination with the free will of man.

> Therefore, although things foreknown and predestined must occur, it is nonetheless equally true that some things foreknown and predestined occur not by the necessity which precedes a thing, and causes it, but by the necessity which succeeds a thing.[14]

Anselm therefore refers to the distinction between preceding necessity (necessitas praecedens) and subsequent necessity (necessitas sequens). In later logical terminology, preceding necessity was interpreted as *necessitas consequentis*, and subsequent necessity as *necessitas consequentiae*. In the case of preceding necessity, the result is necessarily determined by its cause, it is inseparably tied with it as, for example, humanity with mortality: "If he is human, then it is necessary that he is mortal." Consequential necessity does not introduce this determination, but depends on the condition of the occurrence of an incident based on the law of non-contradiction, i.e. it is necessary that if x, then x, for example "It is necessary that if Socrates is walking, then Socrates is walking." So if knowledge means that a belief in a given matter is true, then "If A knows that x, then x."[15] Anselm therefore claims that the proposition: "If God knows that p, then it is necessary that p" has the same logical scheme as the proposition: "If I see that Socrates is sitting, then it is necessary that Socrates is sitting" and it is the scheme "$\Box\ (p \rightarrow q)$."[16] Anselm, the-

[14] *The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice*, in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, p. 547–548; *De concordia* 2, 3 (S II, 261 22–262 3): "Pariter igitur, quamuis necesse sit fieri quae praesciuntur et quae praedestinantur, quaedam tamen praescita et praedestinata non eueniunt ea necessitate quae praecedit rem et facit, sed ea quae rem sequitur […]."

[15] Cf. K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, Oxford 2008, p. 120.

[16] See J. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, Freiburg, München 1956, p. 214.

A better explanation can be provided by diagrams written in the language of modern modal logic:

Reasoning I:

it is necessary that: if God knows that p, then p	$\Box\ (K_G p \rightarrow p)$
it is necessary that God knows that p	$\Box\ K_G p$
Ergo: it is necessary that p	$\Box\ p$

The conclusion can be proved from the premise in every normal modal logic.

refore, diagnoses that the contradiction of God's knowledge and freedom results from the erroneous taking of the scheme *necessitas consequentiae* $\Box (p \rightarrow q)$ for the expression of the scheme *necessitas consequentis* $p \rightarrow \Box q$; hence, instead of the right conclusion that events which God knows of will follow, they mistakenly conclude that events that God knows of will necessarily follow, i.e. they are necessary.[17] This consequential necessity does not mean coercion. It can be argued that if God knows in advance that Peter will go to the theatre, it means that it is necessary for Peter to go to the theatre, but it is a necessity only in a logical sense, where necessity follows the actual state of affairs.[18] This kind of necessity connected with divine foreknowledge leaves an open possibility, which depends on the decision of the free subject, in this case Peter, that God knows beforehand about Peter's going to the theatre. There is no coercion or external interference in this case, but this is ultimately due to the fact that Peter is the main and only reason for going to the theatre. The same reasoning applies to predestination, because what God knows of He is also the cause of, that is, decides and foreordains it to be. On the other hand, it is in the power of a free subject which God's given desires or inclinations will become his current choices, i.e. will actually be realized, which then God will ultimately predestine. Although God predestines these events (as necessary), he does not do so by either pressure on will or by holding back the will, but he leaves the will in its own power as completely autonomous.[19] God, then, predestines according to His prior knowledge. If God has planned some things as necessary,

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Reasoning II

it is necessary that: if God knows that p, then *p*	$\Box (K_G p \rightarrow p)$
God knows that p	$K_G p$
Ergo: it is necessary that p	$\Box p$

Reasoning II is burdened with a formal error, unless the thesis of Christian theism is additionally introduced; the application, therefore, can be proved from the assumptions in any normal modal logic assuming in addition the thesis of Christian theism: $K_G p \rightarrow \Box K_G p$ - If God knows that p, then it is necessary that God knows that p. See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, Lublin 2015, pp. 203–204 and 199.

17 Ibidem; also Hughes G.E., Cresswell M.J., *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*, London 1996, p. 15.

18 Cf. *De concordia* 1, 1.

19 *De concordia* 2, 3 (S II, 262, 3–40): "Non enim ea Deus – quamvis praedestinet – facit voluntatem cogendo aut voluntati resistendo, sed in sua illam potestate dimittendo."

and others as contingent and free, then they also appear according to God's decision. God predestines some deeds as good through grace, and other deeds become evil, having their source in free will as permitted by God. In both cases, either grace or God's admission of evil in no way signifies His interference in the free choice of the rational subject, let alone any divine determination. For God time directly exists as present time and God makes everything in one unchangeable act. But this act must include elements of both necessity and contingency.[20]

II. RATIONAL BEINGS AND THE PROBLEM OF THEIR FREEDOM

Anselm makes a distinction within freedom into: (i) *liberum arbitrium*, which can be understood as the freedom to choose between at least two alternative options; that is, as freedom is usually defined today, as the lack of necessity and the possibility of choosing among at least two states of things; (ii) *libertas*, freedom in the strict sense, which is defined as the power to preserve the righteousness of will because of righteousness itself. This is a normative definition. Both concepts, however, require a more detailed specification, hence the need to reach for the key term of Anselm's doctrine, namely the concept of *rectitudo* — righteousness.

[20] *The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice*, in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, p. 548: "And just as foreknowledge, which is not mistaken, foreknows only the real thing as it will occur – either necessarily or freely – so predestination, which is not altered, predestines only as the thing exists in foreknowledge. And although what is foreknown is immutable in eternity, it can nevertheless be changed in the temporal order at some point before it occurs. Similarly, the case is in every respect the same for predestination. Therefore, if these statements which have been made are examined closely, it is evident from them that predestination does not exclude free choice and that free choice is not opposed to predestination." *De concordia* 2, 3 (S II, 262, 7–14): "Et sicut praescientia, quae non fallitur, non praescit nisi uerum sicut erit, aut necessarium aut spontaneum: ita praedestinatio, quae non mutatur, non praedestinat, nisi sicut est in praescientia. Et quemadmodum quod praescitur licet in aeternitate sit immutabile, tamen in tempore aliquando antequam sit mutari potest: ita est per omnia de praedestinatione. Patet igitur ex iis quae dicta sunt, si bene considerentur, quia nec praedestinatio excludit liberum arbitrium, nec liberum arbitrium aduersatur praedestinationi."

1. RECTITUDO

The key to understanding Anselm's free will theory is the expression *inordinate volendo* (unordered desire), which introduces metaphysical assumption into the conception of freedom. The term *inordinate* stems from the assumption of the existence of *ordo rectus*, or "right(eous) order." So the term *ordo* presumes, on the one hand, a hierarchy of beings — goods, and on the other hand assumes the assignment of every being to a given goal. These two elements are inseparable and internally tied, because the reference to the goal comes from the ontic status of the creation and vice versa, ontic status determines a specific goal. Therefore, "unordered desire" of the devil, and consequently also man, introduces the destruction of the "right order," and it is against righteousness — *rectitudo.*[21] *Rectitudo* is for Anselm a metaphysical principle, which is a faithful "reflection of the eternal truth of certain designata existing in God's mind."[22] Thus, the truths — which are at the same time identical with the *rectitudines* of every existing thing — find their origin and source in the divine act of their creation. God, through the calling into existence, simultaneously determines the *rectitudo* of these things, i.e. the modus of realizing what they should be. To the extent in which they implement the divine obligation (*debitum*), things, actions, cognition and acts of will are true and right, righteous. *Rectitudo* is, therefore, the principle of the conformity of every being and everything that exists with the design of the Author of this existence, that is God. Hence the normativity of this principle, which is expressed in the formula "*X* quod debet *X*," where for *X* we can substitute any verb depending on the type of being to which this obligation (*debitum*) we want to relate. Thus, from the fact of being called into existence, a creation has a debt, obligation and duty towards its Creator[23] — *debitum* of "being as one should be," "acting as one should act," "cognizing and designating as one should cognize and designate" and "wanting what one should want." *Rectitudo* has two variants of realization depending on the ontic structure of the being it deals with, be it the

[21] Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *O prawdzie*, *op. cit.*, pp. 184–185, note 16.

[22] G. d'Onofrio, *Historia teologii*, vol. 2, p. 175.

[23] M. Corbin finds the inspiration for this Anselm's idea in the verse of the gospel of Saint John: "But whoever lives by the truth comes into the light, so that it may be seen plainly that what they have done has been done in the sight of God." (Jn 3:21). See Anselme de Cantorbéry, *Le grammairien, De la vérité, La liberté du choix, La chute du diable*, sous la dir. de M. Corbin, vol. 2, Paris 1986, p. 110.

language or cognition, or an inanimate or animated being not possessing the mind and the freedom of will, or an intelligent creature endowed with free will. Every being does what it should do, so a sentence formulated in a language should mean and signify, fire should warm, an animal should love its young, and will should want; as a result, if each of these entities does what it should, then it does righteousness (*rectitudinem*) and it does the right thing (*recte*) because it actualizes the purpose of his existence. And this is the first variant of implementing or realizing the *rectitudo* principle. The second method of realizing the *rectitudo* principle concerns rational subjects, and thus refers to man and the angel. This type of *rectitudo* includes free acts of rational beings and is subject to modifications depending on what it concerns, but the final reference is always the purpose of such an act, the realization of truth and good, so if a sentence is pronounced, it should state the existence of what exists and the non-existence of what is not there; in the actions of a rational creature, the goal is the obligation to realize justice, i.e. the love of the supreme good, etc.

So *rectitudo* as a rule, but also an obligation (*debitum*), becomes the principle and method of the restitution of an evil-hit fallen creature back to God — the source of its existence. *Rectitudo* thus becomes a kind of pivot around which Anselm builds his system,[24] which, for example, points to the definitional reversibility of key concepts: truth, justice and righteousness, because Anselm says:

> Therefore, if justice is nothing other than rightness, you have the definition of 'justice'. And since we are speaking about the rightness which is perceptible only to the mind–'truth', 'rightness', and 'justice' are definable in terms of one another. As a result, if someone knows what one of them is but does not know what the other two are, he can infer from his knowledge of one to a knowledge of the others. In fact, if anyone knows one of them, he cannot keep from knowing the other two.[25]

[24] It is highly probable that Anselm's inspiration in the construction of the understanding of truth and rectitudo was the passage from John 14: 6, "I Am the Way, the Truth and the Life." Cf. S. Anselme de Cantorbéry, *Le grammairien, De la vérité, La liberté du choix, La chute du diable*, p. 131, note I.

[25] *On the Truth*, p. 181; *De veritate* 12 (S I, 192, 6–10): "Habes igitur definitionem iustitiae, si iustitia non est alind quam rectitudo. Et quondam de rectitudine mente sola perceptibili loquimur, inuicem sese deffniunt ueritas et rectitudo et iustitia. Ut qui unam earum nouerit et alias nescierit, per notam ad ignotarum scientiam pertingere possit; immo qui nouerit unam, alias nescire non possit."

In turn, this justice as the uprightness-of-will kept for its own sake[26] is specific only to intelligent subjects who have the freedom to choose. The freedom to choose one thing or the other, alternative options of actions are not the main research subject for Anselm. Anselm's main focus is free choice, "which is the seat of justice"[27] (*sedes est iustitiae*), which ultimately decides about salvation or condemnation. It is, therefore, a decisive choice for the rational creature's pursuit of a greater happiness, i.e. the main field of research for Anselm is the relation of moral responsibility to the goal of a free subject.[28] The truth of action is therefore the realization of righteousness — *rectitudo*, understood as fulfilling the duty (*debere*) and at the same time the obligation — the debt of the creation towards its Creator. This truth of actions in relation to intelligent beings is connected with justice, which is the foundation of righteous acting. For righteousness, as previously stated, is "the righteousness of will preserved for its sake alone." The preservation of this righteousness of will is tied first with the understanding of one's duty (*intelligere quid debeat*), then with wanting and with acting consistent with the metaphysical principle of *rectitudo*. Understanding — *intelligere* and willing — *velle* therefore culminate in *rectitudo — debere*.

2. FREEDOM AS *LIBERUM ARBITRIUM*

Explaining the notion of *rectitudo* — righteousness allows us to determine adequately the understanding of freedom and free choice, because in his doctrine Anselm makes a precise distinction between these concepts, binding the first one with the necessary property of a rational nature, and tying the other one closely with the realization of the object of will, which shall now be explained in detail.

> For choice and the freedom in terms of which the choice is called free are not identical. We speak of freedom and of choice in many cases—as, for example, when we say that someone has the freedom to speak or not to speak and that whichever of these he wills lies within his choice. Likewise, in many other instances we speak of a freedom and of a choice which are not always present or else are not necessary to us for the salvation of our souls. However, the present

[26] *De libertate arbitrii* 3, (S I, 212, 9–10): "[…] iustitiam esse rectitudinem uoluntatis propter se seruatam."

[27] *De concordia* 1, 6 (S II, 256, 11–12).

[28] K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, p. 57.

> investigation is being conducted only with respect to that choice and that freedom without which a man, after once being able to use them, cannot be saved.[29]

The cited passage clearly indicates that there is a difference between freedom and free choice. What then is the difference? It seems that the criterion for this distinction is the *rectitudo*. Will is a tool (*instrumentum*), and so the faculty of the soul, just as reason is the faculty of the soul. In this sense, man always has "will," regardless of whether he is using it or not. Will, therefore, as a tool of the soul, has two basic feelings or predispositions or inclinations (*affectiones*), thanks to which it can want what is useful (*commodum*) or what is right and just (*rectum*). The first element is intrinsically and inseparably connected with the will of the human soul, and that is why it is somehow unforfeitable. On the other hand, with the desire for justice, things are different, because it has been lost due to the fall of man and can only be restored to him as a gift — grace through God.[30] Finally, will as "wanting" is realized each time in the act of 'wanting' a particular thing. It is the launch of the will to act, to a specific, determined "wanting" of something.[31] On the basis of the previous findings, we can assume that man

[29] *The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice*, *op. cit*., p.541; *De concordia* 1, 6 (S II, 256, 1–8): "Non est enim idem arbitrium et libertas qua liberum dicitur. In multis dicitur libertas et arbitrium, ut cum aliquem dicimus libertatem habere loquendi aut tacendi, et in eius arbitrio esse quid horum uelit. In pluribus quoque aliis similiter dicitur libertas et arbitrium, quae non semper assunt aut ad salutem animae nobis necessaria sunt. Pro illo autem arbitrio tantum et pro illa libertate ista uentilatur quaestio, sine quibus homo saluari nequit, postquam potest illis uti."

[30] See J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, Mineapolis 1972, p.143.

[31] This distinction is perfectly illustrated by the example of "seeing" given by Anselm in *Freedom of Choice*, p. 204 [*De libertate arbitrii* 7 (S I, 218, 26–219, 16)]: "Just as the word 'sight' is said equivocally, so also is the word 'will.' For we call sight the instrument-for-seeing, i.e., the ray passing through the eyes, by which ray we perceive light and the objects which are in the light. And we also speak of sight as the activity of the instrument when we use the instrument: i.e., [we speak of it as] the act of seeing. In the same way, will is said to be the instrument-for-willing, which is in the soul and which we direct towards willing this or that thing, even as we direct sight towards seeing various objects. Moreover, will is spoken of as the use of the will which is the instrument-for-willing, just as sight is spoken of as the use of sight which is the instrument-for-seeing. Now, even when we are not seeing, we have sight that is the instrument-for-seeing; but only while we are seeing is there present sight that is the activity of the instrument. Similarly, even when it is not willing anything (e.g., during sleep), the will — viz., the instrument-for-willing — is always in

always has free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) because it is the property necessary to be human, just like rationality. In this sense, it seems that free choice can be legitimately identified with will in general, which man always has and therefore can make different choices. *Arbitrium*, therefore, is also in this sense identical with the possibility of choosing alternative options of wanting and acting, also, man possessing *arbitrum* has the option of choosing evil. *Arbitrium,* being unforfeitable, and thus belonging to the human nature,[32] fits in with other natural properties, such as rationality and inclination towards gain, included in the will (*affectio ad commodum*). *Arbitrum*, therefore, includes: 1) the act of reason, that is, reflection and analysis of the situation, 2) the act of judgement and decision. The first element is different from lustful inclinations, the other one, that is decision, assumes an act of will, desire and wanting, which results in a choice. These desires are not good or bad in themselves, but they become such when they find their realization at the wrong time, in the wrong place or are done for a wrong cause or result from wrong knowledge.[33] Therefore, these desires should always be subservient to will, just as will should be subordinated to reason. There must, therefore, be a consensus between the consideration of reason and the act of will, thanks to which a person decides to act according to their desires.[34] But will itself is a tool of desires.[35] These desires in will (*affectiones*) are directed towards gain or justice. Man, having will, always has *liberum arbitrium* which, because of the possibility of choosing evil or good can be defined precisely as "the possibility of sinning or non-sinning."

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the soul. But the will that I call the use or the activity of this instrument, we have only when we will some-thing. Hence, the will which I call the instrument-for-willing is always one and the same thing regardless of what we will; but the will which is the instrument's activity is as multiple as the number of things we will and the number of occasions upon which we will. Similarly, the sight which we have even in darkness or with our eyes closed is always the same regardless of what we see; but the sight, i.e., the activity-of-sight, which is also called the act-of-seeing, is as multiple as the number of things we see and the number of occasions upon which we see."

32 *De libertate arbitrii* 13 (S I, 225, 24 nn.).

33 See *De conceptu virigianli et de originali peccato* 4.

34 Cf. J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, p. 141.

35 *De casu diaboli* 7 (S I, 245 1): "[…] quoniam et concupiscientia et desiderium voluntas est […]."

3. FREEDOM AS *LIBERTAS*

It is a different thing with freedom — *libertas*. Anselm claims that one can become a slave to sin, one can lose or reject justice. On the basis of Anselm's statement, it can be determined that: 1) one can have a free choice (*arbitrium liberum*), but not have freedom (*libertas*), i.e. be a servant of sin; 2) freedom can be lost, so it is not inextricably linked with human nature; 3) freedom is connected with justice, whose possession and behaviour is identical with being free (*liber*), liberated (*liberatus*). If freedom is connected with justice, it means that the one who has freedom must have and keep justice. But man alone is not able to restitute justice in himself because he has lost it and it is currently absent. Man cannot give himself what he does not have. Justice can be given or restored in man only from the outside, and therefore by God who is the source of justice. From that it necessarily follows that only God can give man justice as grace.[36] Justice is therefore supernatural. Given to man and preserved by him, it renews the order disturbed by sin, restores the "right order" (*ordo rectus*) in man, the order of relations with God and with other people. Freedom, in contrast to free choice, would be defined as the "power of non-sinning" (*potestas non peccandi*), because that is what preserves the righteousness (*rectitudo)* towards God and towards people. If it is the power of non-sinning, then freedom also means freeing oneself from the power of evil and sin. This liberation from sin and rebuilding the relationship of love for the Supreme Good makes man fully *imago Dei*. Repairing human nature after a fall is therefore a restitution of justice in man, through which he gains real freedom. This freedom is possible thanks to justice, which in turn is a gift of God as grace. Restored righteousness is therefore the path and purpose of the return of a rational creature to its original state in which it was created by God. If the original state of man was a state of happiness, then the restoration of justice is the same as regaining the initial, i.e. the original state by man.

The same applies to angels, or pure spirits; the realization of freedom in the sense of *libertas* also in the case of angels is possible only through God's grace. For Anselm clearly states that the only way to possess the righteousness of will is God's grace; there is therefore a strong assumption that the role of God's cause or grace is not only decisive for the restoration of the

[36] There is a controversy as to whether justice is natural or supernatural and is a gift of God for a given individual. See K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, Oxford 2008; also J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, Mineapolis 1972.

fallen human nature, but also for the right and just action of all rational and free creatures. One can rightly conclude that both the initiation of the desire for righteousness must be preceded by an act of grace, and the fact of maintaining righteousness and the perseverance of the will in righteousness is also an effect of grace on both man and angel. There are, therefore, two kinds of the same grace, one that precedes the act of accepting righteousness, and the other, by which the received grace is preserved.

III. THE PROBLEM OF THE DEVIL

God, creating angels, equally gave them the possession of righteousness - *rectitudo*. And all the angels possessed only what they had received from God,[37] and so their will and their ability to persevere in righteousness necessarily have their source in the will and act of God's donation. Why then did some of the angels abandon righteousness while others persevered in righteousness? Is it not the case that some angels, since they have abandoned righteousness, have not received from the Creator this gift of perseverance in righteousness?

Anselm, trying to solve this problem, distinguishes between the real (i.e. actual) cause and the cause on which one can infer something.[38] To show Anselm's reasoning we can employ the structure of inference found in Boetius' commentary to Cicero's *Topics,* which seems to be adequate for the purpose: hostility is the real cause of war; however, it does not follow from mutual hostility that two states are at war, but rather from the fact of war follows a claim about the hostility of two countries.[39] On this basis, Anselm

[37] 1 Cor 4:7.

[38] See *De casu diaboli* 3.

[39] Boethius, *In Topica Ciceronis*, (PL 64, col. 1066): "Antecedentia vero sunt quibus positis aliud necesse est consequatur, ut quia bellum est, esse inimicitias necesse est. Haec ordinis necessitate tenent. Consequentia enim ab antecedentibus separari nequeunt; consequens vero est quidquid id quod antecedit insequitur, ut inimicitiae bellum consequuntur. Nam si bellum, inimicitias esse necesse est, habetque locus hic illud notabile et spectandum, quod saepe quae naturaliter priora sunt, tamen ipsa sunt consequentia. Saepe quae naturaliter antecedent, et in propositione priora sunt; namque inimicitiae prius existere quam bella sunt. Sed non possumus proponere inimicitias, ut bellum sequatur. Non enim possumus vere dicere, si inimicitiae sunt, bellum est, sed praeponimus bellum, et inimicitiae quae natura priores sunt, subsequuntur, ita, si bellum est, inimicitiae sunt." See also J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm*, Mineapolis 1972, p. 169, note 87.

argues that giving A may be the real reason for accepting B, while not giving A can only be the reason for inferring not accepting C; in turn, not accepting C may actually be the real reason for not giving A. Therefore, from the claim that a good angel accepted perseverance because God gave it to him, does not follow that the evil angel did not accept perseverance, because God did not give it to him, but only that if God did not give it, then the evil angel could have not accepted it. Ultimately, the refusal of the evil angel to accept the perseverance that God has offered is the real reason for God not giving it. For God could not give a gift contrary to, or even against, the will of the endowed person, i.e. the devil, otherwise this gift would transform into imposition and compulsion and would actually deny itself as a gift that requires cooperation and, therefore, voluntary acceptance by the recipient or the endowed one.

Anselm's reasoning in the presented example is based on two elements: 1) distinguishing between the order of cognition and the real order, that is, the order of being, 2) using the reduction inference. If we substitute $W(x)$ for hostility, and $J(x)$ for war, then we obtain a schematic diagram of reduction inference — not reliable, i.e. inference, in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises, but the premise follows from the conclusion, i.e.:

$W(x) \rightarrow J(x)$ *If there is hostility, then there is war*
$J(x)$ *there is war*

$W(x)$ *there is hostility*

However, there exists a transition from the order of cognition and reduction inference to the real order and deductive reasoning — a reliable one:

$W(x) \rightarrow J(x)$ *If there is hostility, then there is war*
$J(x)$ *there is hostility*

$W(x)$ *there is war*

The same schemes applied to Anselm's reasoning take the following form:

$\ulcorner q \rightarrow \ulcorner p$
$\ulcorner p$

$\ulcorner q$, *because* $\ulcorner q \rightarrow \ulcorner p$
$\ulcorner q$

$\ulcorner p$

In this schema, we substitute for: p — God gives perseverance; q — creation assumes perseverance. The first reasoning — analogically to that of Boethius — is reductive (order of cognition), the other one is deductive (real order).

CONCLUSION

The peculiarity of this argument consists, as it seems, in the meaning of a gift as something that must be accepted by a person before it can even become a gift for a given person. This gift consists in having perseverance, which makes it possible to want only righteousness — *rectitudo*, which in effect amounts to conformity of the will of the creature with the God's will. Alternative possibilities of choice are a necessary property of free will, and free will is a necessary condition for man to be saved as having a real free choice. In this way, with regard to those who are not saved, the ultimate responsibility for the cause of this state is not on God's side, who did not restore the duty of justice, nor on Adam, who rejected justice for his posterity. The lack of salvation is borne by a specific individual.[40] Anselm, recognizing the full compatibility of grace and free will, and even its indispensability for man's full freedom, at the end of the treatise *De libertate arbitrii*, distinguishes between God's freedom and the freedom of creatures. Freedom in God exists as uncreated and self-existent, and therefore cannot be lost. On the other hand, the freedom created by God, which people and angels received, is different. In man, freedom as the "righteousness of will preserved for its own sake" is God's gift and can be lost. Freedom can be restored to man by God on the basis of grace. That is in brief Anselm's doctrine of freedom and grace, which — as we have tried to show — are inseparable.

Translated by Barbara Kulicka

[40] K. Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom*, p. 145.

ROBERT GROSSETESTE AND HIS *DE LIBERO ARBITRIO*

Agnieszka Kijewska

1. INTRODUCTION: CONTEXT, INFLUENCES, AND RECEPTION OF GROSSETESTE'S THOUGHTS

In the words of an eminent expert on Robert Grosseteste's thought, James McEvoy, the work *De libero arbitrio* is a tribute of an outstanding logician to Christian tradition, which includes extraordinary achievements of many great thinkers starting with St. Augustine and ending with St. Anselm, on the subject of the relationship between human freedom and God's knowledge and actions.[1] Neil Lewis, the publisher of this treatise, dates both its earlier and later versions to the years 1231-1235, and therefore to the period when Grosseteste taught at Oxford.[2] McEvoy pointed to the most important sources of this work, namely the texts of St. Augustine, Boethius,[3] St. Anselm, and St. Bernard of Clairvaux, whose achievements Grosseteste synthesizes and passes to successors. Scholars influenced by the treatise are also numerous. Among them there are; Richard Rufus, Richard Fishacre, perhaps John Duns Scotus, and, above all, Thomas Bradwardine, who profusely drew on *De libero arbitrio* in

[1] Cf. J. McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste et la théologie à l'université d'Oxford (1190–1250)*, transl. E. Saint-André Utudjian, Paris, 1999, p. 120.

[2] Cf. N. Lewis, *Introduction,* in Grosseteste, *On free decision*, ed. N. Lewis (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 29), Oxford, 2017, p. XXVII f.

[3] Richard Southern claims that in the time of writing his *De libero arbitrio* Grosseteste was commenting upon Boethius's *De consolatione philosophiae*. Cf. R.W. Southern, *Robert Grosseteste. The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe,* Oxford, 1986, p. 197.

his monumental work *De causa Dei*, or Thomas Buckingham and John Wycliffe.[4]

It is in the context of *De libero* that McEvoy wrote about the tribute of a logician to Christian tradition.[5] Recently Angelo Silvestri attempted to classify the sources of Grosseteste's teachings and asked whether he was rather a philosopher who wanted to understand the mysteries of faith (*intelligo ut credam*) or first of all a believer who needed faith to make progress in understanding (*credo ut intelligam*).[6] The answer he gives in the summary of his considerations includes both of these elements: Grosseteste is both a scholar who wanted to understand in order to believe, and a religious man who believed to understand. Applying his scientific methodology to theology, he went — according to Silvestri — beyond its traditional scheme, achieving a synthesis of medieval thinking.[7] A perfect illustration of such an attitude can be found in his work *On free choice* (*De libero arbitrio*), in which Grosseteste shows the way of rational investigations and the way of following the authority as two complementary methods of conduct. He writes:

> Moreover, we can also use rational arguments to make certain to the intellect what is already clear and believed beyond doubt by appeal to different authoritative texts.[8]

And a little earlier, after citing biblical testimonies about the relationship of God's foreknowledge and free will, Grosseteste states:

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4 Cf. N. Lewis, *Introduction*, p. LXXXI-LXXXVI; J. McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste*, p. 121.

5 Grosseteste states that logic is not part of sciences, but it is diffused through all the sciences just as blood is diffused through the human body. Por. Robert Grosseteste, *Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat* 10, [in:] J. McEvoy, "Robert Grosseteste's Theory of Human Nature. With the Text of His Conference *Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat*," in J. McEvoy, *Robert Grosseteste. Exegete and Philosopher*, Variorum, Aldershot 1994, p. 174: "Ad hoc dicunt quod ars logicae est per omnes alias scientias et artes diffusa, sicut sanguis est diffusus per totum hominis corpus."

6 Cf. A. Silvestri, "*Intelligo ut credam, credo ut intelligam:* Robert Grosseteste Between Faith and Reason," in *Robert Grosseteste and the pursuit of Religious and Scientific Learning in the Middle ages,* ed. J.P. Cunningham, M. Hocknull, Springer, 2016, p. 245.

7 Cf. there, p. 258.

8 Grosseteste, *On Free Decision: Earlier Recension* II, 13, ed. & transl. N. Lewis, p. 20–21: "Quod autem iam patet et creditur indubitanter per diversas auctoritates potest certum fieri intellecui et per rationes."

> And indeed, it is pagans who hold the aforementioned view about God's knowledge, and they would not argue by appeal to these or similar passages from Holy Scripture, since they do not take them to be authoritative. Therefore let us confront them with something taken from those authors of theirs whom they do take to be authoritative.[9]

This attitude of the Bishop of Lincoln clearly has Augustinian roots and is supported by the belief that faith is essentially a rational act. Among the powers of the soul, which by their very nature are directed towards what is conceivable (*apprehensibilia*) and knowable (*cognoscibilia*), there is faith (*fides*) the distinguishing feature of which is the fact that its theses are not directly obvious or derived by deduction, but are accepted on the basis of the authority of those who communicate them.[10] Grosseteste shows that this type of cognition is in fact combined with other types, because in various areas of life the act of faith is often the basis of knowledge (eg, the belief that Rome or Jerusalem exist, even if I have never seen them).[11] In this way, he appreciates both knowledge and faith, although undoubtedly mathematical cognition is for him a model of all cognition.

2. STRATEGY OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION OF FREE WILL TO GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE

It seems that the place of Robert Grosseteste's creativity against the background of the 13th century doctrinal trends was clearly and precisely defined by Fernand Van Steenberghen. In his classic work, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, he wrote:

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[9] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* II, 4, p. 16–17: "Et quia praedicta sententia de Dei scientia ethnicorum est, qui non arguerentur per has vel huiusmodi Scirputrae Sacrae auctoritates, cum illas non recipiant, de propriis auctoribus quos recipiunt aliquid contra illos proferamus."

[10] Cf. J. McEvoy, "Robert Grosseteste's Theory of Human Nature," p. 156–157.

[11] Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat* 11, in J. McEvoy, "Robert Grosseteste's Theory," p. 174–175: "Praeter dicta autem potentiis dictis animae rationalis apprehensibilia et cognoscibilia, sunt alia ratione apprehensibilia et cognoscibilia, utpote quae neque per se nota sunt, neque ex per se notis vel suppositis vel probatis in aliqua disciplina simpliciter vel huic alicui probari possunt, nec sensu exterior sunt apprehensa, sed sola relatione seniorum et maiorum vera esse firmissime supponuntur (…). Similiter Ierosolimam vel Romam esse, quamvis non utram vidi."

> As a philosopher, Robert Grosseteste is another representative of eclectic Aristotelianism. On Aristotelian foundations (logic and principal philosophical doctrines) he builds a philosophy strongly influenced by Augustian, Greek (*Liber de causis*), Arabic (Awicenna) and Jewish (Awicebron and Isaak Israeli) Neo-Platonists.[12]

At the same time, Van Steenberghen mentions Grosseteste among those 13th-century philosophers who were aware of the diversity of human knowledge, while being aware of "methods that are appropriate for positive sciences (observation, experience, referring to mathematics)."[13] The general context of the development of knowledge in the eclecticist Augustinian trend focused on creating integral Christian teaching which, apart from theoretical and educational goals, should also perform pastoral tasks.[14] This is perfectly accomplished in the context of the issues raised in the work *On Free Decision*, namely the question of the freedom of human will and its relationship to God's grace and to foreknowledge and predestination. Grosseteste clearly indicates this in the Preface to this treatise, suggesting that freedom of choice is an inalienable element of human dignity and the path that leads to God:

> Since through the freedom of decision man is more worthy than other animate beings, it is unworthy not to have knowledge of this freedom by which he is more worthy. Accordingly, aided by the bestower of this freedom, we propose to investigate it, to the best of our limited ability, so that once we have found out about it through the illumination of his grace, with his support we may rise up more freely *into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.*[15]

In the second book of *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle, commented on by Grosseteste, states that so many questions can be formulated, as many kinds of knowledge are there, namely: (i) does a thing possess a certain property, (ii) why does it have that property, (iii) does the thing exist and (iv) what is the nature of things.[16] Grosseteste applies this procedure to the

[12] F. Van Steenberghen, *Filozofia w wieku XIII*, transl. into Polish by E. Zieliński, Lublin 2005, p. 155.

[13] There, p. 440; Cf. R.W. Southern, *Robert Grosseteste*, p. 172 ff.

[14] Cf. Van Steenberghen, *Filozofia w wieku XIII*, p. 446 and f.; Cf. Silvestri, "*Intelligo ut credam, credo ut intelligam*, p. 256.

[15] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision*, *Preface,* p. 12–13: "Cum per arbitrii libertatem dignior sit homo ceteris animantibus, ipsa qua dignior est libertatem indignum est ignorare. Idiciro eam pro modulo nostro, adiuvante eiusdem libertatis datore, investigare proponimus, ut etiam per illustrationem gratiae eius illa inventa adminiculo eius in *libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei* liberius assurgamus."

[16] Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 89b. Pietro Rossi believes that Robert's commen-

issue of free choice, asking the fundamental question of whether free choice exists at all, because there appear to be serious arguments for its non-existence.

> We must start, then, by asking whether free decision exists. For where doubt can be raised about the existence [of a thing] this is the first question to consider. But the existence of free decision is subject to doubt, for there seem to be forceful arguments for its non-existence (…). These, then, seem to destroy its existence: God's foreknowledge and predestination, the truth of a *dictum* about the future, divination and prophecy, the necessity of fate, and grace. The compulsion to sin, too, that stems from temptation or some kind of force, and our sinning by means of free decision.[17]

This passage shows that its author was well aware of the controversy that arose around the question of the relationship of human free will to God's foreknowledge and providence, and the first thinkers invoked in this context are saints; St. Augustine and St. Anselm. Grosseteste himself formulates the problem by giving it a form of a syllogism:

> For since God knows everything, even future contingents, and this knowledge is both unchangeable and ifallible, and since whatever he knows must come to be, lest his knowing be fallible or changeable, everything will come to be of necessity, since he cannot not know what he knows. So nothing will be from the free decision of a creature, because if it is from its free decision, it does not come to be of necessity (…). Everything known by God of necessity is or was or will be; your sitting, which will be tomorrow, is known by God; so your sitting is or was or will be. But both the major and minor premises of this syllogism are necessary. So the conclusion not only follows necessarily from the premises, but is also in itself necessary, since what is contingent does not follow from things that are necessary.[18]

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tary to the *Analytics* was created during his work on *De libero arbitrio*. Cf. P. Rossi, in Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum*, ed. P. Rossi, Firenze 1981, p. 10.

[17] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* I, 1–2, p. 12–13: "Quaerendum est igitur in primis de libero arbitrio an sit. Haec est enim prima quaestio, ubi circa esse potest versari dubitatio. Esse autem liberi arbitrii dubitabile est, quia ad eius non esse urgentes videntur rationes esse […]. Destruere itaque esse liberi arbitrii ista videntur : [praescientia Dei et praedestinatio, veritas dicti de futuro, divinatio et prophetia, fatique necessitas et gratia. Coactio quoque per temptationem vel vim aliquam ad peccandum, et quod peccamus per ipsum arbitrium liberum."

[18] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* I, 3–4, p. 14–15: "Cum enim Deus sciat omnia, etiam futura contingentia, eiusque scientia sit tam immutabilis quam infallibilis, cumque quidquid ipse scit necesse sit evenire, ne fallibile vel mutabile sit eius scire, eveniet

Grossetete tries out various strategies to solve this problem, which allow him to retain both the necessity of God's (for)knowledge and the freedom of human will. One of the proposals is to include God's knowledge as necessary, but covering only what is common and not what is individual. In this way Divine Providence would only govern general affairs, and God's knowledge would encompass only that. With this interpretation, there would be no justification for rewards and punishments meted out to people for their individual actions. On the basis of the argumentation from the "authority" of the Holy Scriptures or St. Augustine, as well as supporting quotes from pagan thinkers such as Seneca, Cicero or Boethius, the author of *The Consolation of Philisophy*, Grosseteste states:

> And so, as is now clear, if God is a just judge of human acts, if he is creator of singular things, if he is governor and manager of the world and human affairs, if he loves those who are good, if there is a point to pious worship, then he is acquainted with singular contingent human affairs, which come about through free decision.[19]

Let us go back to the syllogism constructed by Grosseteste:

Major premise: Everything known by God is or has been or will be out of necessity.

Minor premise: [The fact] that you will be sitting tomorrow, has been known by God (and God's knowledge is necessary).

Conclusion: The fact that you are sitting — either is or was or will be.

To solve the paradox of the necessity of God's knowledge and the fact of the existence (or non-existence) of contingent human activities, Grosseteste proposes the following solutions: 1) Accepting that this inference is not necessary; 2) that one of the premises or both are not necessary; 3) the conclusionion is not necessary; 4) from what is necessary follows what is contingent (*contingens*).[20]

omnia ex necessitate, cum non possit quod scit non scire. Nihil igitur erit ex libero arbitrio creaturae, quia si ex eius libero arbitrio, non ex necessitate […]. Omnia scitum a Deo ex necessitate est vel fuit vel erit. Atqui tam maior quam minor huius syllogismi est necessaria. Ergo et conclusio non solum necessario sequitur ex praemissis, sed et est in se necessaria, cum ex necessariis non sequatur contingens."

[19] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* II, 21, p. 22–23: "Itaque, ut iam claret, si Deus est iustus iudex humanorum actuum, si creator rerum singularium, si gubernator et administrator mundi et rerum humanarum, si dilector bonorum, si non incassum pietate colitur, noscit res humanas singulares contingentes, quae per liberum fiunt arbitrium."

[20] Cf. Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* II, 24, p. 23; cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grosseteste/#DivForHumFre (24.09.2018).

Grosseteste indicates that each of these variants entails certain difficulties and does not present a reliable solution (*inconveniens*). He believes, however, that it must be assumed that inference is necessary (1), each of the premises is necessary (2) and in the course of this inference, necessity is moved from the premises to the conclusion (3), and at the same time the contingency of events dependent on the human will is preserved (4). To preserve the necessity of God's knowledge, which would be in some way compatible with the freedom of human choice, Grosseteste distinguishes — after St. Anselm — two types of necessity: "the antecedent necessity (*necessitas praecedens*), which is the reason why the thing exists, and forces it to be" and "the subsequent necessity, which is not the cause of things, nor does it force the thing to be." This first type of necessity "is the sort of necessity that, where Aristotle deals with singular future-tensed propositions, seems to destroy alternatives (*utrumlibet*) and establish that all things [come to be] of necessity. It is by this sequent necessity, which produces nothing, that it is necessary for God to know my future sitting tomorrow and the like […]. No difficulty seems to follow from things that are necessary with this sequent necessity; quite the contrary, it seems necessary for what is contingent to follow."[21]

This distinction refers to the Boethian concept of a simple (or absolute) necessity and a conditional necessity.[22] Keeping in mind that there is no exact correspondence here, Boethius was the one who also emphasized that God's foreknowledge includes future contingent events.[23] The analogy with

[21] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* III, 1–2, p. 24–25: "Et 'haec', ut ipse dicit, 'est illa necessitas quae, ubi tractat Aristoteles de propositionibus singularibus et futuris, videtur utrumlibet destruere et omnia ex necessitate astruere. Hac sequenti et nihil efficiente necessitate necessarium est Deum scire meam sessionem cras futuram et similia […]. Ex necessariis hac sequenti necessitate nullum inconveniens videtur ; immo magis necessarium videtur sequi contingens."

[22] Cf. Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* V, 6, transl. J.C. Relihan, Indianapolis, Cambridge 2001, p. 148: "There are in fact two neciessities : One is simple (for example, the fact that all human beings are mortal); the other is conditional (as when it is necessary that a man is walking if you know that he *is* waking). For whatever anyone knows cannot exist in any other way than it is known to exist, but this condition does not at all draw along with it that other, simple necessity. For it is not the thing's own nature that makes this necessity but only the addition of condition; for no necessity compels a man to move forward who is taking a step voluntarily, even though it is a necessary thing that he move forward at the point at which he takes a step."

[23] J. Marenbon, *Le temps, la prescience et le determinisme dans la Consolatio Philosophiae de Boèce,* in : *Boèce ou la chaine du savoir*, ed. A. Galonnier, Paris, Leuven, 2003, p. 541.

Boethius's concept goes even further: the question of God's foreknowledge is closely connected with God's way of existence and cognition. Grosseteste modifies the understanding of the necessity of God's cognition: what God has acknowledged is necessary, but under conditional or consequential necessity, and this necessity in God is not "anything but the voluntarily abiding inflexibility of his will. No difficulty seems to follow from things that are necessary with this sequent necessity; quite the contrary, it seems necessary for what is contingent to follow. For while I am sitting, it is necessary that I am sitting, and after I have sat, it is necessary that I have sat. But the relation that the *dicta* 'that I am sitting' and 'that I have sat' have to my sitting while I am sitting and after I have sat is the same relation that God's knowledge has to my future sitting before I sit. For God knows future things as present, and he knows them no differently when they are future and when they are present or past."[24]

In this way, the truth of the sentences about the future and free choice, that is the contingency of future events, is retained. Contingent and changeable future things can realise themselves in one way or another, and therefore are in themselves contingent, while in God's knowledge they are immutable due to the immutability and constancy of this knowledge (truth). The same is the answer to the charges attempting to annul free choice on the basis of a fact of a prophecy or spaeing:

> For the thing itself foreknown by prophecy is possible in relation to either alternative; the foreknowledge of that thing, once [that foreknowledge] exists, cannot thereafter not have existed. Hence, it is necessary for this thing to have been known, and from this [foreknowledge] follows the existence of the thing, and yet [this existence] is contingent.[25]

Thus, by adopting a specific concept of necessity, a subsequent necessity,[26] it can be reconciled with the contingency that characterizes free human activities. Grosseteste modifies the very notion of a necessary sentence, namely, it is a sentence that is true and cannot become false: its truth cannot cease to

[24] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* III, 2, p. 25.

[25] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* III, 6, p. 26–27: "Res namque ipsa per prophetiam praescita est ad utrumlibet possibilis; ipsa eiusdem rei praescientia, cum iam est, non potest de cetero non fuisse. Unde hanc rem scitam esse est necessarium, ex qua sequitur esse rei, quod tamen est contingens."

[26] Cf. Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* V, 2, p. 33: "But when things exist or are past his knowledge has consequent necessity. So it also has the same necessity before the things come to be."

exist, but the sentence about what is contingent can become false from being true . Necessity and opportunity are therefore defined in terms of change (to be / not to be) and consequently in terms of time. A sentence concerning the future is true and therefore necessary, because the state of affairs that it describes is not yet present. When this state of affairs appears, it can become false, but it will no longer apply to the future, but to the present.[27]

> The truth of *dicta* about the future is like this, for their truth, when it is, cannot have non-being after being, as we showed above. And yet there is a capacity for them to have been true without a beginning and from eternity, and a capacity for them to have been false from eternity and without a beginning, and there is a capacity for falsity that cannot begin and for truth that cannot begin in the. But when [such a *dictum*] has truth and [when it has] falsity, there is not a capacity for the opposite of what it has after what it has.[28]

Sentences about the future are of relative necessity (*ex aliqua parte*), that is, their truth cannot cease to exist until the state of things they are talking about comes into existence. At the same time, "in another respect (*ex parte alia*) they also have contingency, because they have the capacity for being true and false without a beginning, and from this capacity follows the contingency of things."[29] Grosseteste, however, immediately adds:

> We should grant, then, that 'Antichrist is going to exist' is necessary in the sense that its truth and its futurity cannot cease. But this does not mean that Antichrist necessarily is going to exist or necessarily will exist, that is, that he will have existence of necessity in the future.[30]

God's knowledge, however, does not cause the fact that out of necessity the state of affairs which it concerns (here: the existence of Antichrist) will come into existence. Necessity concerns the unchangeable truth of sentences in which God's knowledge is expressed, and not of a specific state of affairs:

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[27] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grosseteste/#ModGodPow

[28] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* VII, 4, p. 40–41: "Talis est veritas dictorum de futuro, {quia eorum veritas, cum est, non potest habere non esse post esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est tamen posse ad hoc, ut sine initio et ab aeterno fuerint vera, et posse ad hoc, ut ab aeterno et sine initio fuerint falsa} et posse ad falsitaten non initiabilem et ad veritaten non initiabilem in his. Sed cum habet veritatem et falsitatem, non est posse ad oppositum eius quod habet post id quod habet."

[29] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* VII, 6, p. 41.

[30] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* VII, 8, p. 42–43: "Concedendum igitur quod haec est necessaria, 'Antichristus est futurus, ex hoc intellectu quod eius veritas et eius futuritio non potest desinere. Nec tamen Antichristus necessario est futurus vel necessario erit, id est habebit esse ex necessitate in futuro."

> By syllogistic inference, then, what is necessary follows from necessary antecedents with the kind of necessity possessed by the antecedents, because the conclusion, like the antecedents, has truth that cannot in the future cease and from which it cannot be altered. But this does not mean that the thing itself referred to in the conclusion has any necessity to exist. Rather, the capacity that the antecedents have for being true and being false without a beginning means that the thing itself referred to in the conclusion necessarily has contingency in respect of existence and non-existence, and it is true that a contingent thing follows from what is necessary.[31]

Robert Grosseteste defines contingency here, as an opportunity to be one way or another: the possibility of "both options." In fact, in his opinion it is alternative/optionality (*utrumlibet*) that is the essence of the freedom of the will. In order to present the specifics and novelty of Grosseteste's approach to the issue of the freedom of the will, it is worth putting it in the context of the solutions of his predecessors, to whom he directly referred, i.e. St. Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux and Anselm.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION OF FREE WILL

Grosseteste speaks of free choice — *liberum arbitrium* — and already at the beginning of his treatise, as well as towards the end of it, raises the fundamental question of whether free choice exists at all. Answering this question, he points out that the existence of free choice is indicated by such facts as the efficacy and reasonableness of orders and praise for the execution of a given order, which would not have happened if it were realized out of necessity:

> So if there is a point to prescribing it, it is neither necessary for it to be done, nor necessary for it not be done. But if it is not necessary for it to be done, it can not be done; and if it is not necessary for it not to be done, it can be done. So if there is a point to prescribing it, it can be done and not be done.[32]

[31] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* VII, 11, p. 42–43: "Per viam igitur syllogisticam ex necessariis sequitur necessarium eo modo necessitatis quem modum necessitatis habent antecedentia, quia conclusio, sicut antecedentia, habet veritatem quae non potest in futuro desinere et a qua non potest alterari. Tamen ipsa res conclusionis nullam propter hoc habet necessitatem ad essendum. Immo propter posse antecedentium ad utrumque, sicilicet ad verum et falsum sine initio, habet ipsa res conclusionis necessario contingentiam ad utrumque, scilicet ad essendum et non essendum, et verum est quod ex necessario sequitur res contingens."

[32] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVI, 1, p. 82–83: "Ergo si non incassum praecipitur,

Speaking of the structure of free choice, Grosseteste and his contemporaries referred to two fundamental powers of the rational soul, namely reason and willingness. The word *arbitrium* refers to the rational power, whose task is to decide and assess the situation, while freedom is a basic feature of the will as a desiring power.[33] In the thirteenth century there were extensive discussions about the mutual relationship of these powers and their possible primacy. In his homily, *Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat* Grosseteste explicitly states that this power of the rational soul, which is free will or free choice, includes all other powers, because by nature it guides them and tells them what to do.[34] This autonomy of will and its independence from the judgment of reason is its distinctive feature: reason presents the results of his work to the will, but only the will chooses, and he can do so even against the judgment of reason.

> Where there is reason, there is the capacity to distinguish good from evil. But this capacity to distinguish would be pointless unless there were a free power to choose good and shun evil. But this free power is free decision. So every rational nature has free decision. For the purpose of the capacity to distinguish good from evil could not be the necessary adoption of only one of them: we could understand this to be the purpose of the knowledge just of what is adopted, but not of the capacity to distinguish one opposite from the other.[35]

Grosseteste rejects the concept of the freedom of the will, the essence of which is a lack of compulsion,[36] or the ability to maintain rightousness for

neque necesse est fieri, neque necesse est non fieri. Sed si non necesse est fieri, potest non fieri ; et si non necesse est non fieri, potest fieri. Ergo si non incassum praecipitur, potest fieri et non fieri ."

33 Cf. N. Lewis, "Libertas Arbitrii in Robert Grosseteste's *De libero arbitrio*", in *Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu. New Editions and Studies*, ed. J. Flood, J.R. Ginther, J. Goering, Toronto 2013, p. 15.

34 Grosseteste, *Ecclesia Sancta Celebrat* 12, p. 175: "Consimiliter potentia animae rationalis quae dicitur libera voluntas seu liberum arbitrium est per omnes alias diffusa; ipsa enim naturaliter est imperativa aliarum potentiarum, ut secundum quod oportet et decet prorumpant in suos actus proprios et naturales et ab eis vacent; cuius imperio aliae sunt naturaliter oboeditivae."

35 Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVII, 17, p. 94–95: "Ubi est ratio est boni malique discretio. Sed cassa esset discretio nisi esset potestas libera eligendi bonum vitandique malum. Sed haec libera potestas liberum est arbitrium. Discretionis enim boni a malo finis non posset esse tantum alterius necessaria assumptio, sed posset intelligi esse finis cognitionis solum illius quod assumitur, non discretionis oppositi ab opposito."

36 Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XV, 4, p. 83: "So no will can be forced not to will what it wills. But it can be forced not to do what it wills."

rightousness alone, the concept which was proposed by St. Anselm.[37] Instead, he is inclined to the solution proposed by Peter Lombard that the essence of the freedom of choice is the possibility to choose one of the options (*ad utrumlibet*):

> And yet definitions of free decision given by other authors seem to indicate that a capacity of the will to turn and freedom in respect of both alternatives do belong to free decision's quiddity. […] And the Master adds in the *Sentences*: 'It is called free in respect of the will, which can be bent to either alternative, but decision in respect of reason'. And a little later he says: 'So that power of the rational soul by which it can will good and evil, distinguishing each, is named free decision.'[38]

In this concept of freedom of choice, there are additional problems, namely the question of whether free choice is attributed to God, man and angel equally, and whether the possibility of sinning belongs to the essence of free choice. There could arise such an eventuality that, for example, God's freedom would involve the "possibility of sinning."[39]
Answering the question of whether free choice is attributed to God and rational creatures in an unambiguous manner, Grosseteste refers essentially to St. Anselm's solutions. According to Aristotle's teaching, a name is shared by those things that have a common essence, and certainly a creation and the Creator cannot have a common essence. However, St. Anselm maintains that "although the free will of people is really different from the free will of God and good angels, the definition of this will in both cases due to the same name should be the same."[40] Following this clue, the Bishop of Lincoln states:

> Now, we concede that nothing is said in the same sense of creatures and the creator. Even so, the rational creature is so close a trace, likeness, and image of its creator that in these respects in which it is so close and similar a trace it also

[37] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 8, p. 98–99; por. N. Lewis, "Libertas Arbitrii," p. 17–18.

[38] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 11, p. 100–101: "Et contra autem videtur per definitiones liber arbitrii ab aliis auctoribus positas quod de quidditate liberii arbitrii sit voluntatis flexibilitas et ad utrumque libertas (…) Et subiungit Magister in *Sententiis*: 'Et dicitur liberum quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest, arbitrium vero quantum ad rationem.' Et Paulo post ait: 'Illa ergo animae rationalis potentia qua velle bonum et malum potest, utrumque discernens, liberum arbitrium nuncupatur.'"

[39] Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 1a.

[40] Anzelm z Canterbury, *O wolności woli*, transl. A. Stefańczyk, Kęty, 2011, p. 115.

> deserves to share the [pertinent] name, not indeed in the same sense, but by reason of the close, imitative likeness. Thus it also has a single definition of the name, not in the same sense, but by reason of a close, imitative likeness. […] And for an intellect contemplating in this way should be assigned one name and one definition of free decision in the creator and creatures.[41]

If, on the basis of the similarity of a creation to the Creator, one definition of free choice in relation to God and intelligent creatures is accepted, then the possibility of sinning should be excluded from this definition, because in no way can it be attributed to God. "The power of sin, Grosseteste explicitly says, must be excluded from the account (*quidditas*) of free decision."[42] Despite this assumption, Grosseteste wants to maintain his concept of free choice as an ability to choose one of the options. This inclination of the will to choose one of the options is not identical with the possibility of sinning or non-sinning[43]:

> Besides, there are a great many pairs of opposites each member of which is indifferent and can be well done, and a man can well and praiseworthily will whichever he pleases. So this power in both cases is a power to act well. But power to act well is not absolutely the same as a power to sin.[44]

Grosseteste therefore defines the essence of free choice as an inclination of the will to opt for one of the possibilities, but does not consider these possibilities in terms of moral opposites: good or bad, sinning or non-sinning.[45] In this context, God can also be attributed with the highest de-

[41] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVII, 10, p. 92–93: "Concedimus autem quod nihil univoce dicitur de creatura et creatore. Sed tamen creatura rationalis ita propinqua est vestigium et similitudo et imago sui creatoris, quod in his secundum quae est ita propinquum et assimulatum vestigium meretur etiam communicare et nomen, non quidem univoce, sed propinqua, imitatoria similitudine […]. Et intellectui sic contemplanti assignandum est unum nomen et una definitio liberi arbitrii in creatore et creatura."

[42] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVII, 14, p. 93.

[43] Cf. N. Lewis, "Libertas Arbitrii," p. 20 and f.

[44] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 16, p. 102–103: "Preterea, sunt plurima duo opposita quorum utrumque indifferens est et utrumque [potest] bene agi, et bene et laudabiliter potest homo utrumlibet velle. Haec ergo potestas utrimque est potetas bene faciendi. Sed potestas bene faciendi non est simpliciter idem cum potestate peccandi."

[45] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 17, p. 103: "Also, if we supposed that all pairs of opposites were indifferent and that none of the opposites was contrary to God's will, we could understand there to be the aforementioned capacity that the will has to turn without the power to sin. So the power to sin is not absolutely the same as this capacity to turn."

gree of freedom of choice as an inclination towards one of the options, without suggesting that there is any possibility of sinning in Him.

> Again, if God could have never willed many things that he wills, because he could have not done many things that he has done and done many that he has not done, then his will has a capacity to turn. This does not mean that, when he wills something, his will can be changed to the opposite, since he is utterly unchangeable, but rather that he has a power to will wither one of two opposites, namely a capacity to will without a beginning and from eternity what he does not will, and not to will without a beginning and from eternity what he wills.[46]

Grosseteste upholds this controversial concept of the freedom of the will, which sees its essence in the possibility of choosing one of the options, but does not refer this choice to a moral context: the choice of this and this, or the choice of its opposite does not have to be a choice between good and evil. In my opinion, accepting such a solution allows him to solve another difficulty related to the paradox of the freedom of the will and predestination, namely the concept of the relation of free will and grace.

The choice facing free will is the choice of one of the options, one of those suggested by reason, but nevertheless, the will is completely free in its operation. The possibilities which free will is facing are in themselves somewhat morally neutral and the possibility of such a choice is like natural human equipment. Our action (choice) becomes good or bad depending on whether it is in accordance with God's Will or against it. God's Will is the highest norm of justice and righteousness:

> Now, to sin is to will what is inequitable. But it is inequitable only because it is contrary to true equity and true rightness, that is, to the divine will. This, then, is to sin: to will what is contrary to what God wills — to will it, I mean, in so far as it is contrary to it. On the other hand, the contrary of sinning, namely to act well, consists in willing what God wills — in willing it, I mean, in so far as it is well pleasing to God.[47]

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[46] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 14, p. 100–101: "Item, si Deus potuit numquam voluisse multa quae vult, quia potuit multa non fecisse quae fecit et fecisse quae non fecit, est in Deo voluntatis vertibilitas — non ut cum velit aliquid possit mutari eius voluntas in oppositum, cum ipse sit omnino immutabilis, sed ex hoc intellectu ut sit in eo potestas volendi utrumque duorum oppositorum, posse scilicet volendi absque initio et ab aeterno quod non vult, et non volendi absque initio et ab aeterno quod vult."

[47] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 18, p. 103; Lewis, p. 102: "Peccare autem est velle quod iniquum est. Non autem iniquum nisi quia verae aequitati et verae rectitudini, hoc est divinae voluntati, contrarium. Hoc est itaque pecare : velle contrarium ei quod Deus vult — velle, inquam, hoc secundum quod est ei contrarium.

If the choice between opposing possibilities belongs to the essence of free will, and free will can be clearly attributed to man, angel and God, then this is an additional argument against the fact that the choice between opposing options is not identical with the possibility of sinning and non-sinning. God is immutable to the highest degree and free to the highest degree, so in His case the choice between different options is not a choice between moral good and evil, but it is establishing the "norm" of righteousness and goodness:

> Nor is this power by which one can freely will either one of opposites, which we have also been calling the will's capacity to turn, absolutely the same as a power to sin and not to sin, since it exists in God, who cannot sin. For since he is rightness in himself, and so things are right because he himself wills them, he cannot will what is not right, because he wills something, by that very fact it is right.[48]

4. THE ROLE OF GRACE

Man, however, by nature, is not assigned to wanting what is righteous, that is, what is in accordance with God's Will. This can be achieved thanks to the support that grace grants to free will.[49] Here, however, the problem arises whether grace does not destroy free choice or whether it imposes some form of necessity on the will. Grosseteste argues that grace and free choice are the two causes performing, through acting together, one, indivisible act of choice. He equates their cooperation to light and color, when a ray of sunshine passes through glass and "in this subject a colorful radiance and radial color are created."[50] In this way, God's action supports free

Contrarium autem peccandi, scilicet bene agere, consistit in volendo id quod Deus vult — in volendo, inquam, illud secundum quod Deo beneplacitum est." Cf. N. Lewis, "Libertas Arbitrii," p. 23 f.

[48] Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 15, p. 101–103: "Nec est haec potestas qua potest velle libere utrumlibet oppositorum, quam etiam vocavimus voluntatis vertibilitatem, idem simpliciter quod potestas [non] peccandi et peccandi, cum sit in Deo, qui peccare non potest. Cum enim ipse [sit] per se rectitudo, et ideo res rectae quia ipse vult eas, non potest velle non rectum, quia, si vult aliquid, eo ipso est rectum."

[49] Robert Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XVIII, 19, p. 103: "So we have found the will's capacity to turn to willing either one of opposites considered nakedly in themselves without relation to God's will […]. However, it cannot will a particular thing in so far as it is well pleasing to God unless it is helped by grace."

[50] Robert Grosseteste, *On Free Decision* XI, 12, p. 66–67.

choice without depriving man of the appropriate authorship of his own acts. God is the prime cause, but permeating the action of free will, He does not deprive it of the co-authorship of the act of choice:

> But if it is in this way said about the action of God and of free decision that they work through each of the advances together and not on their own, at the same time and not in turns, and that each one accomplishes it all with an indivisible work, can we not in just the same way say that whenever any creature is produced, God and the proximate non-incidental cause of that creature work that creature together, not on their own; at the same time, not in turns; not part of it God and part of it that cause, but that they each work the whole of it with an indivisible work? Because God is the primary cause, entering into the whole secondary proximate cause, and not only into it but also into its causation and action, […] a secondary proximate cause produces nothing that the first cause itself does not produce even more closely.[51]

5. CONCLUSIONS

The considerations contained in the treatise *On Free Decision*, starting with the basic assumptions of Augustinism, modify them in the light of philosophical literature, which Grossteste read and appreciated, namely in the light of Aristotle's concept of science, the texts of Boethius, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, and above all St. Anselm, of whose writings Bishop of Lincoln was the first such a zealous reader. As a result, we get a very interesting concept that sees the essence of free choice in opting for one of the options that the mind assesses, but the will is completely autonomous in following. This option of free choice, however, does not come down to choosing between good and evil, sinning and non-sinning, because then, attributing freedom to God in the highest degree, one might think that God also faces a similar opposition. However, this possibility of being in favour of one of the options is morally neutral in the case of man, and in relation to God's Will becomes a source of moral good, because what God wants, is in the highest degree fair and right, is the source of all righteousness and good-

[51] Ibid., p. 69; Lewis, p. 68: "Sed [si] sic dicatur de actione Dei et liberi arbitrii, scilicet quod mixtim non singillatim, simul non vicissim, per singulos operentur, et quod totum singula peragant opere individuo; numquid consimiliter potest dici quod in omni effectu cuiuslibet creaturae Deus et proxima per se causa eiusdem creaturae operentur illam mixtim, non singillatim; simul, non vicissim; non partem hic, partem illa, sed totum singula opere individuo? An quia ipse est causa primaria, totam penetrans causam secundariam et proximam […]?"

ness. In order to reconcile human free choice with what is God's Will, grace is necessary and only these two factors: free choice and the support of grace cause that man favors good. Is it not true that "because of the freedom of choice, man has greater dignity than other living beings"?

Translated by Barbara Kulicka

WILL, KNOWLEDGE, ACTION — GOD'S GRACE: THOMAS AQUINAS ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION AND DIVINE CAUSALITY

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk

αὐτὸς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον
καὶ ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν ἐν χειρὶ διαβουλίου αὐτοῦ
It was he who created humankind in the beginning,
and he left them in the power of their own free choice
(Sir 15:14)

INTRODUCTION*

The idea of divine preordination or predestination appears in Scripture and it is there that the essential meaning of that notion is set. Thus we learn that by God's decision Isaac was elected while Ismael was passed over, Jacob, and not Esau was approved as the true their of God's promise to Abraham, the Gentiles have been called to the kingdom of grace, whereas Israel temporarily removed from grace (Rom 11:11–15). St. Paul then proceeds: "Yet, before the twins were born or had done anything good or bad

* Some help in understanding Aquinas's teaching on divine will and God's action insofar as relevant for the discussion carried out in the present paper and the conclusions reached herein came to me from Father Professor Michał Paluch, O.P., with whom I had a conversation on these topics on 19.06.2017 in the House of the Dominicans, Freta street 10, in Warsaw. It was Father Paluch that drew my attention to the importance of the distinction *voluntas antecedens — voluntas consequens* as related to Gods will. Father Paluch's remarks and his article on this topic that I quote below gave me a stimulus to form a coherent (as I hope) interpretation of Aquinas's teaching on the subject of predestination versus freedom and to construct a model scheme of his conception and explanation of this subject; a model in which will, cognition and God's activity — God's grace — are duly incorporated to form a coherent whole.

— in order that God's purpose in election might stand: not by works but by him who calls — she was told, "The older will serve the younger." Just as it is written: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated." (Rom 9:10–13).

These quotes imply that God, without any breach of justice, moved by His own grace alone, elects some human beings by His supremely free decisions which are in no wise determined by His foreknowledge of any future deserts of those He elects.[1] The New Testament, in its turn, proclaims that the possibility of salvation is [in principle] open to all human beings owing to the work of redemption performed by Christ: in Christ every human being is given a real chance of being saved: "[God] desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" [1 Timothy 2, 4]. Nevertheless, a number of difficulties and questions does not fail to arise at this point: the Old Testament God arbitrarily prefers Isaac to Ismael and Jacob to Esau, and we can readily ascribe sovereign knowledge and supreme power to Him, but how about goodness? Goodness, on the other hand, is evident in St. Paul's testimony, as it is clearly goodness that God's desire for all people to be saved is expressive of; and yet we know from other channels that precisely this particular desire of God's is flawed by inefficiency; for not all human beings are saved in the final analysis; thus, while on St. Paul's statement God's perfect benevolence is preserved intact, questions arise as to His all-power and all-knowledge. Clearly: one ought to acknowledge that an omniscient God should know all about the evil in the world: a perfectly benevolent God should do His best to prevent evil from happening or stop its destructive impact, while an omnipotent God should be able effectively to eliminate any evil from His work. This assumption appears necessarily lead to the conclusion that (1) God lacks at least one of the three attributes essentially present in the classical theistic account of His relationship to creation (omniscience, omnipotence and perfect goodness - benevolence), and thus (2) lacks at least some of the features ascribed to Him by the Christian theistic theology, so the account of God as offered by this classical tradition appears to be inadequate. Thus the problem of evil in classical theism is in a way reducible to the problem of logical consistency, the question being whether the three divine attributes mentioned above can be shown to be consistent between themselves or whether they can be harmonized with the evil we experience in the world, whether it be external evil originating from nature as such or internal evil being the effect of

[1] Cf. Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, *Suma Teologiczna. O Bogu*, Cz. 2 (1, 13–26), przełożył i objaśnieniami zaopatrzył P. Bełch, Londyn, 1977, s. 127–128.

human freedom.[2] There is also the problem of consistency between human freedom and God's supreme government of the world: how can man act in a free way if God's unerring government extends to even the smallest details of the world process? If divine causality reaches as far as a human seemingly free choice, in what sense can this choices be regarded as belonging to man rather than God and as genuinely free? And what sense can we, under this circumstance, make of sin, guilt and responsibility? These question are of essential importance for man's self-understanding as well as the understanding of the Christian doctrine: involved in them are the problems of grace, predestination, guilt and merit. The cooperation of God and man is thus revealed as the leading problem facing the theology of the Christian West.[3] The efforts of Western theologians to solve this problem (or, rather, this complex of mutually related problems) have concentrated on finding an explanatory strategy that would make it possible to show that absolute efficiency of God's will can be reconciled with the real or apparent defeat of the divine wish for all people to be saved.

The concept of divine predestination contains two essential component elements: the concept of divine foreknowledge (prescience) and the concept of divine causality: as a matter of fact God knows in advance both good and evil to come, yet he wills (and, consequently, causes) only good.

The present article undertakes to reconstruct the broad theoretical framework set by Aquinas to achieve an adequate solution of the problem of divine predestination vs evil; it proceeds through discussion of the three principal assumptions of Aquinas's treatment of this problem: (1) the distinction between "antecedent and consequent will" *[voluntas antecedens, voluntas consequens]*; with this distinction Aquinas seeks to nullify the apparent incompatibility of God's desire for all men to be saved with the fact of only some humans being actually saved; (2) the distinction of the terms "necessity in the divided sense" or "necessity as attributed to the thing" [*necessitas in sensu diviso/de re*] and "necessity in the composite sense" or "necessity as attributed to the statement as a whole" [*necessitas in sensu composito*]; this, in turn, serves to resolve the apparent contradiction between the necessary infallibility of God's foreknowledge and the

[2] Cf. McCann, Hugh J. and Johnson, Daniel M., "Divine Providence," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, https://plato. stanford.edu/ archives/spr2017/entries/providence-divine/.

[3] R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice. Domingo Báñez, physical premotion and the controversy "De Auxiliis" revisited*, Boston, 2016, p. 1.

contingent nature of man's freedom; (3) the distinction between "sufficient and efficacious grace" (*gratia sufficiens vs. gratia efficax*); this is to safeguard the absolute efficacy of divine causality without abolishing or compromising free will of human beings. The ontological pivot of Aquinas's construction is his conception of nature as a universal component principle of individual beings and his conception of the person as an individual and singular particular being. In the concluding remarks that round off my discussion I point out (a) some difficulties and limitations of Thomas's teaching on predestination, (b) the lack of precision of his formulations that later on, upon the turn of the 16th century, occasioned the notable controversy called *De auxiliis* between the Dominicans and Jesuits.

1. DIVINE BENEVOLENCE AND GOD'S WISH FOR EVERY HUMAN BEING TO BE SAVED

The chief objection that can be put forward to the Catholic doctrine of predestination, or even more generally, to the relevant Christian dogma as such, is that the theory of predestination contains two points that appear in effect mutually contradictory. (1) One point concerns selective salvation; only *some* human beings will ultimately be saved and enjoy eternal beatitude while the rest will be rejected and relegated to hell[4]; (2) the other regards God's benevolence and His will for all human beings to be saved. The difficulty here is more than obvious: how can God's benevolent desire for every single person to be beatified be squared with the rude fact of a large section of humanity being irretrievably lost in hell? We shall presently see how Thomas Aquinas proceeds to deal with this aporia and whether his strategy is effective.

Thomas variously refers to predestination in many places of his *oeuvre*. A complete and systematic exposition of his views can be found in his *Summa Theologiae* and in his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae;*

[4] See *Sth* I[a] q. 23 a. 3 co., especially "… sicut praedestinatio est pars providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpa."

important are also his discussions in his *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate* and *Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia*. In order to give a complete and coherent presentation of Thomas's teaching on predestination and of his solution of the problems related to that concept we shall make abundant use of the classical distinction between nature and person; nature being general or universal essence, while person being a particular reasonable individual. Some other distinctions that are of crucial importance for Aquinas's teaching on predestination were introduced in his early synthesis of theology, namely in his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences:*

> … will in God is of two kinds, namely antecedent and consequent. Yet this distiction does not result from any diversity inherent in God's will itself, but from diverse conditions of the object willed by God. Now, one can consider in whatever man human nature itself and diverse conditions that accompany it: for instance that the man wills his own salvation and cooperates in preparing it, or he opposes his salvation and acts counter to it. If, then, we consider in man his nature alone [without its concomitant conditions], it is evident that it is good for every man to be saved, for all human beings come together in human nature. And since every good is willed by God, it follows that God also wills that particular good [*scil.* that every human being be saved]. This willing in God is called antecedent will; thus by his antecedent will God wills that humans be saved, according to St. John of Damascus. The effect of this antecedent will is subordination of natural order to the ultimate purpose of human salvation and all the means intended to promote salvation that has bee proposed to all humans in common, both natural and resulting from grace, such as natural powers and precepts of the law and the like. If, however, all circumstances of a person's life are taken into consideration, one cannot say any more: that it be good for all persons to be saved: namely, it is good for someone who prepares himself for salvation and agrees to it to be saved by the generosity od divine grace, but for someone who refuses and resists salvation it would not be good to be saved, because it would be unjust. And since anything so relates to what is willed by God as to what is good, God does not will to save the latter man [namely, the one who resists salvation], while He wills the salvation of the former [the one who accepts and cooperates with salvation]. It is this will in God that is called consequent will, for the reason that it presupposes foreknowledge of human actions, though not as a cause of the will itself but as a reason for the object willed by God to be so…[5] (Transl. A.P.S.)

[5] "… voluntas est duplex; scilicet antecedens, et consequens: et hoc contingit non ex aliqua diversitate voluntatis divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones ipsius voliti. Potest enim in unoquoque homine considerari natura ejus et aliae circumstantiae ipsius, ut quod est volens et praeparans se ad salutem suam, vel etiam repugnans et contrarie agens. Si ergo in homine tantum natura ipsius consideretur, aequaliter

The terms that appear in the quoted passage, namely: antecedent and consequent will, nature, person, and, finally, divine foreknowledge of human actions, though not as a cause of God's willing but as a *ratio* for the object willed by God to be so willed are those that will be crucially present in Thomas's discussion of predestination and its aporias. The main concern with which the distinction of the Sentences commentary from which the quoted passage comes is preoccupied is generated by St. Paul's unequivocal statement in 1 Timothy 2, 4: "[God] desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." This statement appears to imply some contradiction within the body of statements that forms the obligatory object of faith for Catholics; the contradiction seems to be between God's explicit wish for all humans to be saved and the conviction that has usually been upheld as obvious within the Church tradition that many (if not most) human beings will ultimately be damned and relegated to hell. This contradiction apparently affects the very depths of God's will: He seems simultaneously to desire all his creatures to be in heaven and yet to send a considerable number of them to the place of eternal damnation. The challenge facing the theologian is thus to offer a theory of divine will and its objects that will effectively remove this apparent incompatibility of two conflicting volitions in God and vindicate both God's infinite goodness and His perfect justice. What is Thomas's strategy in dealing with this challenge? He refers to St. John of Damascus and adopts his distinction of two moments within God's (single and undivided) will: *voluntas antecedens* (antecedent will), which is God's desire for all people to be saved, and *voluntas consequens* (consequent will), which is God's final and irrevocable decision concerning

bonum est omnem hominem salvari: quia omnes conveniunt in natura humana. Et cum omne bonum sit volitum a Deo, hoc etiam Deus vult, et hoc vocatur voluntas antecedens, qua omnes homines salvos fieri vult, secundum Damascenum. Et hujus voluntatis effectus est ipse ordo naturae in finem salutis, et promoventia in finem omnibus communiter proposita, tam naturalia quam gratuita, sicut potentiae naturales, et praecepta legis, et hujusmodi. Consideratis autem omnibus circumstantiis personae, sic non invenitur de omnibus bonum esse quod salventur; bonum enim est eum qui se praeparat et consentit, salvari per largitatem gratiae divinae; nolentem vero et resistentem non est bonum salvari, quia injustum est. Et quia hoc modo se habet aliquid ad hoc quod sit volitum a Deo, sicut se habet ad hoc quod sit bonum; ideo istum hominem sub illis conditionibus consideratum, non vult Deus salvari, sed tantum istum qui est volens et consentiens; et hoc dicitur voluntas consequens, eo quod praesupponit praescientiam operum non tamquam causam voluntatis, sed quasi rationem voliti..." See *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 co.

the ultimate destiny of a rational individual creature.[6] The latter takes into account the particular circumstances of an individual's moral life, including that individual's personal response to God's offer of salvation. This appears clear enough, but does not this distinction of two different moments in God's one and indivisible will clash with God's absolute unity and simplicity? According to Thomas the answer to this question is in the negative, because "this does not result from any diversity inherent in God's will itself, but from diverse conditions of the object willed by God."[7] God's will remains one and the same while assuming differing aspects depending on the alteration of conditions within the willed object; these two aspects are just two sides of one reality that may only appear divided and even self-contradictory to our limited outlook,[8] that is in the human epistemic perspective.[9] A characteristic feature of the argument contained in the

[6] John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, II, c. .29 (PG 94, 969 A-B): "Oportet scire quod Deus antecedenter vult omnes salvari et regno eius potiri. Non enim in puniendo plasmavit nos, sed ad participandum bonitatem eius ut bonus. Peccantes autem vult puniri ut iustus. Dicitur igitur prima quidem antecedens voluntas, et acceptatio ex ipso existens; secunda autem sequens voluntas, et concessio ex nostra causa. Et ipsa est duplex: haec quidem dispensativa et eruditiva ad salutem; haec autem desperativa ad finalem punitionem, ut diximus. Haec autem in hiis quae non in nobis. Eorum autem quae in nobis, quae quidem bona antecedenter vult, et acceptat; quae perniciosa autem et vere mala, neque antecedenter, neque consequenter vult: concedit autem libero arbitrio. Quod enim secundum vim fit, non rationale neque virtus." Saint John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa: versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, ed. E.M. Buytaert, (Franciscan Institute publications. Text series, 8), St. Bonaventure N.Y., Louvain, 1955, s. 160 ; see also M. Paluch, "Wolność czy konieczność? Nauka o predestynacji a koncepcja woli od IX do XIII wieku," p. 9, note 31. Let me acknowledge here M. Paluch's kindness, who made the quoted article of his available to me before its publication, which is scheduled for later in the present year (2018) as part of a grant.

[7] "...et hoc contingit non ex aliqua diversitate voluntatis divinae, sed propter diversas conditiones ipsius voliti." Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 co. [translated by AS]

[8] See M. Paluch, "The Salvific Will according to Aquinas: An Inspiration for Contemporary Theology?," *Religion and Religions. A Thomistic Look*, 2015, p. 2.

[9] St. Thomas in many places of his work refers to the specific nature of predication as related to God (*in divinis*); the following passage from the *De veritate* seems to provide the most succint — in a nutshell, as it were — definition of his position on this matter: "in divinis est duplex modus loquendi. Unus secundum propriam locutionem: quando scilicet Deo attribuimus id quod sibi competit secundum suam naturam; quamvis semper sibi eminentius competat quam a nobis mente concipiatur, vel sermone proferatur; ratione cuius nulla nostra locutio de Deo potest

quoted passage (*Super Sent,* lib. 1, d. 46, q. 1, a. 1 co,) is the use of the Boethian conceptual apparatus, namely the concepts of nature and person, in describing the objects of God's willing. In the Boethian framework nature is a fixed, unchangeable essence characterized by a set and immutable way of acting; it is precisely that which is common and universal in particular individuals of a given species, e.g. nature in human persons is constituted by their rationality and animality as all particular humans participate in one rational human nature. The person, by contrast, being an "individual substance of rational nature" *(naturae rationalis individua substantia)* is a reality that is particular, singular and in a way unique; it is incommunicable in that it does not share its own individual properties with anyone and anything beyond itself.[10] The Boethian distinction of nature and person neatly corresponds to the distinction of antecedent and consequent will and is a suitable means for defining and characterizing the latter. We thus obtain a neat, symmetrical scheme: nature as corresponding to *voluntas antecedens* on the one hand, person as corresponding to *voluntas consequens* on the other.[11] This correspondence highlights the antecedent will in God as generally willing good for all God's creatures, as intending salvation and beatitude for all human beings, regardless of particular

esse propria ad plenum. Alius modus est secundum figurativam sive tropicam vel symbolicam locutionem. Quia enim ipse Deus, secundum quod in se est, aciem nostrae mentis excedit, oportet quod de eo loquamur per ea quae apud nos inveniuntur." *De veritate*, q. 23 a. 3 co.; "…Deus, quamvis sit omnia potens et omnia sciens, non tamen omnia volens; et ideo, praeter signa in creaturis inventa, quibus ostenditur quod est sciens et potens et volens, voluntati assignantur quaedam signa, ut ostendatur quid Deus velit, et non solum quod est volens. Vel dicendum, quod scientia et potentia non habent ita adiunctum modum passionis sicut voluntas, prout in nobis invenitur. Et ideo voluntas magis appropinquat ad illa quae metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, quam potentia vel scientia; et ideo signa voluntatis magis dicimus voluntatem metaphorice loquendo, quam signa scientiae et potentiae, scientiam et potentiam." *De veritate*, q. 23 a. 3 ad 1.

[10] Cf. M. Paluch, "The Salvific Will according to Aquinas," p. 4

[11] M. Paluch distinguishes two ways of reading the term "nature" in Thomas Aquinas: (i) nature as an abstract concept, the "intelligible species" (*species intelligibilis*), (ii) nature as the essence (*essentia)* that is the constituent metaphysical element of any complex entity, transcendentally related to the other constituent element which is being *(esse)* also (even though inexactly) termed existence – *existentia*. M. Paluch rightly observes that the context of the use of the term "nature" in Thomas's discussion of predestination suggests the former of these two meanings, that is an intelligible species. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

circumstances concerning individual persons. The consequent will, by contrast, is shown as oriented towards the concrete and individual, as concerned with the singular rational being, who is individually free to respond to or reject God's generous offer.

The explanatory effectiveness of the distinction between antecedent and consequent will in God must have appealed to Thomas as he employs it in some of his other works of importance, such as the *On Truth* (*De Veritate*) and, above all, in his *Summa Theologiae* to provide a systematic description of God's activity. In the *Summa Theologiae* the antecedent will is referred to as "will in some respect" *(secundum quid)* or as "velleity" *(velleitas*), the latter word being a neologism created for the purpose of this description. The will in some respect in the *Summa* is the general will in God of good for all of the creature, which, however, is not fully realised. By contrast, the consequent will, which in the *Summa* is called "the will in this respect," the will *secundum quod,* to use the Latin name, or "simply willing" (*simpliciter velle*) is the kind of willing that takes into account the concrete conditions and circumstances of the willed object. This kind of will in God is precisely God's effective will, which never fails to materialize and to achieve its objective.[12] In the *De Veritate* Aquinas gives a more precise definition of the

[12] "Tertio, secundum Damascenum, intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo. Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid. Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi, sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo. Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod antecedenter vult, non fiat." Sth I^{a} q. 19 a. 6 ad 1; cf. also Św. Tomasz z Akwinu, *Suma Teologiczna. O Bogu*, Cz. 2 (1, 13–26), p. 121.

antecedent will as acceptance by God for the sake of Himself, whereas the consequent will is defined as God's approval caused by ourselves; the distinction of these two aspects of the divine will is justified by the fact that in every action account should be taken of both the agent's and the recipient's respective parts.[13] In the *De Veritate* the problem why God's uniform will of good for all creatures should have divergent and mutually opposed results (such as salvation and damnation) is treated without invoking any division within the divine willing itself (such as the distinction *agens - recipiens* quoted above). Instead another distinction is introduced in order to accomodate the difference between the conditionless (absolute) and conditioned (by the intervention of human freedom) realization of God's will, it is the distinction between "absolute necessity" (*necessitas absoluta*) and "necessity by a supposition of end" (*necessitas ex suppositione finis)* or relative necessity. Relative necessity presupposes some degree of contingency within the world. Although there is no perfect one to one correspondence between the parts of the distinction *voluntas antecedens*/ *voluntas consequens* and what comes about by the absolute and the relative necessity respectively, both these distinctions are relevant for the problem of contingency in the Universe made and governed by the all-knowing and all-powerful God, be it from different perspectives.

To sum up this section of our discussion, from the analysed passages in St. Thomas Aquinas's key works a fairly consistent representation emerges of Aquinas's theory of the Divine Will and its relationship to its actual effects within the created Universe: (i) God positively wills the good of all his creatures, and in particular He wills the salvation of all intelligent beings; this overall direction of divine willing is attributed to the antecedent will in God: *voluntas antecedens* (which, let us repeat, is not a distinct power or faculty in God, but an aspect of one and undivided Divine Will). (ii) The consequent will in God (*voluntas consequens*) is another aspect of the Divine Will, it is God's will insofar as it takes into account all the concrete conditions and circumstances of an individual rational being and his action. In particular, the freedom of the individual will of an intelligent being enables this being to reject God's offer of beatitude. God, having endowed his creatures with freedom of will allowed thereby for His

[13] "[…] voluntas antecedens est acceptio Dei ex ipso existens: sed voluntas consequens est concessio ex nostra causa. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in qualibet actione est aliquid considerandum ex parte agentis, et aliquid ex parte recipientis." *De veritate*, q. 23 a. 2 co.

antecedent benevolence to be contradicted and His consequent and final ruling takes into account these concrete instances of misconduct and the requirements of justice. An act of rejection of God's commandments by a human being involves the loss of the supernatural gifts that are indispensable for salvation and thus leads to condemnation of that human being. In this way the ultimate outcome of an individual's history may be contrary to God's antecedent benevolent design for that individual. Importantly for Thomas's theory, God carries out his consequent and unfailing willing without violating the freedom of his creatures, without exerting any compulsion upon the created free and intelligent causes; in other words, God can achieve His intended results through the action of free causes, incorporating it into his overarching designs.[14] "God assigns to His intended effect not only being alone, but He also assigns to it the appropriate way of coming to be and being... Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills."[15]

2. GOD'S OMNISCIENCE AS (FORE)-KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENTS (*FUTURA CONTINGENTIA*)

The problem of divine predestination is inseparable from the problem of divine foreknowledge, since, as already remarked in the introductory paragraph of this essay, predestination is divine knowledge accompanied by an act of divine will, that is by God's choice or decision to create. Given this essential link between predestination and knowledge, the following issues need to be addressed in this chapter: (i) firstly, what does the relationship between God's will and His knowledge consist in, given the assumption of God's absolute ontological simplicity, (ii) secondly, what kinds of knowledge can be distinguished in God from the human perspective,[16] (iii) which

[14] See *Sth* I, q. 19, a. 8; also q. 22, a. 4.

[15] *Sth* I, q. 19, a. 8.

[16] "Difficultas autem in hoc accidit, eo quod divinam cognitionem significare non possumus nisi per modum nostrae cognitionis consignificando temporum differentias... " *De veritate*, q. 2 a. 12 co. Thomas argues in his *De veritate*, that one cannot legitimately speak of God's knowledge (*scientia Dei*) and the knowledge in creatures in the same sense of the terms used for the purpose *(univoce)* nor in a totally different sense *(aequivoce)*, but only analogously. He believes that the only adequate way of understanding predicates describing God's knowledge is by means of analogy of

one of the possibly identifiable kinds of God's knowledge concerns human free action, and (iv) whether and how God can possess infallible knowledge of contingent events.

Critics of classical theism raise the following objection concerning the relationship of God's knowledge and His will: "if God is omniscient and simple, His knowledge is identical with His will and so He cannot act otherwise than He knows He will act."[17] St. Thomas might reject this objection for two reasons: (1) all we can say about God cannot be taken literally but as based upon analogy, namely analogy of proportion, then relevant point of reference for this proportion being man, (2) God does not exist in time, He exists in timeless eternity, in which there is neither past nor future, thus the concept of future action is automatically eliminated as inapplicable to God. The Boethian eternalism as applied to the conception of God thus proves its efficacy in contributing to the discussion of the problem of the relationship of knowledge and will in God; as it removes the idea of temporal succession from God and allows to treat God's attributes and acts as strictly simultaneous.

Thomas distinguishes three kinds of knowledge in God:

(1) Knowledge of approbation (*scientia approbationis*):

> Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the knowledge of approbation."[18]

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proportion (see *De Veritate*, q. 2 a. 11). J.F. Wippel, however, points out the difference between Thomas's conception of predication about God's knowledge with the views he upholds in his *Commentary on P. Lombard's Sentences* and in his subsequent discussion in the *De Veritate,* see. J.F. Wippel, *Divine Knowledge, Divine Power and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent*, [in:] "Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives," ed. by T. Rudavsky, vol. 25, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 2010, pp. 213–241, especially p. 215.

17 D. Łukasiewicz, *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek*, Kraków–Poznań, 2014, p. 67.

18 St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A8THEP1
"Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis." I^{a} q. 14 a. 8 s. c.

God, as this quote implies, creates beings with his intellect which He uses in a practical function, and His approving will. In creating things He also approves all the natural and free actions He knows His creatures will perform and all the other contingencies, good and bad, that He knows will come to them.

(2) Knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*):

> I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision..."[19]

With His intellect as used in the speculative function God knows His own essence and all the effects of action by His creatures coming to being over the whole course of time; He sees all these as actually present to Himself in His eternal "now."

(3) Knowledge of simple intelligence (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*):

> for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is

[19] Ibidem. "Respondeo dicendum quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis." I^{a} q. 14 a. 9 co.

said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.[20]

In His intellectual vision God knows all possible effects of His power and omnipotence, including those which neither existed, nor exist at present, nor will ever exist in the future.

With this classification of kinds of divine knowledge at our disposal, we can attempt to assign human free actions to the objective domain of one these kinds. Most conceptions of freedom of action have two elements in common: (i) freedom presupposes absence of (external) determination, that is absence of necessity, at the very least absence of some kind of determination: (ii) any action or choice is free only if it is autonomous, that is caused and determined by the agent that performs it.[21]

It seems that Thomas describes freedom of choice as (a) indifference as to the causal determination of two alternative courses of action and as motivational equivalence concerning two equally possible and significantly different courses of action,[22] the presupposition being that a truly free act of choice has to be reasonable, that is preceded by rational consideration of both the available courses of action[23]; (b) as the position of being able either to perform an act or to refrain from performing it.[24] Thus for Aquinas the

[20] Ibidem. "Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum extra videntem." I q. 14 a. 9.

[21] See A.P. Stefańczyk, *Między koniecznością a wolnością. Relacja wolnej woli do przedwiedzy, predestynacji i łaski Bożej w doktrynie Anzelma z Canterbury*, Lublin, 2015, p. 20; see also *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, general ed. R. Audi, 2. ed., Cambridge, 1999, p. 326.

[22] "Sed quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est." Iª q. 83 a. 1 co.

[23] Cf. P. Gut, *Spinoza o naturze ludzkiej*, Lublin, 2011, p. 300;

[24] "… appetitus sensitivus, etsi obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non facit

preceding act of choice is essential to every free action; in any situation where a free action takes place the person performing that action must have the power and possibility to make an entirely different choice to that he/she has actually made, all the other circumstances of the action remaining unchanged; the free choice between real alternative possibilities (*liberum arbitrium*) is the necessary condition for an action being free. Absence of an external cause sufficient to explain the caused effect is a common feature of chance events and free acts of will, that is of all contingent events. The difference between free acts and chance events consists in free acts of will having one single ultimate cause which is the willing agent, whereas chance events have no single cause.[25] This means that Thomas's concept of free will entails contingency as an essential feature of acts of free will,[26] and thus his

cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra ratione..." I[a] q. 83 a. 1 ad 1. Por. *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, pp. 326–327; cf. A.P. Stefańczyk, *Między koniecznością a wolnością*, p. 21.

25 Cf. M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, Lublin, 2015, p. 49.

26 Perhaps it is appropriate to observe in this place that associating free will with contingency is by no means the only possible conception thereof, as the example of Charles Hodge (died in 1878) shows. This Calvinist theologian distinguished three types of conceptions of freedom of will: these are the types of necessity, contingency and certainty. (i) When considered under the type of necessity, freedom of will turns out to be mere illusion; although we experience feeling of freedom of our decisions, this is merely a deception, in reality necessity governs all events in the world, including our own decisions; this, naturally, is fatalism. (ii) The essence of free action as conceived in terms of contingency is an act of real choice, which means that the person performing a free act must have the power and possibility to make a different choice than the one he/she actually makes in this given situation, so that the choice will be real and not merely apparent. (iii) Freedom understood in terms of certainty concerns those actions of an agent person which are not determined by any external causes, although the internal conditions of the agent subject, such as his/her emotions, character, upbringing etc. make it certain that in given circumstances the agent will perform precisely that and no other action; in other words, although the action performed by the acting person is not determined by any factor outside that person him/herself it is entirely determined by factors internal to the acting subject. According to Hodge, this kind of action (as determined solely by internal and by no means by external factors) can be classified as free, even though the result of it cannot be other than determined by these internal causes; still, the autonomy of the agent with respect to outside influences is preserved, which is enough for the agent's action being free. The type of certainty combines some features it shares with the type of necessity with others it has in common with the type of contingency: for instance, in common with the type of necessity (and in contrast to the type of contingency) it calls free actions that the agent person can-

arguments for compatibility of God's (fore)-knowledge and human freedom can be added to the catalogue of theoretical attempts to come up with an adequate solution to the antinomy of future contingents formulated in antiquity by Diodorus Cronus in its semantic version, while in Aquinas, and earlier in some other Christian thinkers, such as St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Anselm of Canterbury, it was formulated in the theological version.

The question arising for a theory trying to accommodate both the conception of God's infallible foreknowledge of all events and that of human freedom conceived in terms of contingency is the following: whether at all, or how, necessarily infallible knowledge of unnecessary, that is contingent things is possible. The necessarily infallible knowledge, of course, concerns God, while contingency is a feature of human freedom, hence the theological version of this problems can be formulated as follows: is it possible for God to possess necessarily infallible knowledge of contingent free acts of human beings without making these acts necessary, that is without destroying their contingency? To put this problem even more simply: does God's necessary knowledge leave any room whatever for contingency in the created world? The antinomy of future contingent events can be represented as a contradiction arising from conjunction of three propositions: (i) the thesis affirming that the past is completely determined; (ii) the thesis stating that the future is at least in part open (non-determined); some degree of opennes of the future being a necessary condition for human freedom; (iii) the thesis affirming God's necessary, certain and infallible knowledge of all things, including previous necessary knowledge (foreknowledge) of all contingent events. Basically, two strategies are available for dealing with this antinomy; one can either: (a) remove the antinomy altogether by revising the set of assumptions apparently giving rise to the contradiction involved, that is by dropping all or some of offending assumptions; or (b) prove that in fact no contradiction follows from the accepted set of assumptions once they are correctly understood or the relevant reasoning is correctly performed. A satisfactory solution to that antinomy would consist in proving that both the affirmation of God's necessary, infallible foreknowledge of contingent events and real contingency of these events, and, by the same token, true freedom of at least some

not refrain from performing. Hodge believes that the conception of freedom in terms of certainty is enough to get rid of the unwelcome fatalistic conclusions of an accepted theory of freedom. See C.D.D. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, New York, 1872, pp. 280–288; cf. also M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, p. 49.

human voluntary acts can stand together; in other words, that the necessity of divine foreknowledge and real (not merely apparent) freedom of human will are not mutually exclusive.[27] St. Thomas follows the latter strategy, that is he strives to undermine the proof and affirmation of mutual incompatibility between God's necessary knowledge and the free nature of human voluntary acts. In his discussion and treatment of this problem he employs tools provided by his predecessors who grappled with the future contingents puzzle before him; in particular he is indebted to Boethius[28] and St. Anselm of Canterbury.[29] Thomas in his *Summa theologiae* introduces a distinction that he will find useful in his discussion:

> Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."[30]

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[27] See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, p. 197.

[28] See Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, transl. with Introduction and Notes, by J.C. Relihan, Indianopolis, 2001, p. 148 [5, 6]: "[…] the same future event is necessary seems to be necessary when it is referred to divine knowledge, but completely and absolutely free when weighed in the balance of its own nature. Ther are in fact two necessities: One is simple (for exemple, the fact that all human beings are mortal); the other is conditional (as when it is necessary that a man is walking if you know that he is walking). For whatever anyone knows cannot exist in any other way than it is known to exist, but this condition does not at all draw along with it that other, simple necessity. For it is not the thing's own nature that makes this necessity but only the addition of condition […]"
Boethius found hints concerning the distinction between simple and conditional necessity in Aristotle's *Hermeneutics* 19a 24–28, and he first formulated that distinction in his commentary on that work: "Duplex modus necessitatis ostenditur: unus qui cum alicuius *accidentis necessitate* proponitur, alter qui *simplici praedicatione* profertur" (I quote after: Boecjusz, *Komentarz do "Hermeneutyki" Arystotelesa*, przekład i wstęp T. Tiuryn, Kęty 2010, p. 504). See A.P. Stefańczyk, *Między koniecznością a wolnością*, p. 62, note 71; cf. also W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Foreknowledge from Aristotle to Suarez*, E.J.Brill, 1988, pp. 79–98.

[29] A.P. Stefańczyk, *Między koniecznością a* wolnością, in particular pp. 114–118.

[30] St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A13THEP1.
„Unde et haec propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et

The distinction invoked by St. Thomas concerns different ways of interpreting modal statements; any statement containg a modal predicate (e.g. "necessary") can be understood either in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*) or in the composite sense (*in sensu composito).* If a modal statement is construed in the divided sense, the modal predicate contained therein is referred to the object (the "thing") spoken about and thus the proposition is understood as attributing the modal character involved to the object: it is then a "proposition about the thing" (*de re*). By contrast, if a modal proposition is taken in the composite sense, the modal predicate it contains is understood as referring to and qualifying the whole statement, and not to the thing spoken about; the modal statement is then a statement about "what is said" (*de dicto*). Thus in the example quoted above, if the statement "Everything God knows must necessarily be" is construed in the divided sense, the modal qualifier "necessarily" is taken to qualify the mode of existence of things known by God: thus the statement means "things God knows exist necessarily" that is are necessary beings; which, Thomas observes, is a false statement. By contrast, if the quoted statement is construed in the composite sense, the qualification "necessarily" is referred to the statement "Everything God knows is" which is thereby asserted to be necessarily true, without implying anything about the modal nature of the things known by God (that is whether they are necessary or contingent). Thus, on the reading of the quoted statement in the composite sense, it is perfectly legitimate to suppose, that things known by God in a necessary way are nevertheless contingent in their own natures and modes of existence.

For a clearer elucidation of the matter, let us consult a relevant passage from Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles*:

> If each thing is known by God as seen by Him in the present, what is known by God will then have to be. Thus, it is necessary that Socrates be seated from the fact that he is seen seated (1). But this is not absolutely necessary or, as some say, with the necessity of the consequent; it is necessary conditionally, or with the necessity of the consequence (2). For this is a necessary conditional proposition: if he is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence, although the conditional proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read what is seen sitting must necessarily be sitting, it is clear that the proposition is true if understood of what is said, and compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly (3). Thus,

sic est composita et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est necessarium." I[a] q. 14 a. 13 ad 3.

in these and all similar arguments used by those who oppose God's knowledge of contingents, the fallacy of composition and division takes place (4).[31]

The quoted passages give us a very clear idea of Aquinas's refutation of the position of those who claim that God's necessary knowledge of events in the created world renders these events necessary as well and thus rules out any contingency in the created things. The proponents of this necessitarian thesis simply mistake two essentially different modal conditional statements:

(i) The formal scheme of one modal conditional statement (corresponding to the terms: *necessitas consequentiae, necessitas conditionis, necesitas de dicto i necessitas composita*) is as follows:

$\Box (p \rightarrow q)$ — "necessarily if p, then q" or "(if p, then q) is a necessary truth," also corresponding to C.I. Lewis's strict implication.

(ii) The formal scheme of the other relevant modal conditional statement (corresponding to the terms *necessitas consequentis, necessitas absoluta, necessitas de re i necessitas divisa*) is the following:

$p \rightarrow \Box q$ — "if p, then necessarily q" or "if p, then it is necessary that q."

The distinction between the two uses of the modal qualifier "necessary" or "necessarily" in conditional modal sentences and, correspondingly, between two kinds of modal conditional statements, namely ones expressing necessity of the consequence and those signifying necessity of the consequent turns out to be the key to Aquinas's refutation of his opponents' necessitarianism.

According to Thomas, the propositions of the formal structure "*Necessarily, if God knows that p, then p*" have the same logical structure as the proposition "*Necessarily, if I see Socrates sitting, then he is sitting*"; this structure is illustrated by the scheme: "$\Box (p \rightarrow q)$.[32] The source of his op-

[31] "1. […] si unumquodque a Deo cognoscitur […], sic necessarium erit esse, quod Deus cognoscit; sicut necessarium est Socratem sedere, ex hoc quod sedere videtur.
2. Hoc autem non necessarium est absolute, velut a quibusdam dicitur, *necessitate consequentis*, sed sub conditione, vel *necessitate consequentiae*.
3. Haec enim conditionalis est necessaria: si videtur sedere, sedet; unde etsi conditionalis in cathegoricam transferatur, ut dicatur: quod videtur sedere, necesse est sedere; patet eam de dicto intellectam et compositam esse veram, de re vero intellectam et divisam, esse falsam.
4. Et sic in his et in omnibus similibus, quae Dei scientiam circa contingentia oppugnantes argumentatur, secundam compositionem et divisionem falluntur." ScG I, c. 67.

[32] See J. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, Freiburg, München 1956, p. 214.

ponents' error is mistaking statements signifying necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*) of the modal structure $\Box (p \rightarrow q)$ for statements expressing necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*), whose logical structure is $p \rightarrow \Box$ q; whence they erroneously conclude that the objects of God's necessary knowledge will necessarily occur, and therefore are necessary, instead of concluding that they will simply take place (either as necessary or contingent).[33]

There is one more key point concerning Aquinas's theory of divine (fore-) knowledge that has to be mentioned in this brief restatement of his doctrine of God's omniscience, namely the problem of knowing all things (including temporal ones) *ab aeterno*: eternally. Thomas succinctly states his doctrine on this point in his *Summa theologiae*:

> Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.[34]

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[33] Ibidem; see also G.E. Hughes, M.J. Cresswell, *A New Introduction to Modal Logic*, London 1996, p. 15.

[34] St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. https://dhspriory.org/ thomas/summa/FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A13THEP1.
"Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata." I^{a} q. 14 a. 13 co.

Thomas firmly repeats here his earlier statement to the effect that all things, including all temporal events, those which have already happened, those which are happening at present and those that are still to come, are wholly known to God in their actual existence in themselves (*actu in seipso*); in fact every contingent state of affairs, every temporal occurrence is eternally present for God. Particular emphasis is to be laid on the statement in the quoted passage that "all things are present to God from eternity not only because He has the types of things present within Him […] but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in teir presentiality." As things are present to Him in their concrete and separate reality, their presence to God is not only internal, but also, in a way, external. The conclusion thus seems legitimate, paradoxical as it may appear, that time in its entirety, the whole of the temporal extension of reality, exists a-temporally and owing to this fact it can be known, entirely and simultaneously, by God.[35]

This consideration opens the way for another argument in favour of compatibility of the necessarily infallible knowledge possessed by God and the freedom of (some) human voluntary actions, which are, of course, contingent events. Aquinas formulates this argument in the following way: if a necessary conditional proposition concerns some object of the mind's intention, both the antecedent and consequent refer to that intentional object, and not the real object corresponding to that intention. Thus if the consequent of that intentional (*in anima*) conditional is shown to be necessary, this necessity applies to the intentional object of the conditional "in the mind," and not to the real counterpart of the intentional object. The following example perhaps illustrates well Aquinas's idea: If the consequence "If God knows that Adam will fall, Adam will fall" is necessary, and the antecedent "God knows that Adam will fall" is necessary too, then the consequent "Adam will fall" will be necessary. Yet this does not mean that the real event of Adam's fall is made thereby necessary, since, according to Thomas's assumption, the necessity of the consequent affects only the intentional Adam, and his fall, which are not identical with the historical Adam and the historical event of Adam's fall respectively. The intentional Adam is ever present to God's mind and therefore eternal and necessary, while the historical Adam is temporal and contingent; thus these two are not one object, but two and the necessity of the one does not imply anything about the modal qualification of the other.[36]

[35] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Foreknowledge from Aristotle to Suarez*, p. 117.

[36] Cf. "… quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc contingens futurum,

To sum up this part of our considerations, we ought to observe that the main concern of Aquinas in his discussion of the problem of divine predestination is elimination of the danger of theological fatalism, and other kinds of necessitarianism or determinism. To him (and his contemporaries) the source of this danger lies not so much in the problem of necessary truth of propositions concerning future contingent events, including human free acts, which Thomas succeeds in solving with the help of an analysis of modal conditionals and introduction of the distinction between necessity of the consequence (*necessitas consequentiae*) and necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*), instead, the real difficulty is entailed in the concept of divine foreknowledge of contingent events. If God's foreknowledge is unchangeable and therefore necessary, the purportedly contingent facts must needs be predetermined in a necessary way and in fact necessary too; what follows is strict necessitarianism or (theological) fatalism. This certainly would be the case if God were a temporal being: in a temporal God necessary foreknowledge of future events would make

non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futtum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc eurum non sequatur quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia est compositiam nihil est. Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, sicut et antecedens, *quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est esse*, ut dicitur in I Periherm. I^{a} q. 14 a. 13 ad 2."

these events necessary too. Thomas believes that this is remedied by strict adherence to the conception of God as absolutely atemporal, that is as transcending time and all temporal relations and orders.[37]

On the conception of God as an eternal and timeless being that simultaneously knows all temporal events, all states of affairs that come in succession in time are present to God in His eternal now, are given to Him in His knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis).* What follows is that God's knowledge of temporal events does not precede them in the temporal order but is, in a way, simultaneous with them in the eternal present. God knows all things, including temporal states of affairs, in a necessary way, yet this necessity does not affect the modal status of temporal events as they come about in their temporal setting and so there is no danger of introducing fatalism into the world of apparently free created agents. God sees each contingent event in its occurrence without annihilating the contingence of that event with respect to the proximate causes (*causae proximae*) thereof.[38] So in Thomas's view, God's eternal timelessness and the atemporal nature of his knowledge of the temporal are enough to safeguard both the necessity of his (fore-) knowledge and the contingency and freedom of creatures' acts of will and thus solve the riddle of divine predestination and foreknowledge.

3. GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE AND THE EFFICACY OF HIS CAUSAL ACTIVITY-GRACE

The final point to be adressed in this discussion of the problem of divine predestination in St. Thomas Aquinas concerns God's active part in causing the salvation of man - this active participation by God in saving a human being for eternal life is precisely what is called His grace. Our discussion in the previous chapters has shown that (i) God has the will to save all human beings (as shown in the passage on the antecedent and consequent will in

[37] Cf. "Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata." I^{a} q. 14 a. 13 co..

[38] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Foreknowledge from Aristotle to Suarez*, pp. 115–116.

God: *voluntas antecedens — voluntas consequens*), (ii) God has previous knowledge, or (fore-)knowledge of human deeds uczynkach (discussed in the passage on necessary and eternal nature of God's knowledge and whether it can be shown to be compatible with contingency and freedom of human voluntary acts), (iii) man is endowed with free will which is neither rendered inefficacious nor restricted in any way by God's previous knowledge of man's voluntary acts. What still remains to be considered is whether God's eternal design for His elect to be saved logically depends on God's eternal (fore-)knowledge of the good works to be performed by the elect or is (logically) previous to any recognition of their merits. Naturally, this question concerns only the logical relationship between these two parts of His prescience concerning creation, since there is no possible temporal succession between whatever elements of His knowledge eternally present to His mind. Nevertheless, in order to gain more precise determination of God's working upon man through His grace, what needs to be done is to determine the relationship obtaining between (i) God's purpose and the means He chooses to this end, (ii) the first cause and the secondary causes of an effect, and finally, (iii) sufficient grace and efficacious grace.

Let us consider the relationship of means and ends in God's design first. Thomas states the following:

> Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.[39]

It follows from this quote that there are no causal or motivational connections between acts of God's will, which alone is the sufficient and ultimate reason for all of its acts. However, there are causal and motivating connections between elements of creation as willed by God's will. The sole reason for creation as a whole is God's freely made decision to manifest His

[39] St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A13THEP1.
„Deus autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc." I[a] q. 19 a. 5 co.

goodness to beings other than Himself (*bonum diffusivum sui*), nevertheless the very existence of the world generates infinitely many causal links mediating between the Creator and His creation, since the created world itself is a complex order of ends and means mutually interdependent or subordinated one to another, as well as the network of more distant mutually supporting relationships. As concerns the problem of predestination, the question arises, whether God preordains meritorious acts for his elect as a means for them achieving the glory of salvation which He had in advance assigned to them, or the other way round: He assigns the glory of salvation as a reward for some meritorious acts performed by the elect. It is the answer to this question that in fact determines one's stand on the problem of predestination. If God's election for salvation comes first and the meritorious deeds that make the person performing them deserve being saved come as a result of God's pre-election, we obtain one clear cut solution of the predestination problem, the one in principle in agreement with the theological tradition originating with St. Augustine. The leading idea of this tradition is that God's gift of salvation is entirely free and undeserved by man. If, by contrast, one assumes that God's decision to include a human being in the number of the elect is in response to some meritorious initiative on the part of man, one thereby takes sides with the broad tradition inspired by Pelagius. Naturally, if God in advance preordains some of his creatures for the glory and, accordingly, prepares for them the necessary amount of efficacious grace, which is an absolutely necessary means for achieving salvation, it is clear that those left out by God from His election are by the same token irrevocably excluded from the glory of heaven. Just as the election for salvation is previous to any recognition of the possible deserts of the elect, in the same way the reprobation of the damned is previous to any consideration of their individual sins: the consequence that engenders considerable difficulty for this conception of predestination.

Also, the passage quoted above implies that the order of pure intentions or designs in the mind *(ordo intentionum)* is the reverse of the order of things *(ordo rerum)* employed for the realization of these designs. In the former the purpose comes first and the selection of the efficacious means follows; by contrast, in the order of realization, the necessary means and the nearer objectives must be obtained first, and the very purpose of the whole enterprise can only be realized subsequently, at the very finish of the undertaken action. The conclusion therefrom, approved by Aquinas, is as follows: (1) God's decree concerning the election of the chosen comes

absolutely first in the order, it is not motivated by any consideration of the expected future merits of the elect, (2) it is only as the second step that the efficient gifts of grace come into being as the means of realization of the original decree. The order of implementation of this supreme decree by God is the reverse of the former: first the elect must acquire deserts by performing meritorious deeds with the necessary help of grace, and only then and as a consequence of the acquired merits they may be admitted to the reality of salvation.

PRIMARY CAUSE AND SECONDARY CAUSES

The adequate explication of Thomas's conception of God's special supernatural intervention for the salvation of man requires precise delimitation of the scope of operation of the first or primary cause and of the secondary causes involved in the process. St. Paul teaches that grace is given as an absolutely free and undeserved gift[40]; this statement by St. Paul contains the clou of the catholic doctrine on the election by God that is completely independent of any human desert. Nevertheless human deserts are not for nothing in Thomas's conception; as the discussion above has shown, salvation, that is eternal beatitude is the work of God and His grace, but it is also the reward for acquired deserts and meritorious actions, albeit performed with the necessary help of grace. This theory of grace and meritorious deeds neatly corresponds with the metaphysical pattern of the first or primary cause *(causa prima)* operating through the intermediary of secondary causes (*causae secundae*), for it also rests on the assumption that every action by creatures, that is secondary causes, ultimately derives from the primary cause and makes use of the potentiality to action implanted in those secondary agents.

> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.[41]

[40] Cf. Rom 9.

[41] St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A13THEP1.

So it is ultimately God Himself who imparts the necessary energy for action to both natural agents which operate in a necessary way and to freely acting created agent, and thus makes the action by these created causes possible. The divine influence and action is the source of all efficient acts by creatures not by preceding these acts in time, but in the sense of being their ultimate efficient ground. The motion that originates in God and is given to created free and reasonable agents, at the hands of these takes the form of performance of free acts, which are thus predetermined, since any free determination of a created will can only be effected owing to God's predetermining influence. This predetermining influence involves both God's will and His advance knowledge of the actions performed by free creatures. Hence, just as God knows His own will as expressed in His supreme decrees, so He also necessarily knows all determinations of the free will of His creatures, and this both as regards the necessary developments in the future and the contingent decisions made by individuals in particular circumstances.

This way of thinking concerning the metaphysical order of the operation of the Universe is easily transposed into the domain of the supernatural. In considering the relationship of grace and the natural ability of humans to act in a free way, we ought to consider grace to be the supernatural power enabling a human agent to perform a good act, that is an act that positively contributes to the salvation of the person who performs this act. This power operates on a number of levels, for the Revelation clearly refers grace to the level of actual willing (*velle*) and actual performance of a deed (*agere*) as well as to mere potency to act in a meritorious way. The will that has been predetermined to act in the way compliant with God's will must with metaphysical certainty agree with grace, otherwise it would be both in agreement and, at least in certain respect, in disagreement, which is a contradiction. But can an individual will inspired by grace be both necessarily compliant and free? Thomas's answer is in the affirmative and to make this point he again invokes the paradigmatic distinction between "necessity of the consequence" (*necessitas consequentiae*) and "necessity of the consequent" (*necessitas consequentis*): although the individual will guided by grace must necessarily agree with what has been preordained by God

"… licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit necessaria." I[a] q. 14 a. 13 ad 1.

for this particular situation, this "necessity of following or agreement" does not destroy the free nature of the actual act of will, that is, does not entail the necessity of what follows or enters into agreement.

SUFFICIENT AND EFFICACIOUS GRACE

St. Thomas in a number of places in his output enumerates no fewer than six kinds of grace,[42] which, however, according to later commentators on St. Thomas, can be reduced to two fundamental categories: sufficient grace (*gratia sufficiens*) and efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*), we follow here this reduction in order to avoid unnecessary complexity in our discussion[43] The philosophical basis for this distinction is the theory of the natural concurrence (*concursus*) between God's action and that of a human being; this theory has been designed to safeguard, on the one hand, God's

[42] Thomas gives a list of various kinds of grace among other works in his *De veritate*, q. 27. He distinguishes:

- *Gratia gratum faciens* — grace that makes one pleasing, with this grace God makes human beings holy or prepares them for sanctification or preserves their sanctity. Human beings endowed with that grace direct their attention and love towards God and approach unification with God.
- *Gratia gratis data* — grace freely given or gratuitous grace, a supernatural gift of grace given to persons for the salvation of other persons; this grace is given independently of the moral life of the receiver (thus gratuitous grace can conferred on a person living in sin). Examples of gratuitous grace are; the priestly power of consecration and absolution, prophecy, gift of tongues, gift of miracles etc. All these gifts may help persons other than the actual receiver discover and accept God's will.
- *Gratia operans* — operative grace; divine grace insofar as working in us and making us will that which God wills.
- *Gratia cooperans* — cooperative grace, divine grace insofar as preserving and strengthening in us the effects of former gifts of grace.
- *Gratia praeveniens* — preceding or prevenient grace; a gift of grace prior to any act by the receiver performed thanks to grace
- *Gratia subsequens* — subsequent grace; grace coming after a previous grace has accomplished something in a human; being; a gift of grace following and strengthening the effects of some previous grace.

See B. Davies, *Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary,* Oxford, 2014, p. 226.

[43] Cf. D. Báñez, *Apologia fratrum praedicatorum* […] *adversus novas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludovici Molinae nuncupati*, Madrid, 1595; also G. Stucco, *The Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Luther to Jansenius*, Xlibris Corporation, 2014.

sovereign power, His omnipotence and initiative in being the ultimate efficient cause of the salvific actions performed by man, and on the other hand, the true freedom of human acts of decision, that is a human being's real possibility of choosing between opposite ways of action equally open to him/her. On this theory a rational creature needs two kinds of God's intervention to make sure that his action be good and contribute to his/her salvation. First, he/she needs God's transforming action upon his/her will so as to render it capable of performing the desired kind of acts and thus make the created will acquire potency (*posse*) for action of the desired kind; secondly, God's actual support is needed in order actually to move the created will to perform the required deed (*agere*) and achieve the desired result of it. Hence there are two kinds of grace intervening in any human meritorious action: the sufficient grace (*gratia sufficiens*) merely imparts to the receiver the power to act in a laudable way, whereas the efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*) ensures that the laudable action is actually performed and its result achieved. Owing to the efficacious grace, human action is infallible in achieving the intended result, for it ensures perfect concurrence between divine will and human initiative. Efficacious grace is thus the ultimate impulse setting a concrete created will in motion, it involves God's initiative that precedes the actual human action. God is the supreme act which sets in action every created cause and likewise His efficacious grace with respect to the relevant deed of a human agent is the supreme act which the ultimate cause of that deed coming to be realized. Thus, in contrast to the sufficient grace which only provides potency for the action by a human being, the efficacious grace is the proper act of the relevant deed.

However, this statement granted, the problem returns: if divine efficacious grace is the act of the human deed, in what sense can this act be regarded as free? Here again Thomas attempts to answer this question with the help of the distinction of the composite and the divided sense of modal statements (*in sensu composito* or *de dicto* and *in sensu diviso* or *de re*). Whoever is sitting at the moment, cannot be standing at the very same moment, yet he can stand up and be standing at the next. Therefore the conditional "It is impossible for someone who sits to stand" („Impossibile est sedentem stare") is true in the composite sense (*de dicto*), yet false in the divided sense (*de re*).[44] In the same way, although a human person acting

[44] The use of the distinction between the composite and divided sense of a conditional modal statement in Thomas's analysis of the problem of necessity of God's knowledge versus contingency of creation is best elucidated by the following pas-

sage from the *Summa theologiae* Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 3: "Sed ea quae sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est intelligibile."

"However, as has been explained, the things that are known by God have to be necessary insofar as they are subject to God's knowledge—though they are not absolutely necessary insofar as they are considered in their proper causes. Accordingly, the proposition, 'If anything is known by God, it is necessarily so' has two distinguishable meanings, since it can be either de re or de dicto. If it is interpreted de re, then it has a divided sense and is false — for its meaning is, 'Anything that God knows is such that it is necessarily so'. Alternatively, it can be interpreted de dicto, in which case it has a composed sense and is true — for its meaning is, 'The dictum If anything is known by God, it is so is necessary.' However, some raise a objection here. They claim that this distinction is relevant in the case of forms that are separable from their subject, as when I say 'A white thing is possibly black' — which is false if taken de dicto and true if taken de re, since a thing which is white is able to be black, whereas the dictum A white thing is black is never true. But, they say, in the case of forms that are inseparable from their subject, there is no room for this distinction, as when I say, 'A black crow is possibly white' — for this is false in both senses. But being known by God is inseparable from a thing, since that which is known by God is not able not to be known. Now this objection would be to the point if the term 'known [by God]' connoted a disposition that Part 1, Question 14 125 inheres in a subject. However, since it instead connotes the act of a knower, something can be attributed to the known thing in its own right (secundum se), even if it is always known, that is not attributed to it insofar as it is subject to an act of knowing (inquantum stat sub actu sciendi)— just as material esse is attributed to a rock in itself, but is not attributed to it insofar as it is intelligible." Transl. A.J. Freddoso.

under the influence of efficacious grace cannot act otherwise insofar as it acts thus and thus at the moment, yet in principle that person remains free to act differently from what is dictated by grace and in this respect he/she is free when considered in separation from the actual grace. When considered in him/herself, that person has the possibility to choose between opposed courses of action and as such has to be regarded as free, and, consequently, his/her decision to comply with grace is in itself free as well, notwithstanding the fact that the grace he/she is given is necessarily efficacious.

Nevertheless the grace is efficacious not because a concrete free will gives its assent to its suggestion, but the other way round: the free will affected by efficacious grace gives its assent because this grace moves it towards the performance of the suggested good act. The efficacious grace is effective "from inside and by itself" (*ab intrinseco vel per se*), it never fails to achieve its objective, which means that it is intrinsically and extrinsically different from grace that is merely sufficient, which operates merely as potency and effects merely *posse* in the receiver, in contrast to the *actus agere* of the efficacious grace. However, if the will of the person to whom sufficient grace is given does not put up resistance, God will not fail to follow up his initial offer of grace with the gift of efficacious grace. If, as all too often seems to be the case, the gift efficacious grace does not follow that of sufficient grace, the reason for that seems to be, according to St. Thomas, not any lack of efficacy on the part of God, but, on the contrary, the very efficiency of God's action: God refuses to confer His efficacious grace on a person for He knows in advance that it will not be accepted. This way of thinking is analogous to that adopted by St. Anselm of Canterbury in his attempt to explain the fall of the devil, which resulted form non-acceptance by the devil the grace of perseverance that, however had not been offered him by God. The same reductive scheme of reasoning applied by St. Anselm to the devil's case, can suitably be applied to explain God's apparent refusal to offer the gift of efficacious grace to some of His creatures.[45]

In what follows I try to apply st. Anselme's reductive scheme from his *On the Devil's Fall* to an attempt at a refutation of the criticism addressed at St. Thomas and Thomists to the effect that the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace falls short of its objective since it introduces some limitation on divine omnipotence. The parallelism between the pro-

[45] See Anselm of Canterbury, *O zgodności przedwiedzy, predestynacji i łaski Bożej z wolną wolą. Fragmenty filozoficzne*, transl. into Polish, introduction and commentary by A.P. Stefańczyk, Lublin 2016, p. 25, note 27.

blem faced by St. Anselm and that encountered by St. Thomas seems striking indeed. The problem is as follows: why some creatures are given the efficacious grace and are saved as a result, whereas others are merely offered a sufficient grace and refused the efficacious grace, which is the only salvific grace? Opponents of classical theism may claim that at this point a basic shortcoming of the conception of an omnipotent and omniscient God comes out and that, far from being universally benevolent, the God of that conception is here revealed as high handed and arbitrary: his refusal to grant efficacious grace to some of His creatures appears to be the ultimate and direct cause of the damnation of them. Yet Anselm and Thomas do not view this matter so: for them the refusal of grace on the part of God is not the cause, but the effect: God knows that His gift will be refused and, consequently, declines to offer the gift. They reach this conclusion by a reductive reasoning that is by reasoning proceeding from effect to cause. The point of departure is the constatation that (1) as a matter of fact God refuses to confer efficacious grace on some of His creatures; another premise in this reasoning is the statement that (2) refusal on the part of the recipients of grace may be the cause of the refusal; the reductive, that is non-reliable inference follows: refusal on the part of the recipients of grace is indeed the cause of God's refusal to grant it to them.

In order better to elucidated the rationale behind this reasoning let us briefly consider an example of reductive inference that was a stock model thereof in schools in St. Thomas's time; it comes from Boethius's commentary on Cicero's *Topics*. The example goes as follows: (1) enmity between two states is the real and natural cause of war between these, (2) yet enmity as such is not immediately accessible to our perception, therefore (3) we cannot reason deductively from cause to effect to infer from the fact of enmity to the consequence of war. It is rather the other way round, we conclude reductively from the fact of war (the effect) to the cause thereof, which is the fact of enmity between the states.[46] Presupposed in this

[46] "Antecedentia vero sunt quibus positis aliud necesse est consequatur, ut quia bellum est, esse inimicitias necesse est. Haec ordinis necessitate tenent. Consequentia enim ab antecedentibus separari nequeunt; consequens vero est quidquid id quod antecedit insequitur, ut inimicitiae bellum consequuntur. Nam si bellum, inimicitias esse necesse est, habetque locus hic illud notabile et spectandum, quod saepe quae naturaliter priora sunt, tamen ipsa sunt consequentia. Saepe quae naturaliter antecedent, et in propositione priora sunt; namque inimicitiae prius existere quam bella sunt. Sed non possumus proponere inimicitias, ut bellum sequatur. Non enim possumus vere dicere, si inimicitiae sunt, bellum est,

example are two assumptions:

(i) distinction between the order of cognition and the order of efficient causation in reality (what is prior in the one order will be posterior in the other and vice versa);

(ii) acceptance of the validity of reductive inferences.

Let us illustrate Boethius's example with a formalized scheme. Let $E(x, y)$ stand for "enmity between x and y" and $W(x, y)$ for "war between x and y." The scheme is as follows:

1) $E(x, y) \rightarrow W(x, y)$ *If there is enmity between x and y, there is war between x and y*
$W(x, y)$ *There is war between x and y*

Therefore E(x, y). Therefore there is enmity between x and y

Naturally, as in all reductive inferences, the conclusion does not here follow logically from the premises. Yet from the conclusion and one of the premises of the original inference, the other premise of the original (reductive) scheme logically follows. Thus the following deductive schemes are correct:

2) $E(x, y)$ *There is enmity between x and y*

Therefore W(x, y). Therefore there is war between x and y

As can easily be observed, the reductive inference is typical of the cognitive order, which proceeds from phenomena, that is the effects, to the non-apparent causes. By contrast, the deductive inference follows strictly the order of natural causation as it operates in reality.

Now let us apply the same inferential schemes to the reasoning concerning God's refusal to confer efficacious grace on some created persons and the reason for this being the case. Let p represent the proposition "God confers efficacious grace on the person x," let q stand for "The person x accepts the grace conferred by God." The schemes go as follows:

(1) the reductive inference (from effect to cause, the cognitive order)

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sed praeponimus bellum, et inimicitiae quae natura priores sunt, subsequuntur, ita, si bellum est, inimicitiae sunt." Boethius, *In Topica Ciceronis*, PL 64, 1066; see also Anselm of Canterbury, *O zgodności przedwiedzy, predestynacji i łaski Bożej z wolną wolą. Fragmenty filozoficzne*, pp. 25–26.

⌜q → ⌜p If the person x does not accept the grace, God does not confer it on x
⌜p God does not confer the grace on the person x

Therefore ⌜ q Therefore the person x does not accept the grace;

(2) the deductive inference (from cause to effect, the natural causal order)

⌜q → ⌜p If the person x does not accept the grace, God does not confer it on x
⌜q The person x does not accept the grace

Therefore ⌜ p Therefore God does not confer the grace on the person x

In this last section of my essay, which does not follow strictly Thomas's own discussion yet tries strictly to adhere to his spirit, it has been my purpose to represent the gist of his attempt to excogitate a coherent explanation of the way God works for man's salvation by imparting His graces to human beings. Throughout his work Thomas's concern is to devise a theory of divine grace and the mode of its operation that would do justice to God's claims as the sole and supreme author of the salvation of man on the one hand, and to man's part in the work of salvation as an intelligent and responsible being naturally endowed with freedom of will and the faculty of free choice. To achieve this intended purpose the following steps had to be taken: (1) a closer explication of the way the categories of means and ends apply to God's creative thought, His work of creation and the way His designs are realized in the world had to be given; (2) the relationship obtaining between the primary cause and secondary causes had to be explained; (3) the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace had to be discussed. The following conclusions have been obtained in the course of the discussion: (i) God's omniscience extends to all voluntary actions by human beings; in His sovereign power and all-knowledge He can match means and ends and carry out His designs without curtailing the freedom of intelligent creatures, to that purpose he can grant adequate gifts of grace to human beings as necessary and efficacious means to the ultimate end which is the salvation of man, at the same time observing the demand of justice not confer gifts of grace on those persons thatill spurn them; (iii) God's knowledge and activity are wholly independent of creatures and all free actions by creatures, for being free, spontaneous and voluntary, nevertheless come about by virtue of a previous decree by God. This is so because (a) God cannot be taught by creatures

concerning the actions they will undertake in definite circumstances, for if this were the case, the conclusion would follow that creatures can sway God's power one way or another or even inspire or alter God's sovereign decrees.[47]

The summary of the whole of the exposition contained in this study can be neatly represented in the form of a chart (see next page) that will illustrate the relationships obtaining between the crucial categories and concepts relevant to St. Thomas's theory of predestination as they have been discussed in this text. The scheme is designed in particular to represent the complex relationship between God and the world and between God and man. The dotted lines correspond to contingent relations whereas solid lines depict the nature and activity of God.

GOD'S WILL, KNOWLEDGE AND GRACE AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN



[47] Such was the gist of the criticism of the teachings proposed by L. Molina advanced by the defenders of the doctrine of St. Thomas in the 16th century, among others by D. Báñez.

DIFFICULTIES AND CRITICISM

The monumental and logically coherent edifice of St. Thomas's system nevertheless found its critics, who claimed to have found rifts and gaps in this seemingly flawless structure. In the 16th century Luis de Molina became an influential critic of Aquinas's theory of grace and he gained a considerable following. The molinists pointed out difficulties that ineluctably follow from St. Thomas's assumptions: (1) given the assumption that God's foreknowledge infallibly predetermines every contingent event in the world, including every voluntary action by human beings, it is hard to conceive how one can avoid the conclusion that God necessarily and infallibly predetermines all sinful acts. God is the *causa prima* of all acts: meritorious and salvific as well as sinful and damnable, thus, if He is understood to be the first and ultimate efficient cause of all good works, it is impossible to see why He should not be held to be the primary efficient cause of all voluntary evil doings. All sinful act can be perpetrated because God knowingly imparts the necessary impulse to His creation, which is an impulse *ad unum* whose influence extendes to all evil as well as good deeds, and because of His withdrawing efficacious grace from some of His creatures; and since everything God knows to happen must needs happen, it appears to follow that sin as such is unavoidable necessity imposed on creatures by God Himself. (2) Another serious objection raised by Molinists against Thomas's theory of grace is that freedom of human will cannot be preserved once the efficacious grace is infused; the Molinists argue that the essence of freedom does not consist in mere contingency of a free act nor in passive indifference of will; they point out that freedom rather consists in active indifference: an ability to form a positive act, whether of willing or non-willing (positively refusing to will); whether of willing this or not this, but something else. On this conception of freedom of will it seems impossible to reconcile predetermination of the content of a free act by the will of another and spontaneous determination of that act by the will of the agent . These two kinds of determination of a voluntary act seem to rule out each other just like necessity and freedom or determinism and indeterminism exclude each other. Thomas's effort to reconcile theological determinism entailed by the traditional conception of predestination and human freedom by means of modal analysis based on the distinction of the composite and divided sense of modal conditional propositions is not sufficient in the eyes of Molinists and in itself does not convince.

CONCLUSIONS

Although it is hard not to acknowledge the grandeur, logical consistency and coherence of the doctrine of predestination constructed by St. Thomas, yet, on the other hand, it is difficult not to see the merit of the objections raised by Molinists to his conception. All in all one cannot escape the impression that Thomas, in an attempt to escape a kind of fatalism, did not avoid falling into another kind of determinism.[48] For all his efforts to prove compatibility of the traditional theory of divine predestination and human freedom, he only succeeded in saving a very weak and reduced version of the latter. In his theory God's powerful knowledge is the cause of all things and sets impassable boundaries for everything that exists. Only that, which God knows to exist, exists and nothing can exist beyond His knowledge. The created world and all it contains, down to minutest details, is the result of God's supremely free choice and as such is completely determined. This leaves no room for human freedom in the strong, libertarian sense (although some weak, relative form of human freedom can possibly still be retained in such a God-determined Universe). Aquinas's doctrine did not succeed in avoiding the clash between the absolute freedom of God and the circumscribed freedom of man, and the latter could only survive this clash in a dramatically curtailed form.

Translated by Roman Majeran

[48] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Foreknowledge from Aristotle to Suarez*, p. 126.

THE PROBLEM OF PREDESTINATION OF HUMAN BEINGS ACCORDING TO JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Martyna Koszkało

John Duns Scotus concerned himself with predestination and related issues as he explained to students Peter Lombard's Sentences and composed his commentaries on this scholastic textbook. The lasting effect of his discussions are the following distinctions contained in the chief versions of is exposition of Lombard's work: *Ordinatio* I, d 40–41,[1] *Lectura* I, d. 40–41[2] (both contained in the critical edition) and *Reportatio* I-A, d. 39–40, 41[3] published in a non-critical edition. The structure of these distinctions is similar, a certain exception being the discussion in the *Reportatio,* where the section headed "Whether someone elected for salvation can be condemned to eternal perdition?," which in the *Ordinatio* and *Lectura* forms a separate distinction (distinction 40) is edited as article 3, part of distinction 39–40. Scotus occupies himself with the problem "Whether there is an action deserving election or damnation?" in distinction 41 of all the three mentioned works. Problems related to predestination are thus discussed in two distinctions in each of the three commentaries, yet the context of the discussion slightly differs according to distinction. One context involves modality and the discussion concerns the relationship between predestination (conceived as a special relation of God towards created beings) and supposed necessity of salvation/damnation. The other context concerns the problem of merit (or possibility of deserving

[1] Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani, Joannis Duns Scoti, *Opera Omnia, Ordinatio* I, vol. 6, Civitas Vaticana, 1963.

[2] Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani, Joannis Duns Scoti, *Opera Omnia, Lectura* I, vol. 17, Civitas Vaticana, 1966.

[3] John Duns Scotus, *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture*, *Reportatio* I-A, vol. 1–2, St. Bonaventure, 2008.

salvation or damnation) and (in a more general perspective) possibility of creatures causally influencing their Creator.

Since particular human acts of choice that form the substance of merits and demerits form a domain of future contingents (*futura contingentia*), the problem of predestination is closely related to the problem whether God's foreknowledge predetermines future contingent events, including in that number future meritorious (and demeritorious) actions by human beings. Thus the problems considered in distinction 40 are intimately linked to the problem of how God knows the future contingents, which is discussed in distinction 39 of the *Lectura* whose subject matter is free will and the characteristic features of God's knowledge. This distinction is absent from the critical edition of the Ordinatio.[4]

1. THE MEANING OF THE TERM *PREDESTINATION*

In the Polish language, the word *predestynacja* (equivalent to the English *predestination*) taken in its broad sense has the same meaning as 'irreversible fate,' 'destiny,' 'doom.'[5] This meaning is closely related to Calvinist theological tradition, according to which predestination is essentially linked to the assumption that God eternally and in advance determines by the decision of his will who will be saved and who will be damned for all eternity.[6] However, in the texts by John Duns Scotus the term *praedestinatio* possesses markedly positive connotation and functions as the opposite of the terms *reprobatio* (reprobation) and *damnatio* (damnation). Predestination, to Scotus, is not pre-designation for either election or damnation, it is simply and unequivocally election for salvation. As Scotus himself writes in his *Ordinatio*: "Predestination in the proper sense is an act of God's will, namely a ruling by God's will through which an intelligent or rational creature is elected to grace and glory."[7]

[4] *Ordinatio* I, d. 39 has not been included in the main body of the text by the editors of the critical Vatican edition as a spurious text, an insertion by Scotus's pupils; instead, it has been relegated to appendices (Appendix A, pp. 401–444). The authenticity of this text is still debated.

[5] Cf. *Słownik języka polskiego* [Dictionary of the Polish Language], s.v. *predestynacja*.

[6] M.L. Becker, *Fundamental Theology. A Protestant Perspective*, London, New York, Sidney, 2015, p. 39.

[7] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 4.

Thus the problem of predestination of man as discussed in the questions that form the subject matter of this paper is related to election of man to salvation. This problem should be distinguished from the problem of predestination of Christ, which also features very prominently in Scotus's theology. The concept of Christ's predestination is the idea of absolute primacy of Christ in God's creative project. According to this conception "God from eternity intended his union with human nature through incarnation, and not just a means of obliterating man's sin."[8] For Scotus belongs to the theological tradition originating with Rupert of Deutz (1075–1129/30) and continued by Robert Grosseteste, according to which Christ's Incarnation did not depend on Adam's Fall[9]: even if Adam had not sinned, the Word would still have been made flesh, as Christ had eternally been designated to be the center of all creation. Scotus's argument for this remarkable conception depends crucially on the idea that a contingent fact that was man's fall cannot be regarded as an adequate cause for Incarnation which was the supreme good in the whole work of Creation. For it is Christ's soul that forms the ultimate and at the same time primary purpose of all project of creation. Scotus finds a secure basis for his argument in favor of this theory in two principles of well ordered activity (that is activity characteristic of an agent proceeding in a reasonable way — *rationabiliter*); these principles without any doubt apply first of all to God's activity. They are as follows: (1) in well ordered activity the end is always wanted before the means, (2) in well ordered activity a greater good is always wanted before a lesser one.[10] Richard

[8] W. Pannenberg, *Człowiek, wolność, Bóg*, transl. G. Sowinski, Kraków, 1995, p. 134.

[9] See the comparative analyses of Robert Grosseteste's and John Duns Scotus's views — D.P. Horan, "How Original Was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste," *Heythrop Journal* 52 (2011), pp. 374–391. On Scotus's solution to the problem of Incarnation see, among other publications, L. Veuthey, *Giovanni Duns Scoto tra aristotelismo e agostinismo*, Roma 1996, pp. 51–72; R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, New York, Oxford, 1999, pp. 127–132; M. McCord Adams, *Christ and Horrors. The Coherence of Christology,* Cambridge New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, 2006, pp. 181–183; M.B. Ingham, *The Harmony of Goodness. Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus*, Saint Bonaventure 2012, pp. 40– 41.

[10] See R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 128. Cross cites the Wadding's edition, now, the critical Vatican edition of the Ordinatio III is available. Cf. "[…] universaliter enim, ordinate volens prius videtur velle hoc quod est fini propinquius, et ita, sicut prius vult gloriam alicui quam gratiam, ita etiam inter praedestinatos — quibus vult gloriam — ordinate prius videtur velle gloriam illi quem vult esse proximum fini, et ita huic animae." *Ordinatio* III d. 7 q. 3 n. 61; "Nec est verisimile tam summum Bonum in

Cross offers the following reconstruction of the "stages" in God's design of creation: first of all God foreordains Christ's soul to beatific vision; in the next "stage" He predestines Christ's human nature, as related to the Word, to glory, next He preordains to glory the rest of creatures, then He foresees Adam's sin and, consequently, pre-designates Christ to redeem the fallen humanity. Given the principles of well ordered activity neither the predestination to glory of Christ's human nature, nor preordination of other natures can be considered as dependent on the fall of the first human beings as this would be contrary to the principle stating that a greater good should always come before a lesser one in being desired. In the final analysis, God's decision concerning the redemption of the fallen humankind is consequent on God's prior choice to predestine all the humankind to glory.[11] In this scheme Incarnation comes before creation as the end willed by God for its own sake, as the crowning fulfilment of creation, and not as a mere means of saving the fallen humanity.

Scotus's standpoint in christology throws some light on his treatment of predestination. If ends come before means in acts of willing, God will want salvation of his creatures before the means that can lead to the fulfilment of this end. Thus he will not positively want damnation, for being the Supreme Goodness, he does not project such an end for his creatures. When Scotus discusses the attitude of God's will to a reprobate person, he introduces the concept of refraining from willing salvation, which is not the same as positively willing damnation for that person. This subtle distinction introduced by Scotus throws into high relief his conception of God as a loving Maker who first of all desires glory for all his creation.

2. MODAL PROBLEMS

As he undertakes in his *Ordinatio* the discussion of the question whether someone predestined to salvation can still be condemned to eternal damnation, the Subtle Doctor appears to be considering possibility of God changing his own decrees. This, in turn, seems to contradict the theistic conception of God as an Absolute immune to any sort of alteration whatever. Scotus invokes two difficulties against any possibility of the change of status

entibus esse tantum occasionatum propter minus bonum solum." *Ordinatio* III, d. 7, q. 3 n. 64.

[11] See R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 128–129.

from elect to damned. First, if someone enjoyed the status of election (for all eternity) and then a change came about, whose result would be an alteration of the status to that of (eternal) damnation, there would come about a change affecting an already fixed past state of affairs, yet obviously any change affecting the past seems impossible.[12] The Subtle Doctor confirms this with an invocation of Aristotle's authority, who is quoted as saying in book 6 of his *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> For this alone is lacking even to God
> To make undone things that have once been done[13]

So the past is what has been made necessary and as such immune to any change.

The second objection to the possibility of change of the status from election to damnation comes from consideration from a possible cause of that alteration, since any change of God's decree would be irrational without an appropriate cause. However, as Scotus point out, any cause inducing God to change his previous decision would have to be an act of the will of the person concerned (the elected-changed-to-condemned person) and thus there would be an instance of the will of a creature causally influencing God's will, which, again, appears to be an impossibility, as the Creator is under no obligation to reckon with any acts of His creatures.[14]

On the other hand an assumption of inalterable election or damnation of a person eternally decreed by God appears to lead to determinist consequences, since on that assumption the final destiny, salvation or damnation, of a person seems to have been decided in advance, entirely independently of any moral efforts on the part of that person. This would mean, the Subtle Doctor concludes, that the moral law contained in God's commandments was superfluous.[15]

In trying to solve these difficulties Scotus's efforts will focus on demonstrating that the situation of election or damnation in which a person is found (at a given moment) lacks the feature of necessity; in doing this he will refer to his own theory of synchronic contingency explained by him in the preceding distinction (distinction 39) of his *Lectura*. The essence of his

[12] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 1.

[13] Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* 6, 1139 b 10, transl. W.D. Ross, Oxford 1980. In fact the saying is of the poet Agathon, quoted in this place by the Stagirite.

[14] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 2.

[15] Ibid., n. 3.

arguments will be to show that God's knowledge of the ultimate destiny (salvation or damnation) of a person is certain and eternally immutable, and yet this fact does not imply determinism, as the situation of election or damnation is a contingent situation; it has its source in God's will, but its character is not to determine (the acts of person concerned). Scotus's conception of God's knowledge is an attempt to justify the claim that God's knowledge is absolutely certain and immutable, and yet (with respect to some of its objects) it is perfectly contingent. This moment of contingency in God's knowledge allows true contingency of free (and thus contingent) actions of created persons.[16] This enables the Subtle Doctor to claim that God's eternal decree concerning the salvation or damnation of a person is not determining with respect to that person's acts and leaves sufficient room for human freedom and responsibility.

First of all, Scotus focuses his attention on analysis of propositions related to God's actions, which contain the modal operator "can" ("it is possible for"). In distinction 39 of his *Lectura*, Scotus scrutinized the way of operation of will in general, including God's will; he stated "it is possible for a will, which is willing at the moment *t*, not to be willing at the very moment *t*"; he added by way of illustration: "It is possible for God's will, willing in the instant of eternity that there be a stone, not to be willing at the very same instant that there be a stone."[17] According to the Subtle Doctor, the quoted statement will cease to be true if we take God's willing and His not willing as related to different instants of time, as there is no sequence of different temporal instants in God's willing. The quoted statement, Scotus explains, is true only in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*) when construed as: "it is the case that *p* and it is possible that it be not the case that *p*" ($p \wedge \Diamond \sim p$). Then this composite sentence can be broken into two following clauses: "God's will is willing in the instant of eternity that there be a stone" and: "It is possible for God's will not to be willing in the instant of eternity that there be a stone." This shows that in the quoted statement the modal operator "it is possible" applies only to one clause comprised in the original composite statement and not to the whole sentence.

The very quoted statement, the Subtle Doctor says, will be false and will involve contradiction if we take it in the composite sense (*in sensu composi-*

[16] For a detailed discussion of this matter see M. Koszkało, "*Futura contingentia* jako przedmiot wiedzy Boga. Stanowisko Jana Dunsa Szkota" [Future contingent as an object of God's knowledge; John Duns Scotus view], *Filo-Sofija* 19 (2012/4), pp. 53–74.

[17] *Lectura* I, d. 39, n. 54.

to: $\Diamond (p \wedge \sim p)$); for then it will be construed as "It is possible that in the instant of eternity it is the case that God's will is willing that there be stone and (at the same instant) it is not the case that God's will is willing that there be a stone." In the reading of that sentence in the divided sense, no contradiction appears, for both clauses into which it can be analysed, the "God's will is willing in the instant of eternity that there be a stone" clause and the "It is possible for God's will not to be willing in the instant of eternity that there be a stone" clause, can be simultaneously true.

This synchronicity (of a contingent choice of the will and the possibility of the contradictory choice of that very same will) guarantees that there is only one act of willing in God and that instants of eternity in God do not succeed one another like moments in time. If this were not the case, God would lose His absolute simplicity.[18]

The contingency of the act of God's will related to creation taken for granted, Scotus's response to the question heading distinction 40 (Whether it is still possible for a person elected for salvation to be condemned to eternal damnation) of both the *Ordinatio* and the *Lectura*, must be in the affirmative. He states it as follows: "Given what has been said in the preceding question, God elects his chosen in a contingent way and He can (it is possible for Him) not to elect them to grace and glory, not simultaneously, nor in succession, yet both moments of his contingent act are separately present in the instant of eternity."[19] Scotus, in distinction 40, once again denies possibility of successive acts elicited by God's will and goes on to apply to predestination the modal categories introduced in distinction 39. The statement "An elect person can be damned" (or "It is possible that an elect person be damned") can be construed either in the divided or in the composite sense. Taken in the composite sense ("It is possible that a person is elect and that very person is non-elect") this statement involves contradiction, as it affirms possibility of simultaneous (positive) election and non-election of a person; taken in the divided sense ("It is possible, for a person, who is actually elect, to be damned") this statement is actually a conjunction of two propositions, which can both be true with regard to the same subject,[20] and of which only one is a modal proposition: "A person is elect" and "It is possible for that person to be damned."[21] Scotus clarifies, that

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., n. 5.

[20] Ibid., n. 7.

[21] Ibid.

what he means is not that "contraries can coexist simultaneously" nor that "one of the contraries can follow the other since both of them are in eternity"; what is meant by his statement is that both the states describes by the simple clauses comprising the quoted statement construed *in sensu diviso* are simultaneously true, (a person is elect, and it is possible for that person to be damned) since God's act of choice is considered as prior with regard to nature to the actual realization of that choice in the object. Thus the statement "It is possible that an elect person be damned (or non-elect)" taken in the divided sense ought to be construed as a conjunction of two propositions "A person is elect" and "It is possible for that person to be non-elect," as already indicated above.

The outcome of Scotus's discussion of the question whether it is possible for an elect person to be damned is not the conclusion that there can possibly come about a change in God's mind as to the final destiny of an elect person, but clear and unambiguous recognition of the contingent, and thus non-determining nature of God's decision. This allows the Subtle Doctor to emphasize that predestination does not exert a determining influence on the activity of a person's will in the world and does not take the freedom of choice and action away from an intelligent subject. Scotus's conception demonstrates how it is possible for created intelligent subjects to act in a contingent way even though God's knowledge of their activity is eternally certain and immutable and the reason he finds for this possibility is the contingent nature of God's knowledge of contingent acts of freedom. Here Duns Scotus takes leave of the ontological tradition that associated immutability with necessity: God knows for sure and inalterably whether a given person is ultimately to be elect or damned, yet, since his knowledge of this is itself contingent, it exerts no determinist influence upon the domain of created free agents. In Scotus's conception the eternally immutable knowledge that God possesses of passing events of the created world does not bear the character of a determinist factor in the created Universe because Scotus has shown in his ontology that it is perfectly possible for a state of affairs to be both unchangeable and contingent (not necessary).

However, there still remains the problem, how one ought to save the freedom of created intelligent agents and the contingency of the choices made by them if it is God alone that makes the ultimate and irreversible decision concerning their election or damnation. Even if God Himself decides in a free and contingent way, it appears that His sovereign choice must introduce determinism in the subordinate and dependent realm of

created beings. God remains supremely free but will a created, finite subject remain free in a Universe ruled by the sovereign God? If the decision issued by God concerning predestination of human beings has been made at the very instant of creation of the world, its determinist consequences for the persons concerned appear to be inescapable, even if God in that instant acted contingently and freely, that is, could have decided otherwise. What happened in the past has the character of necessity, for the past is necessary rather than contingent. Consequently, if the decision concerning predestination of a human being was made in the past, it must not only be immutable but also necessary.

Scotus is perfectly aware of the possibility of advancing this kind of reasoning as an objection to his theory. His answer to it crucially depends on exposing and refuting the anthropomorphic assumptions concerning God's relationship to the world that lie at the root of this objection. He warns us not to represent God's activity as if it took place in time, in the past from our viewpoint. For "divine predestination does not pass into the past. Although it coexisted with those past things that have passed away, it has not passed away with them."[22] The mode of existence of the Divine Being is not temporal in its nature, so all the temporal terms signifying the past, the present and the future, when referred to God, no longer signify parts of time, but always con-signify the permanent "now" of eternity. For God it is the same thing whether we say that he "did predestine," "predestines" or "will predestine," and his act of predestination is always contingent; it is neither present (in the temporal sense of the present), nor past, nor future, although it is coexistent with all the parts of time.[23] Our false manner of representing to ourselves God's activity consists in placing it in the past. The Subtle Doctor writes "As we always refer to an act of God's will as though it has already taken place in the past, we do not understand the freedom in God's will with respect to the act of predestination, as if that act has already been completed and finished by that will."[24] Now, according to the Subtle Doctor, we ought rather to represent to ourselves God as acting in the present, after the pattern of our own deliberation preceding our choices and taking place here and now; let us think of God as if He was still undecided, as if He still was in the process of determining his will to one of the two mutually exclusive states of things or as if He still considered, whether He

[22] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 9.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., n. 8.

would predestine a person to salvation or not.[25] It is in this way that we can make it easier for ourselves to understand how the question of a person's salvation or damnation remains an open question for our present and that there is nothing in it to circumscribe our freedom of choice.

Having made these three assumptions, namely that (1) the present state of things is contingent, (2) the act of predestination is performed in the divine "now" and it is contingent, (3) God's will in a contingent way decides on the ultimate destiny of every individual, Scotus attempts to demonstrate that (4) we are not predetermined by predestination, and it is in this sense that it is possible for an elect person to be damned.

Having rejected necessity of the present and dropped the indissoluble link between immutability and ontological necessity, also having discarded the atemporal presence of the stream of time to God's mind (God's immutability essentially exceeds the temporal "now," yet it coexists only with the "now" that is actually present),[26] Scotus presents an impressive attempt to explain God's knowledge of future contingents. Important in this attempt is the assumption that the value of truth possessed by true propositions about contingent events does not make these events necessary. Many of these contingent facts are voluntary acts performed by created intelligent agents, whose will acts in a free way and is not determined by any cause other than the will itself. This freedom of the will is not constrained by the fact that God eternally knows these voluntary acts in a certain way. Scotus once more emphasizes the freedom of created intelligent subjects when he states that the will of a predestined person is not strengthened (*confirmata*)in a special way because of the fact of being predestined, it still retains the ability to sin, and thus it is still possible for it to remain in the state of sin.[27] Thus, in every conceivable respect, predestination is not predetermination. There are no doubts that this was Scotus's meaning, however, it remains open whether he sufficiently justified this point, especially in the context of his theory of grace.

[25] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 8.

[26] On the conception of time in Scotus's philosophy see N. Lewis, "Space and Time," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Th. Willliams, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 83–93; W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foeknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suárez*, Leiden, 1988, p. 30.

[27] *Ordinatio* I, d. 40, n. 6.

3. THE REASON FOR ELECTION OR DAMNATION

In distinction 41 of his *Ordinatio* Scotus confronts the problem whether there is a reason or a meritorious act (*meritum*) justifying or deserving predestination (as we already know, predestination for Scotus is the same as election for salvation). The Latin term *meritum* poses some problems with translation, in diverse context it can be translated as "reward," "merit," "meritorious act," "desirable quality," "essence," "reason." In theology it usually signifies an act or behaviour deserving praise or reward, a meritorious act. Dolf te Velde in his article devoted to Scotus's conception of predestination leaves out a detailed account of the meanings of this word found in actual usage, he does point, however, that the use of the term *meritum* by Scotus should not suggest the idea that a human being may be able to make a contribution to his or her own salvation, to purchase, as it were, salvation with, say, good works. *Meritum* (in Scotus) is not so much an act or behaviour deserving a reward, as, in general, something worthy of praise, something that God may take into account in giving a reward to a human being. On the other hand the term *meritum* may in some contexts be translated as "reason," then it indicates some objective aspects of a person's behaviour.[28] In still other contexts *meritum* may carry pejorative connotations and refer to negative deserts, as when we say of a person justly punished that he/she "merited" a punishment. Regardless of the nuances of translation, the general meaning of the question heading the distinction under discussion is as follows: does God's decision to select human persons for eternal salvation or damnation find some justification on the side of man and his action and behaviour; does it depend in some way on the selected person's qualities, attitudes, acts of the will; does God, when deciding on a human being's ultimate destiny, take into account the conduct of His creatures.

Richard Cross, in his discussion of the conception of predestination found in Scotus's works, assigns rather more space to the explication of the concept of merit.[29] He makes ample reference to other texts than the *Ordinatio* I, d. 41 discussed here, in particular he quotes Scotus's definition of a meritorious act given in his *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*. A meritorious act (*actus meritorius*) is an act that is accepted by God because of certain good

[28] D. te Velde, "Verkiezing en verwerping bij Johannes Duns Scotus. Een analyse van *Ordinatio* I, d. 41," *Kerk en Theologie* 65 (2014), p. 36–37.

[29] R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, pp. 103–107.

it represents, which justly deserves a reward.[30] An essential feature of a meritorious act is that it must be grounded in charity, yet the most important distinctive quality of it is that it has to be positively approved by God. Thus we can identify three essential properties of a meritorious act; it must be a voluntary act, it must be an act inspired by charitable love, it must be positively approved by God (who approves it because it is an act of charity).[31] A meritorious act is by no means an achievement of a human person (that compels recognition on the part of God), nor is it something that "earns" for man the eternal life of beatitude, nevertheless it is something positive in axiological terms.

Scotus also makes use of the distinction between *meritum de condigno* (loosely: merit that is positively deserving of a reward), and *meritum de congruo* (merit that consists in doing what is suitable or obligatory or in compensation of a wrong that has been done), which, according to Cross, has been introduced by St. Bonaventure. The reward of the *meritum de condigno*, in the Subtle Doctor's conception, is the eternal life of salvation, while the reward of the *meritum de congruo* is sanctifying grace (that is justification).[32] The distinction between positive merit (act positively deserving a reward) and mere redress (act of compensation for a committed injustice) is vital in theology, while redress is setting right or offering compensation for harm done to another person or a committed offence, the positive merit is an act done for somebody else's good which deserves praise and reward. Merit *de condigno* is merit in the proper sense of the word, it is an act deserving a reward that is equal in value to the good contributed by that act, while in the case of merit *de congruo*, the reward exceeds in value the deserts contributed by the meritorious act.[33] As an example of merit *de condigno* and its reward one may quote work done by a labourer and the just pay for that work, an example of a reward *de congruo* will be a bonus added to the just wages.[34] As Cross makes it clear, Scotus firmly holds the doctrine

[30] R. Cross, *Duns Scotus,* p. 103–107. Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, 17, in *Opera Omnia, editio minor*, II/1, *Opera Theologica*, ed. G. Lauriola, Alberobello, 1998.

[31] *Duns Scotus on Divine Love*, ed. A. Vos, H. Veldhuis, E. Dekker, N.W. Den Bok, A.J. Beck, Ashgate, 2003, p. 126.

[32] R. Cross, *Duns Scotus,* p. 105.

[33] M. Sieniatycki, *Zarys dogmatyki katolickiej* [An Outline of Catholic Dogmatic Theology], t. III., Kraków, 1930, pp. 158–159.

[34] *Historia dogmatów* [The History of Dogmas], ed. B. Sesboüé, vol. 2., Kraków, 1999, p. 302.

that no human action whatever is sufficient to obtain justification of man, although some human acts may be sufficient to render the person that performed them fit to receive the reward of eternal life of beatitude.[35] Absolutely no meritorious acts on the part of creatures have the power of compelling God's will to recognize them and offer a reward for them; in rewarding human merits God always acts in a free and never in a necessary way.[36]

3.1. THE CONCEPTIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE, PETER LOMBARD, THOMAS AQUINAS, HENRY OF GHENT

Before expounding his own views on the reasons for election or damnation of a person, Scotus discusses relevant theories put forward by other theologians. These could divided into the following groups: (1) theories holding that there are no reasons on the side of creature for either election or damnation, these both states are entirely unrelated to whatever merits humans might have; (2) there exist reasons on the side of creatures for either election or damnation, which means that human merits and demerits are taken into account in deciding the ultimate destiny of a human person, (3) there exists no reason for election, but there is a reason for damnation on the side of creatures, thus no possible merits of creatures can contribute to their election, while demerits do count in preparing damnation.

Scotus quotes St. Augustine as a proponent of the view that the immediate reason for a person's election or damnation by God is not the divine foreknowledge of the good works performed by that person, but God's foreknowledge of the state of her/his faith. The authority for this position is St. Paul's, chapter 9 of the *Epistle to the Romans,* where the classical statement is made as to the faith as the source of justification before God, in contrast to works which are of no avail. Duns Scotus does not go into that matter at a greater length, he contents himself with the observation that Augustine himself dismissed his own view in the *Retractations* when he acknowledged that both faith and works are gifts of God. Thus both faith and good works depend on God who elects and can represent no merit in the eyes of Him who predestines.[37]

The next authority invoked by the Subtle Doctor is Peter Lombard's. Lombard quotes st. Augustine's *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (19, 38) to

[35] R. Cross, *Duns Scotus,* p. 105.

[36] Ibid., p. 104.

[37] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 5.

support the claim that there is no human merit either in election or in damnation. Scotus is not much concerned with Lombard's position, he is more interested in the problem whether or not the view endorsed by Augustine in the quote adduced by Lombard represents the final position of the bishop of Hippo.[38]

The third opinion among those quoted by the Subtle Doctor has been attributed by the editors of Scotus's work to St. Thomas Aquinas. According to this view the only reason for any activity by God is the pleasure of his will and there can absolutely be no other reason. Consequently, this view, just like Peter Lombard's, claims there is no other reason for election or damnation than the pleasure of God's will. Some passages in the discussion of this view by the Subtle Doctor refer directly to views expressed in article 5 of question 23 of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* and contain the same quotes from Holy Scripture as Aquinas's text. The scriptural support for this position comes, again, from the Romans (9:11) and the classical statement therein of the independence of election from human merit in general.[39] An imaginary representation of God and his activity towards creature is, the figure of a potter at work, who, according to his own pleasure, shapes his clay giving it different, more or less noble forms. In the same way God, as holds this opinion, according to the pleasure of His will, freely selects some of His creatures for eternal life, while others designates for eternal perdition. God's absolute freedom in manifesting His goodness is the basis of this theory, looking for reasons external to God's will of election or damnation is pointless. God's goodness can manifest itself in most diverse ways; we see this in the domain of nature, where many forms of being are found, representing different degrees of perfection. This same goodness can be seen in the moral realm of spirit, where both good and evil is found. Summarized in this short philosophical discourse is the view according to which evil is allowed by God into the world as privation: God, being unable to create an absolutely perfect being like Himself, allows his generosity to be displayed in a series of beings of various degrees of perfection; various instances of privation can affect otherwise good and complete beings. The shining of God's perfection in the existence of a hierarchy of various degrees of being is described as perfect, for the perfection of the world is manifested also in there being more or less perfect forms or being. Thus the ultimate reason for there being evil is revelation of the glory of God. If God delivers some

[38] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 6–11.

[39] Ibid., n. 13.

creatures from evil and preordains them for eternal glory, this is because of His goodness. If we ask, why He, while electing some creatures for salvation, refuses to elect others, the answer is: this is because of His sovereign will. In this view one can identify two reasons for election: the general reason for predestination for salvation is God's goodness, the particular reason is the sovereign decision of His will. The selection of particular persons for salvation (God's special activity with respect to particulars) is like the activity of an artist. When we ask why one part of material in which an artist works, has been given one sort of form, while another part has been informed by a different shape, the sole reason can be the sovereign will of the artist, who shapes things according to his liking. It is likewise with predestination: God elects whom it is pleasing to his will to elect.[40]

One cannot accuse God of injustice in this activity of selective predestination, according to the theory under consideration. The punishment suf–fered by the damned is deserved and just, thus in the relegation of the reprobates to eternal damnation the goodness of justice is manifested. The goodness of mercy, on the other hand, is shown in the (undeserved) predestination and election of the blessed. This unequal treatment of the elect and the damned is not injustice, hold the proponents of the discussed thesis, for in the domain of grace (which is a gratuitous, undeserved gift), the giver is free to give whatever he wills without committing injustice.[41] The underlying assumption of this theory is that election to glory is not rightfully owed to or deserved by a created agent and thus predestination for salvation is not an act of justice. It is rather an undeserved award that exceeds in its value every possible merit. In a description of humankind that Henry of Ghent attributed to Thomas Aquinas found is also the phrase *massa perdita* which encapsulates a very grim view of humanity. Humankind is viewed as a mass of sinners from among whom God, moved by mercy, picks out some and predisposes them for glory, even though, as sinners, they do not deserve it.

The difficulties in Aquinas's conception of predestination have been highlighted by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange in his classical work on predestination. Father Garrigou-Lagrange defends Thomas against the accusation of predestinarian determinism; he stresses, that according to Aquinas, the infinite justice of God never requires from creatures what lies beyond their scope of possible activity and makes salvation accessible in principle to all

[40] Ibid., n. 14–19

[41] Ibid., n. 20.

creatures capable of it. On the other hand Thomas accepts the anti-pelagian principle, according to which one thing may be better than other, by virtue of a free act of divine mercy, because it is more acceptable to God. These two views are difficult to reconcile and not without reason: the infinite life of God, comprising simultaneously and without inner contradiction infinite justice, infinite mercy and supreme freedom, remains inscrutable mystery for us and the problem of reconciling these attributes of God lies well beyond the scope of speculative theology.[42]

Thus it is clear what Thomas Aquinas's stand on the problem of relation of merits and election was. Merits of created agents, no matter what they are, can in no wise be the cause of predestination and election; the sole and ultimate source of predestination is God's will. If, as the case may be, God intends to raise a person to glory on the basis of that person's meritorious achievements, he arranges in advance a way of bestowing grace on that person so that she/he may by her/his deserts earn that glory.[43] In this case we see the cooperation of secondary causes with the primary cause; the secondary causes are real and efficient causes even though their operation is directed and governed by the primary cause.[44] According to the teaching of Aquinas, one ought not to set apart, and even less to oppose, free will and predestination, and free will and grace. Thus, despite the emphasis laid on the sovereignty of God's will in the act of predestination, Thomas is far from denying the value of good works and supplicative prayer. Although God's sovereign decision is not a result of prayer, yet prayers are necessary, as also are works, for God's decree of predestination is carried out by prayers and works.[45]

The fourth view referred to and discussed by Thomas Aquinas is the theory of Henry of Ghent. However, before representing Henry's own views, Scotus quotes Henry's critical opinion of Aquinas's conception. Henry objects to Thomas, that moral evil is by no means necessary for manifestation of God's goodness. According to Henry, one thing is the multiplicity and diversity of beings in the domain of nature, which is a clear sign of the perfection of the world, and quite another thing is diversity among the grades of moral perfection. Whereas the world would be less complete if some kinds of natural beings were absent from it, the Universe would be none the

[42] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, London, 1939, p. 104.

[43] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 23, 5 resp.

[44] Ibid.

[45] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 23, 8.

worse for lack of beings that are morally imperfect. The argument defending damnation as preordained by God by invoking the idea of divine justice is lacking too: to manifest God's justice it would be enough to damn the daemons, thus the damnation of human reprobates appears to be wholly superfluous. In the end Henry concludes that divine goodness is such, that it is far better manifested in divine mercy being revealed in many ways than in acts of divine justice.[46] Also, it is not possible that God positively wanted existence of moral evil, as moral evil is the effect of causes corrupted by privation, whereas God only allows effects vitiated by privation. Henry thus unconditionally rules out possibility of God intentionally causing moral evil. Finally, Henry takes issue with the theory that there be no reasons contributing to election on the part of a singular human person, reasons taken into account by God in His particular act concerning that person. Henry's view is that election cannot depend exclusively on God's will, since human beings are not alike, they have different predispositions forming the ground for their behaviour and activity. They could be likened to vessels formed out of different kinds of stuff, which would emphasize their diversity, rather than to things made from the same kind of clay or stone, which differ only with respect to the role assigned to each by their common Maker.[47]

This line of thought tends to justify the claim that the predestination or damnation of particular persons depend not exclusively on the will of God, but also on some qualities and ways of conduct of the agents concerned.

Scotus reconstructs Henry's theory as follows. God's action can be viewed from the standpoint of God Himself as the subject of action, from the point of view of the person who is the object and receiver of God's action and from the point of view of the purpose of the relevant action. In terms of efficient and final causality we can point to the following reasons of acts performed by God: the efficient cause of God's act is his will, the final cause is his goodness. This shows that from the point of view of external causality the sole reasons for any act of election or damnation are God's will and his goodness. However, according to Henry, God's action can also be viewed taking into account its object: the person affected by God's action. When we analyse God's action in this context, we look for some reasons for God's decision that exist on the part of the object; namely the features of the object that make it correspond or not to God' s design with respect to

[46] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 21–22.

[47] Ibid., n. 23–25.

that person.[48] Henry thus applies to God certain rules of free selection, which are analogous to the rules employed in selection procedures by finite intelligent subjects: there is a reason for a choice only when there are differences between objects from among which to choose. This allows Henry to conclude "one cannot speak of a choice in relation to things that are in every respect alike, so, when God chooses some thing from among others, either there is some difference in the elected thing with respect to other things, or there is none, but then there is no election."[49] Henry does accept the opinion (common in the theological milieu of the time) that all men are sinners who do not deserve salvation,[50] yet he also wants to represent God's act of predestination as a reasonable and not purely arbitrary choice. Therefore he acknowledges that there must be some reasons on the part of the damned person that motivate God to choose thus and not otherwise. True enough, the object is not the determining cause for God's act, it goes without saying that God is not a passive receiver of active influences exerted by creatures, yet being an active and intelligent subject, God takes, as it were, into consideration the conduct of an intelligent object of his action and adjusts His sovereign decision accordingly. It is in this sense that one can legitimately speak of there being some reason in an object affected by God's decision, that motivates God to decide in the way He does.[51] Henry goes on to stress that God's mercy always cooperates with His justice; the intervention of mercy is evident in the acts of election (that is always undeserved) issued by God's will, yet such a merciful act in relation to an elect person has to be somehow motivated by an adequate conduct on the part of that person.[52]

The final conclusion reached by Henry as to the reasons for election and damnation found in the person being an object of God's decision is as follows: the reason for election that is present in an elected person is the good use of free will by that person as foreseen by God; the reason for damnation present in a reprobate is the bad use of free will by the reprobate, that was also foreseen by God.[53]

48 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 26–28.

49 Ibid., n. 29.

50 Cf. M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1311.

51 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 31.

52 Ibid., n. 30.

53 Ibid., n. 32.

The principles of Henry's conception of cooperation of the faculty of free choice in man with God's grace are presented and discussed by Scotus in passage 33 of distinction 41. More light on this issue has been shed by analyses carried out by Marilyn McCord Adams, who in considering this problem consulted Henry's own formulation contained in his texts.[54] Henry follows Augustine in affirming that God actually owes nothing to his creatures, neither to angels, nor to humans, and this neither in the condition of fallenness nor in the state of innocence. In principle God could give more grace and glory to one person than to another if He so pleased, regardless of any merits or qualities on the part of the endowed person. Yet God takes the initiative to help sinners and his first step is to warn them of the consequences of sin. Faced with God's initiative, a man can adopt either of two mutually opposed attitudes. He can disregard God's warnings and thus render himself "unworthy of further help" and so gets confirmed in his sin; or he can take God's warning and then in his will appears a state characterized by negative indifference: he no longer wills to sin, even if he not always refrains from sinful acts. A person in such condition may be given further grace which will implant in her/him an imperfect hatred of sin and an inclination towards willing perfect freedom from sin. Still, a person is free to reject this inclination, if she/he does, she/he will deserve to be again confirmed in her sin, however, if she complies with it, this will constitute a reason for obtaining more gifts of grace and be purified of sin. Thus the succeeding affirmative response to the gift of grace results in still more perfect grace being imparted. Such cooperation of a person with the given degree of grace, especially perseverance in the imparted grace until the end of life, results in the situation that it is proper and becoming that God should give glory and eternal life to that person.[55] As Duns Scotus keenly observes in relating Henry's thought, this close collaboration of the will with grace does not annihilate the faculty of free choice; cooperation, that is the adequate response of free will which realizes itself in acts of free choice is the occasion for more gifts of grace which in turn cause confirmation and further strengthening in the person. If a human person accepts a given grace and complies with it so as to make it influence her/his use of the faculty of free choice, this person deserves to be presented with a grace of a higher degree.[56] Thus the

[54] Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* VIII, q. 5. Quoted in: M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1311.

[55] Cf. M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1311–1312.

[56] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 33.

domain of human activity holds ample room for both God's initiative and activity, and the exercise of human freedom, that is of the human faculty of free choice.

On the whole, Henry takes the following position with respect to election and damnation: in his judgment of a person God takes into account the use by this person of her/his free will; single acts of proper use of the faculty of choice are the reason for Him imparting partial gifts of grace to that person, while consistent good use of freedom during that person's whole life as foreseen by God the reason for God's electing her/him for eternal beatitude. Things are analogous in the case of improper use of the faculty of choice by man, which, as foreseen by God, can be a reason for eternal damnation of the person concerned.[57] It is by no means the case, that God decides the ultimate destiny of His creatures in an arbitrary manner, rather in each case He attends to and takes into account the conduct by a person that He chooses for the reward of election for eternal glory. At the same time good and proper conduct of a person does not follow automatically from grace and previous predestination, for grace itself calls for human cooperation and an adequate response of man's will to be effective.

Returning to Henry's distinction related to God's act as viewed from the point of view of the agent, the purpose and the object, one ought to acknowledge that there does exist some reason for election or damnation in a person being an object of God's action, which is a necessary reason (that is a reason being a necessary condition of either election or damnation). This reason is good or evil use by that person of the faculty of free choice. From what has been said it is clear that Henry is convinced, that both salvation and damnation of man is something that man himself deserves, at least to a certain degree. We say "to a certain degree" for the good use of the faculty of free will by a predestined person, which forms a reason for that person's predestination, is only a necessary, and by no means sufficient reason for that person's election.

The principle "the reason for predestination found in a person being an object of predestination is that person's good use made of free will as foreseen by God; the reason for damnation is the evil use of free will by a condemned person as foreseen by God" is universal in its character. Nevertheless, Henry cautions that in singular cases this reason may be hidden from us and remain unrecognizable for our appreciation of a given person. He thus repeats St. Paul's warning not to enquire about alleged merits and de-

[57] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 33.

merits of a person in singular cases and leave the verdict on the ultimate destiny of other men to the inscrutable judgment of God.[58]

3.2. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS'S POSITION ON PREDESTINATION

Henry of Ghent's elaborate solution to the problem of man's ultimate destiny as decided in predestination by God failed to win John Duns Scotus's approval.

The Subtle Doctor formulates three basic objections to Henry's theory. For one thing, he makes a different assumption from Henry's as to the primary and decisive moment determining the cause of good or bad use of the faculty of free choice by a human being. According to Duns, God foresees without doubt all future contingent events and the way they relate to what has been determined by His will. Thus what makes a human being decide to cooperate with grace in its very first instant depends on the will of God and not on the will of a created person. The will of, or a previous decree by God is the cause of the first difference obtaining between persons that are equal as to their nature. The consequence of this primary difference is ultimately election or damnation.[59] Given this assumption, the good use of the faculty of free choice, which in Henry's eyes constituted the merit deserving a reward in the form of election is secondary to the determination set by God's will.

Secondly, the principle assumed by Henry, affirming that "the reason for predestination found in a person being an object of predestination is the good use of free will made by that person as foreseen by God" cannot, according to Scotus, have the characteristic of universality as it cannot apply to children in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of the faculty of choice.[60] Scotus has probably here in mind children who died before reaching adulthood. He tacitly assumes that children as such cannot make choices directed by reason (in this he follows Aristotle), so in the case of children there can be no question of any merit whatever. Another possible interpretation of Scotus's meaning in this passage is that he refers to children who are unbaptized and thus are not eligible for distribution of grace and in there case there can be no response to grace (which is a crucial moment in Henry's theory). In his *Reportatio* Scotus defines his reference with more

[58] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41. n. 35.

[59] Ibid., n. 36.

[60] Ibid., n. 37.

precision: what he means is the situation of a child, who has been baptized, yet died before it had a chance to exercise well its faculty of free choice.[61] In all of these situation there is no room for the reason for election found in the elected person as postulated by Henry. Scotus takes into consideration one possible argument in defense of Henry's position: in the case of children dying before reaching maturity in general God foresees hypothetical use of the faculty of free choice by a given child; he foresees what that use would have been had the child lived long enough to achieve its adult age. On this basis it might be possible to foresee hypothetical future merits and demerits that would constitute a reason for election or damnation. This answer, however, failed to satisfy Scotus; he pointed to the following very inconvenient consequence of this answer; once accepted the principle of including in the assessment of a person's conduct hypothetical would be merits and demerits could in principle be applied to anyone, including any grown up person. There would be no reason then to believe that the elect adults were elected because of the performed meritorious deeds and their death in a state of grace, rather than because of hypothetical merits that had been foreseen for them and would have been earned had they lived long enough to make the foreseen hypothetical future come true.[62] Another drawback of Henry's theory emphasized by Scotus is that it cannot be applied to angels regardless of whether predestined or not.[63]

61 *Reportatio* I-A, d. 41, n. 40.

62 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 37. Marilyn McCord Adams points to further inconveniences involved in assuming that election/damnation depends on hypothetical merits/demerits earned after the moment of death. For any rational being one could probably find in the hypothetical future moments of time when a given being was in a state of grace and one when that being was in a state of mortal sin, and thus there would be no way of deciding which one of these moments should be taken into account in the final assesment of that person's merits and reaching the decision on her/his election/damnation. Since it is not possible to take all the relevant moments into account, the only adequate moment for the assessment of a person's merits appears to be the moment of death. M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1315.

63 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 39. Scotus does no follow this topic in the *Ordinatio.* In the parallel passage in the *Reportatio* I-A, d. 41, n. 40. he explains that Henry's principle cannot be applied to angels as they (in contrast to human beings) do not experience resistance in doing good and inclination towards doing evil; so when God imparts his grace to them they have no impulse to resist that grace and thus no opportunity to earn merit in overcoming that impulse. Consequently, one cannot speak of their merits and their cooperation with grace in their exercise of the faculty of free choice.

Scotus's own preferred opinion is the following; there is no reason for predestination in a predestined person, that was prior to the predestination of that person and that somehow motivated that predestination; nevertheless there is a certain reason prior to and motivating the damnation of a damned person. This reason in a condemned person does not necessitate God's action as the efficient cause in the act of condemnation of that person, it is simply the reason that makes God's condemning act apply to that singular person as an object of damnation rather than to any other.[64] Scotus's view is a strongly modified version of Henry's conception: whereas election or predestination is in no way motivated by the good use of free will an thus human merit plays no part in procuring it (here Scotus departs from Henry's view), God takes into account the sin and evil use made of free will by a person in the act of damnation of that person.

Scotus justifies his position by constructing a certain model of God's action. His first step is to justify the thesis that election is in no way related to merit. Here Scotus once again to the principle of well-ordered action: whoever wills anything in a well ordered way he wills both the end and the thing leading to the achievement of that end, but he wills the end first and the means leading to the achievement of that end only secondarily.[65] In the case of created beings that are naturally capable of achieving beatitude, the end intended by God is to make them achieve that perfect end which consist in perfect happiness. As God wills in a well- ordered way, He wills the achievement of that goal first, and, in consequence, He wants, as if in a succeeding instant, for these created being the means that lead to that desired achievement.[66]

Scotus employs the qualifier "as if" (*quasi*) on purpose, as he wants to make the point that there is no temporal succession of instants in God and if we construe God's wanting the beatitude of his creatures and the means leading to it as coming in two successive moments, we fall into the error of

64 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 40.

65 Garrigou-Lagrange quotes Thomas Aquinas (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 23, art 4, resp) to make the point that Scotus was not the first theologian (as some interpreters meant) who, consciously invoking the principle of well ordered action asserted that God's willing the purpose, which is the glorification of a elect comes before His willing the means to that purpose. See R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, p. 87. However, it seems that Scotus made this point crucial in his arguing for the independence of election by God from any merits on the elected persons part in a more conspicuous way than did Thomas.

66 *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 41.

anthropomorphism. When we speak of "instants" in God's acts of willing, we do not mean temporal moments that succeed one another, but separable moments or aspects of God's total act that differ in intentional content form one another and complement one another to form God's total act, which is wholly atemporal.

Scotus assumes that, with respect to predestination, the first instant in God's act of willing is (a) His willing to beatify a created person, secondly comes (b) His wanting the means of all kinds leading to that beatification, such as grace, faith, all kinds of benefits and good use of the faculty of free choice, and lastly comes (c) His foreseeing that that person will in fact possess any of these means. On the basis of this model Scotus concludes that God wills beatitude for a person beforehand, and not in consequence of His foreknowledge of the possession by that person the means of salvation.[67] It follows from this that merits (which, of course, are of the number of means of salvation) cannot be a reason for predestination.

Scotus represents the action of God's will in an act of damning a person in a different way. As a leading assumption he takes, invoking St. Augustine's authority, the principle that damnation is good only when it is just, as any punishment would constitute an act of cruelty if it were meted out to an innocent person. It follows from this, that God never wants to punish anyone, before He clearly recognizes that person as a sinner. Thus in any instance of damnation the will to punish cannot precede the recognition of a relevant person as a sinner. This is in particular true with respect to Judas, who was the exemplum of a sinner for medieval thinkers. The first act of God's will as to Judas is not a wish to damn him, as "to begin with" he stands before God in his pure natural condition. Damnation of a person in the state of pure nature would be a damnation of an innocent and thus would constitute an act of cruelty. Only when Judas clearly appears before God as a reprobate, God may wish to condemn him. Scotus concludes from this premise that the reason for damnation is something existing in the object of damnation, namely the ultimate seen as foreseen by God.[68]

However, this line of argument may appear insufficient in that it fails to clarify how God comes into the possession of the indubitable grounds for condemning Judas. Scotus intends to obviate this difficulty and he himself formulates the objection to his own view.

[67] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 41.

[68] Ibid., n. 42.

Suppose that God wills the existence of both Peter and Judas, who are equal to each other in their condition of pure nature. It may be granted, that God's first order will for Peter is that of beatitude; how about Judas, however? If God originally wills damnation for Judas, then He condemns him without any reason, or else He wants beatitude for Judas just as He does for Peter, yet in this case he elects him.[69] It appears certain in any case that in creating Judas God must want some destiny for him; this destiny is rather not beatitude (for Judas is the paradigmatic case of a reprobate), but then it must be damnation, which, however, seems to be decided by God before any recognition of Judas as a sinner. To offer a satisfactory response to this sketched difficulty Scotus attempts to construct a more elaborate model of God's acts of volition with respect to both (a) an ultimately elect person, and (b) an ultimately damned person.[70]

Let us consider the relation of God's will to both Peter and Judas as envisaged in such an elaborate model showing the structure of discernible conceptual instants involved in the constitution of God's act of volition. The instants referred to in this models are not, as already observed, to be construed as temporal moments, they are conceptual (or logical) points discernible in the constitution of God's act, that differ as to their conceptual content and remain in relations of motivation or opposition of one to another. The doctrine of divine simplicity excludes in advance any real, and a fortiori temporal multiplicity in God, and in particular it precludes plurality of acts of decision on the part of God. God's will is prior to creature and all created events. Although created events stand in relation of temporal succession to one another, they may be past, contemporary or future one with respect to another, yet the very act of creation stands in no temporal relation to any of these events, it takes place in the eternal "now" of God's reality. Nevertheless, in order to account for the multiplicity and variety of effects of the one creative act, Scotus distinguishes in the one act of divine volition the "natural instants" (*instantiae naturae*), that is conceptual moments (all contained in the unique moment of eternity) whose interrelations within the structure of the whole of the divine act account for the diversity of created effects. In the same way the plurality of God's act of will-

[69] *Ordinatio* I d. 41, n. 44.

[70] More or less detailed accounts of Scotus's conception of conceptual instants involved in God's volition in an act of election/damnation can be found in M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, p. 1319, R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 102; D. te Velde, "Verkiezing en verwerping bij Johannes Duns Scotus," p. 240.

ing as spoken about in Scotus's account a purely metaphorical device, in fact all this analysis rests upon the assumption that in reality there is only one act of will in God, which in diverse ways encompasses all the different possible objects.[71]

The first conceptual instant. At the first conceptually discernible point in eternity, God wills beatitude for Peter and wills nothing for Judas (*nihil vult Iudae*). Both persons are in the condition of pure nature and in this respect are equal each to the other. At that moment there is no positive act with respect to Judas on the part of God, in particular there is no positive damnation of Judas by God.

The second conceptual instant. At the second point, the will of God wants grace for Peter (*vult Petro gratiam*), however, there continues to be no positive act by the divine will with respect to Judas, there is only a negative act: there is no will in God (*negatio volitionis*) of grace for Judas.

The third conceptual instant. In the third instant the divine will intends to permit (*vult permittere*) both Peter and Judas to remain within the mass of beings that would be eternally damned (by virtue of either original or some personal sin). This act of volition is the first positive act issued by God's will with respect to Judas. According to Scotus and by virtue of this positive act and the absence of any positive decision concerning Judas as in the first and the second instant, the proposition "Judas will ultimately be a reprobate" is already true.

The fourth conceptual instant. In this instant Judas is represented to God's will as a final reprobate and then God positively wills justly to punish and damn him.[72]

As we already observed above, God's foreknowledge of our contingent acts of free choice does not interfere with the freedom of our decisions precisely because this foreknowledge, according to the Subtle Doctor, is contingent itself. Yet in this more nuanced model of God's volitional acts with regard to predestination presented matters appear to get complicated and this by the admission into the scheme of God's will. The problem of predestination (and its compatibility with human freedom), as is shown with evidence in this scheme, concerns not only possible interference of God's cognitive acts regarding created persons with the free actions by these persons, it concerns above all influence of God's acts of volition (e.g. His willing to give or refuse grace to a person) on activity of created beings.

[71] *Lectura* I, d. 39, n. 53.

[72] *Ordinatio* I d. 41, n. 45.

Some Scotus scholars believe that the negative moment, evidenced in the first two instants involved in God's act of volition, of not-willing grace for a man (Judas in the above case) may have decisive influence upon that man's activity and his/her ultimate choices. If that were the case, human freedom would turn out to be illusory after all. This is a very difficult and delicate matter. Richard Cross, for instance, points to Scotus's claim that although God positively wants the acts which will ultimately lead to Judas's damnation, this is not enough to affirm that God predestines Judas to eternal damnation. Cross, however, sees the difficulty in Scotus's argumentation and does not venture to issue his own judgment on it; he states that he leaves it to the reader to decide whether or not Scotus succeeds to avoid Calvinism.[73] To Marilyn McCord Adams damnation is the rock on which the ship of Scotus's theodicy gets wrecked.[74] True, it is far from the case that God positively wants Judas damned: He only refrains from positively wishing grace and beatitude for Judas, yet He does not positively want Judas eternally miserable. This way of speaking results from the principle attributing all goods to God and all evil to creatures. Scotus says one cannot ascribe the will to damn to God, if He is viewed as considering the object of possible damnation in its purely natural state; God can only want an object damned if He takes into account that object as known to be in the state of ultimate mortal sin.[75] Thus God is represented as "justified," because He only condemns a person deserving to be damned. If God refrains from positively willing grace and beatitude for Judas in the first two instants, he is not unjust either, for none of these goods is owed to Judas. As Scotus writes: "the highest goodness can go with free communication to others, although this goodness will not be equal for all."[76] God is not bound by any necessity when He gives out goods, for He can distribute His bounty in a free way and thus He can give unequal shares of His gifts to persons who are seen as equal.[77] This reasoning appears cogent enough for God's justice, yet there still remains the problem of mercy. Withdrawing grace from Judas opens room for the latter's sin and the possibility of Judas committing ultimate sin.

[73] R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, p. 102–103.

[74] M. McCord Adams, "Duns Scotus on the Goodness of God," *Faith and Philosophy* 4 (1987), p. 105.

[75] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 46.

[76] Ibid., n. 53.

[77] Ordinatio I, d. 41, n. 53.

Scotus describes Judas's sin and the possibility of committing ultimate sin as something that God permits. In connection to this statement two questions arise: (1) Does God in any way cooperate with a sinner's will? and (2) What kind of act is that permission (*permissio*) given by God to sin?

Scotus observes that God's foreknowledge and permission alone does not seem to ensure that a sinful act will be committed either in the case of a human subject (e.g. Judas), who is contaminated by original sin, or in the case of a subject not concerned with contaminating original sin (Lucifer).[78] So, Scotus concludes, there must be some efficient cause for a sinful act to come into being; a cause that is other than mere foreknowledge or admission of that act. Hence Scotus adds by way of specification that God's foreknowledge extends also to the fact that God will cooperate with the sinner (e.g. Lucifer) with regard both to sins of commission and omission. In the case of a sin of commission God's cooperation concerns the positive essence of a committed deed; in the case of a sin of omission God knows that He will not cooperate in the production of the essence of an act that will be omitted by the sinner (Lucifer in the analysed case).[79] However, there still remains the problem of the nature of the voluntary act of permitting evil by God; Scotus asks the question what type of an act is God's permission given to Lucifer's sin; if it is a positive act of God's will with respect to the committed sin, it would appear that God wants Lucifer to sin. If the act of God's permission is not a positive act of wanting the sin to be committed (God does not want the sin), but it is positive with respect to the act of permission itself (God wants the permission) then the act of reflection (*actus reflexus*) will be positive, that is a second order act (an act performed with respect to a certain first-order act).[80]

The detailed analysis of the problem of the nature of the act of God's permission of evil was carried out by Scotus in another distinction of his revised commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences, where he discusses the nature of God's will.[81] In this distinction he introduces a number of new terms and distinctions: God's efficacy, according to him, may be exercised through a positive willing or lack of willing or unwillingness; thus Scotus distinguishes in God "efficient act of willing" or "efficient volition" (*volitio efficax*) and efficient "unwillingness" or "nolition" (*nolitio efficax*): the for-

[78] *Ordinatio* I, d. 41, n. 48.

[79] Ibid., n. 50.

[80] Ibid., n. 49.

[81] Ibid., d. 47.

mer makes its object exist, while the latter annihilates its object. Moreover, he distinguishes a "withheld act of willing" (*volitio remissa*) and a "withheld unwillingness" (*nolitio remissa*). The former term refers to the case when an intended thing awakes an inclination in the willing subject (God in the given instance), yet the will of the subject refrains from realizing that inclination, while the latter term denotes the case when an intended thing arouses dislike in the intending subject, yet the will of the subject does not prevent that thing from coming about, even if it has the power to do so.[82] The act of permission issued by God's will with regard to sin can be included in the category of withheld nolition (*nolitio remissa*)[83]; it certainly is not an act of efficient unwillingness (*nolitio efficax*) as this would remove the very possibility of sin. In terms of this analysis, God's act of permission with respect to sin will be a positive first order act of God's will (that is an act of will immediately regarding the intended object).

The Subtle Doctor also considers another possible analysis of the divine permission extended to sin; in terms of this alternative analysis God's act of permitting sin will be a a second order act, that is an act of reflection (*actus reflexus*). Scotus points out that even if God is "willing to admit" (*volens sinere*) something, this need not imply that He performs a direct act of willing what He permits (a first order act of will with respect to what He permits), it is enough if He performs a second order act of willing His non-willing that the permitted (but not positively approved) thing come about (e.g. He wills His own non-willing that a given person should commit a sin). In this case God's intellect represents to His will the fact that a given person sins or will sin in the future; then, in the first (atemporal) instant God's will does not have a willing for that person to sin (which is not the same as a willing for that person not to sin) and naturally so, as it is not possible that God should want anyone to sin. In the next instant God's intellect understands His will as not willing a person to sin (that is, God's intellect performs an act of reflection with regard to the attitude of God's will) and then God's will may positively want that His will should will its own "non-willing" (*non velle hoc*) that person as sinning. In this sense one may speak of God as willing to permit the evil of sin (*volens sinere et volens permittere*). In terms of this analysis the problem of Judas's sin and his predestination is represented as follows: to begin with God has a non-willing (*non velle*) of glory for Judas, and He does not have a positive willing for Judas not to have

[82] *Ordinatio* I, d. 47, n. 4.

[83] Ibid., n. 7.

glory (He does not positively predestine him for damnation). In another instant He may reflect upon His non willing glory for Judas and perform a second order willing of that (first order) non willing. In this way, that is willing His own non-willing Judas to sin, God will not have a positive willing for Judas not to have glory and thus will not designate him in advance as a reprobate.[84] In other words this might be expressed that God does not opt for an efficient nolition of Judas's glory (which would mean predestination for damnation), He only chooses (wills) the act of non-willing (refraining from willing) glory for Judas.

The final result of these consideration is that permitting by God sin may be viewed as a positive act, either immediately related to its object (a first order act) or as a second order act. God, in he final analysis, wills to permit sin, although He does not will sin itself. Scotus thus demonstrates not so much why God should permit sin, but how sin is possible at all, that is how the reality of sin can be reconciled with the will of perfect and benevolent God. An appropriate act of divine will can construed either as an act of withheld unwillingness with regard to sin, that makes sin possible (while an act of efficient nolition would destroy every possibility of sin) or as a (second order) willing of non-willing sin to be (as opposed to willing sin not to be, which, too, would make sin impossible).

Coming back to the problem whether or not the negative moment of not willing grace for Judas in God's original (first instant) will for Judas may be decisive for determination of his conduct and thus responsible for his ending up as a reprobate, it should be observed that, on the assumptions made by John Duns Scotus, this negative moment cannot determine or coerce Judas to sin, for, as was made evident in the preceding discussion, God does not (nor can He) want sin, neither does He positively want anybody to sin, nor does He positively will anybody's damnation. The positive acts of any will, whether divine or human, are the acts of willing (*velle*) and positively willing not (*nolle*); these have the property of being efficient acts, it is through them that a subject realizes her- or himself as an efficient agent. The negative attitude of non-willing (*non velle*), does not carry with itself any efficiency, thus the divine non-willing to offer glory to Judas does not have for an effect coercing Judas to become a sinner and finally a reprobate. What makes then the possibility (open by God's refraining from positively willing sin not to be) of turning away from the Creator, and this definitely and ultimately, come into realization? Scotus scholars point to the fact that

[84] *Ordinatio* I, d. 47, n. 9.

the meaning of the Subtle Doctor is that Judas, who, as noted before, exemplifies the case of a reprobate, is not condemned because God had no intention of saving him or because He failed to offer Judas the necessary means of salvation, but because Judas himself did not want the salvation the possibility of which was open to him and spurned the gift offered him by God.[85] Scotus refers to the means of salvation offered by God to all of His creatures in distinction 46 of his *Ordinatio*, where he states that God wills, by His prevenient grace, all person to be saved and offers to human persons "natural gifts, fitting laws and universal aid to salvation." Thus God, on his part (*ex parte sui*) wants all humans to be saved.[86] Yet, if damnation is possible, one ought to assume that the free will of creatures has been given possibility to "escape" the design of their Creator and deserve damnation through conduct lacking acts of charity.

CONCLUSION

In the conception of predestination that John Duns Scotus made his own one can distinguish the following theses. (1) He carries out an attempt to reconcile the immutability of God's knowledge (including foreknowledge of future contingents) and the freedom of created intelligent subjects through application of his conception of synchronic contingency which enables him to justify the thesis that God's knowledge of future contingents is both eternally certain and immutable, and, at the same time, contingent, and thus it does not preclude the contingency of contingent events (including the contingent acts of created free and intelligent subjects) in the world. This is Scotus's way of avoiding fatalism (theological determinism). (2) The election to the select group of the saved persons is a result of grace, and thus of God's will and His choice, it is not, in any case, a result of meritorious deeds performed by an elect person. In contrast to election, damnation of a created person is related to a cause present in that person: in condemning a human being God takes into account sin and bad use of free will on the part of a condemned subject. Scotus's nuanced and carefully worked out conception seeks to reconcile in theory God's justice and His mercy.

Against the background of conceptions discussed Scotus and rejected by Scotus (St. Augustine's, Peter Lombard's, Aquinas's, Henry of Ghent's) his

[85] *Duns Scotus on Divine Love*, pp. 175, 192.

[86] *Ordinatio* I, d. 46, n. 7, 8.

own theory appears as moderate and comes in the middle between those which hold that there is no reason on the part of creatures either for election or damnation and those which attribute some reason for either election or damnation to created persons. (3) The most difficult problem inviolved in the discussion, the problem of relation obtaining between grace and freedom in procuring the act of election/damnation, Scotus solves through the introduction of categories *velle*, *non velle*, *nolle* applicable to analysis of actions by God's will. God's act of *non velle* (as distinct from *nolle*), that is His withdrawing grace from a person does not determine that person's will to commit sinful acts, and, in particular, does not have for an effect making a man a reprobate. Thus the non-willing does not determine man to sin and ultimate damnation.

Translated by Roman Majeran

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON FREE WILL IN GOD AND IN MAN

Elżbieta Jung

William of Ockham was probably born at the end of 1287 or at the beginning of 1288 in a small village by name of Ockham (probably deriving from: Oak Hamlet), near London. Between his seventh and thirteenth year of life he was given to the Franciscan order and he found his abode in the London convent of the Franciscans, known as the "Greyfriars." This convent housed a conventual provincial school which was reckoned to be one of the best Franciscan places of study, beside the general studies at Oxford and Paris. It was probably at that school that William accomplished the course of studies corresponding to the university curriculum of *artes liberales* and, having achieved the age of twenty three, began a course in theology. We do not know where he has made most of his theological studies, it may have been at the London convent or at Oxford. However, it is certain that he was in Oxford in the years 1318-1319. Probably in 1317 he began lecturing and commenting on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* as a *baccalaureus sententiarius*, and he finished his course of lectures on this then basic textbook in theology at Oxford, yet in 1321 he returned to his confrères at the London convent, where he remained until 1324. Ockham probably never accomplished all the courses required for obtaining the magisterial degree and because of that he was accorded the honorific title of "Venerable Inceptor" (*venerabilis inceptor*). While in London he continued teaching and writing and it was there that many of his most significant works in philosophy and theology were composed.

On 12 August 1322 Ockham had a public debate with the then chancellor of Oxford university, the dominican friar John Lutterel, which proved unfortunate for both men: Lutterel was deposed from his chancellorship as a result, and Ockham became the target of unrelenting hostility of his domin-

ican adversary, often described as a "fierce thomist." In 1323 Ockham was summoned to a Franciscan chapter held at Bristol to give account of his theological views before that Franciscan assembly. At the same time some English ecclesiastic whose identity we ignore arrived at the papal court at Avignon and brought there the news of Ockham's teaching accusing it of heresy. As a result, the pope designated a commission of theologians whose task was to investigate and judge Ockham's views, and in May 1324 Ockham himself was summoned to Avignon, to the court of Pope John XXII, to answer the queries and objections as to his views. Thus he came to leave England, where he was never to return. Ockham sojourned four years in Avignon, he was certainly not imprisoned, he may have been under house arrest, although this too may be exaggerated, since evidently he could use the free time at his disposal much at his will and it was in Avignon that he completed his last theological work, the *Quodlibetal Questions (Quaestiones quodlibetales)*.[1] Two commissions appointed by the pope began a study of Ockham's works, two lists of allegedly non-orthodox tenets were compiled. In 1326 fifty one articles excerpted from his *Sentences* commentary were condemned (though this condemnation, it seems, was never made public). In the list of the condemned articles, the first four items were censured as Pelagian by the *magistri* charged with the examination of Ockham's work.[2]

However, crucially for his subsequent career, Ockham, while residing in Avignon and awaiting a definitive papal decision as to his teaching, got entangled in a much more fundamental controversy with the pope, namely the controversy over the nature of evangelical poverty and the vows of pov-

[1] Ockham held five quodlibetal debates while yet in England. In 1323 he was asked to explain his views on the category of relation. Ockham had asserted that relation was not a real entity, and while describing, for instance, an event, we can only identify the efficient active factor, the receiving passive element and the change taking place in that passive object and there is no need to postulate a separate entity within the category of relation (this, of course, is not the critique of the cause-effect relationship as carried out by David Hume, still it remotely touches an important element of it). *Quodlibets* VI-VII were written in Avignon as a response to criticisms of his theological views. See G.J. Etzkorn, "Ockham at Avignon: His response to Critics," *Franciscan Studies* 59 (2001), pp. 9–19.

[2] The list of Ockham's censured articles was published by August Pelzer, see: A. Pelzer, "Les 51 Articles de Guillaume Occam censurés en Avignon en 1326," *Revues d'histoire ecclésiastique* 18 (1922), pp. 240–271. See also G.J. Etzkorn, "Ockham at Avignon: His Response to Critics," pp. 9–19. G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of His "De causa Dei" and Its Opponents*, Cambridge, 1957, p. 189.

erty as taken by the Franciscans and the right manner of fulfilment thereof. The basic question, which had given rise to controversy almost from the origin of the Franciscan order was whether Christ and his disciples possessed any property of their own. At the request of Michael of Cesena, the then minister general of the Franciscans, Ockham carried out an investigation into that problem. The result of this inquiry was that he became convinced that Pope John XXII was in the wrong, contradicted the teaching oh his predecessors and had thus fallen into heresy and thereby forfeited his papal dignity. Consequently he supported the position of Michael of Cesena as to the nature of evangelical poverty and the necessity of absolute poverty for Christian perfection.

On 26 May 1328 the party of Michael of Cesena, including Ockham, unsure of their cause before the papal court, took flight from Avignon to Italy, to seek protection at the court of Holy Roman Emperor Luis IV of Bavaria, who had fallen in conflict with the pope.[3] Ockham reputedly offered Luis defence of his cause with the pen in exchange for the emperor defending him with the sword. On 6 June 1328 William of Ockham was excommunicated for leaving Avignon without papal permission.

Ockham accompanied Luis as he returned to his ducal capital of Munich and he stayed in that city until his death. In Munich Ockham produced a series of polemical works pertaining to controversy over the separation of the imperial and papal, or more generally, secular and ecclesiastical powers; in these works he decidedly defended the position of Luis the Bavarian. All the works written after 1328 concerned above all the question of the internal government of the Church and not politics in general; in particular Ockham defended the conciliarist conception of ecclesiastical government which propounded limitation of the power of the pope in favour of the ecclesiastical council. The unexpected death of Luis the Bavarian on 11 October 1347, who died during a hunt, complicated the situation of William. He sought reconciliation with the Church, in this very 1347 he took the first conciliatory step by sending back the seal of the Franciscan order which he received from Michael of Cesena at the latter's death. It seems that Ockham succeeded in his efforts to be reconciled with the pope, yet shortly after-

[3] On the subject of the controversies between papacy and Franciscans in the 14th century as well as the clash between Luis the Bavarian and the Pope John XXII, and the secondary literature see e.g., E. Jung, "A Few Footnotes to *Il nome della Rosa*," in *The Power of Intellect. Umberto Eco: Rception and Remiscences in Poland. Book dedicated to Professor Umberto Eco, Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Łódź,* Łódź, 2015, pp. 214–237.

wards, in 1349, his stormy life came to an abrupt end; he probably fell victim to the first onslaught of the plague. He was interred in the Franciscan church in Munich; in 1802 his remains were exhumed and moved to an unknown location.

The crucial break in Ockham's creative life was the year 1328. Before 1328 all philosophical works of his were written: commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagogue*, Aristotle's logical writings and his *Physics*, the *Sum of Logic* and other logical treatises. Also all of his theological works belong to the period before 1328: his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (there are two versions: *Ordinatio*, that is an authorized text, and *Reportatio,* that is report of his lectures made by listeners), his disputed questions, both ordinary and solemn, and minor theological treatises. After 1328 only works concerning ecclesiastical politics were composed, including *Treatise against John XXII* (*Tractatus contra Johannem XXII*), *Compendium of Errors of Pope John XXII* (*Compendium errorum papae Johannis XXII*) *On the Power of Popes and Clergy* (*De potestate pape et cleri*). All Ockham's work have by now seen a critical edition.

Ockham never composed a sum that would contain a systematic exposition of the whole of his philosophy; he was above all a theologian and it was in this capacity that he undertook treatment of philosophical matters. Nevertheless it was his philosophical ideas that made him the most influential author of the 14th century and nobody in the intellectual milieux of that time was left indifferent to them. He found many supporters and followers, as well as many fierce opponents, and this from the very start of his activity at Oxford university. Ockham was an innovator. Whereas John Duns Scotus put forward original solutions to well-known problems, Ockham went so far as to undermine the very foundations on which the philosophy and theology of the time had reposed for about 150 years. Although he was cautious enough in critical examination of his predecessors, he almost always succeeded in finding some weak points in their theories, points that could not withstand his critical analyses. This made him undertake a thorough investigation into the basic assumptions of the philosophical disciplines; an undertaking that resulted in a situating of these assumptions in a novel and different perspective, which in turn helped generate innovative modes of ontological thinking and new vocabulary. Ockham's thought is characterized by considerable unity: methods and solutions arrived at in one domain of philosophy, e.g. logic, are consistently applied.[4]

[4] An exhaustive presentation of Ockham's most significant philosophical views as

To Ockham, human life as a whole is subordinated to God, who is the only absolute, necessary and self-sufficient being, who is the unique creator of the world and all things contained therein and all things outside God himself. All-powerful God is a personal being, it is a trinity of persons; He is identical with life, wisdom, charitable love, justice. The God-created world lacks any intrinsic necessity, for omnipotent God is the unique cause of its existence. All these tenets are in fact common to all scholastic systems. More specifically, one finds in Ockham's works the fundamental theses which are the first principles of all scientific knowledge; these are the following:

- All is possible for God except what contains inherent contradiction. Beings containing contradiction (Ockham's example thereof is chimera) are in fact absolute non-beings.
- Whatever God effects with the help of intermediary created causes, He can effect and sustain immediately, without the instrumental help of these causes. In his creative activity God in no wise depends on created causes; on the contrary: it is the created causes that totally depend in their proper activity on God's sustaining assistance.
- God can in principle create and sustain in being every possible entity: substance or accident, totally independently of other substances. For instance; He can in principle sustain in existence matter without form or vice versa.
- We cannot affirm a proposition as true or assert that some things exist without evidence coming from experience, Revelation, or logical deduction based either on revealed truth or on propositions evidenced by experience.

This last point provides the means to correctly understand the principle of "Ockham's razor." This principle frequently comes up in his writings in the following formulations: "Plurality ought not to be posited without necessity" (*Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate*); "It is vain to explain with more [e.g. premises, assumptions, terms] what can sufficiently be explained with fewer" (*Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pautiora*).[5] In these maxims Ockham points out that whoever makes an assertion, ought to have a sufficient reason for his/her assertion if it is to be con-

well as the newest bibliography on *Venerabilis Inceptor* is to be found in: P.V. Spade, C. Panaccio, "William of Ockham," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ockham/.

[5] On Ockham's way of employing "Ockham's razor" in building arguments see i. a. A. Maurer, "Ockham's Razor and Dialectical Reasoning," *Medieval Studies* 58 (1996), pp. 49–65.

sidered valid. This "sufficient reason" for any of our assertions can only be provided by experience, divine Revelation, or logical deduction from other validly asserted propositions. It is important to notice that in Ockham the principle of sufficient reason is applied to matters in epistemology and logic and not in ontology. However, the principle of "Ockham's razor" finds an application also in theology, namely when he affirms that it is uniquely human acts, and not supernatural gifts that really contribute to possible salvation of a human being, since God only rewards our deeds and not the gifts that He himself provided. Thus, by introducing the notion of "God's gift," we commit the sin of "multiplying beings without necessity."

Scholastic philosophers drew a clear distinction between "sufficient" and "necessary" causes. As a theologian, Ockham did not forget that the created world, in so far as God acts out of free will and not compelled by any necessity, is a contingent world and lacks a sufficient cause of its existence. Yet our science, be it theology or philosophy, strives to find sufficient causes of facts given to be explained. This, however, cannot be done with respect to the created world: the existence of all created things can only be elucidated by giving its necessary, and not the sufficient cause: since creation was a free act, each created thing is only contingent and not necessary. The Scotist view that a theological explanation should "preserve the contingency" of creatures is the background assumption in all of Ockham's works. An explicit formulation of that implicit assumption might be as follows:

- Everything that really exists and is not identical with God is contingent in its existence.[6]

HUMAN FREE WILL

Ockham is generally acknowledged to have been a fervent proponent and propagator of indeterminism and the doctrine of "unconditional freedom of will" (*liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*) as far as the ontological foundations of his ethics and theology are concerned. The theory of unconditionally free will holds that will as such is absolutely non-conditioned and entirely free. Will as a faculty of making decisions can make three kinds of choices: it can will (*velle*) something, it can will not a given thing (*nolle*), or it can refuse to will (*non velle*), that is, remain indifferent and decline to choose at all. Free-

[6] See E. Jung, "Wilhelm Ockham. Wprowadzenie," in *Wszystko to ze zdziwienia. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych z XIV wieku*, Warszawa, 2000, pp. 193–196.

dom as conceived in this theory is a positive freedom (freedom to something rather than freedom from something).[7]

As Marilyn McCord Adams aptly observed, Ockham's radical conception of free will inspires many queries. For one thing, under the terms of this theory, will is excluded from the order of nature as it is subject to no natural laws. Secondly, this theory makes will free from the dictate of reason: on this theory will can decide counter to every demand issued by reason.[8] According to McCord Adams Ockham approves John Duns Scotus's solutions and employs them to serve his own theoretical needs; above all he adopts the concept of transcendental "good" which is convertible with the notion of "being" and introduces the category of natural good which is different from the notion of moral good. As to his conception of natural order, Ockham agrees with his predecessors (e.g. Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas). The key feature of that conception, as shared by all scholastic thinkers, is the idea that there is a hierarchy of perfection among natural beings: angels are more perfect than man, man is better (ontologically) than a donkey; the intelligent soul is better than the merely sensible one, substances are more perfect than accidents; within a species, a more intense quality exceeds in perfection one that is less so, and so on. In many of his works Ockham emphasizes that there are norms in nature that determine the perfection of created entities that act according to the laws of nature.[9]

What makes Ockham different from his predecessors is his conception of the relationship between created entities and God. While his peripatheti-

[7] See William of Ockham, *Sent.*, in *Opera Theologica*, I.I.6, p. 501–2; *Sent.* IV.16, p. 359.

[8] M. McCord Adams, "Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, ed. P.V. Spade, Cambridge, 1999, p. 245. Adams reports here two interpretations of Ockham's views, both very significant, according to their authors, for the development of medieval theory of ethics. Armand Maurer thinks that Ockham assumed duty as the foundation of the whole system of morality, namely duty that man has towards God and which man should fulfil by observing the laws laid down by God. This is a different conception from that of Thomas Aquinas, for whom the basis of morality was perfection of human nature which is good in itself, or from the theory which assumes a special theological relation between man and God. Vincent Bourke also sees Ockham as a thinker who discards the eudaimonist tradition based upon the axiom that man by nature strives towards happiness. Both these interpretations are rejected by McCord Adams, who proceeds to develop her own considerations which seem to be better documented with references to the source texts as well as more convincing.

[9] See ibid., pp. 246–249.

cally minded predecessors held that the ultimate goal toward which all nature strives is God, the highest good, and all created natural beings of course imitate this supreme, transcendent good, and for man God, the supreme good is the ultimate objective towards which all of his actions are naturally directed,[10] Ockham affirms that morally good and virtuous can only be an act that is based on reasonable knowledge and a free, unconstrained choice. This means that a human being can, owing to his efforts, issue an act of love whose object is God even if he/she knows that he/she will ultimately be damned. Man does not imitate God, yet still he loves Him because He is the supreme good.

In full agreement with Aristotle, Ockham affirms in many places of his work that will is by nature a reasonable desire, since "nobody can will something of which he has never thought"[11]; some knowledge, whether complex or simple, is usually a sufficient cause of acts of will being issued[12]; practical reason fulfils a normative function, regulating the activity of man's will. Still, all these things granted, Ockham denies the possibility of reason sufficiently and completely determining will, since will by its nature is autonomous and independent. He states expressly: "No matter, how much reason persuades will to certain action towards a thing, will still retains its power of willing, willing not and not willing that very thing."[13] This ever present ability of will to act counter to the dictate of reason may result in a sin of ommission, when will refuses to act even though, according to the indications of reason, it should, or in a sin of commission, when will refuses to refrain from committing a reproachable act. According to Ockham, all attempts to justify transgressions of these kinds by ignorance is counterintuitive, since these acts evidently are instances of free and independent will acting contrary to reason and knowledge.[14]

Ockham's conception of will's freedom is a re-formulated Scotist theory as to the ability of will to choose between two contrary terms of an opposition. Taking into account the conditions that an object willed must be known and that the divine will supports either action of refraining from action by human will, Ockham states: "Will, owing to its freedom, regardless of any extrinsic determination by another action or a habit, is able to

[10] Ibid., pp. 249–253.

[11] Ockham, *Sent.* III.11, p. 64; *Quodl.* III.20.

[12] *Sent.* IV.3–4, p. 50; *Expos. Phys.* II.5–7.

[13] *Quodl.* I.16.

[14] M. McCord Adams, "Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality," pp. 254–255.

choose or not choose an action or the action opposite to that."[15] This means, as Adams points out, that will is able to will or will not, or refuse to will or will not. However, Ockham realistically observes, that a concrete human being is usually directed in his acts of choice (whether positive acts, that is acts of willing, or negative acts, that is acts of refusal of any willing) by definite inclinations, for instance by desire of profit, or justice or avoidance of loss or injustice. These inclinations interfering with our choices produce multiple feelings, such as awareness of harm, sorrow, exasperation, fear etc.. They are partial causes responsible for the fact that some of our choices are difficult while some other are easy.[16]

Having admitted the reality of inclinations influencing our choices, Ockham refuses to acknowledge that these are natural inclinations. Whereas earlier thinkers of note: Anselm, Thomas Aquinas or Scotus affirm that the universal proper object of will in all its choices remains good, while refusals of will are always directed to (relative) evil, Ockham insists on leaving complete freedom to will as such and a *sui generis* power of self-determination in generating acts of choice. This is tantamount to propounding the thesis of unconditional freedom of will; since all acts issued by will must be of the same kind. We cannot assume, that while some of our acts of choice follow from the necessary order of nature, others are the outcome of will acting freely and independently of any natural influences.[17] As neither reasonable comprehension, nor habitual inclinations, nor any combination of these two factors can determine will to a definite choice, the only extrinsic factor that could possibly influence future decisions of will is memory of past choices combined with acquired convictions and inclinations to virtue and to willing those object which are likely to produce pleasure to the senses.[18]

Following Aristotle, Ockham affirms that man, owing to his natural inclinations has the power to perform proper and righteous acts even without the aid of grace. Thus an achievement of human natural and temporal good is fully possible even to an unbaptized man, lacking the grace granted to man at the sacrament of baptism. On the other hand, Ockham did not attempt to diminish or undervalue the value and necessity of grace. Ockham introduces a twofold distinction, first between acts deserving reward or

[15] *Sent.* IV.16, p. 359.

[16] *Sent.* I.I.6, p. 502.

[17] *Sent.* I.I.6, p. 490.

[18] *Sent.* III.7, pp. 210–211; M. McCord Adams, "Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality," pp. 257–258.

meritorious acts (*meritum*) and a moral virtue (*virtus*), and secondly between various degrees of virtuous perfection. Meritorious acts are the opposite of sinful acts, while virtue is the opposite of vice. The reward of meritorious acts is a free gift of God, whereas moral virtue is practical good that man can acquire and strengthen in his earthly life through practicing good acts. The reward of meritorious acts presupposes grace, but virtue is defined by the content of acts it produces and does not require any grace. Consequently, pagans, lacking the grace inherent in baptism, cannot acquire the reward of eternal life, although they can achieve happiness in this life thanks to exercise of virtue. Moreover, even non-baptized men, relying only on their natural abilities can come to believe the articles of Christian faith and love God above all other things, unless God himself does not decide otherwise, for they have natural ability to desire good. Granted all this, it still remains true that Christian virtue, whose ultimate objective is God, the supreme good, is different from virtue in pagans, whose conception of good is less than Christian and, correspondingly, whose striving for good is also diminished.[19] Thereby Ockham and his followers, whom Thomas Bradwardine will soon describe as "modern Pelagians" (*moderni pelagiani*), contradicted the teaching of the new Augustinians as to the weakness of human corrupt nature, which, according to these, is completely incapable of performing any good acts without the aid of prevenient grace.[20]

To Ockham, and he reiterates this statement in all of his theological works, human life as a whole is subordinated to God, who is the only absolute, necessary and self-sufficient being, who is the unique creator of the world and all things contained therein and all things outside God himself. All-powerful God is a personal being, it is a trinity of persons; He is identical with life, wisdom, charitable love, justice. The God-created world lacks any intrinsic necessity, for omnipotent God is the unique cause of its existence.[21]

[19] See R. Wood, "Ockham's Repudiation of Pelagianism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, pp. 350–372; E. Jung, "Teolog Wilhelm Ockham," in *Filozofia Franciszkanów*, Cz. II, ed. S.C. Napiórkowski, E.I. Zieliński, Niepokalanów, 2005, p. 215.

[20] On Thomas Bradwardine's criticism of the allegedly Pelagian views of Ockham and his followers see e.g. E. Jung, "Tomasz Bradwardine o wolnej woli Boga i człowieka," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2017), no. 3, pp. 127–149.

[21] On the subject of semi-Pelagians in the fourteenth century see e.g. G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians,* pp. 216–264; W.J. Courtenay, *Capacity and Vilition. A History of The Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power*, Bergamo, 1990, pp. 123–133; J.L. Halverson, *Peter Aureol on Predestination. A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought*, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, pp. 122–133; J.-F. Genest, *Prédéter-*

Ockham, as a Christian theologian, thought it a matter of prime importance to provide a correct description of the relationship between man and God, a description that would exactly correspond to the teaching of the Saints and Church Fathers. Like St. Augustine before, Ockham was profoundly convinced, that this relationship cannot be correctly represented unless God's sovereign liberty and man's utter dependence on God's magnanimity are taken into account and laid heavy stress upon.[22]

Ockham was also faithful to Augustine and opposed Pelagius in embracing the classical teaching on original sin, which holds that every unbaptized man bears the burden of Adam's sin and the consequences thereof. The punishment of original sin is loss of eternal life of beatitude, while personal sins committed during a human being's lifetime here on earth are punished with eternal torment in hell.[23] Ockham also refuses to accept Pelagius's thesis that grace is not necessary for salvation and he affirms that the immediate source of our reward, even though earned by our meritorious deeds, is divine grace.[24] In short: according to Ockham grace is necessary for salvation, merit and divine acceptance, although it is not necessary for moral virtue. Since man is in possession of "unconditionally free will," he could in principle achieve the reward of eternal life of beatitude *ex puris naturalibus* although in actual fact this does not happen so and in actual fact God's assistance and grace are of primary importance and indispensable.

THE DIVINE FREE WILL

A significant element of Ockham's theory of the functioning of will in God is the distinction he draws in common with other theologians of the time between two ways of viewing God's activity: namely according to his absolute power *(potentia absoluta)* and according to his power as seen in the context of the works God has accomplished, that is his ordained power

mination et liberté créée a Oxford au XIV^e siècle. Buchingham contre Bradwarine, Paris, 1992.

22 Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 17, q. 1, pp. 455–456; 17, q. 2, pp. 471–472.

23 Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.*(*Reportatio*) IV, dist. 3–5, in *Opera Theologica*, vol. 7, pp. 54.

24 Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.* (*Ordinatio*), I, dist. 17, q. 3, pp. 475–479; I, dist. 17, q. 1, p. 440.

(*potentia ordinata*).[25] Contemplated from the point of view of *potentia absoluta,* God can do absolutely everything that does not go counter to the principle of contradiction. In discussing diverse possibilities open to man and his action, Ockham is in fact concerned with God and the range of possibilities open to His absolute power. In this abstract perspective God can elevate man above all laws, since, seen in this perspective, God stands above any conceivable law.

Envisaging things from such abstract viewpoint gives ground to considerations which Ockham does not fail to carry out. On the one hand, contemplation of God's absolute power throws into high relief man's limitations: man cannot attribute to himself power of action similar to God's and cannot make any claim on God because of his supposed merits. Seen from that absolute perspective, everything is absolutely dependent on His will, including alleged human deserts, grace and human actions themselves. All these things are only contingent and all conceivable human merits can be either acknowledged, refused recognition or simply disregarded by God, who is absolutely free with regard to them.[26] On the other hand, however, God in his absolute power is free to save a man even if he fails to acquire grace that is necessary for salvation in the order actually established by God in the world. Seen from the perspective of God's *potentia ordinata*, that is taking into consideration the actual order of things, grace is necessary for salvation; grace, that in the ordinary course of things is the primary cause of the works deserving of eternal reward performed by men.[27]

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[25] On the history of the distinction between *potentia absoluta,*and *potentia ordinata* see for example W.J. Courtenay, *Capacity and Vilition. A History of The Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power*; E. Jung, "Świat możliwy versus świat realny w koncepcjach średniowiecznych, czyli o boskiej mocy absoluta i ordinata," *Filo-Sofija* 30 (2015/3), pp. 67–80, http://www.filo-sofija.pl/index.php/czasopismo.

[26] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians,* p. 188.

[27] See W.J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," in *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion*, ed. C. Trinkaus and H. Oberman, Leiden 1974, pp. 37–43, 47; H. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Baker Academic 2000, pp. 139–141, 176–77, 246, 427; W.J. Courteney, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, Leiden 2008. This conception of Ockham's was subjected to sharp criticism by Pope John XXII, who wrote the sermon *Deus autem, rex noster, ante saecula operatus est* salutem, edited with an introductory study by Eugenio Randi in "Il rasoio contro Ockham? Un sermone inedito di Giovanni XXII," *Medioevo* 9 (1983), pp. 179–198.

However, man can also perform good acts *ex puris naturalibus*, without habitual grace, and thus earn merits *de congruo*, which could in principle be recognized by God. According to Ockham, as Gordon Leff explains, the merit unconditionally deserving the reward of eternal life, that is the merit *de condigno* cannot be achieved by man by means of his natural forces in the actual order of things and can only be received as a free gift of grace. Yet the merit earned by naturally good conduct, the merit *de congruo*, can be achieved by man in this life without prevenient grace, and, looking from the perspective of God's absolute power, could in principle be recognized by God and rewarded without intervention of grace.[28]

Discussion of things from the point of view of God's absolutely free will easily strayed to conclusions that could not fail to provoke vigorous criticism and attract accusations of heresy. Ockham does not flinch from the affirmation that in the judgment of human deeds only God's absolutely free will matters, and neither merits *de condigno* nor *de congruo* are of any account; which is tantamount to affirming that the ultimate value of our acts depends totally on the decision of God's absolute will.[29] As a result, it is affirmed, God is free to recognize a human being as deserving salvation even if he/she lacks the gifts of grace and corresponding merits; on the other hand God is equally free to condemn somebody who has never sinned. God can also decide that prevenient grace is not required; thanks to his absolute power he can annihilate sins that have already been committed without previously granting grace to the sinner.[30]

Moreover, Ockham asserts that supernatural gifts are not necessary for God acknowledging a human being as deserving of eternal life of beatitude. For God, in his absolute power, can make a newborn baby free from the fault of original sin, just as He can designate a child for eternal life of salvation without granting it grace and glory and a man for glory without any merits on his part. Ockham advances three arguments to support his theory that the gifts of grace are not essential in a human being's way to God. First, we cannot prove by reasonable arguments that gifts of grace are necessary for divine assessment of human acts; secondly, there are no compelling reasons for the assumption that grace is indispensable for human beatitude; thirdly, man as such is only provided with natural gifts, and not supernatural, that only come to him as accidents. The consequences of these

[28] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 74–76.

[29] See ibid., p. 191, footnote 1.

[30] See ibid., pp. 195–197.

assumptions are momentous: grace and glory in themselves are of no moment in our salvation or lack of it; whether we have them or not is irrelevant for God's sovereign decisions concerning a human beings ultimate destiny. Irrespective of whether we are endowed with grace or not, God, in his absolute liberty, can offer us his supreme reward. In the final analysis, everything depends solely on the inscrutable, sovereign will of God; paradoxically, this circumstance seems to impart some measure of independence to human conduct (namely independence from pervasive concern with one's own salvation), and above all, independence from close observation of the teachings of the Church.[31]

According to Venerable Inceptor, supernatural gifts (such as grace and glory) are accidental features and have no weight with God in his acts of selection. As G. Leff writes, this issue has three aspects: the first is the problem of the location of supernatural gifts, the second is related to the role of human will, the third and last concerns the problem of merit and reward.[32] Of the two supernatural gifts related to human salvation, namely grace and glory, the former comes before the latter, as it concerns human earthly life, while glory is the crown and reward for temporal life received in afterlife. Yet the latter need not be related to the former; as Ockham unflinchingly asserts, God, according to his absolute power, can donate to man one of these two gifts without the other. Furthermore, he holds that good works performed by a person may add to that person's merit, confirm the grace given to that person and contribute to the glory accorded to her/him.[33] Grace is only formal in its status, it will produce good insofar as it is really present, however grace does not oblige God to accept and reward the person endowed with it; glory in afterlife does not make the elect more acceptable to God. Paradoxically, to Ockham absolute liberty of God means that he is never compelled by anything to reward some definite actions; He is totally free and his decisions and acts are never determined by anything external to Himself and His will.[34]

The conclusion following from this theory is contradictory to the views of all of Ockham's predecessors. He asserts that it is human acts, and not supernatural gifts, that contribute to possible salvation of a person. This is

[31] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, p. 192.

[32] See ibid., p. 193.

[33] See Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.* (*Ordinatio*), I, dist. 17, q. 3, pp. 475–479; I, dist. 17, q. 1, p. 440.

[34] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 193–197.

so, because God rewards deeds and not gifts that He Himself donated. When we introduce the concept of supernatural endowments as a factor operative in effecting human salvation, we commit the methodological sin of "multiplying beings without necessity" (and, consequently, "Ockham's razor" may here be effectively applied). As the causal principle of human acts is, as already remarked above, "unconditionally free will," an acts that is truly human is an act, which is wholly produced as a result of choice by human will, and it is only such a voluntary act that can be judged by God and win His acceptation and reward. Ockham offers the following argument in support of this: since God rewards man for good actions, they have to flow from man's free will, as only that which is found in human beings themselves, namely will that is free and that which lies in our power, that is free choice, deserve praise or reproach. Thus, when it comes to judgment, acceptation or condemnation, our will and its works is more important than supernatural gifts.[35] Therefore it is perfectly reasonable that man should be rewarded (as well as punished) for the choices made by his own free will, and not for what has been given to him to him by God without his action and initiative, that is not for supernatural gifts.

The problem of final reward and punishment and the problem of divine predestination and human freedom are closely related to the question of future contingent events, which Ockham treated in his work *De futuris contingentibus.*[36]

The purpose of this treatise is to solve the riddle facing Christian theology in consequence of making the philosophical assumption that some future events are contingent, that is they may come about and they may also not come about. From our limited human point of view most of future events appear as contingent, as we have no means of knowing whether or not they will happen, however, from the point of view of God, who possesses perfect knowledge and whose vantage point is timeless eternity, where there is no future time, no temporal events ought to be contingent; certainly God's knowledge of temporal events cannot be contingent.

Aristotle, whose discussion of future contingents presented in his *Hermeneutics* provided inspiration for medieval debates on future contingent events, asserted that "that which is must needs be when it is, and that which

[35] See Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, p. 472.

[36] See Guillelmus Ockham, *The Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus Of William of Ockham*, ed. Ph. Boehner, Toronto, 1945.

is not must needs not be when it is not."[37] Ockham, however, as a Christian theologian, could not accept this statement; from his point of view such a statement cannot refer to temporal things, as such things are not necessary. Only God, according to his theory, is absolutely necessary, whereas created things are wholly contingent and depend for their existence on the sovereign free will of all-powerful God. Given this assumption, Ockham is compelled to reject Aristotle's axiom "that which is must needs be when it is" as false in virtue of the very meaning of its terms: if necessity is an exclusive preserve of God, nothing other than God, however well established in existence, can truly be said to be necessary. Ockham then proceeds to identify the root cause of Aristotle's error: the Stagirite falsely refused to accept that statements concerning future contingent events are unconditionally true or false.[38] In fact these statements are true or false and that in the light of divine inerrant knowledge as well as the determination by God's will. From God's perspective statements on future contingent events cannot lack the logical values of truth or falsity. God has unconditional, inerrant knowledge of all contingent events, although such knowledge cannot be acquired by us in our temporal condition.

According to this theory God of necessity knows from eternity which human beings are to be saved and which are condemned for eternal perdition. Thus it is true to say that God predestines some humans for salvation, while others He relegates to damnation. There are two points one has to keep in mind while considering divine predestination: on the one hand, according to Ockham, God preordains some for election, because he knows in His inerrant foreknowledge what use they will make of their free will: with regard to every one of ourselves, God eternally knows what our conduct will be like: proper and righteous or improper and shameful.

There is, however, another consideration to bear in mind in thinking of predestination: God, in his absolute power (*potentia absoluta*) is entirely free to decide that some human beings should be saved while others should be damned, and this without any necessary, compelling reason: the infinitely free will of God is not constrained by any external factor, save impossibility of contradiction in things.

To affirm so much is not to deny, that in the actual God-established order reigning in our Universe, God acts according to His power conceived as ordained (*potentia ordinata*). In this ordained action by God the elect re-

[37] Aristotle, *Hermeneutics*, 19a.

[38] See ibid., 19b.

ceive their reward according to their merits, and the reprobate are damned because of their sins. Yet in this normal course of things, grace is required for a human being to earn the sufficient merit deserve the prize of eternal life. Thus the reward in the form of eternal life of beatitude depends, in this world of ours, on the gift of divine grace. A human being can, through his good works, prepare for the gift of grace, yet this does not mean, that God comes thereby under the obligation to grant him/her the required grace or reward him/her with eternal life of happiness.[39]

GOD'S FREE WILL VERSUS HUMAN WILL

Ockham is of the opinion that our intellectual activity is always accompanied by joy caused by our love for God and expectation of the ultimate, endless happiness which is the proper end of human life in accordance with human nature as created by God. Enjoyment of the fruits of life *(frui)* is not, according to Ockham, a cognitive act, and beatific vision is not intellectual vision.[40] Ockham is aware of the distinction between love (*dilectio*) and enjoyment (*fruitio*).[41] Enjoyment is a form of love and a source of pleasure which is not to be identified with enjoyment itself: enjoyment is an immediate result of an act of will. Object produce pleasure in the contemplating subject if they are encountered with a desire to love them, that is will to love them: in order to experience pleasure in something we have to desire it first. In other words, the intensity of pleasure we may get from an object depends not only on the object, but it increases in proportion to the intensity of expectant enjoyment that we feel before we come across the desired object, so to say, "in person." Thus enjoyment precedes and provokes pleasure. A human being might experience pure enjoyment, not linked to any pleasure, for example a man might love God and make sincere effort to fulfil God's commandment, which would produce enjoyment in him, and be simultaneously aware of not being predestined for election, provided that God's dispensation concerning himself was known to him.[42]

[39] See J. Biard, *Guillaume d'Ockham et la théologie*, Paris, 1999, pp. 86–115.

[40] See Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.* (*Ordinatio*) I, dist. 1, q. 2, in *Opera Theologica*, vol. 1, pp. 395–396.

[41] See ibid., q. 3, pp. 403–428.

[42] See ibid., q. 6, pp. 486–506.

According to Ockham it is possible to separate enjoyment from an act of love as preparatory for immediate encounter and pleasure, and this is true of love both as present in our everyday life, and in religious experience. In this life we can enjoy God, the ultimately perfect object of love, thanks to our natural faculties, even without aid of grace, and thus have enjoyment of God without the pleasure of meeting Him in person.[43] This shows that an act of love is exclusively produced by will and is not a cognitive act: it is will alone that generates desire.

Whereas created grace is not indispensable for will to accomplish right acts of choice, uncreated grace, which is identical with the Holy Spirit is the intermediary thanks to which God, in his absolute power accepts these acts performed by created will as meritorious.[44]

Nevertheless, in Ockham's opinion, in the last analysis it is only God's will and the free will of rational creatures that are operative in the working out of the final reward of human life, the eternal life of beatitude. On the one hand, rational creation must accomplish acts of free choice in total liberty, on the other hand it is only God's free will that confers salvific value on actions generated by wills of humans. According to G. Leff, Ockham's famed voluntarism should be understood as a theory affirming lack of direct engagement in the affairs of creatures on the part of God.[45]

As Ockham makes being generated by free will the first and main condition for a person's act of acceptance by God, the natural faculties, including the faculty of free will, suffice to earn God's approval (*deus potest aliquem acceptare in puris naturalibus tanquam dignum vita eterna sine omni habitu caritatis*).[46] A human being's merits accrue from the right acts of choice made by his/her will. Human will comes before God's will in generating decisions made by humans; its operation is entirely original and autonomous, God's contribution comes ex post and consists in acceptance or rejection of the choices made human will. Human free will is independent in its power and action of supernatural gifts of grace, therefore man can

[43] See Guillelmus Ockham *Sent.* (*Ordinatio*), q. 2, pp. 396–397: "Dico primo quod obiecto fruibili ostenso voluntati per intellectum sive clare sive obscure sive in particulari sive in universali, potest voluntas active elicere actum fruitionis, et hoc ex puris naturalibus, circa illud obiectum."

[44] See Guillelmus Ockham, *Sent.* (*Ordinatio*), I, dist. 17, q. 3, s. 475–479; I, dist. 17, q. 1, p. 440.

[45] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 194–203.

[46] *Sent*. III, q. 8, p. 532.

love God above all things and is able all by himself to accomplish actions deserving of eternal prize if God approves of them, for it is ultimately God's approval that makes an act meritorious.[47] Voluntary acts, regardless of what they are, whether they are good or evil, must derive from free will and not from supernatural gifts.

The conception assuming that man can deserve eternal reward with right decisions issued by his faculty of free will, as formulated by Ockham and developed by his followers, presupposes, as Alister McGrath has shown, that the covenant between God and man sets the conditions needed for a principled judgement and assessment of actions performed by us, humans. God has decreed that human actions will be approved on the condition that a human being "does his/her best" in a given situation (*facit quod in se est*). This condition was construed as an injunction to do good and shun evil. If a human being makes sincere efforts to do good, God, on the strength of the covenant concluded with man, will be under obligation to acknowledge these good works and reward them accordingly. To quote the words of Ockham himself:

Every merit lies within the scope of our power, so a meritorious deed is not so above all because of grace, but because of the will that has been created free. Thus God may approve such a praiseworthy act even without previous grace.[48]

According to McGrath, this kind of moral-theological conception was grounded in late medieval economic theories and the example, often quoted by theologians, illustrating the analogy between a good work and just price, concerns the practice occasionally resorted to by kings of debasing the currency. It may happen that a king, when faced by a financial crisis, will decide to adulterate the precious metal with some lead when producing gold or silver coins. The debased coins thus produced do not have the same value as a purely gold or silver ones, yet they may be accepted as valuable because the king makes a solemn promise that he will replace the "bad" coins with "good" ones once the crisis is over; the king's promise is the guarantee of the value of debased coins. In fact the value of such adulterated coins does not come from the quantity of the precious metal

[47] See above.

[48] William Ockham, *Quodlibetum* 6, q. 1: Nihil est meritorium nisi quod est in nostra potestate, ergo actus non est meritorious principaliter propter illam gratiam, sed propter voluntatem libere causantem, ergo posset Deus talem actum elicitum a voluntate acceptare sine gratia."

they contain but from the royal "covenant" establishing that a debased coin should be regarded "as if it were pure gold." The case of human actions and God's judgment on them is analogous. Theologians, in order to avoid the suspicion of Pelagianism with its doctrine that God is constrained to reward human good works with eternal life, affirmed that human works are like leaden coins: taken in themselves they possess little intrinsic value. However, God imparts value to them, when, thanks to His grace, He decides to treat our good actions "as if they possessed value in themselves."[49]

The problem of conditions of God's acceptance of human deeds is related to another issue, namely the question whether, how, and to what extent the ultimate reward offered to man is related to merit *(meritum)* earned by good living, and eternal punishment to demerit (*demeritum*) incurred as a result of bad conduct in this life. According to Ockham, man is able to acquire merit *de congruo*, relative to the circumstances of the presumably meritorious action and depending on the absolute power of God. An acknowledgement on the part of God of somebody's merit *de congruo* does not require previously granting by God grace to that person.

Since, as has been shown above, supernatural gifts are only accidental with respect to free will, the Holy Ghost can acknowledge purely natural acts of created will, and deeds deriving from hope and faith can be purely natural, and yet recognized as deserving the highest prize. A human being's natural free will can be the cause of actions, which could, in principle, gain the supreme reward of beatitude. Ockham believes, that every human being is naturally capable of loving God, and if so, God, acting within the framework of His ordained power *(potentia ordinata)* can grant that human being grace that will enable his/her ability to earn further merits.[50] While merit *de congruo* is common to all, merit *de condigno* requires above all divine grace and can thus be achieved exceptionally by select individuals.

RECAPITULATION

William of Ockham was, as the above discussion clearly shows, a very consistent thinker, who applied the principles of his scientific approach to all fields of knowledge. Ockham's razor, employed in theological considerations, led him, on the one hand, to acknowledging the necessity of assuming

[49] See A.E. McGrath, *Reformation Thought*, pp. 68–69.

[50] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 74–76.

"unconditional freedom of the will" of a human being and absolute freedom of his/her acts of choice. Human will is not subject to the dictate of human reason and can make positive or negative choices or refuse to choose at all. In all these manners of will's action, a human being carries full responsibility for his/her choices and the consequences thereof. On the other hand, it is true that the human freedom as reaching so far, while belonging to a contingent being that depends for its existence on its creator, must have its source in an even more powerful freedom of God, who is an infinite being. God could in principle, if He found fit, be the cause of all sorts of events, even such events as might seem to be completely at odds with "common sense," as e.g. saving a man without previous grace, or damnation of a virtuous human being. The scope of God's possible choice is only limited by the principle of contradiction, there are absolutely no other restrictions to His absolute power. According to His *potentia absoluta,* God could select for actualization every conceivable, that is non-contradictory, fact. His infinite, absolute might, assures Him absolute freedom.

Translated by Roman Majeran

DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THOMAS BRADWARDINE'S VIEW

Elżbieta Jung

Thomas Bradwardine (ca. 1290–1349) was a mathematician, logician, philosopher and theologian, with Richard Kilvington, one of the founders of the school of Oxford Calculators.[1] Bradwardine in 1323 became member of Oxford Merton College where he probably remained for the next twelve years. In the same year he became Master of philosophy, in 1333 bachelor and in 1340 Doctor in theology.[2] He actively participated in the life of the Church and the royal court. His career as an ecclesiastic began in 1333 when he was made Canon at Lincoln Cathedral and was crowned with his election in 1349 as Archbishop of Canterbury. Immediately after his episcopal consecration, which was held in Avignon, Bradwardine returned to England to assume his dignity, yet he died a month later, on 26 August 1349, a victim of the first wave

[1] See E. Jung, *Arystoteles na nowo odczytany. Ryszarda Kilvingtona Kwestie o ruchu*, Łódź 2014, pp. 13–24.

[2] The newest findings concerning the dating of the written works and academic activity of Bradwardine are to be found in the work by J.-F. Genest, "Les premiers écrits theéologiques de Bradwardine: Textes inédits et découvertes récentes," in M*ediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Petere Lombard*, ed. G.R. Evans, Leiden, 2009, vol. S., pp. 395–421. See also A. Toplady, "The Complete Works of Augustus Toplady," https://archive.org/stream/ worksoftopladyootopluoft#page/ 104/ mode/2up/ search/Thomas, pp. 105–115; G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of His* De causa Dei *and Its Opponents*, Cambridge, 1957, pp. 1–7; H. Obermann, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth Century Augustinian: A Study of His Theology in Its Historical Perspective*, Utrecht, 1957; idem, *Forerunners of the Reformation; The Shape of Late Medieval Thought*, New York, 1967, repr. Cambridge, 2002; J.-F. Genest, *Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIV*e *siècle. Buchingham contre Bradwarine*, Paris, 1992.

of the Black Death. Bradwardine belonged to the circle of friends and courtiers of Bishop of Durham Richard de Bury, who, starting with the year 1335, helped him to advance in his ecclesiastical and political career. Life at the court of a bishop surrounded by the best philosophers and theologians of the time gave Thomas ample opportunity to participate in debates and intellectual exchanges on the most important topics engaging intellectuals of the day. Richard de Bury also introduced Bradwardine to the royal court of Edward III. As a chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral in London Bradwardine was made royal chaplain in 1337 and, probably, the king's confessor. He accompanied Edward in his travels to Flanders and France during the campaign of 1346.[3]

Thomas Bradwardine authored many significant works, which cover a number of scholarly domains. His insight and intellectual curiosity earned him the title of *Doctor profundus* and a mention in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales.*[4] The works of his that have been preserved to our time are the following: two treatises in mathematics: *Speculative Arithmetic* (*Arithmetica speculativa*) and *Speculative Geometry* (*Geometria speculativa*), a number of logical treatises, a famous work on theory of motion *Treatise on Ratios of Speeds in Motions* (*Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus*), a treatise on continuous magnitudes *Treatise on the Continuum* (*Tractatus de continuo*),[5] two theological works: *On Future Contingents* (*De futuris contingentibus*) and *In Defense of God Against the Pelagians and On the Power of Causes, to his Fellow Mertonians* (*De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses*). There is also an anonymous treatise attributed to Bradwardine: *On Divine Prescience and Predestination* (*De praedestinatione et Praescientia*).[6]

[3] The reader will find bibliographical information on Bradwardine's work in: E. Jung [-Palczewska], *Tomasz Bradwardine. Wprowadzenie*, in *Wszystko to ze zdziwienia. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych z XIV wieku*, ed. E. Jung[-Palczewska] (selection, edition and introduction), Warszawa, 2000, pp. 287–291.

[4] See K.L. Lynch, "The *Parliament of Flows* and Late Medieval Voluntarism," *The Chaucer Review*, 25 (1990), 1, pp. 1–16.

[5] An extensive presentation of Thomas Bradwardine's theories on mathematics, logic and natural philosophy can be found for instance in: E. Jung[-Palczewska], *Tomasz Bradwardine. Wprowadzenie*, pp. 287–291; eadem, *Między filozofią przyrody a nowożytnym przyrodoznawstwem. Ryszard Kilvington i fizyka matematyczna w średniowieczu*, Łódź, 2002; eadem, *Arystoteles na nowo odczytany*, esp. pp. 13–24. In these works the reader will find an extensive bibliography covering the scholarly literature on Bradwardine published worldwide.

[6] Edited by H.A Obermanna, in *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis* 43 (1960), pp. 195–200.

In his works devoted to theological problems Bradwardine focused on the questions related to predestination, grace, merit, divine prescience and free will. His early theological studies addressing the problems of God's prescience and predestination were a preparation for his comprehensive work *In Defense of God Against the Pelagians and On the Power of Causes.* Bradwardine began writing this treatise when he became lecturer in Merton, that is in 1323, and completed it in 1344 in London. In its first printed Henry Savile's London edition, in, 1618, it covers 876 pages.[7] At a glance it is evident that *In Defense of God* was written by a logician and mathematician; in its general layout it follows the pattern of Euclid's *Elements;* it contains some elementary statements accepted as principles without proofs, which serve as primary premises for first degree proofs, whose conclusions enter as premises into further necessary proofs. *In Defense of God* is a work composed as a case in defense of God's sovereignty, modeled after defensive cases as made in a court of justice, and written "on behalf of God, for friends of God." Bradwardine sees his work as a part of a long struggle going on in the Church and himself as a member of a small group of God's servants calling out to God for aid in the work of the defense of God himself carried by themselves. Bradwardine laments the present condition of the Church, in which, as he believes, Pelagians have gained considerable power and almost everyone follows the error of Pelagius. Bradwardine considers himself as called to war against the Pelagians by God himself, and he believes that victory in this struggle will only be won if he wholly surrenders to God's grace. In the end all the enemies of truth shall be made to perish.[8]

The main thrust of the argument contained in this work is directed against all erroneous theories that reject God's absolute dominance and propound priority of free choice (these matters are discussed in Book I), secondly, it strives against theories rejecting freedom of human will and affirming

[7] *Thomae Bradwardini Archiepiscopi Olim Cantuariensis, De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses*, libri tres, Opera et studio Henrici Savilli. Ex scriptis codicibus nunc primum editi, Londini 1618. Some fragments of this work have been translated into Polish (see Tomasz Bradwardine, *Dlaczego jest Bóg*, transl. M. Gensler, D. Gwis, E. Jung, in *Wszystko to ze zdziwienia. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych z XIV wieku*, pp. 292–298; *O sprawie Boga przeciwko Pelagiuszowi i o mocy przyczyn*, transl. [with introduction] E. Jung, in *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje… Wolność człowieka a hipoteza teistyczna. Wybór tekstów*, ed. A.P. Stefańczyk, Lublin, 2018, pp. 325–367) and into German in a bilingual edition — see A. Lukács, *Thomas Bradwardine: "De causa Dei contra Pelagianum et de virtute causarum,"* Göttingen, 2013).

[8] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, in A. Lukács, *Thomas Bradwardine*, p. 50–62.

total dependence of human actions on God (the subject matter of Book II); thirdly Bradwardine's treatise combats theories upholding "prior necessity" in God relating to and predetermining future contingent events (this discussion is carried out in Book III). With his extensive treatise Bradwardine joined heated debate carried out at that time against the proponents of the so called *via moderna*, including, above all, such English thinkers as William (of) Ockham, Adam Woodeham, Robert Holkot, Richard Kilvington and Thomas Buckingham, whose views were commonly construed as semi-pelagian.[9]

In his late twenties Thomas Bradwardine had an experience of conversion and he described this event in his *De causa Dei:*

> Stupid, as I was, according to God's knowledge, and vain, while delving in the works of the philosophers, I let myself seduce by the error opposed to truth. And even when I learned that the theologians treat of this matter, I still stuck to Pelagius's doctrine which appeared to me to be closer to truth. For in the schools of the philosophers I only seldom heard anything on the subject of grace; if mentioned at all, grace was understood equivocally. By contrast, I continually heard philosophers affirm that we are masters of our free actions, that it is in our power to do right or wrong, to acquire virtues or vices, and many other like affirmations. And if I happened, in church, to hear the teaching of the Apo-

[9] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 2–11, 127–266. In the literature of the subject so far the mention of Richard Kilvington has been missing, as his *Commentary on Peter Lombard's* remains still in manuscript. Nevertheless my studies on Kilvington allow to acknowledge that Kilvington, was a follower of Ockham's views (see e.g. E. Jung & M. Michałowska, "Scotistic and Ockhamist Contribution to Kilvington's Ethical and Theological Views," in *1308 Ein Topographie historischaer Gleichzeitigkeit*, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, Bd. 35 (2010), pp. 104–125. In his first two questions, headed *Utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus* (Whether or not one ought to love God above all other things) and *Utrum per opera meritoria augeatur habitus caritatis quo Deus est super omnia diligendus* (Whether or not the habit of charity through which God should be loved above all other things is augmented through meritorious works) Kilvington adopts Ockham's views as his own and affirms in the former question that human external action can add to the fund of merit deserving life of eternal salvation for a human being (Ms Paris BN 14576, f. 122rb: "His non obstantibus dico quod actus extrinsecus est circumstantia aggravans et quandoque augens meritum"). As to the other question, he states that if the title of that question is read as *Whether one's disposition to charity can be augmented owing to meritorious works* the answer to that question ought to be in the affirmative, provided that the preposition "owing to" is taken as signifying an occasional agent cause and not a removed cause, which is God. (Ms Paris BN 14576, f. 129ra: "Utrum per opera meritoria sit augmentalis habitus caritatis. Dico quod si ly 'per' denotet causam agentem occasionalem non remissam, propter quam Deus auget gratiam, sic concedenda est questio").

> stle extolling grace and slighting free choice — this teaching and many other sentences are contained in the *Epistle to the Romans*: So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. [Romans 9, 16] — I did not like it, since I was unfavorable to grace. I believed with the Manichaeans, as any human being, that the Apostle could occasionally, in some matters, depart from the way of truth.[10]

However, the quoted words of the *Epistle to the Romans* often occupied Bradwardine's thought and, according to his own statement:

> Later, yet before I began my study of theology, provided with these words as with a ray of grace and in possession of some representation of truth, it appeared to me that I saw from afar God's grace preceding as to timing and nature all good meritorious works, namely the desired will of God. who, prior as to time and nature, wills the salvation of a deserving human being an produces his deserts in himself before that man does it himself. Just as God is Prime Mover with respect to all motions, so I was provided with God's grace before any effort of mine, for which I render Him my thanks.[11]

The quoted verse from the *Epistle to the Romans* (9,16) became Bradwardine's favorite reference point, it reappears in the *De causa Dei* a lot more often than any other quote from the Bible. Seen in a larger perspective of Church history, some historians think, the work of Thomas Bradwardine is an expression of a rebirth of relatively pure Augustinianism. Alister McGarth goes so far as to affirm that nearly all theologians in the Middle Ages were in fact Augustinians, as was later Martin Luther and in that respect Bradwardine was no exception. They could draw on the enormous fund of Augustine's legacy, out of his many works they could select quotes and make use of his ideas taken from either earlier or later writings depending on what theory of their own they chose to prop with his authority. And as the quotes from the works of the bishop of Hippo were often drawn from memory rather than from reliable copies of his texts, it was not unusual for them to be taken out of their context and reinterpreted,[12] thus giving a distorted representation of Augustine's thought. According to Walter Hook, the English scholars of the time quoted Augustine only insofar as it suited their needs and ignored his anti-Pelagian writings altogether, since they had no use for them.[13] However things may have been with other English theologians, Bradwardine was much more faithful to the genuine thought of the

[10] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, p. 156.

[11] Ibid., p. 156.

[12] See A.E. McGrath, *Reformation Thought*, 4th ed., Cambridge 2002, pp. 63–70.

[13] See W.F. Hook, *Lives of Archbishops of Cantenbury*, vol. I, 1861, p. 253.

bishop of Hippo. As Joseph Kelly observes: "Bradwardine studied all the works by Augustine, whom he regarded as the true apostolic logician and philosopher."[14] Together with Bradwardine a new Augustinianism was born, that is a current of thought which influenced, among others, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolin Malabranca of Orvieto and the subsequent generations of theologians. This new development was accompanied by a number of facts: first of all there was a marked increase in the number of written commentaries on Augustine's works produced at that time, while some writings of the bishop of Hippo became important textbooks at the theological faculty at Oxford. Secondly, owing to the influence of Richard Fitz-Ralph, a new style of reading and commenting on the Scriptures came into practice. The objective of studying scriptural text became different, emphasizing personal approach to the studied text; this new style imitated the attitude and manner exemplified by the *Confessions* of St. Augustine. Both Richard Fitz-Ralph and Thomas Bradwardine contributed to the increase of interest in Augustinian thought.[15] David Aers thinks Bradwardine would be glad to know that because of his work he would one day be called an Augustinian and an opponent of the *via moderna.* However, there is a weighty difference between Augustine and his fourteenth century English follower: whereas Augustine's treatment is comprehensive and takes into account different aspects of matters under discussion, Bradwardine tends to be rather selective and include in his discourse only those arguments taken from Augustine's works which suitably support his own preferred views. The *In Defense of God* reduces the theology of Augustine to a simplified, static scheme of ideas, grounded on a basic assumption of the all-importance of divine action and the corresponding presupposition of passivity of human beings with regard to divine grace and predestination. According to Aers, Bradwardine's work illustrates how some ideas concerning God's sovereignty and the helplessness of human beings with regard to salvation, abstracted from Augustine's view as a whole and deployed as a means of combating the theories of some contemporary opponents lead to a model of theology that was in fact alien to Augustine's idea thereof. Aers thinks that *In Defense of God* is a good example of the heterogeneous inspiration and eclecticism of the fourteenth century scholastic theology.[16]

[14] See J. Kelly, "The Knowledge and Use of Augustine among the Anglo-Saxon," *Studia Patristica* 28 (1993), p. 215.

[15] See A.E. McGrath, *Reformation Thought.*

[16] See D. Aers, *Salvation and Sin. Augustine. Langland, and Fourteenth-Century Theology*, Notre Dame, 2009, pp. 57–58.

SEMI-PELAGIANISM IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

In the time of Thomas Bradwardine the innovative, nominalist philosophy of William Ockham, that was soon to inspire the current in scholasticism described as *via moderna,* was causing much agitation in Oxford. As a nominalist, Ockham denied existence of universals as realities. He also reinterpreted the Scotist notion of intuitive knowledge and held that the knowledge regarding existence or non-existence of things is intuitive in its nature.[17] Since we possess no intuitive notion of God and we can only know God through Revelation, the unique way open to us to know God is the way of faith. Thus Ockham was led to introduce a novel and crucial demarcation between the provinces of faith and reason which was tantamount to a denial of the natural theology as found e.g. in Thomas Aquinas. One of Ockham's affirmations that would excite Bradwardine's strong opposition was the Venerable Inceptor's doctrine concerning the relationship between God and man. In Bradwardine's opinion, Ockham separated God from the world and raised Him to such lofty heights that there remained practically no relationship between Himself and the world.[18] The result thereof was that man gained much freedom from God in his actions, even to the point of becoming independent of Him in a way. This is well illustrated by Ockham's statement that, contrary to our natural desire for good, we may nevertheless hate God although He is the greatest good. On the other hand, we might love God even if we knew that we would not be elected for eternal salvation. Ockham also held that God's free will, whose absolute freedom is only limited by the principle of contradiction, enables Him to act in a wholly arbitrary way towards both man and Nature. For instance, God could so make it that we had an intuition of things that did not really exist. God could in principle save a man as a reward for some work performed by him, thus making it possible for human action to be deserving of grace.[19] It is easy to suppose Pelagian provenance behind this kind of statements.

[17] See Wilhelm Ockham, *Czy poznanie intuicyjne może dotyczyć przedmiotu nieistniejącego*, transl. M. Gensler, D. Gwis, E. Jung, in *Wszystko to ze zdziwienia. Antologia tekstów filozoficznych z XIV wieku*, pp. 209–212; E. Jung, *Wilhelm Ockham. Wprowadzenie*, ibid., pp. 193–202.

[18] See R. Dykstra, "Thomas Bradwardine: Forgotten Medieval Augustian," *Protestant Reformed Theological Journal*" 34/1 (2000), 34/2 (2001), 35/1 (2001), http://www.prca.org/prtj/nov2000.html.

[19] See for instance E. Jung[-Palczewska], "Teolog Wilhelm Ockham," in *Filozofia Franciszkanów*, ed. S. Napiórkowski, I. Zieliński, vol. II, Niepokalanów, 2005, pp. 203–226.

In Bradwardine's time also John Duns Scotus, besides Ockham, was frequently considered to be a semi-Pelagian. Semi-Pelagianism, as its opponents held, taught that human nature is corrupted by sin, not so much, however, as to make it impossible for human beings to win divine grace through their own efforts; to put it simply, human nature is only partially and not completely corrupted. Semi-Pelagians acknowledged that a human being retains sufficient freedom to be the master of one's actions and to earn some merit in the eyes of God by acting rightly of his/her own accord and thus induce God to grant him/her grace. Over and above the consequences of original sin, human will remains fundamentally free and capable of choosing good as against evil even without being liberated by previous grace. Ockham held that a human being, depending solely on human natural powers, is able to love God above all other things. Nominalists laid particular stress on the distinction between *absolute* and *ordained* power of God.[20] By virtue of his power conceived as *absolute,* God may save a man even if he lacks the grace that is necessary for salvation in the order actually established by God. To the ordained power of God, that is his power conceived as operating within the order of things previously instituted by Himself, grace is a necessary condition for salvation, yet to God's absolute power only will, and not grace is the primary cause of election for salvation.[21]

Furthermore, nominalists affirmed that as a result of correct actions issuing *ex puris naturalibus* a human being can obtain grace and earn merit *de congruo*, that is he can perform good works without habitual grace. As Gordon Leff explains, the nominalists assume that while unconditional merit (*de condigno*) is a free gift of grace and cannot be earned by nature alone, man can, nevertheless, win merits *de congruo*, which are in proportion to human efforts, depend on the circumstances and have no absolute value. Attributing to a man merit *de congruo* lies within the absolute power of God and does not require any previous grace. According to Bradwardine, this concept is tantamount to an acknowledgment that a human being can

[20] On the history of the distinction between God's *potentia absoluta / potentia ordinata* see for example E. Jung, "Świat możliwy versus świat realny w koncepcjach średniowiecznych, czyli o boskiej mocy absoluta i ordinata," *Filo-Sofija* 30 (2015/3), pp. 67–80, http://www.filo-sofija.pl/index.php/czasopismo.

[21] See W.J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," in *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion*, ed. C. Trinkaus and H. Oberman, Leiden 1974, pp. 37–43, 47; H. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, Baker Academic 2000, pp. 139–41, 176–77, 246, 427; W.J. Courteney, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, Leiden 2008.

deserve grace through good works performed by his own effort, this is so much as to assume self-sufficiency of man with respect to salvation, which is the worst of errors committed by Pelagius and his followers. This is indeed a cardinal error, which, in Bradwardine's opinion, leads to the necessary inference that God is under obligation to reward good actions performed by humans, which in turn implies that He is not absolutely free but depends on human beings and their decisions. This error also implies that man can perform good works without the gift of prevenient grace; yet grace ought to precede any good works of ours, otherwise we would have to conclude that grace is altogether useless to human beings.[22]

The view assuming that owing to correct choices of free will man can deserve God's reward, fully developed by proponents of the *via moderna*, yet formulated in germ by Ockham himself, implies, as Alistair McGrath demonstrates, the covenant between God and man lays down the conditions necessary for evaluation of our actions. God ordained, that human actions will be approved on the condition that man will "do the best he can" (*facere quod in se est*). This injunction was construed as the commandment to do good and avoid evil. Thus if a man does his best to do good, God, on the strength of the covenant he made with humanity, is obliged to acknowledge his efforts as good works. Ockham says:

> Nihil est meritorium nisi quod est in nostra potestate, ergo actus non est meritorious principaliter propter illam gratiam, sed propter voluntatem libere causantem, ergo posset Deus talem actum elicitum a voluntate acceptare sine gratia.[23]

According to McGrath, this kind of moral-theological theory was grounded in late medieval economical theories and the example, often quoted by theologians, illustrating the analogy between a good work and just price, concerns the practice occasionally resorted to by kings of debasing the currency. It may happen that a king, when faced by a financial crisis, will decide to adulterate the precious metal with some lead when producing gold or silver coins. The debased coins thus produced do not have the same value as a purely gold or silver ones, yet they may be accepted as valuable because the king makes a solemn promise that he will replace the "bad" coins with "good" ones once the crisis is over; the king's promise is the guarantee of the value of debased coins. In fact the value of such adulterated coins does not come from the quantity of the precious metal

[22] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 74–76.

[23] See William Ockham, *Quodlibetum* 6, q. 1.

they contain but from the royal "covenant" establishing that a debased coin should be regarded "as if it were pure gold." The case of human actions and God's judgment on them is analogous. Theologians, in order to avoid the suspicion of Pelagianism with its doctrine that God is constrained to reward human good works with eternal life, affirmed that human works are like leaden coins: taken in themselves they possess little intrinsic value. However, God imparts value to them, when, thanks to His grace, He decides to treat our good actions "as if they possessed value in themselves."[24]

This analogy brings out the points of similarity between the theories of the *via moderna* and Pelagius. Both doctrine assume that achievements and efforts of every individual in the pursuit of good ought to be acknowledged and rewarded; consequently, God is under obligation to recognize and remunerate human beings for them. Ockham's followers admitted with perfect clarity that the merit of the human acts thus acknowledged by God would not come from the intrinsic worth of these acts as naturally performed by humans; as a matter of fact it would only be attributed to theses human deeds by God's gracious decision to accept them as meritorious. Still, the Ockhamists argued, given God's promise, or 'covenant' God would find Himself under the obligation of granting grace and remuneration *de congruo* to an acting human being who did his/her best (*fecit quod in se erat*.) to achieve moral perfection naturally available to them. They made use of the counterfactual model of the relationship obtaining between God and man and often construed the covenant between God and man concerning salvation of human beings as an act placing God under obligation to accept certain of human acts as meritorious and deserving reward, even if they in fact lacked the intrinsic value proportionate to the promised remuneration.

The theory adopted by Bradwardine in his later years, which, in his eyes, was St. Augustine's view, opposed Pelagius's doctrine. Let us not forget, however, that before his conversion Bradwardine himself preferred Pelagius to St. Paul whom he found diminishing human freedom and human capability of good conduct.[25]

Pelagius assumed that man in himself is neither good nor evil; Adam's sin has exerted no corrupting influence on the nature of human beings. This first sin was an act resulting from desire to follow wrong suggestions, yet evil as such is not an essential feature of human nature. As human nature is not inherently evil, man still retains the power to produce good acts as well

[24] See A.E. McGrath, *Reformation Thought*, pp. 68–69.

[25] See *supra*, n. 10.

as evil ones; original sin has not depraved human nature so as to make it incapable of good. Pelagius's followers believed that God has granted to man the ability to comply in his conduct with God-established laws, and it was precisely this ability that Pelagius named grace. In the final analysis it depends on man alone whether he/she will opt for good or evil. By compliance with God's law man can deserve salvation, for his good works would call for just appreciation and proportionate remuneration.

By contrast, the central theme in Augustine's thought is the "fall" of man. His whole discussion of this theme is based on the source which is chapter three of *Genesis*; its net result is the acknowledgement that human nature "fell" from its pristine purity. The outcome of the fall was that the ensuing condition of human nature has nothing in common with the condition thereof as projected by God. Human nature underwent radical corruption, not so radical, however, as to make redemption absolutely impossible. Augustine holds that in his present condition man is only capable of sin, since our nature has been corrupted by original sin and all descendants of Adam can only sin when left to their own natural abilities and faculties. All of us, humans, are sinners and stand in need of redemption of our sins. Yet man, when deprived of God's aid and left to his own devices, remains utterly incapable of renovating the covenant that once united us to God. In order to reestablish the broken relationship between man and God, God's grace is absolutely necessary. Yet grace is a free gift of God, it is a divine act by which God, absolutely gratuitously, takes away the yoke of sin from ourselves. Grace is absolutely free and cannot be deserved in any way. Thus, in the final analysis, the possibility of salvation does not depend in any way on man and his efforts; it wholly depends on God, who freely and gratuitously bestows grace on human beings. However, not all human beings are granted this salvific divine grace. Being God's free and undeserved gift, it is given only to those whom God chooses in his inscrutable designs, it is only donated to the "elect." This election and the consequent gift of grace results in the elect being able to act morally correctly and, in consequence of this, being granted eternal salvation. Such is the concept of grace, that Thomas Bradwardine adopts as his own.

GOD'S GRACE AND HUMAN ACTIONS

Before presenting his polemical argument against the Pelagian position on grace and sin, the position that has become odious to him, Bradwardine

will, in Book I of his *opus magnum,* give some proofs of God's existence[26] and characterize His nature and attributes. The discussion is opened by a commonplace constatation that before we proceed to talk about God's goodness, mercy, justice or grace, we must first ascertain that He exists; all divine attributes are grounded in the fundamental reality of His existence. There are two aspects of Divine Existence that should be taken into account: a higher and a lower one. The former regards God as simple being, His inner nature and the attributes inherent in Himself; the latter concerns God in His relationship to the created things. Both these aspects together form a kind of knowledge of God that Bradwardine terms "composite knowledge." This differs from "simple knowledge" of God which is a direct affirmation of God, an intuitive, non-discursive kind of knowledge. The composite knowledge proceeds by means of successive affirmations and negations and arrives, as the result, at truths regarding various attributes of God. Thus the following unquestionable true statements concern God: 1) God is the necessary efficient cause of every produced thing. 2) No cause can produce anything without God cooperating. 3) Whatever is caused by any cause, is also caused directly by God Himself. 4) Whatever has been created, has been created thanks to God's will and this statement is equally true of that which now exists, existed in the past and will exist in future. 5) That which is prior in the order of "composite knowledge" is a cause of the truth of that which is posterior in the same order: thus the truth "God exists" is the primary truth and a cause of the verity of all the other truths. 6) God's will is preceded by the truths: "God exists," "God is all-powerful," and "God is eternal." 7) From God's will follows he truth "The world exists." 8) The primary truths, namely the truths preceding His will, God knows through His essence, the truths that follow from His will He knows through His will. 9) God has the knowledge of future contingent events owing to His will, with which He wills them to come about. 10) A seeming change of God's will does not result from any imperfection of His nature; it is not an intrinsic change but merely a change in the external manifestations of His will and it affects not Himself but merely the created world.[27]

In this way God's unconditioned, necessary existence, being the ultimate cause of all things, is also the ultimate cause of all knowledge which is in its turn anterior to the divine will. The divine all-knowledge is His knowledge

[26] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, (*Praefatio*), Londini 1618, pp. 1–3.

[27] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, p. 200; see also G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 23–24.

of Himself and God knows Himself through His own essence. His essence is anterior, in the logical order, to His will and omnipotence. Before God can will anything, He has to have knowledge, before He can possess knowledge, He has to be all-powerful, but in order to be all-powerful, He must simply be.[28] Now, all things God created He knows owing to His will, so with regard to all the creature "to know" is the same for God as "to will." Thus God, as an infinite omnipotent being, has, on the one hand, complete knowledge of Himself, and on the other of all created entities. His knowledge must be complete, therefore it must encompass all the which was, is, and will be; all that is possible and all that is impossible. So God is not merely the first cause of that which is, but equally He is the cause of that which is not as such. He thus possesses positive knowledge as well as negative one. It is ultimately Himself who decides what can and will be realized and what is to be excluded from realization, yet in order to take this decision He must comprehend all that can be comprehended. Yet from the fact that He is omniscient in the full and absolute sense of the word, it does not follow that He wills everything He knows. It is His will that selects, among all the possibilities, that which is to be made real, created or caused. To quote G. Leff: "Gods' intellect, as omniscient and indifferent, plays no active part in creation. It knows everything through the divine essence, and is not concerned with which of the possible is made actual and which not; its part is to present everything to be known, possible and impossible, to His will; from there His will takes control."[29]

God alone is a necessary being, while all his creatures are contingent beings. As this statement captures the very foundation of the order of things, the statements 2–4 as quoted above are necessary truths. Things being so, man, taken as such, does not contribute anything essentially new to reality. God is an intensively infinite being: simple, immutable, with indivisible nature; all his attributes being identical with Himself and with one another; thus his infinite goodness is one with his infinite justice, clemency etc. By the same token He is infinitely removed from all the creature. In Himself God is unknowable, yet He possesses complete knowledge of all created things. Since God's goodness is an essential attribute of his, everything that has been created has been created as the best of its kind, and God, being the

[28] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, p. 200: "Est enim aliud verum naturaliter prius isto, sicilicet Deum esse, Deum esse cognitivum, Deum esse omnipotentem, cum similibus suis, distinguendo et multiplicando ista de Deo."

[29] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 37–39, here 39.

highest good, is also supremely merciful and it lies within his power to grant grace to a sinner entirely lacking merit. Yet as his justice is one with his goodness, God will neither leave someone who does good, without appropriate reward, nor allow a sinner to go unpunished.[30]

It follows clearly from the above quoted statements that divine prescience relative to his creature is mediated by his will and that God participates in all actions by creatures through his will. All good human acts can only be performed thanks to divine grace.g. Leff construes Bradwardine's doctrine of grace as being dominated by the conception of divine participation in all actions issued by creatures.[31] This conception, Leff so develops his point, enables Bradwardine to show that: 1) grace is God's free and undeserved gift, 2) grace of necessity has a part in all acts performed by man, 3) human good actions are irrelevant as to whether a human being will be granted grace, they are the result of rather than reason for being given grace which is a free gift by God, 4) all disposition in man towards good is also only possible thanks to grace.[32]

Bradwardine opens in the following way his discussion of grace:

> Under the guidance of divine grace I shall now present a short sermon on it against the thankless and hostile to grace Pelagians, who, spreading the pestilence, proclaim that this supreme grace is not donated free by God, but must be earned with meritorious deeds.[33]

Then Bradwardine proceeds to argue that grace is a free gift and that donated grace is the same thing as God's will, which eternally desires good; thus every particular gift of grace derives from uncreated grace. Grace as well as divine will is twofold: it is one thing as God's property, abiding in his essence, it is another thing as God's influence descending upon and present in a man.[34] In order to answer the question concerning the relationship between God, or His free gift: grace, and man, the recipient thereof, Bradwardine quotes the following argument:

> God's will is the first in the order: God willing the chosen man to attain the Divine Kingdom, bestows grace upon his elect. Yet it is fitting for the elect and predestined for salvation to possess deserts, owing to which they can enter the

[30] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 31–34.

[31] Ibid., p. 66: "Bradwardine's doctrine of grace is governed by the principle of divine participation."

[32] See ibid., p. 66.

[33] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, p. 155.

[34] See ibid., p. 155–56.

> Kingdom of God; moreover, it is also God's wish that the elect possess some deserts, for it is not becoming that anyone enter God's Kingdom without merit. It is the operation of efficacious grace that the predestined man is able to perform appropriate meritorious deeds. Thus it follows from these assumptions that election by God for eternal salvation of a man comes first and prior to that person's deserving conduct, which is merely a consequence of the election.[35]

Bradwardine imagines an interesting, hypothetical debate with Pelagius, which goes as follows:

> Pelagius asks: supposing grace a free, undeserved gift: why then, given that all men are essentially equal, should someone be granted it and not another?
> I reply by asking: why should God, out of infinite number of souls and other things equally possible and equally good in all respects, were they created, select some for creation and not other?
> Pelagius: I am a man just as Christ is, why am I not the same nature as Himself? If he is what he is because of received divine grace, why is the grace given to him different from that given to me, if our nature is common?
> I: Surely God shows no favoritism.[36]

This possible exchange clearly shows that the question why God opted for doing some particular definite thing rather than some other, seemingly equally good, is meaningless in that it fails to elicit a satisfactory answer. It is only from human perspective that respect for a particular person is always essential, whereas from divine perspective only an existing person is worthy of respect. The final conclusion of that imaginary dialogue is of paramount importance: a human being becomes "acceptable to God" only when endowed with and transformed by grace, that is when he or she is "ready" to do good, that is to earn merit by performing appropriate deeds and deserve a just reward.

Without grace a man cannot even be charitable to God. Bradwardine states:

> Moreover, we need to observe, with the assistance of that much desired operation of grace, that there is some grace, some kind thereof, we have already alluded to, which is more desirable than other kinds. This special grace God not only bestows freely, but He makes everyone whom He endows with it dear to and beloved by Him, and His son in this temporal life, and a participant of eternal glory in the future life.[37]

Bradwardine distinguishes two kinds of created grace: 1) habitual grace (*gratia gratis dans et volens*), which makes a human being habitually want good; a human being endowed with habitual grace is sanctified, 2) actual

[35] Ibid., p. 156.

[36] Ibid. p. 159.

[37] Ibid, p. 155.

grace (*gratia gratis data*) which is a gift enabling anyone receiving it to achieve enough good to save his/her soul. The former kind of grace dwells internally in the soul, while the latter is not necessarily present therein. And as created grace emanates from uncreated grace which is the Holy Spirit, anyone to whom grace is granted has a part in Divine Nature. Thus God Himself and the Holy Spirit provide the basis for charity and grace. Thanks to grace God loves man but it is also owing to grace that man becomes capable of loving God. All that human beings have been endowed with is God's gift: either one of nature or one of grace. Furthermore, God is always present to human life and activity and He participates in the generation of our acts as a direct cause. He participates in our deeds both via His Spirit, that is uncreated grace, and via his presence in man by means of created grace, so every good work performed by a human being is the outcome of both kinds of grace working together.[38]

This theory is intended to show that the semi-Pelagian distinction between merit *de congruo* and merit *de condigno* cannot be maintained. In Bradwardine opinion this distinction serves the kind of theology which allows men to feel secure as to their prospects for future life and have hope they can deserve grace and election thanks to their own efforts. However, this claim is false according to Bradwardine; the true virtue is only produced by God's free gift of grace, whose effect is to direct all human endeavours towards God as the ultimate objective. The Pelagian error is precisely to deny the need for this kind of gift; it makes the gift of theological virtues superfluous by claiming that we are capable of fulfilling the commandment to love God without any grace, by means of our natural dispositions alone. Yet virtue which has no root in supernatural grace is no more than a mere semblance of virtue; only the divine aid imparted to us in the form of grace has the power of enabling men really to act and behave well and it is only due to grace that human beings are ultimately saved. Nobody, who is not intrinsically just, will be able to desire justice, and nobody is just, unless transformed by the divine gift of grace. We are saved exclusively thanks to grace and in all our free acts of choice we are uniformly passive. It is exclusively grace that justifies; it is grace alone that creates genuine will to good and, consequently, generates truly good deeds.[39] From such an assertion it logically follows, as Aers observes, that Bradwardine rejects outright the

[38] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa*, Londini 1618, pp. 373–375; G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians,* p. 69.

[39] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, pp. 154–158.

assertion propounded by the *moderni* that human beings love God above all other things and totally owing to their natural inborn capacities.[40]

This criticism of the semi-Pelagianism introduces the notion of predestination. As the deeds performed by human beings cannot, in the present condition of man, form the adequate basis for God's judgment, neither is God's foreknowledge related to what use we, humans, will make of our free will, whether for good or evil deeds, the adequate criterion of the discrimination between those who will be saved and those who will not. In fact, God's choices are entirely free and independent of our acts of choice whatever.[41] Bradwardine goes so far as to assert, that even if a human being has the greatest love for God, this fact alone will not contribute anything towards the felicitous achievement of eternal life in heaven by that person if that person has been predestined to damnation. Even in the attitude of love for God, such a person will still be abominable to God as one who has fallen in the extremity of sin. Bradwardine's opinion is that God donates grace only to some men and very few of them.[42] For instance, he did not like to give the grace and election for eternal life in heaven to Judas. "The uncreated love itself, by loving some and choosing them for the Kingdom, while refusing to love others, divides the sons of the Kingdom from the sons of damnation, just as it divided light from darkness at the beginning."[43]

Granted all this. there is, nevertheless, the other side of the coin: as already stated above, God's justice ensures that He will reward those who do good and punish those who do evil. Moreover, deserts are needed for anyone to be acceptable to God. And as God's justice is one thing with his goodness, He will never leave a deserving man who does good without recompense, neither will He let off a sinner without punishment. Thus, Bradwardine concludes, it is useless to pray for salvation for everybody, we ought only to pray for those, for whom we may legitimately hope they will be saved. According to Bradwardine, the theory of double predestination provides the adequate response for the Pelagian ill-founded distinction between merit *de condignuo* and one *de congruo.*[44]

[40] See D. Aers, *Salvation and Sin*, pp. 63–66.

[41] See H. Obermann, *Archbishop Bradwardine*, p. 115.

[42] See D. Aers, *Salvation and Sin*, p. 67.

[43] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, pp. 145.

[44] The theory of double predestination has time and again been the object of heated controversy since the early Middle Ages. Chauser believed that the problem of predestination is central to *De causa Dei*. Yet, as James Halvorson observes, it is diffi-

GOD'S ABSOLUTELY FREE WILL AND LIMITED WILL OF MAN

As already stated above,[45] the basic and distinctive feature of the divine intellect, according to Bradwardine, is omniscience: the possession of all-comprehensive knowledge extending over all that is possible as well as all that is impossible, while the fundamental attribute of God's will is love and unlimited freedom as to the choice among all the possibilities represented to it by the intellect. God's will is always active, always busy choosing and deciding. Both the knowledge and the will of God are eternally immutable. God's will is entirely free in its acts of choice, it is as free from external compulsion as internal necessity of divine nature. If God did not possess free will, He would act out of necessity, and then He would not choose from among the possibilities made present for Himself within his own essence, in fact He would hardly make any choices at all, but act under compulsion .[46] Yet if the First Cause acted not in a free way, but under compulsion, then freedom and contingency would be totally absent from His creatures, and it is the contrary that we observe in our experience.[47]

To Bradwardine's mind the completely unrestrained, infinitely free will of God is the ultimate cause of all the freedom present in the Universe. It is the self-sufficient, immutable, eternal first cause of everything that has been created. It is the channel through which God's omnipotence expresses itself. From this premise Bradwardine infers his highly controversial conclusion to the effect that not only general features of the created world are willed by God and in agreement with His creative project, but also every

cult to be sure whether Bradwardine propounded the double predestination, as in his writings he uses the terms *nolle*, *non velle*, *velle non*. quite equivocally. Halvorson arrives at the conclusion that bradwardine's view of the matter can be interpreted as follows: God created some men to know and love Himself, while others He made in order that they opposed His gift of grace. (see J. Halvorson, *Peter Aureol on Predestination: A Challange to Late Medieval Thought*, Leiden Brill 1998, p. 131). Russel Dykstra, discussing the views of historians of theology, lays the stress on the fact Bradwardine excludes any possibility that predestination might depend on human efforts, on the contrary, it was owing to predestination that some men receive grace enabling them to perform deserving acts (see R. Dykstra, "Thomas Bradwardine: Forgotten Medieval Augustian").

[45] See above.

[46] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, p. 191; G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, p. 41–47.

[47] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, p. 197.

action by any of His creatures.[48] As Leff observes, this extension of the operation of divine will even to the smallest contingent events in the Universe make God's will the sole criterion of possibility and non-possibility of any thing whatever and amounts to the claim that divine will decides what will happen, in what way and at what time. Moreover, God being eternally immutable, everything He wills and does takes place beyond time and space. For this reason everything He wants to be comes to being in Himself in the eternal now, his projects thus becoming the universal law governing everything.[49] Granted all this, His will still is far from arbitrary, for it is love that motivates every divine action and it is exclusively good that is the ultimate objective of His creative activity

With reference to Distinction 39 of John Duns Scotus's commentary on Book I of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Bradwardine affirms that contingency of created causes does not follow merely from the fact the effects these causes produce may happen or not, in fact created causes are contingent because of the way they act, which is essentially different from necessary causes. Any acting cause may act necessarily or contingently, and since the cause always precedes its effects, which may come about or not, contingency or necessity is a characteristic belonging to the nature of the cause. Free will, being a non-necessary cause, acts, that is wills something in a contingent way.[50] God is an absolutely necessary being and as such He possesses a totally unlimited free power to produce any effects whatever. His power is such that He could in principle "undo" the past, that is make it so that some past events that have already happened would not have happened; e.g. He could still make it so that Abraham would never have been born and by the same token his covenant with God would never have taken place. Paradoxically, however, such an intervention within the past would not have changed the overall course of the world's fate.

Bradwardine states:

> God's existence is necessary, God generates the Son and knows intellectually all things knowable; and all of this not in the past time or in the future, but in His eternity which is always present to Him as a whole, as it was before time itself. Thus one can speak about necessity as related to the present and the same holds of freedom.[51]

[48] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, pp. 195–197, 208–209.

[49] See G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, p. 42.

[50] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa dei*, p. 205–206.

[51] Ibid., p. 205.

As God alone is a being existing totally in the eternal present, this means, to Bradwardine's mind, that His activity emanating from His will is necessary activity. This is also true of His knowing, which is intuitive in its character, that is it is an immediate insight in the essence, since Himself, the object of His knowing, His *de facto* decisions, His will and His activity, that is His knowing itself, are all one and the same thing. As a necessary and free being totally active in the present, He acts in a necessary way, yet this mark of necessity as the essential characteristic of His action in no way limits His absolute freedom.[52]

According to Bradwardine, God's knowledge concerning future contingent events, which in the natural temporal order of the world become present events only to pass into the past, is eternally immutable, yet still contingent, so that it does not become necessary with the passage of future contingents into the present and then into the past. Of contingent events God possesses contingent knowledge, just as of necessary events His knowledge is absolutely necessary.[53] As he says:

> God's knowledge is always uniformly free, that is uniformly internally necessary, and this with respect to every object of that knowledge; and Divine Intellect, that is God Himself, remains eternally perfectly uniform, that is always equally free or equally necessary as to His every internal act. When future contingent events become present or pass into the past, God's will as related to these does not cease to be free with the same freedom or the same kind of internal liberty with which it was free when these events lay still in future, and it does not, because of these events taking place, begin to be necessary with a kind of necessity opposed to contingency.[54]

Thus, when God's will is directed outside of God's essence, the activity resulting therefrom is absolutely contingent, as any striving outside of the domain of absolute necessity (that is Divine Nature) can tend in two opposed directions, and every action can end in either of two opposed outcomes. This means that a choice always has to be made between opposed objectives. Bradwardine adduces following examples illustrating and confirming his thesis:

> Who would be able to deny that it comes about on occasion that God in a free way does something: He effects this or that; that He can do something particular, for instance restore sight to a blind person or raise a deceased person

[52] Ibid.

[53] See the article by Martyna Koszkało in this volume.

[54] Ibid., p. 291.

> from the dead [...] When we assume that there is in God absolute knowledge about the Antichrist and a possibility for God to wish for the Antichrist to come, we ought not, nevertheless, hence infer that God in fact wills this to happen, but we ought to admit that the opposite thereof can happen with equal likelihood. For if something like that followed of necessity from the possibility of it happening, together with all concomitant dispositions preceding the related willing in God, then it would be absolutely necessary for God to will so. In the case of the Antichrist, it would then be necessary for the Antichrist to come, and this with natural necessity or a necessity resulting from preceding natural order. If this were true, nothing in reality would be free or contingent.[55]

A human being, endowed with created free will which is the spring of human actions, is "created at a definite moment of time complete with everything that is necessarily needed for him/her to be able to will. Thus a human being is able freely to will, for there is nothing at the moment to make it impossible for him/her to will.[56]" Yet free activity of a created being is not exclusively the outcome of his/her free acts of choice, which are contingent as to the choice of one of the terms of a given opposition (that is A or ~A). It also "grows out of the necessity which naturally precedes it, and in this respect it is necessary.[57]" This free activity (of a created person) is necessary in the sense that free will of a created being, e.g. man, is a creation of God, and it is because of the will of God, who decided to endow man with free will, that man is free. Thus God wills man to be free according to and within the limits of his nature. The consequence thereof, Bradwardine observes, is that "no free act of a free created being is absolutely contingent in the sense of being equally balanced between opposite options."[58] This is tantamount to saying, that a choice made by a human being is conditioned by external factors, among which a human being makes his choice.

The freedom and indeterminacy of human choices with respect to any particular term of a given relevant opposition is grounded in and guaranteed by the absolute contingency of God's will as to either of the opposite terms. Man, in so far as endowed with free will, is bound up with the necessity to choose only one term of any relevant opposition, this means he always decides for a particular opposite, although he could in principle always choose otherwise. In that sense his will is contingent, although not necessarily free. The necessary freedom of will is an attribute of God, who is

[55] Ibid., pp. 207–208.

[56] Ibid., p. 207.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

the co-author of all our actions, and this both as the First, absolutely necessary and absolutely free Cause of the existence of every single thing, and as the First, absolutely contingent and absolutely free Cause of our, human, free will. God is an absolutely necessary being, and His will is both absolutely necessary and absolutely contingent. Man, in his turn, is a contingent being, which means he lacks necessity. His will is contingently free in the sense that he is able, supported by a prior absolutely free choice made by God Himself, willing for man to have the possibility of free choice, to make choices of just one term of the oppositions he faces. This faculty of free choice is a kind of dignity with which "reasonable creature ought to have been dignified," as Bradwardine claims.[59]

According to Bradwardine every action of a created will issues from that will itself, but also from God, who in His own self equally cooperates in the production of any deed, and His operation in this production is both immediate and substantial. And in any such co-produced action, God's will is by nature prior in operation, while the created will in the natural order follows the divine will like a servant; thus it is God that by nature acts first. Man, as it follows from this statement, cannot and does not determine by his decisions what God's choices will be and how God and man will co-operate, as a posterior, created cause, in this case human will, can by no means influence the sovereign choices made by the very first cause — God Himself.[60]

However, if all created things owe their ability to act to divine will and God Himself is a true co-producer of every human action, as stated above, it seems to naturally follow that in reality man possesses no free will: man's actions are wholly determined by the irresistible influence of the divine will, man's decisions are not only known to God in advance, they are in a way programmed by God. In one word: man appears to have no independent will and not to make any really free choices.

Yet Bradwardine does not admit such inferences from his assumptions. True, he affirms that "All that has been created has been created thanks to God's will and this statement is true of that which is as well as of that which was and that which will be; God knows future contingent events by means of his will through which He wants these events to come abour"[61] At the same time, however, he argues as follows: since necessity is the contrary to

[59] Ibid., p. 159.

[60] Ibid., p. 169–175.

[61] Ibid., p. 142.

contingency, they must in a way be alike or appear at the same level; a necessity and its corresponding contingency must be, respectively, necessary and contingent in the same degree. Now, if there is necessity in a created thing, there must also be corresponding contingency, and by the same token, freedom. It is unconditionally, that is absolutely, possible, because non-contradictory, that God should create reasonable creatures endowed with freedom and this precisely because God is absolutely all-powerful and free, and free will is "rational ability to form rational judgments and perform spontaneous, voluntary action.[62]"

So man possesses free will, even though God Himself is the co-author of any man's deeds, choices etc., and even though any man is, or is not, elected for salvation independently of his/her own initiative. Every created agent, that is created being capable of action, which by nature acts in a free way, produces some effects spontaneously and freely, that is not because of antecedent necessity (*de necessitate antecedentis*), this phrase meaning that there are no preceding reasons for him/her acting in this particular way rather than otherwise, nor because of absolute necessity. There is no determinism here: every agent producing an effect in a free way, does this contingently and spontaneously. An active cause is naturally prior to its own action, yet a cause that acts in a free way can, in principle, refrain from definite choice both at a time when it is active and at a time when it is at rest. Nor can the effect of an action determine with necessity the activity of a free cause, there can be no question of necessity imposed by the ends that an action strives to achieve (*necessitas consequentis*). If an active cause were determined with necessity by the effects it seeks to achieve, it would no longer be a free cause.[63]

Free will of man, or "will that that is free" is defined as follows: "it is rational ability to issue a rational judgment and intentional" action, the acts of free will are "willing and willing not, loving and hating, its object is that which appears as good or evil." To quote Bradwardine's own formulation:

> The first an the most appropriate action of will is willing its first and the most appropriate object, which is good as such. Because will as such wills good, it does not will evil; therefore it hates evil and shuns it; for good is by nature prior to evil.[64]

[62] See ibid., p. 162.

[63] See ibidem, p. 140–143.

[64] Ibid., p. 163.

Man is free in the sense that no inferior cause, that is no non-rational factor can compel his will to any conscious and voluntary action resulting in an increase of merit or in sin. The thesis concerning the impossibility of rational will being forced to action by irrational causes can be deduced from the following reasoning: reasonable creature is free in the same degree in which irrational creature is subject to necessity; but irrational creature is subject to necessity so much, that an inferior cause can force it to action, therefore, *per analogiam* reasonable creature is free so much, that it cannot be compelled to action by external forces.

There is one more argument Bradwardine quotes for freedom of man, briefly: reason as such, and so human reason is immaterial, therefore material things cannot affect it. Bradwardine is also convinced that man as a rational being ought to rule animals and the plant world. In human societies too the wise man should govern and guide the non-wise, and the more wise should rule those who are less so.[65] Bradwardine's arguments and formulations, that have been quoted here, give rise to serious doubts related to a number of problems regarding human freedom. What is the ultimate foundation of that freedom, since the immediate cause of all actions of human will is absolutely, necessarily free God, and the ultimate and the most proper purpose of any created will is loving God. The answer to this question is that the freedom of human will consists in its independence from inferior, that is secondary, causes. Nature cannot "compel a created will to reasonable and voluntary action resulting in an increase in merit or in sin," because "reasonable creature possesses power of free choice and is thus naturally free." Neither can stars or other celestial powers influence human acts of choice.[66] Consequently, the freedom of man, God's perfect work, is founded on the absolute freedom of God, who freely created man free, and guaranteed by the independence from nature

FREE CHOICE: DIVINE AND HUMAN

Being absolutely, infinitely perfect being, God is able to make absolutely free, perfectly independent acts of choice. The very notion of choice relates to the judgment by the divine intellect, the concept of the choice being "free" indicates being made by an absolutely free, sovereign will. Absolute

[65] See ibid., p. 163–169.

[66] Ibid., p. 170.

reason and absolute will guarantee, according to Bradwardine, perfect rightness and justice of God's choices. As he states:

> So it is generally known that God possesses power of free choice by His will. It is choice, I insist, because based on a judgment of reason, that is intellect; it is free, because made by the free faculty of will. These two acts and two faculties in one mind together combine to form this complex term: "free choice," as clearly shown by the essence of this term. And since the act of choosing performed by reason should be prior to the related act of will, it is better to say "choice that is free" than "free choice."[67]

All free acts of choice of whatever kind always tend towards one term of an opposition. Bradwardine, like earlier John Duns Scotus, assumes that all acts of will are positive acts, regardless of whether they are acts of willing an A (*volutio*) or not willing an A (*nolutio*). It would seem, then, that the necessary divine will is related to oppositions between possible contraries and God always chooses between one of the contrary opposites (A or ~A); these contraries are the possibilities which divine reason represents to the divine will. The absolute freedom of God consists in the power of making a choice (*libertas contradictionis simpliciter*) and this does not entail the necessity of realization of this choice. All the choices made by His free will, as I have already mentioned, concern God's external activity, they relate to acts directed to the world of creation (*solus actus voluntatis divinae ad extra est liber simpliciter libertate contradictionis*).[68]

God's free choices concern in equal measure that which was in the past, that which is now, and that which will be in future. God, subsisting beyond the temporal order, makes his acts of choice in the eternal "now"; this means that past, present and future events are all eternally in God, they are all present to God in the same way. God Himself being immutable possesses absolute knowledge of changeability of things; God knows all events in the same way: He knows them as they belong to the future and as they become present in the order of time and as they subsequently move into the real of the past. If this is so, Bradwardine affirms, God, who is all-powerful, is able to change not only the future, which is contingent, but also, in the same measure, the past, which to Him is equally contingent. The divine creative will has the actual power to change all temporal events happening in the world. Since the past is always present in the divine eternity as something existing in the eternal "now," there is nothing inherently contradictory in

[67] Ibid., p. 160

[68] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, p. 654.

the affirmation that God can actually change the past. To quote Bradwardine himself:

> When they speak about future contingent events, they entertain no doubts as to their own freedom of will and, even against prophecy, they want to break free from the subjection to Thyself, and Thy will, the most free, the all-powerful and the most constant — " when things happen which were unknown in the past" — they want to throw down from the summit of the prior freedom and subjugate to the service of the new ineluctable necessity.[69]
>
> When future contingent events come to be present or pass into the past, God's will considered in respect to them does not cease to be free with the same freedom, a kind of inner freedom, with which it was free previously and does not, because of these events, begin to be bound with some necessity opposed to freedom.[70]

The conception affirming that God can alter the past is committed to the assumption that His will is a contingent cause; the idea overtaken by Bradwardine from John Duns Scotus. Both scholastic philosophers assume, as already stated above, that will is such that it simultaneously can will A and not will A. His discussion of this problem Bradwardine begins by quoting with approval the common assumption that God could in principle create a different world from the actual or not create any world at all. As to past events as such, being past is not an inherent necessary feature of theirs, to be past is by no means part of the essence of an event, but a mere accident of it.[71] True, it is not possible even to God to make an event both exist and, at the same time, not exist in the past, yet it is possible to Him in His eternity to will an event to take place and, simultaneously, it is possible to Him not to will that very same event. This assertion is perfectly justified, for to God in His eternity all past events are present (in the way characteristic of eternally existent features), by the same token all kinds of temporal succession immediately and contingently depend on God's will. God eternally possess the power to issue an eternal decree specifying that some definite event, e.g. somebody's wish to do something, should take place at the appropriate time, and, in His presence, God "now" possess unmediated knowledge about this event of somebody acting according to his/her will even though in the world this very event may appear as belonging to the future or having passed into the past.[72]

[69] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, p. 51.

[70] Ibid., p. 291.

[71] Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, Londini 1618, pp. 858–860.

[72] See M. Sylwanowicz, *Contingent Causality and the Foundation of Duns Scotus'* Metaphysics, Leiden, 1996, pp. 231–33.

According to Michael Sylwanowicz, this way of representing God's relationship to temporality allows one to assert that Bradwardine propounded a different theory of future contingent events from that put forward by John Duns Scotus. Both thinkers agree that contingent events occurring in the temporal Universe are predetermined by the eternal decrees of God and that they are always true in the divine eternity. In the temporal world they only become true as they come about. But, in Bradwardine's opinion, future events, as it were, already exist in the eternal "now" with all their causal relationships, even though, in the temporal world of ours, they will only occur in future. Likewise, that which for us is past, for God is part of the eternal present, and in principle He could wish for a "past" event (that is, past from our perspective) not to come about. This is in principle possible, for it is possible for God, who in His eternity actually wills A, not to will A in the same eternity. God's contingent will immediately affects all events as their cause. All form of time and temporality is by nature contingent, therefore all temporal events, for us either past, present, or future, for God eternally present, are so many contingent events, and all of them stand in the same relation of dependence on God's will. Here the essential difference between Bradwardine and Scotus comes in. For Scotus, any past event is no longer contingent, for by its actual occurrence in the real world it has passed into the realm of conditioned necessity, and, consequently, it is withdrawn from immediate dependence on God's contingent eternal decrees. Whereas for Scotus only the temporal present (and future) remain contingent in God's eternal perspective, for Bradwardine all of the temporal events, including the past events, and the eternal decree concerning these, always remain contingent and depend contingently on God's will.[73]

The ability to equally will both contrary terms of an opposition (A or ~A) is not a vacuous attribute, Sylwanowicz observes, but a real and indispensable condition for any decree by the divine will concerning any contingent event. Without this ability God's will would not be absolutely free and its acts would be less perfect. Since past events are eternally present to God, they are eternally represented to the divine will which relates to them in contingent acts of willing. With respect to God, these events are always present and will never shift into a past of any kind: "[past events] will never escape from the contingent efficacy of God's will into the abyss of the necessity of the past."[74]

[73] See ibid., pp. 233–234.

[74] Ibid., p. 236. On Bradwardine's theory of future contingent events see also J.-F. Genest, *Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIV^e siècle*, pp. 38–76.

God's infinitely free will, assuring Him absolute freedom of choice extending to that which came to be, that what becomes and that what will come to pass in future is entirely different from the faculty of choice as possessed by man. Human choices are free only with regard to the present; once accomplished, they become fixed in reality and as such move into the past, and thereby we lose all power of influencing and altering over them. In the present we have the power to make a choice and opt for one of the contrary members of an opposition; every choice made by a free created cause, read: every free choice issued by the free will of a human being, is an option for one of mutually exclusive members of an opposition (*ad utrumlibet*), that is a choice of either A or ~A. Only a choice between contraries is an act that is free, that is non-necessary. Obviously, from what has already been said above, it follows that God participates in all human choices as an immediate cause.

> The question naturally arises: what objects of possible human choices are the most appropriate objects for man? The answer appears to be self-evident on the ground of Bradwardine's theory. The first and the most appropriate object of created free will is good, and willing good is the first and the most proper action thereof.[75] If this is so will can only naturally will good and undertake any action in view of some good. True, it may happen that a human being will desires evil if he/she expects to get some enjoyment or advantage from it. When, however, a man fully realizes the evil nature of his striving, he will probably desist from the projected action, for, as Bradwardine says: "human nature is such that when presented with something evil, it abhors it and flees from it, unless perhaps someone be a Manichaean, with a soul that is by its essence evil and dark, produced by an essentially evil god — he Prince of darkness, which, however, is impossible."[76]

To Bradwardine it is self-evident that in principle human natural conduct is good. The argument he adduces in support of this opinion is little sophisticated and rather commonplace, yet one cannot deny it some persuasive force:

> We see that all natural things, animate as well as inanimate, sensible as well as insensible, and those lacking reason, desire things that are good for themselves and avoid those that are noxious and evil. Therefore, what possible irrational reason would make it so, that only the reasonable being, which surpasses all irrational entities, should desire and love that which is evil for it and avoid that which is good for it?[77]

[75] See Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, pp. 283–291.

[76] Ibid., p. 165.

[77] Ibid.

Free as human will undoubtedly is, its freedom, nevertheless is far from absolute. Because of the beatitude of eternal life, which is assured to human beings, or at least to some of them, namely the elect, man cannot with his own faculty of free will make choices between absolute contraries forming the basic opposition of good versus evil, for the elect their scope of choice is limited to various forms of good; an assertion, Bradwardine claims, confirmed by all the Catholic Doctors. Man, naturally can make choices during his temporal existence in this world, yet he is never completely detached from the matter of his choice and does not stand in equally free relation to the contrary terms of the oppositions he faces, thus he cannot either will or not will one and the same term of a given opposition.

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

Let us observe, that, paradoxically, while combating semi-Pelagians, to whom both John Duns Scotus and William Ockham were thought to belong in his time, Bradwardine starts his debate by accepting some views of his opponents. To begin with, he follows Ockham in assuming that man can know God not by means of his reason, but only thanks to the Revelation; thus the basic source of knowledge is Holy Scripture. He declares the greatest truth of philosophy the statement to the effect that we cannot know God by our own unaided efforts and, therefore, he is keenly aware of his need for God's assistance, for which he ardently entreats at the beginning of his work.

In his concern to work out a reconciliation between two theories that may appear mutually exclusive, that is the theory upholding the absolute free will of God and the one defending free will of man, Bradwardine makes use of theory elaborated by John Duns Scotus. His *magnum opus* directed against some of his contemporaries whom he terms Pelagians, was intended to preserve his fellow "Mertonians" from the heretic view claiming that grace is not needed for salvation, or, more precisely, that grace merely assists, and not enables, our good efforts aiming at salvation.

The most significant ideas of Thomas Bradwardine's, selected from his more than 670 page great work *In Defense of God*, and here briefly sketched, suggest, even at the first acquaintance, the fundamental question: does man possess the power to make a genuine free choice and thus to decide about his life? From what we briefly outlined above it would seem, at first glance,

that the answer that suggests itself must be in the negative. Bradwardine, in his effort to defend God's claims against Pelagians, reduces to pieces not only the last named but also man himself. He as good as deprives him of free will and enmeshes him in the network of determinist influences. Man, God's most perfect work, His rational creature, cannot decide his own destiny, God appears as the co-maker of all decisions issued by man. God is the first, absolutely free, cause of man; it is the First Cause of both man's existence and his activity. His omniscience and omnipotence assure him absolute freedom and, by the same token, place man in the position of inevitable dependence on God. Bradwardine's strong commitment to the divine all-power appears with force in his theory of salvation and his belief in double predestination. He is convinced that God selects some human beings to good, while others He predestines to hell. This ruling by God is totally arbitrary and not based on God's foreknowledge of our deserving actions or lack thereof. Naturally, if Bradwardine acknowledged that God predestines a human being to good in reward for his/her future merits, knowing in advance how a given person would conduct him or herself, he would lapse into the Pelagian theory, which he set out to combat in his *magnum opus.* It thus would seem that according to Bradwardine neither a future elect nor a future reprobate makes his/her choices personally. For those predestined to salvation are only enabled to do good by the free gift of grace they receive from God, while the future reprobates, being refused grace, are unable to produce righteous deeds and thus condemned to doing evil. To be sure, Bradwardine repeatedly makes the statement that man is endowed with free will and possesses the faculty of free choice, but what he means by this is simply that man is not determined in his allegedly free acts by nature and its forces. As for man's dependence on God, Bradwardine always makes it clear that man is predetermined in his acts by God's decrees. Admittedly, God, being infinitely benevolent and perfectly just positively wills human beings to make good choices and willingly grants his grace to humans to enable them to deserve eternal life through their good works, yet there always comes up the proviso, that his benevolence does not extend to all human beings. Thus the overall tendency of Bradwardine's thinking seems to be to defend the absolute freedom of God at the expense of the extent and nature of human freedom: while defending the limitless liberty of God, he imposes rather narrow limitations on man. Some of Bradwardine's followers even claimed, that according to his view God, being the co-author of our acts, carries the responsibility for all our deeds: sinful as

well as righteous, for the good performed by humans as well as for the perpetrated evil. This theory bears the name of theological determinism and is based upon the peculiar concept of divine omnivolence (*omnivolentia*).

Although this rather extreme reading of Thomas Bradwardine's ideas does not seem to correspond to his true intentions, nevertheless it was in this predeterminist form that his theory was received and appreciated, first in his homely milieu of Oxford, and then in Paris. Only few theologians wholly escaped its impact and undertook an attempt to defend the full extent of human freedom against what must have appeared to their eyes as an outright predestinarianism or theological determinism based on the concept of God's preestablished design. *De causa Dei* made its author famous in Oxford and elsewhere and it set in motion a new reception and reinterpretation of Augustine, which continued in subsequent ages to produce a new development and have prolonged history in the times of the Reformation.

Translated by Roman Majeran

THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE CAUSATION AND HUMAN FREE WILL:
AN OUTLINE OF THE 16TH CENTURY CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THOMISM AND MOLINISM

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk

INTRODUCTION: THE SOURCES FOR THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN MAN

The problem of the relationship between divine causation and human free initiative in determining human moral conduct was the chief concern of the dispute between St. Augustine (354–430) and the followers of the teachings of Pelagius (ca. 354–ca. 419). That ancient dispute had an essential impact upon the development of theology and philosophy in subsequent centuries up until our own times, since noticeable reverberations of that distant controversy can be heard in contemporary debates on human freedom between determinism and libertarianism.[1] In the 5th and early 6th century the keen exchanges between the both sides of the conflict brought as the result the first official definition of the Church's stand on grace and predestination formulated at the council of Orange in 529.[2] However, the decisions of the

[1] See Augustine's writings from the period of his struggle against pelagianism: *De correptione et gratia*; *De praedestinatione sanctorum; De gratia et libero arbitrio; De dono perseverantiae; Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum.*

[2] The second council of Orange was convened in 529 to discuss the controversy between the supporters of the teaching of St. Augustine on grace and its role in human salvation, and the defenders of the Pelagian and Semipelagian doctrines. The controversy concerned the responsibility man bears for his own salvation and the role divine grace plays therein. In a brief outline: the Pelagians upheld the thesis that human beings are born entirely innocent, there is neither sinful nature in man nor original sin weighing heavily upon human will, hence they concluded that human beings can in principle by their own moral effort achieve a state of sinless perfection. Particular attention was paid at the council of Orange to the doctrine of Semipelagianism, which affirmed that the human race, fallen as it is and burdened with a nature inclined to sin, still retains sufficient goodness as to be able to obtain a gift of grace from God through an act performed by unregenerated human nature. A study of the canons of

council failed sufficiently to clarify the key matters concerning grace, human freedom and predestination, nor were some notoriously unclear statements by St. Augustine on these matters, occasionally suggesting interpretations beyond the limits of orthodoxy, ever explained in a universally acceptable manner. This lack of precision in the official ecclesiastical statements and theological formulations, combined with the intricacy and difficulty of the matter itself accounts for the extraordinary vitality of the problem of predestination and its obstinate tendency time and again to resurge and occupy the minds of the foremost theologians. Undoubtedly, the commanding influence upon all these debates was exercised by St. Augustine's teaching on the matters concerning predestination and grace and the whole theological synthesis elaborated by the Bishop of Hippo, which accorded the preeminent role in human salvation to divine grace and accordingly positioned the respective roles played by human free will and God's prescience and predestination.

The earliest staging of the controversy over predestination after the second council of Orange took place in the 9th century, the climax of the Carolingian Renaissance, with Gottschalk of Orbais (800–868), Hincmar of Reims (806–882) and John Scotus Eriugena (800–877) playing the leading roles.[3] Again the problem of divine causation and human free will and their respective roles in human meritorious conduct and ultimate salvation made its appearance in a number of medieval debates, as, for instance, those conducted by St. Anselm, which were typically marked by efforts to reconcile the teaching on divine prescience and predestination in the spirit of St. Augustine with the affirmation of free will in human beings, usually also making extensive use of the ideas and terminology drawn from Boethius's *De consolatione* and his commentaries on Aristotle's logic.[4]

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the council of Orange reveals the source whence John Calvin drew his doctrine of the complete corruption of the human race. Very telling in this respect is Charles Hodge's *Systematic Theology,*a synthesis of Presbyterian Church doctrine and, therefore, strongly predestinarian. Hodges affirms that controversies concerning predestination time and again recurring in the Church history were the outcome of Semipelagian attitudes constantly reasserting themselves in the Church; accordingly, Hodges regards the condemnation of Gottschalk in the 9th century as a result of a Semipelagian stance adopted by the institutional Catholic Church. See Ch. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 2, Grand Rapids, MI, 2005, pp. 167–168.

[3] Cf. A. Stefańczyk, "The Doctrinal Controversies of the Carolingian Renaissance: Gottschalk of Orbais' Teachings on Predestination," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2017), 3, pp. 53–70.

[4] See A. Stefańczyk, *Między koniecznością a wolnością,* Lublin 2015, pp. 52–72.

This problem featured prominently in the theological syntheses of leading Scholastic theologians, including St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) and John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266–1308).[5] William of Ockham (ca. 1285 — ca. 1347) proposed a solution to the problem of predestination and human free action from a Nominalist point of view, by contrast, Thomas Bradwardine (ca 1290–1349) defended the view of predestination as found in late writings of St. Augustine.[6] Medieval discussions of the problem of divine causation and human free will in the work of human salvation preceded and paved the way for the turbulent quarrels over divine grace that marked the epoch of the Protestant Reformation. The views originated by Robert Holcot (ca. 1290–1349), John Hus (ca. 1369–1415), Gabriel Biel (ca. 1425–1495) and John Wycliffe (ca. 1320–1384) were developed and gained considerable influence in the teaching of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–1564). Martin Luther, in his famous exchange with Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536) acknowledged himself that his view of divine grace (divine causation) and human freedom formed the chief point of difference between his own doctrine and that of the Catholic Church. Likewise, the question of free will and divine causation formed the main subject matter in John Calvin's exchange with Albert Pighius (1490–1542).[7] The Protestant Reformation and

[5] See M. Koszkało, *Jan Duns Szkot i jego kwestie o predestynacji*, in *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje… Wolność człowieka a hipoteza teistyczna. Wybór tekstów*, ed. A.P. Stefańczyk, Lublin, 2018, pp. 293–318; see also in this volume: A.P. Stefańczyk, "Will, Knowledge, Action – God's Grace: Thomas Aquinas on Divine Predestination and Divine Causality."

[6] See E. Jung, "Tomasz Bradwardine i jego dzieło *O sprawie Boga przeciwko pelagianom i o mocy przyczyn*," in *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje… Wybór tekstów*, pp. 319–368.

[7] See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice. Domingo Báñez, physical premotion and the controversy "De Auxiliis" revisited,* Boston 2016, pp. 3–4; see also Albertus Pighius, *De libero hominis arbitrio et divina gratia libri decem,* Coloniae 1542, Jean Calvin, *Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de servitute et liberatione humani arbitrii adversus calumnias Alberti Pighii Campensis,* Geneva 1543. Phillip Schaff in his *History of the Christian Church* gives some information about Pighius and a summary of the main points of the debate between Pighius and Calvin: "Pighius (or Pigghe) of Campen in Holland, educated at Louvain and Cologne, and a pupil of Pope Adrian VI, whom he followed to Rome, was a learned and eloquent divine and deputed on various missions by Clement VII and Paul III. He may have seen Calvin at the Colloquies in Worms and Ratisbon. He died as canon and archdeacon of Utrecht, Dec. 26, 1542, a few months after the publication of his book against Calvin and the other Reformers. Beza calls him the first sophist of the age, who, by gaining a victory over Calvin, hoped to attain to a cardinal's hat. But it is wrong to judge of motives without evidence. His retirement to Utrecht could not

promote such ambition.Pighius represents the dogma of the slavery of the human will, and of the absolute necessity of all that happens, as the cardinal error of the Reformation, and charges it with leading to complete moral indifference. He wrote ten books against it. In the first six books, he defends the doctrine of free-will; in the last four books, he discusses divine grace, foreknowledge, predestination, and providence, and, last, the Scripture passages on these subjects. He teaches the Semi-Pelagian theory with some Pelagian features, and declares that 'our works are meritorious before God.' After the Synod of Trent had more carefully guarded the doctrine of justification against Semi-Pelagianism, the Spanish Inquisition placed his book, *De libero arbitrio*, and his tract, *De peccato originali*, on the Index, and Cardinal Bona recommended caution in reading them, since he did not always present the reliable orthodox doctrine. Pighius was not ashamed to copy, without acknowledgment, whole pages from Calvin's Institutes, where it suited his purpose. Calvin calls him a plagiarist, and says, "With what right he publishes such sections as his own, I cannot see, unless he claims, as enemy, the privilege of plunder." The arguments of Pighius against the doctrine of the slavery of the human will are these: It contradicts common sense; it is inconsistent with the admitted freedom of will in civil and secular matters; it destroys all morality and discipline, turns men into animals and monsters, makes God the author of sin, and perverts his justice into cruelty, and his wisdom into folly. He derives these heresies from the ancient Gnostics and Simon Magus, except that Luther surpassed them all in impiety. Calvin's answer was written in about two months, and amidst many interruptions. He felt the weight of the objections, but he always marched up to the cannon's mouth. He admits, incidentally, that Luther often used hyperbolic expressions in order to rouse attention. He also allows the *liberum arbitrium* in the sense that man acts voluntarily and of his inner impulse. But he denies that man, without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, has the power to choose what is spiritually good, and quotes Rom. 6:17; 7:14, 23. 'Man has *arbitrium spontaneum*, so that he willingly and by choice does evil, without compulsion from without, and, therefore, he incurs guilt. But, owing to native depravity, his will is so given to sin that it always chooses evil. Hence spontaneity and enslavement may exist together. The *voluntas* is *spontanea*, but not *libera*; it is not *coacta*, yet *serva*.' This is an anticipation of the artificial distinction between natural ability and moral inability — a distinction which is practically useless. As regards the teaching of the early Church, he could not deny that the Fathers, especially Origen, exalt the freedom of the will; but he could claim Augustin in his later writings, in which he retracted his earlier advocacy of freedom. The objection that the slavery of the will nullifies the exhortations to repent, would be valid, if God did not make them effective by his Spirit. The reply of Calvin to Pighius is more cautious and guarded than Luther's reply to Erasmus, and more churchly than Zwingli's tract on Providence. In defending himself, he defended what was then the common Protestant doctrine, in opposition to the then prevailing Pelagianism in the Roman Church. It had a good effect upon the Council of Trent, which distinctly disowned the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian heresy.Calvin dedicated his book to Melanchthon, as a friend who had agreed with him and had advised him to write

the theologies of Luther and Calvin had their impact upon Catholic theological milieus, one of its results was the most famous controversy within the Catholic Church to take place at the late 16th and early 17th century, the so called controversy *de auxiliis.* This name derives from the main subject matter of that debate, which was the nature of the divine help (*auxilium*) offered to human beings in the form of grace. The precise point of the controversy was whether divine grace, the *auxilium* bestowed on man, infallibly achieves its objective by totally subduing human will and making it wholly subservient to its powerful influence, or the efficacy of that divine *auxilium* is still conditioned by a free response of the human being to whom it has been offered. Different possible answers to this dilemma divided the Catholic world and the roles of champions of the opposed solutions of that question were assumed by the orders of the Dominicans and the Jesuits: the former standing by the absolute efficacy of divine grace, while the latter upholding some measure of independence of human freedom. Among the Dominican theologians involved in the controversy the chief

against Pighius, if he should attack the Reformation. But Melanchthon, who had taught the same doctrine, was at that time undergoing a change in his views on the freedom of the will, chiefly because he felt that the denial of it would make God the author of sin, and destroy man's moral accountability. He was as competent to appreciate the logical argument in favor of necessity, but he was more open to the force of ethical and practical considerations. In his reply to Calvin's dedication, May 11, 1543, he acknowledged the compliment paid to him, but modestly and delicately intimated his dissent and his desire that Protestants should unite in the defence of those more important doctrines, which commended themselves by their simplicity and practical usefulness. 'I wish,' he says, 'you would transfer your eloquence to the adorning of these momentous subjects, by which our friends would be strengthened, our enemies terrified, and the weak encouraged; for who in these days possesses a more forcible or splendid style of disputation? ... I do not write this letter to dictate to you who are so learned a man, and so well versed in all the exercises of piety. I am persuaded, indeed, that it agrees with your sentiments, though less subtle and more adapted for use.' Calvin intended to answer the second part of the work of Pighius, but as he learned that he had died shortly before, he did not wish 'to insult a dead dog' (!), and applied himself 'to other pursuits.' But nine years afterwards he virtually answered it in the Consensus Genevensis (1552), which may be considered as the second part of his refutation of Pighius, although it was occasioned by the controversy with Bolsec." Ph. Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, vol. VIII: *Modern Christianity The Swiss Reformation*, Oak Harbor, WA, 1997, § 119. This material has been carefully compared, corrected and emended (according to the 1910 edition of Charles Scribner's Sons) by The Electronic Bible Society, Dallas, TX, 1998. http://www.bible.ca/history/philip-schaff/8_ch15.htm.

names were, among others: Domingo Báñez,[8] Diego Alvarez,[9] and Francisco Zumel,[10] whereas the Jesuits were represented by Luis de Molina, Francisco

[8] Domingo Báñez — theologian and philosopher, a co-founder of the theological system based upon the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, known under the name of Banesianism. Born 29 February 1528 in Medina del Campo (Valladolid); died 21 October 1614 ibid. He began his studies at the age of fifteen at the university of Salamanca where he completed a course in liberal arts. After finishing it, he entered the Dominican order, where in 1547 he took his perpetual vows in the convent of San Esteban. In the years 1548–1552 he studied theology under such distinguished masters as Melchiore Cano (ca. 1509–1560) and Pedro Sotomayor (1494–1560). He obtained his doctorate at the university of Sigenza (1565). Next, in the years 1567–1568 he taught at the university of Alcala; between 1561 and 1582 he was a spiritual director and a confessor of Saint Teresa of Avila. In 1577 he obtained the chair "Durando" in Salamanca and in 1581 a newly founded chair of theology which he headed until 1599. The writings he left fall into a number of categories; his treatises on freedom and grace, related to the controversy *de auxiliis*, are as follows; *Apologia fratrum praedicatorum* […] *adversus novas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludovici Molinae nuncupati* (Madrid, 1595), *Relectio de merito et augmento caritatis* (Salamanca, 1590), *De vera et legitima concordia liberi rbitrii cum auxiliis gratiae Dei moventis humanam voluntatem* (Madrid, 1600); his commentaries on Aristotle include *Commentarius in libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione* (Salamanca, 1585); there is also a compendium of logic: *Institutiones minoris dialecticae* and a notable array of commentaries on and expositions of works by St. Thomas Aquinas, including *Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae.*

His *Apologia fratrum praedicatorum* consists of three parts: the first contains critical examination of Molina's teaching on predestination [chapters 22 – 26], the second and third, consisting of six chapters each, undertake discussion of some of the topics referred to in Molina's work *De concordia*, such as free will, divine prescience (foreknowledge), middle science and efficacious grace and offer philosophical and theological explanations of these wholly in the spirit of the doctrine of Saint Thomas Aquinas. See Guido Stucco, *The Catholic Doctrine...,* Xlibris Corporation 2014, p. 142.

[9] Diego Alvarez (ca. 1550–1635) — Dominican, a staunch defender of the Thomist doctrine of grace and predestination, actively participated in the controversy *de auxiliis* and wrote numerous polemical works against L. Molina's doctrine, among other works *De auxiliis divinae gratiae.*

[10] Francisco Zumel (ca. 1540–1607) was a Spanish philosopher, superior general of the Royal and Military Order of Our Lady of Mercy of the Redemption of the Captives (the Mercedarian Order: *Ordo Beatae Mariae Virginis de Mercede*) and a master at the university of Salamanca where he taught natural philosophy and moral philosophy. He was a convinced Thomist and attacked the doctrine of Luis Molina and his followers from the Thomist standpoint.

Suárez and others.[11] The principal impulse causing the debate *de auxiliis* to start came, undoubtedly, from the Protestant Reformation and its doctrines, nevertheless the immediate point of reference for the Catholic theologians taking part in the exchange were the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning justification (*iustificatio*). In the Decree on Justification (*Decretum de Justificatione* — 1547), the council laid it down that the first step on the way to and the beginning of the justification of a human being is always taken by God, it is always an act of undeserved grace, previous to any initiative on the part of man, which moves the will of a human person, which, however, can be either obeyed or resisted by that person's free will.[12]

[11] See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice*, p. 5

[12] "Declarat præterea, ipsius justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum Jesum præveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab ejus vocatione, qua nullis eorum exsistentibus meritis vocantur, ut qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adiuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, eidem gratiæ libere assentiendo et cooperando, disponantur, ita ut, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abicere potest, neque tamen sine gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit. Unde in sacris Litteris cum dicitur: «Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos", libertatis nostræ admonemur; cum respondemus: «Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur", Dei nos gratia præveniri confitemur." *Decretum de justificatione*, Sessio VI, Sacrosancti Œcumenici et Generalis *Concilii Tridentini,* sub Paulo III pontifice maximo celebrata, die XIII mensis Januarii MDXLVII, c. 5.

The Synod furthermore declares, that in adults, the beginning of the said Justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are called; that so they, who by sins were alienated from God, may be disposed through His quickening and assisting grace, to convert themselves to their own justification, by freely assenting to and co-operating with that said grace: in such sort that, while God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, neither is man himself utterly without doing anything while he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able to reject it; yet is he not able, by his own free will, without the grace of God, to move himself unto justice in His sight. Whence, when it is said in the sacred writings: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you, we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer; Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted, we confess that we are prevented by the grace of God. The Council of Trent The Sixth Session, *The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent*, transl. J. Waterworth, London, 1848, pp. 32–33. Hanover Historical Texts Project, Scanned by Hanover College students in 1995.

It is a dogma in the Catholic doctrine that grace is necessary for salvation, nevertheless it is also teaching of the Church that grace can be resisted by man. It clearly follows from that that grace is sometimes unopposed and cooperated with by man, and sometimes rejected and resisted by the person to whom it has been offered. Hence comes the distinction between sufficient grace *(gratia sufficiens)*and efficacious grace *(gratia efficax)*. The efficacious grace, as the very name suggests, is always successful in bringing about its effect (human salvation), whereas the former kind of grace does not, by itself, achieve the intended result. Whence comes the difference between these two types of grace? Does the different degree of efficacy between them depend more on God or more on man? If it is the will of a human being and its failure properly to respond to God's gift that is responsible for the lack of efficacy of the sufficient grace, it follows, that divine grace can in some cases be cooperated with and, in other cases, refused human voluntary cooperation and thus rejected. Yet if divine influence can be resisted, be it by mere refusal to cooperate therewith, it seems to follow that divine designs can be frustrated by man, God's influence resisted and thus His omnipotence is called into question. On the other hand, if we wish to keep the divine omnipotence intact, we face the awkward consequence of having to give up the link between divine omnipotence (which cannot be frustrated) and sufficient grace (which can); still the lack of efficiency of sufficient grace remains in a way attributable to God. The solution to this aporia of sufficient and efficacious grace may seem to lie in ultimately reducing the difference between these two kinds of grace to God's supreme free choice, which decides who will be saved and which is antecedent with respect to the human freedom to accept or reject the offered grace.[13] But here again we face an aporia: God's sovereign and irrevocable decision as to who will ultimately be saved clashes directly with any human initiative, indeed, with any kind of human freedom in the work of salvation.

Now we are in a position to state what the problem of divine grace versus human freedom consists in: it is the problem of reconciling or preserving both God's sovereignty on the one hand, and human autonomy and freedom on the other. Different strategies of treating this problem and arriving at a satisfactory solution to it appeared in the 16th century; it was these different ways of dealing with this aporia that were the source of the

[13] See K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, *Mały słownik teologiczny,* transl. T. Mieszkowski, P. Pachciarek, Warszawa, 1987, p. 214.

controversy in that century between Luis Molina[14] and his followers on the one hand and Domingo Báñez and staunch Thomists on the other. Howev-

[14] Luis de Molina (1535–1600) — one of the most learned and highly appreciated theologians of the Society of Jesus (*Societas Iesu*). At the age of eighteen he entered into the Society of Jesus in Alcalá, where he completed his novitiate; his philosophical and theological studies he completed at the university of Coimbra in Portugal, where he became professor of philosophy; later he moved to the then flowering university of Évora in Portugal as a professor of theology. In 1590 he left for his native town of Cuenca, where he devoted his efforts to writing and publishing his monumental commentary on the first part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae.* Molina's *Concordia de liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, praedestinatione et reprobatione* is his foremost contribution to the science of theology and he took thirty years to complete it. The publication of that work was supported by valuable assistance from Albert, the then Grand Inquisitor of Portugal and brother of Emperor Rudolph II, the book, soon made famous, first came out in Lisbon in 1589 (though with the date1588). As the title already suggests, the main objective of the book is solving the notorious problem of reconciling grace with human free will. The book also contains confirmation of the Tridentine doctrine of persistence of human will under the influence of efficacious grace (Session 6, chapters 4–6). Molina's work can be described as the first effort to treat within one logically consistent system the related problems of grace, free will, divine prescience, providence and predestination to salvation and damnation. Nevertheless Molina's novel treatment of these issues and novel solutions he proposed to some of the problems associated with them met with many reservations and objections. The basis on which the Molinist system rests is his famous theory of "middle science" (*media scientia*) in God. Nevertheless novelty for its own sake was far from Molina's objective: his strong committment to tradition is attested by the fact that his theological work took the shape of a commentary on Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* (IQ xiv, 13; Q xix a 16, QQ xxii–xxiii). As far as the style of the *Concordia* is concerned, it is a heavy read, laden with frequent repetitions and tedious presentation of ideas, with prolix and convoluted sentences. Naturally, some of the difficulties of the work can be attributed to the abstruse nature of the matters it treats about, nevertheless one can suspect that the disagreements sparked off by Molina's doctrine would have been far less turbulent, had his style and manner of presentation been simpler and clearer. Molina, quite conceitedly, affirmed that the earlier heresies concerning grace either would not have appeared at all or would have quickly disappeared, had the Catholic doctrine on grace been treated and presented according to the principles and in the systematic and logically precise way he himself used in his own discussion of this matter. In short, the publication of the *Concordia* gave rise to much controversy and disagreement among theologians, especially those in the orders of the Dominicans and Jesuits. Molina himself delayed the publication of the *Concordia* and information about the content and the theses of this work leaked out to theological circles, causing some theologians to try and prevent the publication of the work. It was finally published in 1589 complete with a defence in which the au-

er, the springhead and the nucleus of the whole debate was the question of divine causation in the work of salvation of a human being, that is, to put it simply, the question of divine grace. Other matters which were highly relevant in this controversy, such as the problems of divine prescience and divine predestination, followed from and accompanied this core issue.

1. GOD'S CAUSATION: GRACE

Is the divine aid to man in the work of human salvation irresistibly efficacious, or does its efficacy depend on a human being's free response to it? Luis Molina, anxious to preserve the autonomy of man, represents the divine help offered to human beings in the work of their salvation, that is grace, as depending for its efficacy on human free will; by contrast, D. Báñez and Thomists that divine grace has to be omnipotent and irresistible. Thus grace, that is God's auxiliary causation in the process of the salvation of a human being forms the nucleus of the problem, and matters are additionally complicated by the distinction within the domain of grace between sufficient (*sufficiens*) and efficacious (*efficax*) grace. The difference between the two kinds of grace again proved to be a source of controversy: where does it arise from? Thomism assumes that the irreducible difference between sufficient and efficacious grace in no way derives from human will,

thor tried to answer to the objections to his views which already became current before the publication of his work. This move, however, proved of little efficiency and the heated controversy surrounding Molina's work was on the increase. Not only theologians from te Dominican order, with Domingo Báñez and de Lemos, but also a number of Molina's Jesuit confreres, including Henriquez and Mariana,, resolutely opposed his doctrine. The affair became notorious in the whole of Spain, with the inquisition of the country condemning Molina's teaching. As the temperature of the conflict kept growing, Rome itself felt compelled to intervene and take matters in its own hands. In 1594 Pope Clement VIII imposed silence on both sides of the controversy and demanded that documents concerning the disagreement be sent to the Vatican. In 1598 a special commission was set up by the pope under the name of "*Congregatio de auxiliis"* with the task of examining the controversial issue; some early findings by this commission suggested that Molina's teaching in some points diverged from the Catholic doctrine. Nevertheless no official condemnation of Molina's doctrine followed and he was able to publish another edition of his *Concordia* with additions and explanations designed to rectify misconceptions and misrepresentations of his doctrine (Antwerp, 1595, 1609). See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina. The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge*, Zondervan, 2015.

but is an immanent feature of grace as such. According to proponents of this position, efficacious grace is so by nature, it naturally secures the achievement of its objective because it infallibly wins the cooperation of the concerned human being, whereas sufficient grace only provides the power (*potentia*) for a salutary action, without ensuring that the action actually takes place; the effects of sufficient grace consist in elevation of the powers of the soul and making them capable of deeds whose value is supernatural. The Thomist conception is based upon the assumption of God's concurrent cooperation with nature. The way sufficient and efficacious graces mutually relate in their way of operation is conceived in terms of the universal Aristotelian-Thomist paradigm of act and potency. According to Báñez any voluntary salvific (supernaturally meritorious) act of man stands in need of twofold divine assistance: a) firstly, the help consisting in an immediate influence upon the will of a human person, making this will capable of a salutary act; b) secondly, a positive prompting given to the will, setting the will in motion towards an act that is meritorious as to its result and as to its motivation. This setting the will in motion towards a salvific deed is the famous "physical premotion" (*praemotio physica*). Now it is clear how the scheme of sufficient and efficacious grace corresponds to the scheme potency and act: sufficient grace is the divine intervention providing man with the potency needed for a salutary act, whereas efficacious grace is the "physical premotion," pushing, as it were, the will towards an actualization of that potency in the form of an actual salutary deed.

By contrast, the central concern for Molina and the Molinists and their point of departure is human free will. They are guided by the research directive enjoining them to begin their investigation by precisely defining what human freedom consists in and how it operates and only then move on to a consideration of God's active cooperation in the accomplishment of a salutary deed. We have to begin by that what we supposedly know and only then to proceed to matters less known and more abstruse. The Molinist teaching on grace can be summarized in a few fundamental points: i) divine grace is a salvific component of human action, ii) grace is not the only factor in a meritorious human deed contributing to its salvific value, iii) another active factor, be it a subordinate one, in the work of salvation is human free will. The effect of grace on a human person is always a) to impart to that person a supernatural ability to perform acts whose value is supernatural, yet b) grace never compels any human being to perform any act, on the contrary, it always leaves intact to the human being the full possibility to refuse to perform the act it suggests. According to Molinists, if

a person chooses to perform a salutary act, this person acts by virtue of the supernatural ability imparted to that person by means of grace; if, by contrast, that person forbears from performing a meritorious act suggested by grace, he/she acts solely with his/her natural power. Thus the difference between sufficient and efficacious grace derives from the response of the free will of a person to the gift of grace, and not from the essence of the grace itself. Human will has the power to reject any gift of grace and refuse to cooperate, in this way rendering this gift futile, it has this power with respect to any grace in any situation, for no grace can subdue human will to the extent of making that will incapable of resistance and opposition to what is suggested by grace. Every free will in every possible situation retains the ability to oppose the action of grace and to perform an act contrary to that suggested by it; even when exposed to its direct influence. This thesis, which amounted to an assertion of the inalienable nature of human freedom, made Molinists feel entitled to regard any theory refusing to go thus far in affirmation of human freedom as guilty of laying upon God the burden of responsibility for all human deeds: good as well as evil. What the Thomists effectively hold, Molinists claimed, is that it is ultimately God who induces human beings to perform all deeds they commit; if it is God that determines man to perform every physical action, how can one avoid the consequence that it is God that determines man to commit sin, if the physical action in question is sinful? Thus, Molinists held, the Thomist theory of efficacious, that is irresistible, grace is tantamount to making God directly responsible for the evil found in the world.

Thomists, on their part, pointed to consequences of the Molinist doctrine on grace and human freedom that appeared to contradict the Catholic teaching regarding God's omnipotence and omniscience. They argued as follows: (i) no created event nor any created action can take place without being previously predetermined by God. This is because: (ii) God eternally knows all He intends to effect, knows all that is going to happen, including all human free decisions and actions. This further means that (iii) God's knowledge is absolutely independent of whatever His creatures decide and do, it is impossible for God to draw information about what His creatures freely decide to do from the creatures themselves, for this would imply that creatures can influence and change God's mind and incline His will this way or that. In fact things seem to be the other way round: whatever creatures decide and do, they decide and do because God knows eternally they will, their actions and decisions seem to be predetermined by God's previous knowledge of them. The Molinist theory of human freedom can hardly be

squared with this established view of God's eternally unchangeable knowledge and decrees.

These sketchy remarks are intended to give some general outline of the problem that confronted the theologians engaging in the controversy that sprang up in the 16th century between the upholders of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas and the new theory proposed by Luis Molina and his Jesuit school, concerning divine grace, that is God's causal influence involved in the process of the salvation of the individual human being. Needless to say, these matters were highly relevant both for particular questions concerning theory of divine prescience and for the conception of freedom. These points will be discussed in the further part of this article.

2. LUIS DE MOLINA: THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM

If Molina assumes, as clearly follows from the above, that no divine grace is efficacious in itself, the problem arises how to explain God's foreknowledge of the (future) cooperation between gifts of grace and (unpredictable) decisions of human freedom, and how He adjusts distribution of His gifts of grace to human decisions. How does Molina (and Molinism) conceive of divine prescience (God's foreknowledge of contingent events) and what does he make of the concept of omnipotence of graces?

The council of Trent in its decree on justification as quoted above[15] defined the general outlines of the orthodoxy concerning two necessary conditions of salvation, which were the necessity of divine grace and necessary human freedom. However, naturally enough, the council abstained from giving a precise definition of the relationship between grace and human free action and the way they cooperate, which opened the way for philosophical theological theorizing aiming at a more detailed explanation of the respective modes of action of God and the human person in the process of human individual salvation. Even before Molina came up with his theory, Leonard Lessius[16] put forward the thesis that God does not grant efficacious grace to

[15] See footnote 12.

[16] Leonard Lessius (1554–1623) — Flemish Jesuit, a theologian and a moralist; the author of *Theses theologicae* (Louvain, 1585) where he considers, among other things, problems concerning divine grace and foreknowledge; his solutions agree in part with Molina's views.

a human being before He is sure that that human person will positively respond to His initiative. This idea appears to anticipate Molina's conceptions, who elaborated in detail a coherent doctrine of God's middle knowledge *(media scientia)* as a means of reconciling God's infallible foreknowledge with human freedom.[17] His celebrated doctrine Molina presented in his work *De liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia,* which was intended as a commentary on the first part of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae.*

2.1. GOD'S (FORE)KNOWLEDGE

Molina elaborated his conception of God's middle knowledge as a basis for a solution of the notorious problem of God's infallible foreknowledge of apparently contingent events in the world and the truly contingent nature of these events. The question he faced was: how can God know in a certain way future events that are not determined by causes operating in a necessary way? Provided that God's necessarily infallible knowledge extends to all future events, how can we avoid theological necessitarianism or fatalism? The comprehensive solution to that aporia that was officially approved by the Church in Molina's time was that offered by St. Thomas Aquinas, so it was natural for the Jesuit theologian to take Aquinas's views on that matter as the principal point of reference for his own examination and treatment of the problem. Let us, then, take a brief look at Thomas's conception of God's knowledge and the kinds thereof and then proceed to see what innovations and alterations Molina introduced in his own reworking of this model conception.

In accordance with the long standing Christian theological tradition, Aquinas introduces the assumption of the atemporal nature of God's knowledge, which exists without any conceivable change in eternity. This atemporal character also extends to God's knowledge of temporal matters:

> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time.[18]

[17] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez,* Leiden 1988, p. 169.

[18] St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*. (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947), transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ summa/

According to Aquinas (who faithfully follows in this respects St. Augustine), although God's all-knowledge is one reality (identical with God's essence) and consists of no really distinct parts, we can, nevertheless, from our circumscribed point of view, distinguish three aspects or kinds of the one timeless and undivided knowledge in God, according to the the three distinct objective domains this knowledge is concerned with. First there is "knowledge of simple intelligence" (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*)[19]which refers to the fact that God comprehends in His intellect all possible states of affairs (all possible worlds, to use a modern term). Secondly, there is "approving knowledge" or "knowledge of approval" (*scientia approbationis*)[20] in God, which is God's knowledge of what He Himself brings into existence. Thirdly, there is "knowledge of vision" (*scientia visionis*)[21], which is God's knowledge of all the contingencies really occurring in the actually created world[22]; this

FP/FP014.html#FPQ14A13THEP1; *Sth* 1, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3: "[…] ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus."

[19] *Sth* 1, q. 14, a. 9: "Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum extra videntem."

[20] *Sth* 1, q. 14, a 8, s. c.: "Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari scientia approbationis."

[21] *Sth* 1, q. 14, a. 9 s. c.: "Respondeo dicendum quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis."

[22] Cf. W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 173; also M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, Lublin 2015, pp. 204–205.

knowledge also extends to the evil which is really present in the created world. Thomas's consideration of God's knowledge and its kinds can be neatly illustrated with a diagram consisting of four unequal circles, each larger circle containing all the smaller circles of the diagram in its inside. The largest circle, containing all the others, denotes (i) God's "knowledge of vision" (*scientia visionis*) as related to His own essence; God knows His own essence and in it He perceives all truths whatever, all possibilities, whether actualized in the world or never to be actualized: there is nothing in the domain of possible knowledge that is hidden from God. The next circle in the diagram, the one immediately contained in the former, designates (ii) God's "knowledge of simple intelligence" (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) that is His knowledge of all possible effects of His power, whether realized or not. Both God's knowledge of His own essence and His knowledge of all possibles are speculative in nature and they form what might be called speculative intellect in God. The third circle denotes (iii) God's "approving knowledge" (*scientia approbationis*), that is His knowledge of what He Himself chooses to actualize in His creation as essence endowed with existence and as form essentially related to potency; this knowledge is practical in nature: it is the knowledge of what God wills to become real (and so it is essentially related to God's will), and it is said to form practical intellect in God. In other words, the approving knowledge is God's knowledge of the actual world complete with all its possible contingencies (whether actualized or not) including natural and free acts by actually existing intelligent creatures and the contingencies that may happen to these.

The fourth and the smallest circle (see graph on next page), contained within the inside of the circle of the "knowledge of approval" again represents God's "knowledge of vision," this time, however, applied not to God's essence but to the actualized contingencies within the created world; these actualized contingecies include evil committed by intelligent creatures.

L. Molina, having taken Thomas's comprehensive conception of God's knowledge as his point of departure, nevertheless modified it significantly, so it can be said that Molina's theory of God's knowledge together with distinctions it introduces, is a novel and distinct doctrine, notwithstanding his avowed intention to remain a faithful disciple and interpreter of Aquinas. Like Thomas, Molina distinguishes within essentially one and undivided knowledge of God three aspects or three domains according to the objective spheres to which they relate. These domains are: natural knowledge (*scientia naturalis*), free knowledge (*libera scientia*) and, situated, as it were, in between the two, middle science (*media scientia*).



> […] it is necessary for us to distinguish three *types* of knowledge in God. One type is purely natural knowledge, and accordingly could not have been any different in God. Thorough this type of knowledge He knew all the things to which the divine power extendet either immediately or by the mediation of secondary causes, including not only the natures of individuals and the necessary states od affairs composed of them but also the contingent states of affairs — through this knowledge He knew, to be sure, not that the latter were or were not going to obtain determinately, but rather that yhey were indifferently able to obtain and able not to obtain, a feature that belongs to them necessarily and thus also falls under God's natural knowledge.[23]

The defining feature of God's natural knowledge is that it is related to natures in the largest sense, that is essences that can be thought (because they are free of any contradiction whatever) and could, in principle, exist in actuality. All that which can be understood belongs to the scope of God's natural knowledge: all metaphysical necessities, including truths of mathemat-

[23] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, translated, with an introduction and notes, by A. Freddoso, Ithaca, London, 1988, p. 168 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii,* 4.52.9).

ics and logic, as well as all possible contingencies; in His natural knowledge God knows them precisely as necessary and possible respectively. God's natural knowledge is natural for Him in the sense that it is a necessary feature of His essence, it is entirely independent of God's will,[24] so we say it is prevolitional. Owing to this knowledge God knows not only metaphysically necessary states of affairs, that is everything that must be the case, but also all metaphysically possible states of affairs, that is everything that could possibly be the case,[25] for instance, God knows for every contingent state of affairs "p" which other contingent states of affairs are compatible with it and which are not[26]; thus no possible state of affairs (no possible world) is hidden from God's natural knowledge.[27] His natural knowledge comprises propositions "the logical value of which does not depend on God's will, in particular it does not depend on His decision to create the world and on His choice of what the created world should be like. The logical value of the propositions comprising God's natural knowledge depends uniquely on God's nature […]. By means of natural knowledge God knows all possibilities, all worlds that could possibly be created."[28]

By contrast, God's free knowledge *(libera scientia)* comprehends all that which exists actually, that is all that which constitutes the actual created, therefore contingent, world:

> The second type is purely *free* knowledge, by which, after the free act of His will, God knew absolutely and determinately, without any condition or hypothesis, which ones from among all the contingent states of affairs were in fact going to obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to obtain.[29]

So God's free knowledge is posterior, as it were (of course not in any temporal sense, but only logically), to God's free decision to create a real world and His will's free choice among the innumerable possible worlds known to Him through His natural knowledge of the one to be made actually existing. The fact that God's free knowledge follows the decision of His will and the freedom of the creative act indicate, that the content of the free knowledge is

[24] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p.174.

[25] Metaphysical necessity and contingency are metaphysical modalities. See L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of the Concordia,* transl. A. Freddoso, p. 12.

[26] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, pp. 269–279, footnote 17.

[27] Ibid., p. 279, footnote 18.

[28] See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, p. 206.

[29] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, 1988, p. 168 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 52. 9).

not an essential and, therefore, necessary feature of divine omniscience; it is a contingent feature thereof and depends on God's decision to create rather this possible world than any other . Had God created another world or had He altogether refused to create any world at all, the content of His free knowledge would have been entirely different.[30] Nevertheless it is an essential feature of divine omniscience that God should possess a free knowledge.

Thus the free knowledge comprises propositions, whose logical value is conditioned by choices made by God, its objective domain contains all contingent states of affairs in the created world (including the existence of the created world itself); to the category of truths comprising the free knowledge in God belong the statements of physical laws holding in the created natural universe such as the law of universal gravitation or the velocity of light. Laws of nature obtaining in this world of ours are contingent in that they could in principle be different: God could freely decide that light should travel at a different velocity from that denoted by the symbol *c*, and that two bodies should attract each other with a different force than that directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between their centers.[31] God's free knowledge is postvolitional, because, as shown above, it depends for its content on an act of God's free decision, namely the decision to create a real natural Universe and to make it thus and so rather than otherwise.

The whole extent of divine knowledge, which in Molina is divided into natural and free knowledge, corresponds exactly to the scope of God's omniscience in St. Thomas, which, however, is articulated into three subdomains: the knowledge of simple intelligence, the knowledge of vision and the approving knowledge. To Molina (like to St. Thomas), God's knowledge is the cause of created things, however the Spanish Jesuit goes beyond St. Thomas in distinguishing two ways in which this causal dimension of divine knowledge is realized: (1) one way is in providing exemplars for the work of creation, which is the function precisely of the natural knowledge in God, which contains the ideal patterns (ideas) of all essences capable of existence, the other way (2) is the role of middle science (*scientia media*) in God and

[30] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 1. Even if God had held Himself back from creating any world at all, He would still have possessed some kind of free knowledge, which in that case would have consisted of negative truths of the sort: "Creation does not exist," "No incarnation of the Son will ever take place" etc. [L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.52]. Ibid. p. 270, footnote 20.

[31] See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, p. 206.

consists in providing patterns of all possible contingent orderings of things, some of which God actualizes in creating the world.[32]

2.2. GOD'S MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE AND FUTURE CONTINGENTS

In the last chapter we have defined two kinds of knowledge discernible within divine omniscience: natural knowledge *(scientia naturalis)*which is wholly derivable from divine essence, and free knowledge, which depends on the decision of divine will; the content of the former being all possible ways divine essence can be expressed and imitated; the content of the latter being all that which God has chosen by the act of His will for actual existence in the created world. However, Molina noticed, there is still room for distinguishing a third kind of knowledge in God: neither the natural nor the free knowledge account in a sufficient way for the fact that some possible states of affairs may and in some cases are decided by free decisions made by intelligent creatures. Freedom of created intelligent agents is precisely the point where the problem of the apparent contradiction between God's infallible prescience, the omnipotence of grace and created freedom resides. If the power of grace settles all, where is the room for true, and not merely apparent freedom? If, by contrast, grace is not efficacious all by itself, the difficulty needs to be explained how God can know in advance free decisions of His creatures so as to adjust the distribution of His graces to the free conduct of human persons. The key problem is always the same: how to devise a theory that would preserve genuine autonomy and freedom in human beings without diminishing God's omniscience and omnipotence.

It is in this context that Molina introduces his celebrated concept of middle knowledge (*media scientia*), a kind of knowledge included in God's omniscience, which was not distinguished as a separate category by St. Thomas.

> Finally, the third type is *middle* knowledge, by which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things — even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite […].[33]

[32] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 178.

[33] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 168; L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.52.9: "Tertiam denique medi-

God's middle knowledge is a kind of knowledge that is located in between the natural and the free knowledge of God. Its objective domain is that of all possible contingent arrangements of events; it is wholly independent of God's will, it precedes (in the logical, not in the temporal sense) God's decision to create the world (this feature it shares with the natural knowledge), however, it takes into account all possible outcomes of concrete free decisions of created wills in all possible situations or in all possible sets of circumstances,[34] in this respect the middle knowledge is not purely natural and does depend in some way on will and freedom, in this respect it is like the free knowledge. The middle knowledge is of possible free acts of created beings as conditioned by diverse sets of circumstances, it is knowledge of "free deeds as conditioned: (*libera conditionata*); naturally, most of them will never be actualized, while some of them have been and will be realized in the created world. For instance, the middle knowledge includes the knowledge of what would have become of Socrates and how would he have behaved if, instead of being born in Athens in 469 BC, he had been born in the 1st century BC in Gaul, among the Arverni. With it God knows whether he would have become a follower of Vercingetorix, whether he would have died at the siege of Alesia in 52 BC, or, perhaps, would have survived the defeat and been sold into slavery by Julius Caesar.

Thus, owing to this knowledge, God knows in advance what each of His possible intelligent creatures could freely choose to do in every possible set of circumstances and conditions. Molina is satisfied that his conception of the middle knowledge in God is precisely the theoretical device that guarantees the infallibility of God's foreknowledge on the one hand, and undiminished human freedom on the other.

The middle knowledge differs from the free knowledge in being entirely independent of God's will: God could not make Socrates change the way he will act in definite circumstances; for instance He could not make Socrates refuse to drink the hemlock and follow the suggestion of his friends in escaping from his prison. God could hold back fro creating Socrates or set him in a different set of circumstances, but He could not possibly make him act differently in the same definite set of conditions. The middle knowledge also differs

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am scientiam quo ex altissima et inscrutabili comprehensione cuiusque liberi arbitrii in sua essentia intuitus est, quid pro sua innata libertate, si in hoc vel illo vel etiam infinitis rerum ordinibus collocaretur, acturum esset, cum tamen posset, si vellet, facere re ipsa oppositum..."

[34] W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 175.

from natural knowledge in its object not being wholly derivable from God's nature, but depending in part on the will of creatures and free decisions made by creatures. It is this features that makes the middle knowledge contingent in nature rather than necessary[35] and it is to this domain of God's knowledge that His knowledge of future contingents (*futura contingentia*) belongs.

> All contingent states of affairs are, I repeat, represnted to God naturally, before any act or free dtermination of the divine will; and they are represented not only as being possible but also future — not absolutely future, but future under the condition an on the hypothesis that God should decide to creat this or that order of things and causes with these or those cirumstances.[36] Once the determination of the divine will is added, however — not a determination by which God dtermines created free choice to one or the other part of a contradiction (as Scotus and the others maintain), but a determination by which, while leaving created choice free and altogether indifferent to strive after what it will, He decides to create this or that order of things and of causes an of circumstances, an order in which there exist these or those free causes — once that determination is made, God knows all the contingent states of affairs with certainly as being future simply and absolutely, and now without any hypothesis or condition.[37]

This passage makes it clear how the conception of the middle knowledge safeguards the metaphysical status of future contingent things as truly contingent: they are not only appear to be so to the limited perspective of human beings, they are also thought as contingent by God and, therefore, actually are so. The contingent nature of matters known by God in His middle knowledge does not prevent this knowledge from being absolutely certain, just like His natural knowledge: God's omniscience means that He has to know all conditional counterfactual truths in a sure way before (in a logical, not temporal, sense) He makes His decision to create the world. Nevertheless, unlike the content of God's natural knowledge, the content of His middle knowledge is not of the essence of God, since it depends on decisions made by creatures, which could always be different from what they actually are; had they been different, the content of God's middle knowledge would have been different too.[38] Yet to know all these conditioned future contin-

[35] See M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, p. 206

[36] In this passage Molina represents God's knowledge of conditioned future contingents as falling within the scope of God's natural knowledge; see his Dispute 49, points 11 and 16.

[37] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 140 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 50.15).

[38] See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina*, p. 93.

gents God does not need to consult any source of information other than Himself: he knows them in Himself and not from anywhere *extra se*, as "God acquires no knowledge from things but instead knows and comprehends everything He knows in His own essence an in the free determination of His own will."[39] God's knowledge has no cause and thus is "natural" or "innate" to Him in the sense of flowing from His own essence. God knows all truths, thus, if there are counterfactual truths, God knows all counterfactual truths. Along this line of reasoning, as K.R. MacGregor has shown, a philosophical proof of the existence of the middle knowledge in God can be constructed, starting with the assumption of God being an omniscient being.

(i) If there are counterfactual truths regarding free actions performed by free and intelligent creatures (located in the domain of freedom of intelligent creatures) and if there are counterfactual truths concerning chance events (the domain of chance), the omniscient God knows all these truths.
(ii) There are counterfactual truths regarding free acts performed by creatures and chance events.
(iii) If God knows the counterfactual truths regarding free acts of creatures and chance events, God knows them either as logically anterior to His decision to create the world or as logically posterior thereto.
(iv) But obviously counterfactual truths regarding free acts of intelligent creatures and chance events cannot only be known as logically posterior to God's decision to create the world.
(v) It follows from (i) and (ii) that God knows all these counterfactual truths.
(vi) Therefore (following from (iii) and (v)), God knows all counterfactual truths regarding free acts by creatures and chance events either as logically anterior or as logically posterior to His own creative act.
(vii) Finally, it follows from (iv) and (vi) that God knows these counterfactual truths as logically anterior to His decision to perform the act of creation. Obviously, to know these truths in such a way is precisely the essence of the middle knowledge.[40] Therefore:
(viii) There exists middle knowledge in God.

The theory of middle knowledge appeared to provide a satisfactory solution to the crucial pfilosophical and theological aporia involved in the com-

[39] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 179 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.52.19).

[40] See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina*, pp. 97–98.

bined conceptions of predestination, grace and human freedom and responsibility. This theory convincingly showed how God can possess perfect and infallible beforehand knowledge of contingent events without reducing their contingency to nothing, in particular it made it clear that God's foreknowledge of human free acts did not amount to undue predetermination of the outcome of these acts or any coercion applied to intelligent creatures' will: in making their choices intelligent creatures are left to their own moral insight and power to decide, in particular, at the very instant of making their decision they are still possess the power to decide otherwise than they actually do.

> Through His natural knowledge God comprehends Himself, and in Himself He comprehends all the things that exist eminently in Him and thus the free choice of any creature whom He is able to make through His omnipotence.[41] Therefore, before any free determination of His will, by virtue of the depth of His natural knowledge, by which He infinitely surpasses each of the things He contains eminently in Himself, He discerns what the free choice of any creature would do by its own innate freedom, given the hypothesis that He should create it in this or that order of things with these ot those circumstances or aids — even though the creature could, if it was going to do so, as it is able to freely, God would foresee that very act and not the one that He in fact foresees would be performed by that creature.[42]

God is able to comprehend all things in Himself and out of Himself because his knowledge is super-comprehension (*supercomprehensio*) that is absolutely perfect understanding.

> For it would be insulting to the depth and perfection of the divine knowledge — and indeed impious and not at all compatibile with so great a comprehension of the free choice of each creature — to assert that God is ignorant of what I would have done by my freedom of choice (i) if He had created me in some other order of things, or (ii) if, in this very order of things in which He has created me, He had decided to confer on me more or fewer aids than He in fact decided to give me, or (iii) if He had granted me a longer life or handed me over to more serious

[41] Molina uses the adverb "eminenter", which can be rendered as "perfectly" or "in a perfect way"; the function of this adverb here is to suggest that (i) good and perfect as things created by God are in themselves, nevertheless (ii) they exist most perfectly in God's knowledge. It should be noted, that in Dispute 49 the concept of middle knowledge is not yet introduced; it only appears in the following treatise, namely Dispute 50, therefore all prevolitional knowledge in God is attributed to God's natural knowledge. See A. Freddoso, points 2.8, 3.3 and 4.1 – 4.4 of his Introduction to L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*.

[42] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 119 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.49.11).

> temptations. So it follows that even before He created anything by His free will, He knew all future contingents with certainty through natural knowledge. That is, Through His natural knowledge He knew whether or not they were going to be, not absoultely speaking but rather an the hypothesis that He himself should decide to create this or that order of things with these or those circumstances; and from this it follows that by the very fact that He freely chose the order of things which He in fact chose, He knew absolutely and with cetainty which contingent things were going to be or not going to be; and He knew this in that very choice and decree of His will, before (at least in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality) anything emanated from that decree with its real existence of those things in His eternity in order to know them with certainty.[43]

3. DOMINGO BÁÑEZ: DEFENCE OF GOD'S FREEDOM (AND OMNIPOTENCE)

Domingo Báñez alongside other Dominican theologians came to be an implacable opponent of Molina's teachings and his chief antagonist in the controversy *de auxiliis* between traditional (Thomist) approach and Molinists.[44] In the debate over the problem of cooperation between divine grace and human freedom and respective contributions of these two factors to salvation of the individual human being, Báñez adopted the stand based on the theory of "physical premotion" (*praemotio physica*). Essentially, this theory was based on the classical conception of the order of causes, starting from the first cause and proceeding through intermediary causes to the proximate cause of an effect. The chain of causes starting from God and proceeding to created secondary causes is an essentially ordered series of cause, which means that subsequent causes in this chain operate only insofar as supported and moved by preceeding ones, ultimately by the First Cause, that is God: thus the operation of each subsequent cause is in fact cooperation with all the preceding ones, eminently with the First Cause. Báñez laid heavy stress on the concept of cooperation of every secondary cause with God as the First Cause and called this cooperation "antecedent cooperation" or "predetermination" (*praedeterminatio*): no causal factors in the world, whether natural or free, can act without being previously determined and actualized by the First Cause. The ultimate reason of actuality of every effect is the operation of the First Cause, no secondary cause can con-

[43] Ibid., pp. 119–120.

[44] The description "Molinist" applies to Jesuit theologians who defended Molina's theories in the controversy *de auxiliis.*

fer actuality on its effects without the cooperation of the First Cause which is actuality itself and the self-contained source of all actuality in the Universe. The concept of antecedent cooperation is the expression of the metaphysical concern in an offered explanation to highlight the ultimate reason of reality of considered effects: the activity of secondary (contingent) causes considered without taking into account their necessary relationship with the Absolute would, in the last analysis, appear inexplicable and self-contradictory. The concept of physical premotion refers to the causal activity related to and conditional to the action of a proximate cause proper, in particular it refers to the very action of God's creation of the world. While creating the Universe, omniscient God possesses complete knowledge of every aspect and nuance of the world to be brought into existence, including all free acts of human beings to be performed therein, complete with the situations and circumstances they take place in. Báñez is satisfied that God's perfect foreknowledge and his predetermination do not pose any threat to the freedom of intelligent creatures and the free nature of acts performed by these creatures. God's absolute knowledge and His activity neither annihilate nor diminish the freedom of intelligent beings other than God Himself. We can safely affirm so much, even though God's way of operating as a perfect being is not knowable by man. Nevertheless we know that God can determine His free creatures to act in a free way just as He can determine the nature of unfree (natural) beings to operate in a necessary way. Thus the created will is not exempt from predermination in its causal activity and yet its integrity as free cause remains undiminished.

3.1. BÁÑEZ'S CRITICISM OF MOLINA'S DOCTRINE

In his work[45] co-authored with P. Herrera and D. Alvarez and titled *Apologia fratrum praedicatorum in provinciâ Hispaniae sacrae theologiae professorum, adversus novas quasdam assertiones cujusdam doctoris Ludovici Molinae nuncupati* a number of objection is formulated against Molina's theory of middle science and its implications and the claim is made that at least some of the consequences entailed by this theory contradict the Catholic teachings. The principal target of Báñez's criticism are two elements of Molina's theory: (i) his conception of the *concursus,* that is

[45] The work was published on 20.11.1595 in Madrid and signed by twenty two masters, professors of theology; appended to it was a treatise on the efficacy of divine grace; nevertheless the leading authority behind this work was undoubtedly D. Báñez.

cooperation between divine causation and human free will, and (ii) his theory God's middle knowledge (*scientia media*).[46] Both conceptions are harshly criticized as highly inadequate hermeneutical tools for interpretation of the Catholic doctrine of grace and predestination. These two problems are discussed in particular in the second chapter of the *Apologia* which treats of divine causation and human free choice.

> These future conditioned things, which are not actually future, have no certainty and infallibility, either on the side of logical necessity or on the side of their proximate cause, which is contingent and indifferent in itself; neither [are they certain and infallible] due to the fact that they are really future or due to being a decision of God's will, because, as Molina admits, such knowledge precedes any free act of God's will. Thus, such conditioned future things, as such, can not be known by God.[47]

Báñez's criticism of Molina's conception of God's way of knowing counterfactual possible future contingents highlights two closely connected elements: the relatedness of created things to divine will and the relatedness of the same to divine intellect. If there are things which escape the command of God's will, these very things, by the same token, cannot be known by God in a sure way; so Báñez believes. Báñez also thinks that according to Molina human free acts are exempt from predetermination by God's will; this must be so, he claims, since according to Molina human will can oppose and frustrate even God's efficacious grace. Yet if human free act are exempt from efficacious command of God's will, they cannot, by virtue of the principle stated above, be known by God with certainty. From this it is evident that the main target of Báñez's criticism in Molina is the latter's conception of freedom and the doctrine of middle knowledge is involved in his criticism because it is presupposed by Molina's understanding of human freedom.

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[46] See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice*, p. 103

[47] D. Báñez, *Apologia*, I c 16 & 2 (182): "Ila futura conditionata quae revera non sunt futura, non habent aliquam certitudinem et infallibilitatem, neque ex vi consequentiae, neque in sua causa proxima, quae de se contingens est et indifferens, neque ex ea quod revera futurum est, neque ex decreto divinae voluntatis, quia, ut Molina fatetur, talis scientia antecedit omnem actum liberum divinae voluntatis. Ergo talia futura conditionata ut sic non sunt a Deo scibilia."

3.1.1. CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AS INDIFFERENCE

The doctrine of physical premotion upheld by Báñez and his followers intends to emphasize God's absolute sovereignty, without compromising in any way the freedom and responsibility of intelligent creatures. God causes and predetermines the created will, yet He does this in such a way as to make this will able equally freely to actualize either of the two opposed options, that is equally able to perform the suggested action or held itself back from performing it. To Báñez's mind, God's concurrence *(concursus)* with secondary causes means not only giving to a secondary cause the power and ability needed to act in a definite way, but also in impelling this cause to act in acertain way. Free acts of intelligent creatures are performed owing to God's causal influence upon the will, which, prompted in this way, moves in the one or the other of the two mutually exclusive directions.[48] This line of thinking did not appeal to Molina, who rejected this interpretation of God's cooperation as deterministic in its consequences; in particular, as he thought, this theory failed to explain the fact of sin and sinful actions and in fact laid upon God the blame for there being moral evil in the world. Molina's conception of God's cooperation with the free act of man replaces the emphasis laid upon God's action upon the secondary cause in its action of producing its effects with that upon God's acting jointly with the secondary cause in order to produce the effect:

> We claim that God's general concurrence with the things He produced directly, in order that the other things might be derived from them, is not an influence of God's on the cause, so that the cause might act after having first been moved and applied to its act by that influence, but is instead an influence along with the cause directly on the effect.[49]

> […] this concurrence is not a motion of God's on the faculty of choice by which He moves, applies, and determines it either to precisely that act of speaking or even to some act of speaking or other; instead, it is an influence along with the faculty of choice, an influence that depends for its existence on the influence and cooperation of that faculty itself […][50]

[48] W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 201.

[49] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 239 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.53.3.2).

[50] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 243 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.53.3.7).

In this conception of the divine *concursus,* even though God does cooperate in the performance of a sinful action, He bears no responsibility for its sinful nature, because He does not move the will towards this action, only allows it to fulfil its freely chosen project.

The chief objection raised by Báñez to Molina's teaching concerns the key concept in the latter's explication of freedom, namely that of indifference. Indifference in Molina's parlance designates the essential feature of freedom, namely the ability: (i) to adopt either of the two mutually contradictory options: to perform an action or not tom perform it; (ii) to adopt either of the two opposed courses of action, e.g. a morally right action or a morally wrong one. This definition of freedom as ability to choose between oppositions was made the principal target of criticism by D. Báñez.[51] He argued that the definition of freedom in terms of ability to choose between oppositions excludes from the domain of freedom both God and the angels and the saints; since neither of them is able to sin, that is to choose the course of action opposed to that of moral goodness. Hence, Báñez concluded, Molina's definition of freedom is too restrictive and thus erroneous. What is more, the possibility of sinning, far from adding to the perfection of free choice, counts in fact as its imperfection.[52] According to Báñez, the metaphysical foundation for free choice is will conceived as necessarily subordinated to its proper aim and able to choose between diverse means leading to an achievement of this aim. Will is free because if there are many ways leading to the desired end and it is not determined to only one of these but can freely choose between them in order to reach the desired objective. The plurality of means and diversity of possible strategies to achieve one's objective do not imply necessity to choose between oppositions, since, as the case may be, all options leading to an achievement of the purpuse may be morally good. Thus the definition of freedom as the faculty of choice between oppositions is inadequate.[53]

[51] See Báñez, *Apologia,* I, c. 13 & 4.

[52] Cf. R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice,* pp. 120–121. A similar discussion is carried out in St. Anselm's *De libertate arbitrii.* In this work the bishop of Canterbury concerns himself with formulation of a definition of freedom. He quotes a number of theological consideration and rejects the definition of freedom as the power either to sin or not to sin on the grounds that this definition falls short of the requirement of completeness, since it leaves God, angels and saints, who are unable to sin, out of the domain of freedom, and thus is unacceptable for formal reasons.

[53] Ibid., p. 121.

Another objection raised by Báñez against Molina's conception of free choice concerns the formula *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum* used by the latter in his work.

> This power is only formally free which, having met all the necessary requirements to act, can act or not act of its own choice. (Transl. A.P.S.)[54]

As a matter of fact both adversaries employ this formula, yet each of them understands it differently: whereas Báñez is satisfied to take as a necessary condition for free choice ability to choose between contradictories: to act/not to act; for Molina this is not enough; he adds another necessary condition for free choice, namely ability to choose between contraries: to act thus/ to act otherwise. This disagreement is eminently metaphysical in its nature: it concerns an answer to the question, whether human will acts all by itself (*a se*), and in this case the human sphere of action may be seen as restricting God's, or it is God, who as the First Cause sets human will in motion, and then the problem seems to arise in what measure God may be seen as responsible for the moral evil in the world.

> If the phrase requistis ... refers to what happens in time before a free act is made, it is best understood that the will remains indifferent at the moment to act or not act. But the efficacy of God's motion is not one of these temporary predecessors [in relation to] choice, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace; this effectiveness occurs simultaneously with the consent of our will. On the other hand, if [Molina and his followers] understood their definition as referring to their predecessors, which at the same time simultaneously with free action, this is considered false, that simultaneously with all these [predecessors] it would be possible, that man would not choose the good that God gives or recommends, because one of those things required for free action is God's actual motion, by which the will is moved casually to want. Hence, it should be noted that we do not say that it is impossible to choose not entirely for the will, but we said that it is not possible for the will not choose assuming everything that is required for action at the time of [good] consent that the will would not do it act. Otherwise, God's intention, by which God wants man to choose, would fall into the void.[55]

[54] D. Báñez, *Scholastica Commentaria In Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris S. Thomae. A Qvaestione LXV. vsque ad CXIX, & vltimam*, Dvaci, 1614, q. 83 a. 1 dub 2 secunda conclusio (376A): "Illa sola potentia est formaliter libera, quae positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest pro suo arbitrio agere & non agere." Cf. also *Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia: textos y documentos*, ed. R.P. Mtro. V. Beltrán de Heredia, San Esteban, 1968.

[55] D. Báñez, *Apologia*, I, c. 1, & 4 (357): "si fiat sermo de requisitis antequam exerceatur actio libera, optime intelligitur quod voluntas adhuc manet indifferens ad agendum vel non agendum. Verumtamen inter illa requisita non annumeratur efficacia divi-

In this passage Báñez considers the *requisita* that is necessary conditions for an act of free choice; among these necessaries he distinguishes: (i) conditions which precede in time the act of choice itself, and (ii) the physical premotion, that is God's causal intervention in the act of making the choice, which is concurrent with the act itself, though it is prior to this act in terms of causal action. He goes on to affirm that the conditions that precede the act in time cannot render this act necessary, whereas divine premotion does in fact make the act of choice necessary as it positively moves the will to pass from potency to act.[56] Here the question inevitably arises, whether and in what sense freedom of choice is possible at all, given the assumption of the divine premotion necessitating the act of will. To solve this difficulty, Báñez engages in complex analyses of statements concerning the necessity of the fulfilment of God's will and the contingency of human free acts; the solutions he offers follow those of Aquinas and are based on the distinction of the composite and divided sense of complex modal statements.[57] Alt-

nae motionis, sive in ordine naturae, sive in ordine gratiae; illa enim efficacia simul est cum nostrae voluntatis consensus. Si autem intelligent suam definitionem de requisitis in momento in quo actio libera exercetur, falsum esse comprobatur quod, omnibus illis positis, sit compossibile hominem non eligere illud bonum quod Deus praecipit vel consulit, quia unum de requisitis actualis divina motio qua voluntas movetur de non volente in volentem. Ubi observandum est quod non asserimus simpliciter et absolute non esse possibile voluntatem non eligere, sed diximus non esse compossibile cum positione omnium quae requisita sunt in momento boni consensus, quod voluntas non exerceat illum actum. Alias frustraretur divina intentio qua Deus vult hominem eligere."

56 See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice*, p. 123.

57 The sources of the distinction of the composite and divided sense (*sensus compositus*, *sensus divisus*) of complex modal propositions are to be sought in Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* (*De sophisticis elenchis,* 166 a 22 nn). The point suggested in Aristotle received comprehensive treatment and development at the hands of medieval logicians. The purpose of this distinction was to disambiguate complex modal statements of the sort *Possibile est stantem sedere* [It is possible for the standing one to sit] or *Necesse est currentem non stare* [It is necessary that the running one should not stand]. These statements (and all modal statements of this sort) could be construed in two ways, depending on whether the modal operator is taken as qualifying the whole proposition, that is in the composite sense or "concerning the whole proposition" *(de dicto)* or as referring to the object which the proposition refers to, that is in the 'divided sense' or 'concerning the thing this proposition speaks of (*de re*). Thus the quoted examples taken in the composite sense mean, respectively, "It is possible for someone standing to be sitting (at the same time)" (or generally: it is possible to be standing at sitting at the same time) and "It is necessary that someone running should not stand at the same time"; as is easily seen, the former of

hough modal (containing the modal operator *necesse*) conditional statements concerning fulfilment of God's will concerning particular contingent events (which are free acts of creatures) are necessary when construed in the composite sense, this by no means implies that the contingent events referred to by these statements are in themselves necessary, therefore unfree, as the construal of these statements in the divided sense would suggest. The logical distinction between the composite and the divided sense provided Báñez with tools with which, at the level of semantic analysis, He believed he could vindicate God's absolute sovereignty without encroaching on the domain reserved for human freedom. God is the single ultimate cause of both necessary and contingent things and his causal activity extends not only to the content of created things but also to the mode of their being: thus God Himself determines the status of the things He creates as either necessary of contingent. God, in creating a given person and in making this person make a decision, ensures that this decision is made freely.[58]

Involved in Báñez's argument in defence of the efficacy of divine predetermination as wholly compatible with human freedom is a certain metaphysical conception. The basic assumption of that conception is that ideal patterns of things as found in intellect, far from being merely copies of actual originals, have a different mode of existence from things existing on their own in the actual world. Thus the ideal mode of existence of things is to be distinguished from their real mode. The proposition "If there is a practical judgment of the practical intellect of a person (A), the appropriate act of choice (B) by the will of that person necessarily follows" exists in intellect, where A and B exist as ideas; the term "composite sense of a complex statement" refers precisely to the proposition as found in the mind, where it represents perfect unity. It is in intellect that the composite sense

these interpretations is false, while the latter is true. Taken in the divided sense, both propositions mean, respectively "It is possible for someone who is standing (now) to be sitting (at another instant of time)" (true) and "It is necessary for someone whom is running never to stand" (false). See John E. Murdoch and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *John Buridan on Infinity,* in *The Metaphysics and Nattural Philosophy of John Buridan*, ed. J.M.M.H. Thijssen and J. Zupko, Leiden, 2001, p. 135

58 According to Báñez, the necessary requirement for a choice being free is that different goods be available and known to the practical intellect, and that selection be made among these goods. Each of these goods carries some satisfaction with itself, incomplete and limited, for if any good provided perfect and complete satisfaction, it would be necessarily desired and thus leave no room for freedom. See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice*, p. 123.

(*sensus compositus*) of a proposition is metaphysically realized. When we consider the extramental objects in the real world this proposition refers to and the real relationship obtaining between these objects, we might say that we consider this proposition as taken in the "divided sense" (*sensus divisus*), since the objects referred to are separate from each other and distinct in actual, extramental reality. The connection between the antecedent (there is a practical judgment in the mind of a person) and the consequent (the will of that person follows that judgment with its decision to act) may be seen as necessary, yet in actual reality there are more factors influencing the will than merely a practical judgment and thus the decision of the will may well be different from that advocated by the practical reason. In this way what appears as necessarily connected in an ideal perspective, is only contigently joined in actual reality. This is a metaphysical illustration of the logical principle that modality which truly obtains in the composite sense of a proposition, need not be truly predicable in the divided sense thereof, that is of the referents of that proposition as taken separately. The answer to the question "Does the act of choice performed by the will necessarily follow from the practical judgment formed by the practical reason", though affirmative in the abstract and notional sense is negative when the question is applied to a concrete situation in the real world (where other factors, besides the practical judgment may efficaciously influence the will). Thus if the choice made by the moral agent in a concrete situation agrees with the practical judgment concerning that choice, this act of choice must be regarded as perfectly free and not necessitated, but only guided, by that judgment.

What is the net outcome of these considerations? The employment in the analyses of the distinction *sensus compositus* versus *sensus divisus* of complex modal propositions and of the metaphysical interpretation of that distinction allows Báñez to assert perfect compatibility between the necessary divine impulse (premotion) moving a concrete will and the freedom of that will in an act of free choice. In fact, in the overall Thomist framework which forms the basis of Báñez's philosophy, God's necessary impulse imparted to the will, far from annuling the freedom thereof, is a necessary condition for the exercise of that freedom in acts of free choice. According to the classical metaphysical scheme, the ability of an intelligent creature to perform an act of free choice is merely potency, which for its actualization necessarily requires an impulse from some cause which is an entity already in act; in the case of freedom this higher entity is God; thus divine premotion is a necessary condition for a passage of a created will from the state of potentiality to the state of act, that is for free action by an intelligent creature. From Báñez's point of view,

the definition of free choice made by a creature must be set in the context of the overall conception of God's causal activity in the world.[59]

3.1.2. BÁÑEZ'S CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPTION OF MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE

Báñez's chief objection to the conception of middle knowledge, around which all his criticism is built, is what he perceives as exclusion of God's active causal involvement in the work of human individual salvation, that is exclusion of grace. A more particular objection concerns the point concerning knowledge of future contingent events: according to Báñez, Molina's doctrine is not able to ensure God certain and infallible knowledge of future contingent events.

For what, in its essence, is middle knowledge. To grasp the gist of Báñez's criticism of Molina's conception we must recollect the terms in which Aquinas treats of God's knowledge. Since, according to Molina, middle knowledge is part of God's prevolitional knowledge (that is the knowledge which antecedes God's decision to create), which means that it must be classified as knowledge of simple intelligence *(scientia simplicis intelligentiae)* in Thomas's terms; on the other hand, middle knowledge is of the domain of the contingent, which assimilates it to Aquinas's knowledge of vision *(scientia visionis).* Let us recollect, that owing to knowledge of simple intelligence God knows all possibles whatsoever, whereas His vision is of contingence in the actually created world. Molina's middle knowledge differs from the latter in that it concerns the domain of possible contingence, including conditioned possible free choices made by possible (creatable) free intelligent agents. In brief, God knows the logical value of all possible propositions of the form "If the person X were put into the circumstances Y at the time T, he/she would freely perform the act A."[60] In his criticism thereof, Báñez intends to demonstrate impossibility of such knowledge. He examines various strategies supposedly ensuring infallible knowledge of future conditioned events only to conclude that each of the examined strategies fails in its objective and thus to draw the general conclusion that the kind of cognition of future contingents envisaged by Molina is in fact impossible.

First, he makes the target of his criticism the category of God's supercomprehension *(supercomprehensio Dei)* introduced by Molina to give a fir-

[59] Ibid., p. 124.

[60] Ibid., p. 154.

mer basis to his conception. Supercomprehension is God's insight into the mind and personality of intelligent creatures capable of free choices, which makes it possible for Him to foresee what decisions will these creatures make when placed in some definite circumstances. The introduction of the category of supercomprehension was necessitated by the fact that a person, insofar as he/she acts freely, is not determined in his/her action by his/her nature, thus his/her free acts cannot be foreseen on the basis of the knowledge of that person's nature. In foreseeing a person's future free conduct supercomprehension fulfils the same role as does comprehension of a thing's nature in foreseeing that things future natural action. Báñez's reasons as follows: Molina assumes that God can obtain knowledge of future conditioned things through knowing their proximate causes *(causae proximae)*, in the case of free intelligent causes which do not operate in a determined way, the knowledge of the cause of its future free acts is simply the knowledge of the future choices this person can possibly make. However, the problem consists in, granted that the choices of that person are genuinely free, that is not determined in advance, that there is nothing in that person, and least of all his/her nature, that can give one any clue as to what the real free act of that person will be. What is more, given the fact that middle knowledge is of pure possibles (counterfactuals), neither the person to be known nor his acts exist as yet: they are pure possibles; and how the notion of a pure possibility can give us any information about possible contingencies to follow? Thus the concept of supercomprehension utterly fails in its function to provide any explanation of God's knowledge of future free acts of created persons: even God cannot know what simply cannot be known in logical or epistemic terms.[61]

Báñez's succeeding criticisms of Molina's theory can be summarized in the following points:

(i) The truth concerning future conditioned event cannot derive from these future events alone; it is already contained in their conditions. If future

[61] R.J. Matava discusses an attempt at defence of middle knowledge by Francisco Suarez, which made crucial use of the notion of bivalence. However, his argument based on bivalence turns out to be ineffective, since the relation of contradiction does not obtain between conditionals whose antecedents are the same and consequents contradictory. In fact the cases of future contingents and future conditioned events are not analogous: to affirm that propositions concerning future contingents are neither true nor false (which would imply predetermination of these events, which then could no longer be regarded as really contingent) before the proper conditions obtain or determining their truth value, one would have to giva up the principle of bivalence (or the principle of excluded middle). See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice,* p. 155.

events were really contingent and not predetermined by God's will, God Himself would not be able to know the truth about these events.

(ii) *Scientia media,* being prevolitional knowledge, is logically independent of God's knowledge of His own creation. Thus God cannot know things that will be or not be from His nature (by His natural knowledge or by His simple intelligence) nor from His knowledge of His own will (by His free knowledge or His approving knowledge). If God does not cause in any way free choices by His creatures, according to Báñez, the inevitable conclusion is that He cannot know them in a certain way at all.

(iii) If the propositions concerning future conditioned events are true by virtue of the "power of inference", this means that they follow as consequents with some kind of logical necessity from the antecedents concerning their respective conditions, which further means that these conditions somehow necessitate their conditioned events, yet the events which are free acts of persons cannot be necessitated by any conditions, as Molina himself perfectly recognizes. This means that propositions concerning future conditioned events cannot be true by virtue of any necessary logical relation obtaining between an antecedent and a consequent.

(iv) The truth concerning future free acts cannot derive from knowledge of the proximate causes of these, for, if these acts are really free (they are solely determined by their agents' *liberum arbitrium*), their free and intelligent agents are not predetermined to them by any natural factor. Moreover, if neither the agents under consideration, nor theirs acts, exist in reality (as Molina's conception of free knowledge presupposes), what can be the possible grounds for a certain knowledge of the contingent future? How can God possibly know what is unknowable in itself?Molina resorts to the conception of God's supercomprehension, which Báñez finds futile and misguided for the reasons already stated above.[62]

The fatal defect of the conception of the middle knowledge in God is its failure to account for anything effectively contingent being real and known by God with certainty antecedently to God's act of creation. Since, as Báñez asserts, Molina has no plausible answer to that question, which touches the very *fons et origo* of his whole theory and can give no viable reasons for God's knowledge of what is truly contingent and relatively independent of His own will, his theory of the middle knowledge in God fails in its objective and has to be rejected.[63]

[62] Ibid., p. 154–155.

[63] Ibid., p. 166.

CONCLUSIONS

In the confrontation *de auxiliis*, Molina's approach was anthropologically centred, while Báñez and his followers took for their point of departure abstract metaphysical principles. Molina proposed his conception of freedom and the related theory of God's middle knowledge as plausible hypotheses that threw light on how God's providence and grace cooperates with human freedom in the work of salvation of the individual human being. In his eyes, these hypotheses better fulfilled that task than the traditional approach, which, to his mind, seemed to lay on God the blame for there being evil in the world as a consequence of the assumption that God condoned human sinful acts, since He knew them in advance and yet allowed them to happen. Báñez and the Thomists, on their part, considered Molina's solution as diminishing the extent of God's causal involvement in human salvation and attributing too much to the initiative of creatures. This, in their eyes, amounted to a redefinition of the Christian, and in particular, Catholic conception of God and overlooking God's role as the First Cause in the shaping of acts of man insofar as these acts are realized, that is become accomplished acts rather than mere potency.

The controversy *de auxiliis*, although somewhat inconclusive, brought many novel insights and some novel attempts at formulation of classical problems in epistemology, metaphysics and even logic. Let us conclude with a statement by Molina himself:

> But, surely, since truth agrees with truth, whereas truth will not easily and perspicuously with freedom of choice on the basis of middle foreknowledge is a manifest sign that we have propounded a comprehesive and legitimate way of reconciling all of them.[64]

Translated by Roman Majeran

[64] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 228–229 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.53.2.22: "At profecto cum verum vero consonet, a falso autem cito discrepet verum, quod tam facile ac perspicue illa quattuor ex capite praescientiae mediae cum arbitrii libertate cohaereant, signum est manifestum nos integram legitimamque rationem conciliandi ea omnia tradidisse.")

LUIS DE MOLINA — FREEDOM OF MAN AND GOD'S KNOWLEDGE: THE DOCTRINE OF "MIDDLE SCIENCE" *MEDIA SCIENTIA*

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk

INTRODUCTION: THE TARGET OF L. MOLINA'S CRITICISM — THE THOMIST DOCTRINE ON THE DIVINE FREEDOM, FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION

God in a free and intelligent way establishes the order of the world he creates and he knows beforehand, so to say, and infallibly all events and effects that take place in it; He knows the created world with the whole of its historical development down to the minutest details. The entire world and its history is God's project chosen by Him for realization out of infinite possibilities. God not only brings the Universe into existence but actively participates in its history so as to make sure that His design be carried out in every detail; consequently, whatever happens in the world is ultimately the result of His decision. There are two ways things happening in the world may relate to their ultimate source, which is God's providence: (i) a given thing or event can be positively willed and designed by God; in that case His providential care extended to that thing is called "providence of approval" (*providentia approbationis*), or, far from being approved, a thing or event can be permitted to happen in the world without being positively willed, in this way God allows various defects and various form of evil to exist in the created Universe and His providence insofar as admitting evil into the world is called "providence of concession" (*providentia concessionis*).[1]

[1] *De veritate*, q. 5 a. 4 co.: "Responsio. Dicendum, quod cum idem sit primum principium rerum et ultimus finis, eodem modo aliqua progrediuntur a principio primo et ordinantur in finem ultimum. In progressu autem rerum a principio invenimus,

Such conception of the providence entails the assumption that God is in possession of the complete and certain knowledge of all of His creation

quod ea quae sunt propinqua principio, esse indeficiens habent; quae vero distant, habent esse corruptibile, ut dicitur in II de Generat.; unde et in ordine rerum ad finem, illa quae sunt propinquissima fini ultimo indeclinabiliter tenent ordinem ad finem; quae vero remota, quandoque ab illo ordine declinant. Eadem autem sunt propinqua vel remota respectu principii et finis; unde incorruptibilia, sicut habent esse indeficiens, ita nunquam declinant in suis actibus ab ordine ad finem, sicut sunt corpora caelestia quorum motus nunquam a cursu naturali exorbitant. In corruptibilibus vero corporibus multi motus proveniunt praeter rectum ordinem ex defectu naturae; unde philosophus in XI Metaph. dicit, quod in ordine universi substantiae incorruptibiles similantur liberis in domo, qui semper operantur ad bonum domus; sed corpora corruptibilia comparantur servis et animalibus in domo, quorum actiones frequenter exeunt ab ordine gubernantis domum. Et propter hoc etiam Avicenna dicit, quod ultra orbem lunae non est malum, sed solum in his inferioribus. Nec tamen isti actus deficientes a recto ordine in rebus inferioribus, omnino sunt extra ordinem providentiae. Dupliciter enim aliquid subest providentiae: uno modo sicut ad quod aliquid ordinatur; alio modo sicut quod ad alterum ordinatur. In ordine autem eorum quae sunt ad finem, omnia intermedia sunt fines et ad finem, ut dicitur in II physicorum et V metaphysicae; et ideo quidquid est in recto ordine providentiae, cadit sub providentia non solum sicut ordinatum ad aliud, sed sicut ad quod aliud ordinatur. Sed illud quod exit a recto ordine, cadit sub providentia solum secundum quod ordinatur ad aliud, non quod aliquid ordinetur ad ipsum; sicut actus virtutis generativae, qua homo generat hominem perfectum in natura, est ordinatus a Deo ad aliquid, scilicet ad formam humanam, et ad ipsum ordinatur aliquid, scilicet vis generativa; sed actus deficiens, quo interdum monstra generantur in natura, ordinatur quidem a Deo ad aliquam utilitatem, sed ad hoc nihil aliud ordinatur; incidit enim ex defectu alicuius causae. Et respectu primi est providentia approbationis, respectu autem secundi est providentia concessionis, quos duos modos providentiae Damascenus ponit in II libro. Sciendum tamen quod quidam praedictum providentiae modum retulerunt tantum ad species naturalium rerum, non autem ad singularia, nisi in quantum participant in natura communi, quia non ponebant Deum cognoscere singularia; dicebant enim, quod Deus taliter naturam alicuius speciei ordinavit, ut ex virtute quae consequitur speciem, talis actio consequi deberet; et si aliquando deficeret, quod hoc ad talem utilitatem ordinaretur, sicut corruptio unius ordinatur ad generationem alterius; non tamen hanc virtutem particularem ad hunc particularem actum ordinavit, nec hunc particularem defectum ad hanc particularem utilitatem. Nos autem Deum perfecte cognoscere omnia particularia dicimus; et ideo praedictum providentiae ordinem in singularibus ponimus, etiam in quantum singularia sunt." Also *De veritate*, q. 5 a. 4 ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de providentia approbationis; sic enim nihil providetur a Deo nisi quod ab eo aliquo modo fit; unde malum, quod non est a Deo, non cadit sub providentia approbationis, sed concessionis tantum."

including all aspects and details thereof. This further implies that God possesses complete foreknowledge of future contingent events; He infallibly knows what He intends to effect in every instance and He infallibly foresees all consequences, including contingent ones, of what He does. Thus God's knowledge not only embraces all necessary things and events, but also extends to contingent acts and events. Yet, given the contingent, that is unpredictable, nature of these, the question arises: how is God's true and infallible knowledge of future contingent things at all possible?

Further, if we follow this strong conception of divine providence to its more remote consequences, we have to acknowledge that God has not only knowledge of those future contingent things that will come to being at one time, but also of all possible contingencies that will never be actualized and all their possible consequences. In other words, God infallibly knows all contingent facts about the created Universe, but also all conceivable counterfactual states of affairs and all their possible combinations; to use a contemporary technical word, God knows all possible worlds. He knows what would be the case in some definite circumstances if something else were the case in the same circumstances even though He knows that this condition will never be fulfilled.

This consideration gives rise to another question of philosophical interest, namely how these counterfactual states of affairs exist (what is their way of being) and how God comes to know these counterfactually conditioned things?

Another consequence of this strong conception of providence is the affirmation that God, who not only created the world out of nothing but also preserves it in existence, is the ultimate efficient cause of every event and every act taking place in the world, including all acts performed by rational and free beings, since the rational beings in the world, human beings and angels, depend on God not only for their *esse*, but also for their *agere.* However, God, being the supreme efficient cause of the Universe and its every part and feature, does not produce all details of His providential design for the Universe immediately, that is as the proximate and only cause, but most of them He effects through the intermediary of secondary causes, which work with their own power to realize His project of creation. The existence of two kinds of causes in the Universe: the first and primary cause (*causa prima, primus motor*) and the secondary causes gives rise to the question concerning the cooperation (*concursus*) of these in producing the final shape of the Universe; a particularly significant part of this matter

is the question whether the general cooperation (*concursus generalis*) of the primary and secondary causes concerns only *natural* and necessary processes, or extends also to *voluntary* and *free* actions performed by rational and free agents.

God is the ultimate source and giver of both *esse* and *agere,* so the real import of this question lies in its attempt to probe into the way God, the first and ultimate cause, cooperates with secondary causes active in the world, that is with createdefficient causes and agents. God of course participates in every activity going on in the Universe, be it at least as the supporter in being of the agent forces immediately involved, yet the agreement between His supreme causal influence and the immediate impact of the secondary agent involved calls for an explanation, since both of the agents (the first and mediate and the secondary and immediate) exercise causal powers of very different sorts and are located in different orders of causality. The created secondary agent is able to act owing to its natural powers of action that have been created and granted by God; with these donated powers it functions as a particular cause that produces particular effects. By contrast, God, the supreme universal agent and the first and universal cause acts with His uncreated power as the universal ultimate cause of all effects produced by secondary agents. The function of the first efficient cause is thus twofold: (i) He is the giver of *esse* to the secondary agent and its action, that is to say the *esse* of the secondary cause participates in the *esse in se* of the first cause; (ii) His own formative influence is channelled through the secondary agent's action, God's causal contribution being perfectly adjusted to the nature and active power of the secondary efficient cause. In the effect produced by the cooperation of the first and a secondary cause, some of the features are directly attributed to God's influence (e.g. being something rather than nothing), while other features, namely the traits specific to the nature of the effected object and the defects thereof are ascribed to the secondary causes.[2] The relationship of the first cause to secondary causes is conceived by analogy with that obtaining between natural or human causality and instrumental causality. Just instrumental causes can produce no effect without the driving force imparted to them by the proper efficient cause, so no movement nor any action is possible for secondary causes without the influence of the first cause; in this sense the secondary cause is subordinated in its action to the first cause.

[2] See. https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/freedom%20and%20God.pdf.

According to Aquinas, everything in the world is subordinated to a definite purpose. What, then, is the purpose of man? As the Christian doctrine teaches, the purpose of man is eternal salvation, and the necessary means to that purpose is divine grace; thus the question naturally arises, how a given human person can obtain the necessary grace from God. Now, according to Thomas, man has been endowed with a natural disposition *(dispositio)* towards his supernatural destination. The actual achievement of this supernatural objective exceeds man's natural possibilities, so he needs supernatural help to become what he has been destined to be. This supernatural aid is divine grace imparted to man by God in various forms and at diverse points of his life's journey. The natural disposition in a human being towards his supernatural fulfilment is in itself a grace, it is the first grace, which is given by God to every human being by virtue of God's original benevolent disposition towards every created human being, which is His antecedent will (*voluntas antecedens*), this first grace granted to everyone is called sufficient grace (*gratia sufficiens*).[3] However, more supernatural aid (*auxilium*) is needed to bring this initial disposition in man to fruition according to the universal order. This superadded supernatural help is called efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*).

The supernatural divine influence strengthening the individual person in his/her effort to obtain the desired supernatural goal is the work of God's so called consequent will (*voluntas consequens*) which is the cause of more supernatural means of salvation (*media salutis*) given to the person that are efficient in making that person perform good works. Aquinas's conception of God's activity in causing man to achieve salvation, which is divine predestination, represents this divine intervention as a particular kind of divine providence which is extended to rational beings. Essentially, his conception is an effort to integrate the conception of human action as governed by human free choice *(liberum arbitrium)* and, at the same time, as predetermined by divinely generated predestination, which is independent of the foreseen future meritorious acts of the person concerned (*praedestinatio ante preaevisa merita*). An individual's own effort, operating as a secondary cause, generates salvific effects, whose first and ultimate cause is in God, and, in St. Thomas's conception, both causes and their perfect cooperation are indispensable for these deeds being salvific: the individual voluntary and

[3] More on the distinction *voluntas antecedens* versus *voluntas consequens* in Thomas Aquinas see in the same volume: A.P. Stefańczyk, "Will, Knowledge, Action — God's Grace: Thomas Aquinas on Divine Predestination and Divine Causality."

spontaneous action of the person concerned is a necessary condition for that person's salvation. Thomas's idea of the cooperation of causes operating at different levels of activity is neatly illustrated by his image of a flying arrow, shot by the archer towards the mark:[4] the arrow is carried by it own kinetic energy, which, however, has been imparted to it by the archer in the act of shooting. Still, this picturesque simile leaves open the central question of the efficiency of the either cause involved: either the divine archer sets the whole action in motion and leaves no initiative for other factors, including the free will of the human agent, which only function as mechanical instrumental causes bringing into fulfillment God's eternal design (*praedestinatio ante praevisa merita*), or there is still some room left by God's supernatural act for human free efficient initiative, be it only in overcoming forces resisting the fulfilment of God's will. The former interpretation of Aquinas's idea is certainly closer to the literal reading of the simile of the flying arrow, yet it also disquietingly smacks of theological determinism: if human will has no initiative of its own, it seems to be reduced to a mere passive transmitter of all-powerful divine influence, it is

[4] *Sth* Iª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co. "[…] omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis. Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis. Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per rationalem appetitum, qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Tamen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut sagitta tendit ad determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, sed solum in finem ab alio ordinantur. Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens principale, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo proprium est naturae rationalis ut tendat in finem quasi se agens vel ducens ad finem, naturae vero irrationalis, quasi ab alio acta vel ducta, sive in finem apprehensum, sicut bruta animalia, sive in finem non apprehensum, sicut ea quae omnino cognitione carent."

hard to see how there can be any room left for human freedom and responsibility. If, however, the latter reading of Aquinas's intention is correct, then the will of the person involved in the process of generation of a meritorious (salvific) deed is not for nothing in this process, it retains the freedom of choice between resisting God's inspiration and complying with it; in particular it is given free initiative in overcoming obstacles that come in the way of realization of God's intended design and in this way it can act freely as a secondary cause and generate its own secondary effects. This latter construal of the concurrence of divine influence and human freedom is the classical synergistic model in which the efficacy of divine grace still depends on human free acceptance thereof and voluntary cooperation therewith, which is the effect of human free will (*praedestinatio post praevisa merita*).[5]

This, in the briefest summary, is Aquinas's teaching on grace, free will and the cooperation of both. Diverse interpretations of Thomas's formulations provided the sparks which ignited the controversy caused *de auxiliis* in the 16th century, between the Dominicans and the Jesuits.[6] The

[5] See *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, ed. M. Kaufmann & A. Aichele, Leiden, 2014, pp. xviii-xix.

[6] The controversy *de auxiliis* between the Dominicans and the Jesuits concerned the problem of the efficacy of grace. Pope Clement VIII set up a commission of theologians, called '*Congregatio de auxillis*' under the presidency of the cardinals Madrucci and Aragone, which began its sessions on 02 January 1598. After many years of public debates and as many as eighty five hearings in the presence of successive popes, no definitive solution to the debated problem was found, nevertheless the controversy was ended by the papal decree of 5 September 1607 issued by Pope Paul V. The decree ruled that both sides, that is the Dominicans and the Jesuits were free to defend their own respective doctrines on grace and free will and both were forbidden to censure or condemn the doctrines of their opponents. The controversy *de auxiliis* engaged a very large part of Christendom, including Protestant circles, although the chief opponents were, on the one hand, the Order of Preachers, which defended the formulations of Aquinas, interpreted in the spirit of emphasised Thomist finalism and mild anthropological pessimism, and, on the other hand, the Society of Jesus, which stood by the Scotist synergist model reinforced by strong anthropological optimism proposed by Luis de Molina. See *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, p. xx.

The principal stimulus to this controversy was provided by the publication in 1588 of L. Molina's chief work, the *Concordia*, neverthless the start of it can be moved back as far as January 1582 when a public debate was held at the university of Salamanca presided over by Francis Zumela, a pupil and firnd of D. Báñez. The subject matter of the debate was whether Jesus died on the cross in a free, and there-

protagonists of the both opposed parties in this controversy represented their respective standpoints as faithful interpretations of the thought of the Angelic Doctor. The champion of the Jesuits in the controversy, Luis de Molina, intended his chief work: *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione* [*Agreement of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace, Divine Prescience, Providence, Predestination and Reprobation*] as a commentary on Part One of the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas, and also his chief adversary, the Dominican Domingo Báñez claimed to be a faithful interpreter and expounder of the doctrine of Aquinas.[7]

The exposition of St. Thomas's teaching on the efficiency of grace and human free choice in terms of assimilation of human secondary causality to instrumental causality was firmly rejected by Luis Molina in his *opus magnum* since he came to believe that this solution in its essence amounted to fatalism or theological determinism and destruction of human freedom. To his mind, the affirmation that God is the first cause of the Universe and all its parts and aspects is enough grounds for the affirmation that His creative act should be the sufficient cause for every contingent state of affairs. This in turn facilitates the belief that God knows His intentional causal contribution to all future events. Since God Himself projects contingent events, His knowledge of what in the temporal order appears as future is easy to explain. But there remains the other side of the story to be accounted for: (i) in order to be held morally responsible for their deeds, human beings must have the possibility of free choice, that is a faculty of deciding between alternative courses of action free from external coercion, and secondly: (ii) God should in no way be represented as the immediate cause of evil and responsible therefor. The former of these two postulates

fore meritorious, way, fulfilling the wish of the Father. However, the chief point of interest in the debate was not Christ's sacrifice but the conditions of a free and laudable act. R.J. Matava holds that the question of the necessary conditions of a free act was a test and an impulse for discussion and rethinking of the old questions of predestination and justification, it also provided a point of departure for the theory of "physical premotion" (*praemotio physica*) advanced by the Dominicans. See R.J. Matava, *Divine causality and human free choice*, p. 19; also in the same volume: A.P. Stefańczyk, "The problem of divine causation and human free will: L. Molina versus D. Báñez: An outline of the 16th century controversy between Thomism and Molinism."

7 See in the same volume: A.P. Stefańczyk, "The problem of divine causation and human free will," note 8.

requires a conception of freedom, which rules out any causal determination of the will in an act of decision other than determination by the will itself, that is self-determination. As to the latter postulate, the model proposed by St. Thomas, as has been shown above, remained open to a determinist interpretation, and as a result seemed to fall short of its objective of providing a theoretical framework that would effectively exonerate God from being directly involved in causing evil in the created world.[8]

The present study is an attempt to delineate the doctrine that sought to reconcile divine knowledge and human freedom in a different way from the doctrine of St. Thomas and which in its time competed with Thomism, namely the doctrine advanced in the 16th century by Luis de Molina. Molina, sensitive to the threat of theological fatalism latent in the Thomist model, advanced a theory of a kind of knowledge in God which he termed "middle knowledge" (*scientia media*). Molina's new theory sought to relate God's knowledge of contingent events of the world to certain specific features of God's intellect rather than to God's will. In what follows we will attempt to give general outlines of the doctrine of God's middle knowledge, its sources and consequences.

1. GOD'S (FORE-)KNOWLEDGE

In the Aristotelian-Platonic tradition the necessary features of knowledge in the strict sense, that is of scientific knowledge (as contrasted with mere opinion, that is probable knowledge of contingent facts) are truth, certainty and necessity. The question immediately arises, whether a knowledge of this kind, or at least a knowledge approaching this standard, some kind of true and infallible knowledge is in any way possible regarding contingent things. Two simplest strategies employed in order to secure an affirmative answer to this question were either to weaken the strict conditions of infallibility and necessity and thus make the concept of knowledge more comprehen-sive, or to modify the concept of contingency so as to assimilate it to necessity (e.g. to interpret the apparent contingency of observed phenomena as a manifestation of underlying necessary laws of nature). The problem how necessary knowledge is possible of contingent reality and how the key concepts related to both knowledge and reality have

[8] See P. Dvorak, "Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Necessity," in *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, p. 56.

to be modified in order to prove this being possible exercised much theologians' minds since at least the 13th century. However, before we start our discussion of this problem, we have to take a general survey of the kinds of knowledge found in God's mind and the proper scopes thereof.

Molina distinguishes three kinds of knowledge in God according to three domains of objects they respectively concern: natural knowledge (*scientia naturalis*), free knowledge (*scientia libera*) and middle knowledge (*scientia media*).[9] Natural knowledge is of necessary truths and as such it is entirely independent of God's will, as we say, it is prevolitional. Free knowledge, by contrast, is of the contingent states of affairs brought about by God's will, in other words, it is knowledge of that which God freely creates. Middle knowledge, so called because it comes, so to say, between natural and free knowledge, is the knowledge God has of free (and therefore contingent) acts of His creatures; it is like natural knowledge in being independent of God's direct will: God in no way compels his creatures to act in a definite way, He leaves to them full freedom to decide on how they act in a given concrete situation. Thus middle knowledge is prevolitional (like natural knowledge). On the other hand, middle knowledge is like free knowledge in that it concerns only contingent states of affairs: the facts it is about need not necessarily come about: they can come about or not come about; to put it in our contemporary terms; middle knowledge is of all possible worlds that differ between themselves by different free acts as performed by the inhabitants of respective worlds (in contrast to the possible worlds that differ between themselves by different contingent inputs directly put into them by God's free action; the latter case being the object of God's free knowledge). In other words, God's middle knowledge is of all metaphysically contingent states of affairs which he does not control directly.[10]

Thus absolutely all possible contingent states of affairs are evident to God in his natural knowledge (which extends to all necessities as well as to all pure possibilities); the contingent states of affairs which are sure to come about, because decreed by God Himself are known to God in His free knowledge, while His middle knowledge embraces those contingent states of

[9] More on God's natural knowledge and free knowledge in A.P. Stefańczyk, "The problem of divine causation and human free will: L. Molina versus D. Báñez: An outline of the 16th century controversy between Thomism and Molinism" in this volume.

[10] See L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, Translated, with an introduction and notes, by A. Freddoso, Ithaca, London, 1988, p. 47.

affairs that are conditioned by free decisions of God's free and rational creatures, which are situated between the absolutely certain states of affairs decreed by God and purely possible contingent events. A nice illustration of the difference between these three kinds of knowledge in God is provided by A. Freddoso: God knows that Adam may sin when put in Paradise with His natural knowledge (because Adam's sin is a pure metaphysical possibility); with His free knowledge God knows that Adam will as a matter of fact be placed in Paradise, which opens a definite possibility of his sinning; with His middle knowledge God knows that Adam will actually sin, if and when put in Paradise. So it can be stated that God's middle knowledge is of all contingent events as conditioned by other contingent events.[11]

2. CONTINGENCY

Given the fact that the object of God's middle knowledge are future conditional contingent states of affairs, it is apposite that we begin our discussion thereof by an examination of his conception of contingency; the interest of this matter lies in contingency being the essential feature of all acts by rational and free beings that can be qualified as free acts. Thus the subject of our discussion in this section is no other than the classical dilemma of freedom and (divine) foreknowledge, or more precisely, the problem how necessary and true knowledge is possible of future contingent events, and in particular of future free acts performed by free agents.

> To understand the source or origin of contingency, we must note that there are two senses relevant to the present undertaking in which a state of affairs may be said to be contingent. A state of affairs is contingent in the first sense when, if you think just of the natures of the terms, the subject no more lays claim to the predicate that is affirmed of it than to the opposite of that predicate. For instance, that Socrates is sitting is contingent, since Socrates as such no more lays claim to sitting than to standing or to tying down.
>
> Contingency taken in this sense does not rule out fatalistic necessity. For if all agents acted by a necessity of nature, then, without a doubt, even if nothing pertaining to the natures of the terms were incompatible with things turning out otherwise, everything that occurs would still, in relation to its causes as constituted and arranged in such a universe, occur with a fatalistic and infallible necessity in just the way that it in fact occurs. For any cause that, given the constitution and arrangement of the universe in question, was able to impede

[11] Ibid.

> another cause would in fact impede in. Thus, given this hypothesis, anyone who knew all the causes in such a universe would thereby know infallibly and with certainty all the things that were going to be.[12]

This passage can be interpreted in two ways which, however, do not exclude each other, rather they can be seen as complementing each other. One way of reading this passage is in logical terms: the author may be viewed as suggesting that contingency of an event is compatible with certain modal logical necessity, namely with necessity of the consequent — *necessitas consequentis,* as in the formula "If Socrates is sitting, it is necessary that he be sitting," in modern symbolism: $p \rightarrow \Box q$ (If p, then necessarily q).

Alternatively, this passage can be read as discussing the nature of efficient causality, whether natural (that is necessary) or free, conceived after the manner of Aristotle, that is as grounded in individual substances equipped with definite causal potential, which, when actualized, generates a definite effect, causality thus amounting to a kind of relation obtaining between the agent and the effected event.[13] This interpretation corresponds to the observation, that Molina intends to indicate in this passage that every causal potential of a given power is determined to one of a pair of opposed states of affairs. this accounts for the fact that once a given causal power is applied, the effect that follows must be precisely the one to which this power is determined and in no wise the opposite, in that way one could say that whatever happens or has happened is in a way necessary, or necessary with regard to its cause. This is captured by the following semantic formula: "A (logically contingent) statement p is true if and only if the state of affairs it corresponds to is the effect of some determined causes."[14]

> By contrast, a given future state of affairs is called contingent in a second sense, because it rules out not only the necessity that has its source in the natures of the terms, but also the fatalistic and extrinsic necessity that results from the arrangement of causes. So given this universe of things which we see around us and given that all the causes are arranged in just the way they are now in fact arranged, such a state of affairs is still indifferent as to whether it is or is not going tp obtain by virtue of the same causes through which it ordinarily obtains.[15]

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[12] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 86 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*,, 4. 47. 2).

[13] See L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, Cornell University 1988, p. 86, note 4.

[14] See P. Dvorak, "Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Necessity," p. 64.

[15] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, pp. 86–87 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.47.2).

Contingency in the other, and metaphysically significant sense is, according to Molina, inseparably linked to what he calls (metaphysical) indifference, that is the state perfectly compatible with some other state of affairs happening or not happening, or with the opposite of it happening. The concept of indifference introduced by Molina as a necessary condition for true metaphysical (and not merely logical) contingency appears to be particularly relevant for the adequate conception of freedom: the essence of freedom consisting in real possibility of choosing between alternative options: freedom of choice, and an act of choice is truly free if the causal potential inherent in the world does not necessitate any of the options open to the choosing agent, in other words if the causal potential of the world is indifferent as to the final outcome of the act of choice. The concept of causal indifference provides the metaphysical foundation for an indeterministic realm of true contingency in reality which is a necessary condition for true freedom. The strong emphasis laid in Molina on metaphysical indifference and contingency as a necessary condition for meaningful freedom was intended as a challenge to the Thomist concept of predetermination, which, to Molina's mind, rendered meaningless human freedom of choice and, consequently, abolished moral responsibility of human beings, with the additional consequence of shifting on God the burden of the responsibility for the evil in the world. As will be shown in what follows, it is the concept of freedom as founded upon metaphysical indifference that opens the way to the correct comprehension of the doctrine of *media scientia*. The ultimate and universal metaphysical source of contingency as such is free will as a power found in the first place in God, and then in angels, man and, in an inchoate form, even in animals, in the shape of the sense of desire:

> […] that the divine will is the primary source, is perfectly obvious, since if anything else is to count as a source of contingency, then it is necessary that it, in turn, have its existence from the divine will, so that it is by all means necessary as well always to designate the divine will as the primary source. […] only angelic and human free choice, along with the sentient appetite of beasts (which has a trace of freedom with respect to some acts), have it within their power to do this or that in one or another way or to refrain entirely from the activity that characteristically emanates from them, it follows that the contingency of any effect that proceeds from secondary causes has one of these three causes as its proximate source.[16]

[16] Ibid., pp. 94–95 (4.47. 10).

So, according to the Spanish Jesuit, God's will is the first and ultimate cause of the metaphysical contingency as found in the world, whereas the free will of angels and human beings contribute to the contingency in the world as secondary and immediate causes.

3. FREEDOM AS (FOUNDED UPON) INDIFFERENCE

It seems that the chief reason and stimulus for the creation of the theory of middle knowledge and, consequently, of a new, indeterministic (libertarian) theory of freedom, was, for Molina, the realization that the Thomistic model remains dangerously close to some form of (theological) determinism. Historically speaking, there are two more factors that must have had a role in prompting the rise of such theory at precisely the second half of the 16th century. One of these were the intellectual currents generated by the renaissance, whose echoes could not fail to reach the universities of Spain and Portugal; the other was the Protestant Reformation and the nascent protestant theology whose orientation was heavily predestinationist, particularly in Calvinism. Also within Catholicism there were marked predestinationist tendencies, especially in the broadly conceived Augustinian school, which required an appropriate answer in the opinion of more humanistically minded theologians.[17]

Nevertheless, over and above these circumstances, Molina's predominant concern in undertaking his defence of the claims of human free will was to provide a new, anthropologically oriented version of Thomism suitable to Catholic teaching; hence the heated controversy, the debate *de auxiliis*, aroused by his views affected mostly Catholic and Thomistic circles, and particularly notable was his controversy with the Dominican and Thomist Domingo Báñez (1528–1604).

Molina's objective was in its essence far from startlingly novel: it consisted in presenting such a conception of freedom that would escape any deterministic or fatalistic misinterpretations and would thus safeguard man's moral autonomy without diminishing God's prerogatives of omnipotence and omniscience and without possibly offending against other points of Catholic orthodoxy (in fact it is safe to affirm that such conception of

[17] Here I mean a number of thinkers with whom Molina debates in his *Concordia* and whose views he criticizes; among them were: Gregory of Rimini (died 1358), William of Ockham (1285–1347) and others.

human freedom has always been presupposed by the orthodox Christian body of doctrine). The first, metaphysically crucial step towards achieving this objective was to draw a clear demarcation line between the spheres of metaphysical necessity and contingency in the world. Freedom of choice and free acts of choice belong in the sphere of that which can either be or not be, or which can be thus or otherwise, which is to say they belong wholly and unambiguously to the domain of the contingent. Freedom is a potency or ability (*potentia, facultas*), which is attributed to the reasonable agent capable of action, the performer of an act or doer of a deed (*agens*). The function of that potency and faculty is either to act (positively to perform an act) or forbear from acting (refuse to perform an act). Thus a free agent in every moment can in principle engage in mutually opposed courses of action. In fact freedom embraces twofold potency: it entails the power either to actualize the potential for action (perform an act) or to forbear from actualizing this potential (hold back from performing any act); this power is called *potentia ad exercitium*[18] and according to Aquinas, this power remains totally in the control of the agent. The other potency entailed by freedom is the power to determine one's act in one way or another, this Aquinas calls *potentia ad determinationem actus*. Once the agent has decided to act, it can act one way or another, yet having made the decision to act, it can no longer forbear from acting.

In order to determine his/her action, the agent needs a definite object, the attainment of which is the aim of the intended action and to which the agent must adjust his/her exertions. It follows that the determination of a free act depends on the agent's intellect grasping the goal of the intended action; in fact no free and rational action is possible without some conception of the aim thereof. This implies that both kinds of potency entailed by freedom (namely *potentia ad exercitium* and *potentia ad determinationem actus*) are of necessity linked to each other: whenever one of them is actualized the other must be actualized too. In fact this conclusion follows from the general assumptions of the theory of act, potency and motion

[18] Cf. *Sth* Iª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 co.: "Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa, uno modo, quantum ad agere et non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud. Sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subiecti, quod quandoque invenitur agens, quandoque non agens, aliud autem est ex parte obiecti, secundum quod specificatur actus."

(*motio*) conceived as the passage from potency to act. Every actualization of any potency whatever ends in producing a definite object, clearly distinct from all other objects. Every actualization entails determination and the other way round: every real determination is actualization; there is no such thing an indeterminate actualization of some potency.[19]

Importantly: any free act, that is joint realization of both *potentia ad exercitium and potentia ad determinationem actus* must be performed, that is realized, by the agent spontaneously, that is the will of the agent must be the only efficient cause of this free act, regardless of the necessity of performing definite actions in order to carry out this deed. In other words freedom of will essentially requires self-determination.

> The free agent of the action is called that that assuming everything necessary for action, can act and not act or can do one thing in such a way that it can be done in the opposite way. This freedom implies that this ability by which the agent can act in this way is called free. (Transl. A.P.S.)[20]

At least three elements of this definition require some elucidation: (i) presupposing all conditions required for acting (*positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*); (ii) being able either to act or not to act (*potest agere et non agere*); (iii) being able to act in such a way as to be able (supposedly: at the very moment of acting) to act in a contrary way (*ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere possit*). As for the conditions required for acting (i), what Molina refers to is (a) rationality (of the agent, presumably full possession by the agent of the power to understand and reason clearly) and (b) absence of compulsion, understood broadly as necessity of whatever kind. Rationality is a necessary condition for a free act, since any free act must be preceded by an intelligent insight into the situation of the intended action, rational determination of the objective of the action and the selection, from a spectrum of, minimally a set of two, possible options, of one definite means and way of acting. Thus it is essential for any actions qualified as free to be predetermined by an intellectual insight and deliberation. However, the function of the agent's intellect is merely to provide the form for the intended action, the intellect acts as the formal and

[19] See A. Aichele, "The Real Possibility of Freedom: Luis de Molina's Theory of Absolute Willpower in *Concordia I*," in *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, pp. 5–6.

[20] L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 1.2.3 (14: 9–11): "... agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere possit. Atque ab hac libertate facultas qua tale agens potest ita operari dicitur libera."

not the efficient cause, consequently, the conception of the intended action formed in the intellect by itself has no power to make the agent will the projected action and perform it.

> But because it does not act in this way, unless after prior decision and judgment of reason, that's why the decision is called free, as long as it is preceded by rational judgment. From this it follows that a free decision (if it anywhere should be recognized) is nothing but a will in which formal freedom is explained by a prior rational judgment.[21]

[21] L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 1.2.3: "Quoniam vero non ita operatur nisi praevio arbitrio iudicioque rationis, inde est, quod quatenus ita praeexegit iudicium rationis, *liberum* appelletur *arbitrium*. Quo fit ut liberum arbitrium (si alicubi concedendum sit) non sit aliud quam voluntas, in qua formaliter sit libertas explicata praevio iudicio rationis." This requirement of rationality and of ability to analyse and evaluate given situations of choice is, according to Molina, crucial for a being to qualify as genuinely free; this view of the Spanish Jesuit appears to be firmly rooted in the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition. Very telling in this respect is Molina's explanation of the way animals function which is contained in Dispute 47, where he argues that although there is a "vestige of freedom" in animals because they are able to make choices, their insufficient comprehension of the circumstances of their choices rules out any qualification of them as really free beings. True, animals meet another condition for freedom, namely ability to desire, yet desire by itself, without rational consideration, and even ability to act for a purpose, is insufficient to make the resulting action qualify as moral activity (since all natural processes are purposeful, and yet not free, because necessary. "Perhaps you will object that although freedom […] is in the appetitive faculty formally and in the way that a thing is in its subject, nonetheless, in the way that a thing is in its source, freedom is in the indifferent cognition and understanding that has to precede a free act. But this sort of cognition cannot exist in animals, since it has to be a cognition that collates and compares one object with another and distinguishes one object from another; but there can be no such cognition in animals." L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 89–90; L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 47.6.

In another place of his work Molina writes in much the same manner about dissolute people and, without implying that mere ability rationally to consider a situation is a sufficient condition for freedom, he observes that, occasionally, ability rationally to consider one's situation may be regarded as reason enough for considering a given action as a kind of moral behaviour. Let us consider the following quote from *Concordia*, 4. 47. 7: "Take those utterly dissolute people who care nothing for, nor even think about, their own salvation or the law of God, but who are drawn like brute animals to the pleasures of taste and touch. Surely, when they consent immediately to some shameful object presented to them as pleasurable, they do so without any comparisons or deliberations of the sort in question. And yet as long as they

The other necessary condition for freedom of will is absence of any kind of necessity (compulsion), which is the same as contingency. In contrast with the formal causes of natural events, which are strictly determined and can only happen in the way fixed in advance by natural causes, the formal determination of free acts must be such as to leave the final decision to the determination by will, which is always contingent. It is ultimately the will of the agent that decides which of the potential formal causes, that is which one of the diverse contemplated projects of action will eventually be actualized. One of the possible descriptions of the action to be taken by the agent will become a description of fact at the will's bidding, the description only potentially true will become actually true, what was, metaphysically speaking, only potency will become act because of the will's decision.[22]

What is only in potency, can be actualized or remain unactualized; if it is, its actualization is true and real contingency. When Molina represents freedom as opposed to necessity, he speaks metaphysics, and not merely logic, although logic is implied too: if an action contemplated as possible to realize can determine the will of an agent to a decision in its favour, it must be free of contradiction, that is be logically possible. It seems plain that in Molina's conception will is indifferent in being able to fulfil the function of an efficient cause with respect to potential states of affairs whose formal causes as grasped by the intellect are opposed one to another and mutually exclusive, it can also will possible counterfactual states of affairs.[23]In this independence of natural necessities and facts of the world the real contingency and indifference of will consists. What the will wills is really and finally decided by the person to whom this will belongs. God is no sufficient cause of the determination of the will, although He always is there as the necessary concomitant cause which supports both the person and the person's will in existence.

One notable consequence of this conception concerns the source of God's knowledge of human free acts: if His will does not decide theses acts, His own will cannot be the source of His knowledge of them, in other

could have thought of and deliberated about those things and neglected to do so, this is enough for them to be said to have willed the act freely […] and for mortal guilt to be imputed to them." Cf. L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 91, note 13.

22 See A. Aichele, "The Real Possibility of Freedom: Luis de Molina's Theory of Absolute Willpower in *Concordia I*," in *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, p. 8.

23 Ibid., p. 9.

words, God's knowledge of human free acts does not fall under God's free knowledge. To answer the question of God's knowledge of human contingent acts Molina needs to go back to divine intellect, yet to account of the specific nature of the object of knowledge, which is contingent and not necessary, he needs to introduce a new kind of intellectual knowledge. This new kind of intellectual knowledge, which is of the contingent and not necessary, is precisely God's middle knowledge. Thus Molina's theory of middle knowledge comes as his answer to the problem of God's infallible foreknowledge of human free, therefore contingent, deeds.[24]

4. HOW FUTURE CONTINGENTS EXIST (*FUTURA CONTINGENTIA — CONDITIONATA*)?

Since Molina's solution to the aporia of God's infallible prescience of future contingents and the contingent nature thereof differs from the solutions of the same problem as proposed by Aquinas and, in particular, by Aquinas's followers in the 16th century, who found the basis for God's foreknowledge of the contingent aspects of creation in God's will, in seeking the adequate foundation for divine prescience in some aspects of divine omniscience, he must adopt a different startegy from that of his opponents in his discussion and treatment of this problem. One point of the difference between the two approaches concerns Molina's distinction of a new aspect of divine knowledge: the middle knowledge. To adequately characterize a body of knowledge one needs to give an unambiguous definition of its subject matter, including the way these matters exist, so Molina faces the task of defining the subject matter of God's middle knowledge.

Molina attempts to discharge this task in his dispute 49 of the fouth part of the *Concordia.* He considers the question how future things exist and how God can know them. He begins his discussion by examining Aquinas's treatment of the problem in order to question the received interpretation of Thomas's thought and propose his own solution, which, he claims, is the correct reading of Thomas's intended meaning. The essence of the problem, in Molina's formulation, is how God can infallibly know beforehand future events that are not yet causally determined.

[24] See P. Dvorak, "Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Necessity," in *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, p. 60.

> A contingent thing can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, it can be considered insofar as it already exists in itself outside its causes, in which case it is considered not as future or as contingent with respect to either part, but as present and as determined to one part. And so considered, the thing can be the subject of a certain and infallible cognition. For as long as Socrates is already actually sitting, I visually perceive with certainty that he is sitting. Alternatively, a contingent thing can be considered insofar as it still exists in its cause, in which case it is considered as future and contingent, not yet determined to one part, since of course a contingent cause is indifferent to opposites. Considered in this way, a contingent thing is not the subject of any cognition that is certain and unable to be mistaken, and thus anyone who knows a contingent effect merely in its cause has only conjectural, and not certain, cognition of it. [25]

Molina is ready to concede that, since contingent things are eternally present to God in their existence, they can be known by Him, as all other things known by Him, in a certain and infallible way, whence follows that God's foreknowledge of future events is ultimately grounded in God's exemplar ideas. Nevertheless Molina refuses to believe that this explanation represents Thomas's intended meaning, since, to his mind, reducing God's knowledge of contingent events happening in the world to an insight into the content of divine eternal ideas endangers faith and diminishes the firmness of God's knowledge, and he formulates a number of arguments against this view.[26] One of his objections concerns the problematic aspects of the assumption of things existing eternally in God's mind before they come to exist in time, if, he argues, things already exist in eternity, they cannot come to existence in time, since they already exist, at best they can be said to assume a new, temporal, mode of existence; however if this were the case their contingency would be illusion: as eternally existent they would be necessary. On the other hand, if one wished to retain both the eternal existence of seemingly contingent things and their nature as contingent beings that can occur and not occur one would have to concede that these things could in principle fail to come about at the appointed instant of time, and this in turn would make their eternal existence uncertain and instable and thus undermine the infallibility of God's knowledge of them.[27] Molina is firmly convinced that if something is truly a contingent thing

[25] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, pp. 111–112 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 49. 2).

[26] L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.49. 7.

[27] See L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 49. 18; cf. also W. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, pp. 171–172.

happening at a certain point in time, it cannot exist as the very same contingent thing in eternity, and, consequently, whatever things do exist eternally they are not temporal contingent thing and cannot be a source of God's certain knowledge of them. The Spanish Jesuit illustrates his meaning by reference to the Boethian image of a circle being drawn, in which the central point corresponds to the part of the circle that has already been drawn, but has no relation as yet to the points of the part still to be drawn; in the same way the indivisible eternity of God corresponds not to the whole length of time, but only to the part of time that has already passed.

> An appropriate model is the center point of a circle in relation to the circle drawn around it, which indivisible eternity and the time that moves or runs its course around it are said to resemble. For while the circle is being drawn, the center point does not yet correspond to the part still to be drawn, but corresponds only to the part already drawn. And this is not because the center point is lacking something that is required in order for it to correspond to the part still to be drawn; rather, it is because what is lacking is that very part to which the center point, in itself already existing as a whole, would correspond. But once the entire circle has been drawn, the center corresponds to the whole circumference and to each of its parts. In the same way, as long as the whole of time has not yet elapsed, indivisible eternity corresponds not to the whole of time, but to the part that has elapsed. Therefore, just as the center point is able never to correspond to a part of the circle that has not yet been drawn, since that part might not be drawn in the future, so too eternity is able not to correspond to the parts of real time that are still future or to the things that will exist contingently in those future parts of time, since real time might cease or, even if it endures, the things in queston might not exist in it, as indeed they are able not to exist.[28]

In the quoted passage Molina indicates that the relationship obtaining between "indivisible eternity" and what still remains to be accomplished and constitutes the future of the real history of the world differs from that obtaining between eternity and the past, that is things that have already been accomplished. The unchangeable persistence of eternity, while perfectly corresponding with the past and the present, does not correspond in the same manner with the future. Future contingent things, while already present in the indivisible "now" of eternity are so in a different manner from things of the past and are seen differently by God. In principle, as Craig observes, future contingent things could fail to come about, and this rules

[28] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, pp. 125–126 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4.49. 18).

out unconditional certainty of God's knowledge of them.[29] Molina's final conclusion is as follows:

> […] God's knowledge of things that are still contingently future in time does not, properly speaking, have the character of a knowledge of vision until those things actually exist in time; rather, in the meantime it has the character of a knowledge of simple intelgence, because the things that are its objects do not yet exist. But since the proper duration of that konowledge is eternity, and because in eternity, since it coexists with future time, those things will in the end be present, God's knowledge may simply be called a knowledge of vision in relation to all the things that will exist in any interval of time.[30]

Thus God's knowledge of the contingent future is not "knowledge of vision" (*scientia visionis*): God does not "see" things before they actually come to being in time, because they do not yet exist, so there is nothing to see. This is, of course, not to say that God has no exhaustive knowledge of future things; He knows them with His knowledge of "simple intelligence" (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*), that is with the knowledge He has of things that could possibly exist but do not actually exist.[31] This represents a modification of Aquinas's view of God's knowledge of the contingent future, and Molina's phrase "the proper duration of this knowledge is eternity and in eternity, because it coexists with the future time, and these things will finally be present" is clearly meant to say that present to God in His ideas are not only all possible things (*possibilia*) but also all future contingent things (*futuribilia*), that is the contingent possibles that will in fact be the case. God, in His middle knowledge, knows all conditional contingent possibles, that is all states of affairs that would come about if some other contingent states of affairs earlier came about. Among all possibles arrangements of contingent conditional states of affairs God chooses one arrangement which is actualized in the actually created world. Having chosen one complete system of contingents God knows all future contingent events that will come about as a consequence of preceding contingent states of affairs.[32] In Molina's own words:

> It is not simply because things exist outside their causes in eternity that God knows future contingents with certainty; rather, before (in our way of con-

[29] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 172.

[30] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, Cornell University 1988, p. 127 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 49. 20).

[31] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 172.

[32] Ibid., p. 172.

ceiving it, but with a basis in reality) He creates anything at all, He comprehends in Himself — because of the depth of His knowledge — all the things which, as a result of all the secondary causes possible by virtue of His omnipotence, would contingently or simply freely come to be on the hypothesis that He should will to establish these or those orders of things with these or those circumstances; and by the very fact that through His free will He established in being that order of things and causes which He in fact established, He comprehended in His very self and in that decree of His all the things that were in fact freely or contingently going to be or not to be as a result of secondary causes — and He comprehended this not only prior to anything's existing in time, but even prior (in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality) to any created thing's existing in the duration of eternity. [33]

5. GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE, MIDDLE SCIENCE (*SCIENTIA MEDIA*) AND FUTURE CONTINGENTS

Thomas P. Flint affirms that the doctrine of divine providence assumes that God's project for the world He created embraces the whole of the universe complete with all the details and particular aspects it involves. All things are under God's care and in His control and all of them operate in accordance with His benevolent will; to conceive of God as providence is to represent Him as an intelligent and merciful arranger of every event that happens to every particular creature and steering every single creature to the purpose He set in advance for it.[34] The concept of divine providence presupposes a number of definite perfections in God, in fact it implies, that God is, according to St. Anselm's formula, "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived" (*id quo maius cogitari non potest*).[35] From this general description all the properties of a perfect being were deduced by theologians, such as the power to create things out of nothing, perfect justice, absolute beatitude, omnipotence and omniscience. God's knowledge of everything there is to know entails knowledge of all true propositions, including all true statements concerning future events insofar as there are truths concerning the future. So it is clear that omnipotence should entail prescience or foreknowledge, that is knowledge of things that have not yet come to being but will exist in the future. It was usually assumed among

[33] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 115–116 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 49. 8).

[34] T.P. Flint, *Divine Providence: The Molinist Account*, Ithaca, NY, p.12.

[35] Anselm of Canterbury, *Proslogion*, cap. 2.

theologians, that, given the truth of the above statements concerning divine prescience, the following conditional propositions have to be true:

(1) If God infallibly knows in advance that the person P will perform the act A, necessarily P will perform A (it is necessary that P perform A).

(2) If P necessarily will perform A, P is not free with respect to performing A (P is compelled to perform A).[36]

Presupposed by these statements is the assumption of God's infallibility: whatever God knows, cannot turn out to be false. The infallibility of God's knowledge imposes some form of necessity on the objects of divine insight; they cannot turn out otherwise than as God knows them, yet if this is so, freedom of human voluntary action must be no more than illusion.

Molina's enterprise is to prove the last statement following from this formidable array of seemingly indisputable assumptions wrong: He claims, there is no incompatibility between God's necessary knowledge and the contingent nature of voluntary actions by intelligent creatures. His theory of God's middle knowledge is a means by which he intends to prove his point. In this theory the order of cause and effect in God's relationship with the contingent objects of his knowledge is reversed: it is not the case that a contingent effect E comes about because God knows it will, but, on the contrary, God knows that E will happen because E will actually happen.[37]

As already stated above, the kind of knowledge that ensures God's infallible knowledge of contingent events which come about because of free acts performed by creatures is called middle knowledge (*scientia media*), which is a aspect of divine omniscience distinguishable alongside God's natural knowledge (the knowledge of necessary states of affairs and metaphysical possibles) and His free knowledge (the knowledge of God's own free acts):

> Finally, the third type is middle knowledge, by which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with its innate freedom were it to placed in this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things — even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite […].[38]

[36] See E. Wierenga, "Omniscience," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2018 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/omniscience/.

[37] Cf. A. Freddoso's comments, p. 53, in L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso.

[38] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 168 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 52. 9).

Molina, in contrast to Aquinas and his followers of the 16th century, does not point to God's will as the sole basis of contingency in the world and God's beforehand knowledge of it, but refers to certain features of God's knowledge of the contingent as another source of His infallible foreknowledge of future contingent events. Yet can Molina's ingenious enterprise be accomplished at all and if so, at what costs? For the sake of the order of exposition and better explication of the difficulties posed by the conception of middle knowledge let us delineate the structure of God's omniscience in Molina's own formulation.

Although God's knowledge as such is one and indivisible in itself, because of different objects it concerns, there are three distinguishable aspects of it. Let us repeat: (1) the so called natural knowledge in God relates to all truths independent of God's or anybody else's will, it embraces all necessary and all possible states of affairs, to use our contemporary technical term: it is knowledge of all possible worlds; (2) middle knowledge covers all possible conditional states of affairs, including all counterfactual states of affairs, in other words, all possible states of affairs dependent on free acts of decision by creatures (perhaps also on chance events); (3) free knowledge is of all contingent truths established by God Himself; it embraces the actual created world and the whole length of time: the past, the present and the future.[39]

In Molina's conception, God's middle knowledge assumes key importance, it is precisely the *locus* in God's mind where the full and adequate relationship between God's insight and the relatively independent, contingent Universe is established. Owing to middle knowledge God remains fully in control of the world inhabited by intelligent beings that have the power of free choice and thus are capable of relatively independent initiative. Without middle knowledge either the freedom and independent moral initiative of creatures would turn out to be illusory, or God knowledge of His own creation and His providential control over it would cease to be absolute and perfect. In Molina's own words from his dispute 51 of the fourth part of the *Concordia* the problem is restated as follows:

> We must now examine the thesis by means of which a good many thinkers reconcile our freedom of choice with divine foreknowledge and predestination, and by virtue of which they think that these things cohere well with one another. For they maintain that if, for instance, Peter, who, let us assume, is going to sin at some moment of time, did not sin at that time (which he is capable of because

[39] See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina. The Life and the Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge*, Zondervan, 2015, pp. 95–96.

> of his freedom), then God would bring it about that He had never known that Peter was going to sin, but that instead He had always known from eternity that Peter was not going to sin.[40]

In the same dispute the Spanish Jesuit surveys and discusses a number of solutions proposed by other thinkers, all discussions ending in discovering some shortcomings: gaps, errors or inadequacies in the theories concerned.[41]

Let us take the example quoted by Molina, namely Peter's denial of Christ, as an illustration of Molina's conception of the function of the middle knowledge. Peter's denial can be seen in diverse perspectives: it is for instance evident to God's free knowledge, that is knowledge succeeding and resulting from God's free decision to create the world in which Peter is put in the circumstances in which he will freely commit his act of betrayal. In contrast to God's prevolitional (natural and middle) knowledge, which in Molina's conception lays the necessary foundation for all created effects and actions, the free knowledge concerning Peter's denial comes *post factum* as it were: too late to cause Peter to act; it comes after both Peter's act and God's creative act have been accomplished.[42] On the other hand, contingency is a necessary condition for any free act, so freedom and its acts cannot be objects of God's natural knowledge. Nor can they be objects of God's free knowledge, for free knowledge concerns states of affairs causally determined directly by God's acts of will. The outcomes of free acts performed by intelligent creatures are neither necessary (because free and, therefore, contingent) nor decided directly by God (because decided by creatures which act as immediate secondary causes), they are, so to say, in between the pure necessaries and pure free acts of God. Accordingly, God's knowledge of free acts performed by creatures is, as it were, in between His natural and free knowledge and thus aptly called middle knowledge. On the one hand, this knowledge is like

[40] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, Cornell University 1988, p. 145 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 51.1).

[41] Luis Molina in the dispute 51 of the IV part discusses, among others solving the problem of God's knowledge and free choice: Duns Scotus, Saint Bonaventure, Wilhelm of Auxerre (Altisiodorensis) (1150–1231), Gilbert de la Porrée (1076–1154), Gregory of Rimini (1250–1358), Johannes Driedo (1480–1535), Albert Pigghe (1490–1542) and a number of lesser-known theologians and philosophers.

[42] A. Freddoso writes that God's free knowledge is a speculative knowledge of vision and, unlike His prevolitional knowledge, is not a potentially practical knowledge assigned to the production of effects. So, not because of God's knowledge of Peter's sin, Peter will sin. See L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 53. Cf. also L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 52. 10.

natural knowledge because it is prevolitional; it envisages a possible free act as a pure conditioned possibility that comes before any determination of God's will; on the other hand it is like free knowledge because its subject matters are not necessaries but contingent possibles, which are wholly dependent on created (and therefore conditioned) free causes.[43]

> Therefore, it should be said (i) that middle knowledge partly has the character of natural knowledge, since it was prior to the free act of the divine will and since God did not have the power to know anything else, and (ii) that it partly has the character of free knowledge, since the fact that it is knowledge of the one part rather than of the other derives from the fact that free choice, on the hypothesis that it should be created in one or another order of things, would do the one thing rather than the other, even though it would indifferently be able to either of them.[44]

Nevertheless God, Molina continues, has infallible foreknowledge of Peter's act od denial of Christ; He knows for sure that Peter will deny Jesus Christ because this will be the case in the possible world selected for creation by God Himself. God's sure foreknowledge of Peter's act is perfectly compatible with Molina's contention that Peter by his free act in no way contributes anything to God's eternal store of knowledge and so there is no question in Molina's conception of a creature causally influencing God and modifying His unchangeable mind. In fact God knew Peter's act of denial long before Peter was called to being, He knew it precisely in His middle knowledge and in His free knowledge He knew that Peter's denial will actually be the case and not remain a mere possibility. Free deeds performed by secondary causes, that is by creatures bear, according to Molina, both the mark of necessity and that of contingency. They are contingent with respect to the secondary agents themselves and they are necessitated by God's decision, whether positively approving or merely conceding, that they should actually be the case. This decision by God, which in fact is the decision to create this precise possible world and not any other, is based on the infallible prevolitional knowledge of all possible conditional contingent states of affairs: of all possible ways all possible secondary causes would act in all possible circumstances, which is precisely the middle knowledge. God's decision to create one definite world from among all possible ones supported by His middle knowledge makes it certain that the contingent effect E will come to being in the appropriate circumstances as produced by created free secon-

[43] See P. Dvorak, "Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Necessity," in *A Companion to Luis de Molina*, pp. 69–70.

[44] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 169 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 52. 10).

dary causes with God's supporting concourse. The knowledge of E contingently coming about belongs to God's free, that is postvolitional knowledge as its guarantee is His own eternal decree.[45]

Prevolitional knowledge in God that relates to necessary effects is purely natural knowledge; when contingent effects come in, God's knowledge becomes middle knowledge. What God contemplates in His middle knowledge is metaphysically contingent. Peter's denial of Christ results from no necessity, it is not necessary that Peter should sin when put in definite circumstances. In His middle knowledge God knows both Peter falling to temptation in the definite circumstance and Peter resisting his temptation in the same circumstances. By creating the world in which Peter yields to temptation God makes it sure that Peter will deny Jesus Christ and he will do it as a perfectly free act. By dint of God's eternal creative decision it becomes eternally true that Peter will deny Christ and God knows this truth infallibly in his free (that is postvolitional) knowledge. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that God knows that E will occur because E will in actual fact occur.[46]

> God acquires no knowledge from things but instead knows and comprehends everything He knows in His essence and in the free determination of His own will, nonetheless it is not because He knows that something is going to be that that thing is going to be. Just the opposite, it is because the thing will come to be from its causes that he knows that it is going to be.[47]

All this supports the conclusion that God knows the content of His natural and middle knowledge in His own essence (His own mind), without receiving any information from beyond, while the basis of His free knowledge is the act of determination performed by His creative will. If God knows all natural and possible contingent things in His own essence, His prevolitional knowledge is uncaused: God does not draw His information from any sources *extra se*.[48]

Molina goes on to stress that God knows the content of His middle knowledge in a sure, yet not necessary way; this naturally results from the nature of the relevant subject matter which consists of conditional contingent states of affairs which only exist as metaphysical contingents.[49]

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[45] Ibid., p. 54.

[46] Cf. ibid.

[47] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 179 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 52. 19).

[48] See W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 178

[49] See L. Molina, *Concordia*, 4. 52. 35.

Nevertheless God knows in an absolutely certain way that His middle knowledge is true, even though every known contingent object could in principle be other than it is. Thus whatever God knows in His middle knowledge is contingent and true in a non-necessary way.[50] Knowing in His essence all possible creatures, God, whose intellect infinitely surpasses the circumscribed possibilities of creatures, also knows all possible free choices of all possible intelligent creatures in all possible situations.

> Through His natural knowledge God comprehends Himself, and in Himself He comprehends all the things that exist eminently in Him and thus the free choice of any creature whom He is able to make through His omnipotence. Therefore, before any free determination of His will, by virtue of the depth of His natural knowledge, by which He infinitely surpasses each of the things He contains eminently in himself, He discerns what the free choice of any creature would do by its own innate freedom, given the hypothesis that He should create it in this or that order of things with these or those circumstances or aids — even though the creature could, if it was going to do so, as it is able to freely, God would foresee that very act and not the one that He in fact foresees would be performed by that creature.[51]

CONCLUSIONS

The doctrine of the middle knowledge in God was formulated as an attempt to unite the Biblical image of God, the perfect Creator, perfect being, benevolent, omnipotent and all-knowing person with rigorous philosophical logic. From the logical point of view, God's knowledge of the contingent element of His creation either preceded (so to say, naturally, with the understanding that no temporal precedence or sequence is meant) His act of creation or succeeded it. If the former were the case, there would, in fact, be no contingence in the world, since God's previous knowledge, necessarily infallible, would in fact decide every detail of creation, leaving no room for any initiative on the part of creatures. Destroyed with the contingence would be human freedom in the libertarian (as well as in any other) sense.

[50] See K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina*, p. 103. Nevertheless, this metaphysical contingency also falls within the scope of God's natural knowledge, like Molina writes in *Concordia*, 4. 50. 15.

[51] L. de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of The Concordia*, transl. A. Freddoso, p. 119 (L. de Molina, *Concordia liberi arbitrii*, 4. 49. 11).

As it is clear to Molina, on the basis of both faith and philosophical reflection, that human beings are capable of free action, it follows that God's certain knowledge of what contingently and freely will come about in this actual world must (logically) come after His decision to create this and no other possible world and constitute part of what Molina calls free knowledge. This knowledge of what actually will be the case in the created world is founded on what Molina calls middle knowledge, that is prevolitional knowledge of all possible conditional contingent states of affairs and all possible arrangements of such states of affairs. Molina's middle knowledge comes in God as it were, between natural knowledge (prevolitional apprehension of all possible necessities) and free knowledge. In His middle knowledge God knows all possible free actions of all possible free and intelligent creatures in all possible circumstances. From this store of conditional possibilities , which is infinite in number, God chooses one possible world for His creation. In Molina's eyes, the theory of middle knowledge offered a satisfactory solution to the vexed problem of divine prescience and human freedom. In Molina's eyes this theory allows to affirm both eternal knowledge in God of human free acts and the character of human voluntary deeds as genuinely free acts thus solving the intractable dilemma of necessity and freedom in the theory of God's relationship with the world.[52]

Naturally, neither natural, nor middle, nor free knowledge do not constitute different faculties in God, they are only different aspects of God's unique and indivisible omniscience, distinguished with regard to the different objective domains they concern.

Translated by Roman Majeran

[52] Cf. K.R. MacGregor, *Luis de Molina*, p. 103–104.

SPINOZA: THE CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL

Przemysław Gut

In most synthetic presentations of Spinoza's philosophy in histories of philosophy he is described as the chief critic of the concept of free will in the strong sense, nowadays called the libertarian sense.[1] And indeed, if we consult any overall presentation of the arguments advanced against the conception of freedom of will, we cannot overlook the central role played in that critique by the critical arguments put forward by Spinoza.

Thus it is not at all surprising, that most modern thinkers, with G.F. Hegel, A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche in the lead, adopted Spinoza as their chief guide in their polemical writings against theories espousing the conception of *liberum arbitrium*. In what follows I will present the principal reasons that led Spinoza's thinking into formulating the view that "In the Mind there is no absolute, or free, will, but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause […]" (E2 p48 II).

To begin with, I enumerate the reasons which, according to Spinoza, make of the doctrine of *liberum arbitrium* a universally acknowledged theory. I follow that with a presentation of arguments given by Spinoza in

[1] English citations of Spinoza's *Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, Metaphysical Thoughts, Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* are taken from *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, vol. 1, ed. and transl. E. Curley, Princeton, 1988. English citations of Spinoza's Letters are taken from *Spinoza. Complete Works*, transl. S. Shirley, ed. M.L. Morgan, Indianapolis, 2002. Spinoza's *Ethics* (E) is cited by part and proposition using the following abbreviations (d – demonstratio; p – propositio; s – scholium, so, e.g,. E2 p49d means *Ethics*, Part 2, propositio 49, demonstratio. Other works of Spinoza are cited by using abbreviations: CM – *Metaphysical Thoughts* (cited by page number); ST – *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being* (cited by page number); TIE – *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect* (cited by page number); Ep. – Letters; PPC – *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* (cited by page number).

the first part of his *Ethics* with the purpose of showing that these reasons have in fact no value in the context of the basic metaphysical assumptions made in his own theory. Next I discuss in detail two of Spinoza's arguments directed against the Cartesian conception of free will. I round off my reflections with an analysis of Spinoza's case for the thesis that the concept of freedom can be legitimately preserved in a metaphysical theory without postulating the existence of such a special faculty as free will.

1.

It is not hard to conjecture that Spinoza saw as the main cause for the universal acceptation of the doctrine of free will false assumptions people derive from confused and irrational representations concerning the nature of the world and man. Because of these false representations they believe that the experiences that come their way must have more elevated causes that merely natural efficient ones. In consequence they hold "than man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself" (E3 preface).

What precisely are the assumptions alluded to by Spinoza which make human beings believe in the existence of free will? First and foremost, what is intended here are the assumptions resulting from the vision of creation as narrated in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis. On the ground of this magnificent story men have fallen into the habit of thinking there exists God, who is an absolutely free being, who is omnipotent, omniscient and, what is more, He made the whole of the material world for the realization of the good that was in particular intended in the act of creation, namely man, who is a being made in God's own image and likeness. This God is powerful enough to fashion a world in which only some things are subject to determinism, while other things are free from external determination and can exist "in nature as a dominion within a dominion" (E3 preface).

Secondly, there are assumptions resulting from the widespread teleological way of explaining things in nature (see E1 appendix). These assumptions make people think, that whatever happens in nature, must have some deeper significance than that suggested by nature alone. That is why they accept without reservations that, if, say, somebody was killed by a stone falling from a roof, this must have happened because of some design pre-ordained by the will of God, otherwise "how could so many circumstances have concurred by chance (for often many circumstances do concur at once)?" (E1 appendix).

In the third place, implied here are the assumptions following from the ingrained representations concerning the status of moral concepts which are thought to signify something positive in things in themselves. There are also corresponding assumptions regarding the alleged existence od some supernatural model of human nature, which is thought to provide a superior criterion for appreciation of human conduct. On the basis of these assumptions it has become customary to think that genuinely moral behaviour as well as true religion can only exist on condition of assuming the existence of free will in man that is not determined by preceding causes or by the laws of nature

Spinoza did not entertain any doubts as to the thoroughly false nature of all these assumptions, he thought that they drew all their persuasive force from ignorance and failure to comprehend the true nature of God, nature and the place occupied by man in the whole of the Universe. Now, according to Spinoza, God, regardless of the aspect under which He is considered is by nature only Substance and thus can by no means be represented as analogous in any way to the kind of being that is human being. This follows from the fact that, according to Spinoza, neither intellect nor will constitute the essence of the divine substance. Intellect and will are nothing but the logically primary aspects of the divine attribute of thought. In this perspective it is counterintuitive to represent God in such terms as God making a decision to create nature or God insofar as He intends to create nature (see E1 p17s). Moreover, once we assume that God made nature according to an absolutely free and unconditioned decision of his sovereign will, we will have to accept that there are no necessary laws of nature and nature would by itself be plunged in chaos, which is nonsense, or else to admit that the laws of nature are entirely arbitrary and, as such, incomprehensible, which is manifestly at odds with the principle of sufficient reason (see ST part 1, ch. 4).

It is equally hard, Spinoza thinks, to accept the thesis of God creating nature in view of some objective. True, nature is a divine attribute, a manifestation of the divine substance, this does not mean, however, that we can construe the relationship between God and nature as that of a maker producing a work for some previously chosen purpose or because of some preconceived project (see E1 p33s2). Such an interpretation of the relation obtaining between God and nature is inadequate, if only for the reason that it presupposes intentions on the part of God, which cannot be possessed by the divine substance. Moreover, any assumption of some purposive action

in God would imply that "he necessarily wants something which he lacks" (E1 appendix). Yet the very ontological nature of the substance of God, which is characterized by absolute necessity, including the necessity of existence, implies that God is a perfect and complete being in which nothing is lacking. More than that, the assumption that nature has been made by God in order for God to achieve his end, appears to put the question of nature's coming to exist upside down, for it presupposes that that, which does not yet exist has acted causally and has caused that which already exists (see E1 appendix). To avoid all these absurdities the right way is to assume that whatever happens in nature, does not take place because of some project or to achieve some purpose, but because of the operation of laws governing nature and because of previous events and factors acting causally (see E4 preface).

Even more inconvenient consequences follow from any attempts to represent man as a special being, qualitatively different from and elevated above the rest of nature. If all of nature (all things in existence) derives from one and the same substantial stuff, it follows that no part of nature, not even human beings can legitimately be regarded as essentially distinct and superior entity with respect to nature as such. Likewise, a careful consideration of the phenomenon of thought indicates that thought "does not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate (E2 p13s).

Things look the same when we consider human beings from the nomological point of view. If nothing can take place in nature that would contradict nature's universal laws, and all things that come to being must agree with them or result from them, it follows that the distinction between man and the rest of nature cannot be nomological in character, in other words it cannot be the result of the operation of natural laws (see TTP, ch. 6, § 10; see also E1 p28).

All these reasons concur unambiguously to prove that human existence cannot legitimately be classified apart from other natural beings as a special kind of entity, an irreducible component in the structure of reality as a whole. Spinoza is quite positive, that correct reasoning clearly shows that man, both in his corporeal and his mental aspect is an integral part of nature and is subject to the same laws as the rest of natural reality.

This is how Spinoza's principal arguments against the foundations of the doctrine of free will look like in their basic tendency and structure. As is easy to see, all of them tended to demonstrate, that the reality of free will cannot be brought into agreement with the nomological order of nature,

nor with the actual way nature exists. If all things in nature, including human beings, constitute a uniform system, without exceptional points of special value, a system in which nothing occurs contrary to nature's laws and nothing exists in a way opposed to the way natural things actually exist, all this can mean only one thing: namely, that there is no room in man for a power capable of originating some new action without being induced thereto by another cause or for a faculty of absolutely free choice, a choice not predetermined in any way by natural factors. (See E2 p48d; ST part 2, ch. 16; CM I, 3, p. 151; TTP, ch. 5, p. 150–151).

2.

These general metaphysical considerations were by no means the only reason to make Spinoza oppose the doctrine of free will; he believed there are two more errors that this theory can be charged with. To begin with, once we assume that free decision is the source of human actions, we become committed to giving up any possibility of achieving systematic knowledge (explanation) of them, since according to one basic assumption concerning knowledge, all cognition (of effects) depends on knowing their causes. Thus, if human actions were brought into effect by virtue of free will, then there would be no regular causal relationship to serve as the basis for explanation thereof. This would be tantamount to a rejection of the principle of sufficient reason (see Ep. XXXIV, p. 170; ST part I, ch. 6). Moreover, given the assumption that freedom of will rules out regular and necessary causal relationships in the domain of human action, it would be necessary also to assume that every act of free will is equivalent to an accident. Now, for Spinoza, the accident conceived as a thing that is totally or in part lacking an efficient cause is a fiction; it is a category that cannot legitimately be applied to reality. If free will, therefore, were to be thought to be the reason for an act coming into existence, this, Spinoza thinks, would be tantamount to the assumption that accident, that is nothing, was the reason for a given action. Yet to think that nothing is the reason for anything real is sheer absurd (RM part I, ch. 3).

The second of the mentioned erroneous assumptions of the doctrine of free will is the following. The doctrine of free will assumes the existence in the mind of some general abilities, which supposedly exist independently of particular acts of willing. Yet the whole mind consists of nothing but particular ideas. Just as there is no general ability to understand or love (conceived as existing independently of particular acts of understanding and

loving) in the human mind, so there is no absolute ability to will freely existing over and above particular acts of willing. Singular acts of willing are the only things that really exist in our minds. In other words, the will considered as a reality in itself is nothing but a fantasy (it is only an *ens rationis,* and by no means an *ens reale*) produced by our imagination on the basis of our particular wishes, and, if only for this reason, cannot be a cause for anything. (See ST part 2, ch. 16).

To sum up this part of Spinoza's critical discussion of the concept of free will; according to him the theory of free will can only be defended at the cost of assuming that, first, human mind is a very special part of nature and exempt from usual causal relationships, secondly, that it exists independently of the body and, thirdly, that it contains abilities that are substantial in nature. All these assumptions, however, fall in conflict with what we know about nature, man's place within the world and the nature of human mind.

3.

Thus far runs the first part of Spinoza's case against the existence of free will. The immediately following part consists of two arguments directed against the reasoning Descartes formulated and adopted in defense of the doctrine of freedom of will he himself put forward.

Descartes believed, first, that our inner experience provides us with irrefutable evidence for the existence of free will.[2] Secondly, he affirmed that acknowledging freedom of will is an indispensable prerequisite of the correct theory of the psychological nature of judgment. For according to Descartes, each act of judging is an outcome of two different faculties cooperating: the faculty of knowing (*facultas cognoscendi*) and the faculty of choosing (*facultas eligendi*).[3] Thus whenever we perform an act of judging, we begin by apprehending the idea of a thing with our intellect, and then we complete our judgment by asserting or denying that idea. The first stage of this process is the work of the intellect alone, while the other stage is the function of the will alone. Spinoza attempted to refute both of these Cartesian arguments. We shall consider his attempts in turn.

[2] R. Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, Part One, § 39, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. I-II, ed. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, Cambridge, 1985, vol. I, pp. 205–206.

[3] R. Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. II, pp. 39–40; *Principles of Philosophy*, Part One, § 34, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. I, p. 204.

Spinoza, contrary to Descartes, was deeply convinced that our inner experience brings no evidence supporting our belief in free will. First of all, it is scarcely posible to assume that human mind is provided with full and, what is more, obstacle-free access to all the causal factors which influence human behaviour. And yet, it is only in the case when a human mind were able clearly to discern all the agencies that produce their effects in it, that this mind would be able to affirm with certainty that its decisions flowed from free will and not from another agency. This allows us to conclude, that the fact that human beings have immediate awareness of decisions and actions issued by themselves by no means implies that they are aware of the real causes of their acts. Therefore, Spinoza observes, the question whether our inner experience proves our will to be free, the correct answer should be in the negative, since we are never in the position to identify the true causal influences shaping our behaviour.

Spinoza's line of thinking on that point is graphically illustrated by the mental experiment described by him in his letter to Schuller of 1674:

> Furthermore, conceive, if you please, that while continuing in motion the stone thinks, and knows that it is endeavouring, as far as in it lies, to continue in motion. Now this stone, since it is conscious only of its endeavour and is not at all indifferent, will surely think it is completely free, and that it continues in motion for no other reason than that it so wishes. This, then, is that human freedom which all men boast of possessing, and which consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which they are determined. In the same way a baby thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child revenge, and a coward flight. Again, a drunken man believes that it is from his free decision that he says what he later, when sober, would wish to be left unsaid. So, too, the delirious, the loquacious, and many others of this kind believe that they act from their free decision, and not that they are carried away by impulse. Since this preconception is innate in all men, they cannot so easily be rid of it. (Ep. LVIII, p. 262; see also E3 p2s).

This passage shows what Spinoza's position on the question of inner evidence is: a stone, being unaware of the causes needed to sustain its motion, may think, mistakenly, that the state in which it is presently maintained is the effect produced exclusively by its own free decision. If it made an attempt to stop its motion or to accelerate its speed, it would realize, that these changes do not depend on any effort by its will, but on other, external causes. It is not otherwise in the case of a child, a boy blinded by anger or a drunken man: all these work under the delusion that what they are in the course of doing at a given moment flows from their own decisions, and this

is because they remain ignorant of the causes whose influence is affecting them. It is in this kind of delusion, according to Spinoza, that the erroneous feeling of being free and independent of any external determination, and the consequent mistaken belief in the existence in us of a free faculty of decision is rooted. This feeling is a result of the fact that the only thing in the process of forming their own behaviour human beings are directly conscious of are their own decisions and actions, while they totally lack an awareness of all the external causes that affect them and influence that process from outside. Thus they are inclined to take their conscious experiences at the instant of making a decision for a proof of freedom of their decisions. They take here as the basis for their belief the feeling they get that just as they decided on one of the possible courses of action, they could equally have decided on another one. Yet the truth of the matter is, that if they knew the true causal influences on their seemingly autonomous decisions and actions they would realize that the true source of their acts were causal factors anterior to their conscious experiences. Thus the sole basis for introducing free will as a causal factor is, Spinoza believes, the ignorance of the real causes operative in the conscious life of will, and from ignorance no valid inference to the existence of anything can be made. In actual fact we do as w have been determined to do by factors beyond our immediate awareness. It is not possible by any means that whatever we did would not have come about, had our will withdrawn its consent. All these considerations amount to the realization, that inner experience is no convincing argument for the existence of free will.[4]

[4] Leibniz reasoned in a like way in his *Theodicy* Leibniza: "Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove the independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter. Nevertheless we shall see later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogether its own natural principle in relation to its actions, dependent upon itself and independent of all other creatures." *Theodicy*, § 50. Leibniz believed that we cannot achieve a well-founded certainty as to the existence of free will solely on the basis of our inner experience. This is because, firstly, not all factors responsible for our decisions and actions are available to our immediate consciousness; secondly there is a difficulty in bringing into agreement the doctrine of free will with the causal determinism assumed in science or with God's prescience and predestination described by theologians (G.W. Leibniz, *Wybór tekstów*,

As concerns the argument assuming that operation of free will is an indispensable component of an act of judgment, Spinoza was convinced that any attempt to represent an act of judgment as an act of will must fail, for, according to his theory, there is no other kind of willing (equivalent to either affirmation or negation) in mind than the willing already included in the idea (of the thing willed) (E2 p48s).

According to Spinoza, will construed as an ability to affirm what appears to be true and deny what seems to be false is no different faculty from our ability to acquire knowledge (E II, theorem 49, addition). Moreover, all the acts of affirmation and negation are subject to determination, just as all other mental acts (E II, theorem 48). It is not possible for anyone to decide to perform an act of judgment without any regard to what his cognition dictates to him. There is always some reason required in order to affirm or deny something, therefore, according to Spinoza, inconceivable is a situation (admitted by Descartes, at least with regard to judgments based on confused and unclear notions) that a thinking subject might issue either an affirmative or negative judgment, or suspend a judgment, on the grounds of one and the same cognition. The conception of the act of judgment which assumes that the affirmation or negation involved in it is a reality different from the content of ideas constituting this act of judgment and which identifies an act of judgment with a free, non-determined act of choice or a decision, is, to Spinoza's mind, improbable and it requiries a thorough revision. The judgments, regardless of whether or not based on clear and distinct notions, are always the result of the determining power of cognition (ideas). For nobody is able to issue whatever judgment he likes on a given subject, but must always form his judgment with regard to some reason open to his mind, that reason being that which by nature determines and directs the corresponding act of judging. Many arguments, Spinoza claims, can be advanced pointing to the fact that matters are indeed so.

First of all, by carefully analyzing the power of affirming and denying, allegedly being an attribute of will, on the one hand, and that of knowing, which belongs to reason, on the other, we are unable to discover any difference between these two faculties. This inability is in part a result of the

transl. M. Gordon, Warszawa, 1974, p. 161). On the whole the problems of the sort the question concerning free will exemplifies are, in the final analysis, not related to subjective feelings but to coherence or lack of it with some metaphysical theses and conclusions following therefrom. The knowledge concerning these problems and the solutions thereof is thus to be sought in analyses of the conceptual structures of the relevant metaphysical theses.

fact, that both these traditionally distinguished mental faculties, taken in abstraction, are, in Spinoza's eyes, only universal beings, or, more precisely, abstract names, which we only use to throw light on what is common to all individual acts of willing and all particular ideas. In point of fact, there are no separate faculties of either willing or understanding in the mind, all there is are particular, concrete ideas and wishes (E II, theorem 48, footnote).

However, the chief reason conducting to the conclusion, that will and reason are in fact one and the same thing is, according to Spinoza, the fact that we are unable to discover in our minds any other "affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea" (E2 p49).

For when we consider any mode (*modus*) of thinking whatever, any thought involving assertion, which affirms something, e.g. the thought that the sum of the inner angles of a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, we observe, according to Spinoza, that there is no way this theorem could be thought without an idea of a triangle; moreover, we also clearly see that it is impossible for the idea of a triangle to be and be adequately comprehended without the realization of the truth of the theorem that the sum of a triangle's inner angles equals two right angles. Now, if neither a theorem can exist without the appropriate idea, nor an idea without the corresponding theorem(s), the upshot of this is that a theorem is no different reality from the idea it concerns. It has to be granted concerning the idea of a triangle, that it cannot exist and be comprehended without the theorem stating that the three inner angles of a triangle equal two right angles; yet the same has to be conceded with respect to any other particular act of assertion, namely that the asserted theorem is included in the content of the idea it concerns. Let us quote the words of Spinoza himself, taken from his justification of theorem 49 of his *Ethics.* Therein he states that in mind "there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea":

> Let us conceive, therefore, some singular volition, say a mode of thinking by which the Mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the concept, *or* idea, of the triangle, i.e., it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For to say that A must involve the concept of B is the same as to say that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation (by A3) also cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle. Next, this idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, viz. that its three angles equal two right angles. So conversely, this idea of the triangle also can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation. (E2 p49d).

The quoted passage shows that Spinoza's principal idea is the following: acts of judgment are not outcomes of free acts of deciding on the part of a subject. An assertion, even though it may appear as a separate and independent act of a subject, is in fact part of an act of comprehending an idea, with which it forms an indissoluble whole. What Descartes held is far from being the case: when given some ideal content, we are by no means free to assert whatever statement we might wish with regard to that content. Whoever thinks the idea of a triangle, cannot, without falling into contradiction, refuse the statement that a triangle is a figure delimited by three straight sides or that the sum of its inner angles equals the sum of two right angles. Thus, Spinozac thinks, careful consideration of the phenomena of mental life provides no support whatever for introducing a distinction between the ability to know things and the ability to assert some statements: there are no grounds whatever for regarding affirmation and negation as present in our acts of judgment as independent acts of free will dictated solely by our willing.[5] And Spinoza stresses, that this is true of all kinds of judgments, not only judgments based on clear and distinct cognition, as perhaps the example of a judgment concerning a triangle might suggest. For every judgment, without any exception, regardless of whether it concerns

ideas that are clear and distinct or confused and imperfect, is always the outcome of an apprehension of the idea itself, such as it is in itself (E II, theorem 49, footnote). The act of withholding one's judgment is also a cognitive act and by no means an arbitrary decree of a free will (E II, theorem 49, footnote). We possess, Spinoza holds, absolutely no independent power to reject the things that we cognize with evidence. If someone suspends a judgment on a certain matter, this is because he fails to gain adequate knowledge of that matter, and not because he wishes to exercise some sovereign power of a free will. If someone refuses to give a judgment on a thing while being in possession of the idea of that thing, this happens in consequence of himself possessing another idea, which makes him withhold his judgment concerning the former idea. If that person did not possess that other idea, whose effect was as if to cancel the force of the former, he would not be able to withhold his assertion of the existence of the thing represented by the former idea, or even to doubt that existence. Spinoza illustrates this point with the following example:

[5] Cf. J. Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, Indianapolis, 1984, p. 162; R.J. Delahunty, *Spinoza*, Boston, 1985, p. 35.

> To understand this clearly, let us conceive a child imagining a winged horse, and not perceiving anything else. Since this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by P17C), and the child does not perceive anything else that excludes the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present. Nor will he be able to doubt its existence, though he will not be certain of it. […] For if the Mind perceived nothing else except the winged horse, it would regard it as present to itself, and would not have any cause of doubting its existence, or any faculty of dissenting, unless either the imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which excluded the existence of the same horse, or the Mind perceived that its idea of a winged horse was inadequate. And then either it will necessarily deny the horse's existence, or it will necessarily doubt it. (E2 p49s).

All this, Spinoza thought, makes it clear that an act of some alleged free will is not a necessary condition of asserting a judgment, nor is it a condition of withholding a judgment. This in turn undermines the thesis that ideas forming the ground of our cognition are neutral in themselves with respect to affirmation or negation. On the contrary, an idea, insofar as it really is an idea, always entails its own affirmation or negation.

It should here be noted, that Spinoza's view that acts of judging (affirming or denying) are purely the outcome of cognition and cannot be categorized as acts of will was by no means revolutionary in history of philosophy; quite the contrary, it appears to have been a universally accepted view.[6] The novelty of Spinoza's position lies elsewhere, namely in the assumption, that ideas in mind which represent things are, to use contemporary parlance, propositional in nature.[7] As such, their function is not restricted to passively representing things, as is the case in Descartes's conception. One of their essential characteristics is that they are in fact actions, they are acts of the mind (*actiones mentis*). Spinoza expressly states this when he defines the idea in part two of his *Ethics:* having stated that an idea is a "concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing," he adds immediately that in his definition he purposely used the word "concept" (*concepctus*) rather than "perception" (*perceptio*), "because the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind" (E2 def. 3). This implies that every idea insofar as an idea entails two moments: it is that which represents a thing, and it is also that which defines that thing as ex-

[6] See A. Kenny, "Descartes on the Will," in *Descartes*, ed. J. Cottingham, Oxford, 1998, pp. 132–159.

[7] E. Curley, "Descartes, Spinoza, and the Ethics of Belief," in *Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation*, ed. E. Freeman and M. Mandelbaum, La Salle, 1975, p. 169.

isting or nonexistent. If ideas did not possess this twofold structure, they would not be able to carry affirmation or negation with themselves. Thus accepting the described twofold structure of ideas is tantamount to accepting that any idea by its nature entails the moment of affirmation, yet Spinoza assumes more than that, namely, as stated by theorem 48 of his *Ethics,* that there is no other affirmation in the mind than that carried by ideas. To translate this assumption into our contemporary parlance, we might say that affirmation or negation of the existence of a thing is already included in the content of a judgment; it is not, by any means, a separate act of affirming or rejecting, respectively, of the existence of a thing, which is superadded to a neutral idea, which has previously been formed. It is precisely this aspect of Spinoza's conception that situates it beyond any voluntarist conception of judgment.[8]

On the basis of this statement it becomes clear why in his proof of the thesis 49 of his *Ethics:* that in the mind "there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves" Spinoza states expressly that the key role in the understanding of the functioning of our intellect is played by the conception of ideas as active rather than passive. This conception should also be read as expressing the assertion that problems related to existence or non-existence of things are solved exclusively with reference to the content of ideas. Activity of the mind exhausts itself in formation of ideas, the existence of the mind itself is closely bound up with the existence of ideas. Thus the mind itself is not placed over and above ideas, in a position making it possible for it to monitor the content of ideas, their origin and growth, finally to decide to acknowledge them or dismiss them. Spinoza's view is that the mind is its ideas, its life is production of them and all acts of affirmation or rejection performed by the mind are included in the content of these produced ideas.

4.

Thus far our discussion was concerned with the negative part of Spinoza's case against the conception of an independent faculty of free choice; we

[8] J. Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*, p. 164; E. Curley, *Descartes, Spinoza, and the Ethics of Belief*, p. 169; J. Cottingham, "The Intellect, The Will, and the Passions: Spinoza's Critique of Descartes," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26 (1988), p. 243–244; M.D. Wilson, "Spinoza's Theory of knowledge," in *The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza*, ed. D. Garrett, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 124–126.

have presented the main lines of his destructive argumentation. Now I pass to the positive part of his argument, in which he attempted to prove, that, contrary to what has been affirmed before, postulating the existence of free will is not required for philosophical and scientific explanation of man, as all that which concerns the distinction between free and unfree human action can adequately be explained without assuming the existence of such a special and mysterious faculty as free will.

However, it is fair to observe, before we embark on the examination of his conception, there is no unanimity among Spinoza's scholars as to the grounds of his opinion, nor as to its value in the context of the basic metaphysical and anthropological assumptions presupposed in his work.[9] Many critics of Spinoza's work continue to believe that the distinction between a free and an unfree human being cannot in fact be made in Spinoza's system: the consequences of the assumptions laid at the basis of it: his monism, necessitarianism and determinism do not allow an introduction of any such thing as man acting in a free way. To be able to preserve such a concept in a system, these critics believe, we need precisely that which Spinoza rejects: the concept of free will.

We have to start by explaining what the difference between a free and an unfree man consists in in Spinoza. First of all, Spinoza argued, we must realize that freedom cannot be defined in opposition to determination as such, for the only kind of determination that is incompatible with freedom is external compulsion. On the other hand, that which is free is no less incompatible with absence of any determination whatever than with constraint coming from outside. In view of this initial dilemma Spinoza believed that the only plausible definition of freedom is in terms of internal causal determination: any thing is free, if it is subject to causal influences coming from inside and there are no causal influences imposed from outside.

[9] L. Kołakowski, *Jednostka i nieskończoność. Wolność i antynomie wolności w filozofii Spinozy*, Warszawa, 1958, pp. 565–580; H. Allison, *Benedictus de Spinoza: An Introduction*, New Haven, 1987, pp. 141–175; D. Garber, "Dr. Fischelson's Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Sociability," in *Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man*, ed. Y. Yovel and G. Segal, New York, 2004, pp. 183–207; S. Nadler, *Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction*, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 230–138; M. Della Rocca, "Egoism and the Imitation of Affects in Spinoza," in *Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man*, ed. Y. Yovel and G. Segal, New York, 2004, pp. 123–143; A. Youpa, "Spinoza's Model of Human Nature," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*" 48 (2010), 1, pp. 61–76; M.J. Kisner, *Spinoza on human freedom, Reason, autonomy and the good life*, New York, 2011, pp. 46–57.

Of equal importance to him is the distinction drawn between two kinds of necessity: a thing is to be described as necessary either because it exists and acts by virtue of its own nature, or because its existence and functioning is an effect of some external cause. Necessity of the former kind is called by Spinoza free necessity or simply necessity. The other kind of necessity is given the name of coercive necessity or constraint (Ep. LVIII, p. 263). These descriptions alone indicate clearly enough that to Spinoza the contrary of freedom is not necessity as such, but only constraint. Freedom and necessity as such, contrary to generally assumed notions, remain in agreement with each other. The contrary of necessity is not freedom, but chance, by which he means something that in part or as a whole lacks any cause whatever. This assumption was expressly stated in two letters of 1674, one to H. Boxel and the other to G.H. Schuller:

> I am similarly at a loss to understand the reasoning whereby you try to convince me that chance and necessity are not contraries. […] That 'necessary' and 'free' are contraries seems no less absurd and opposed to reason. […] Thus you fail, I think, to make any distinction between constraint (*coactio*) or force, and necessity. (Ep. LVI).

> I say that that thing is free which exists and acts solely from the necessity of its own nature, and I say that that thing is constrained (*coactus*) which is determined by something else to exist and to act in a fixed and determinate way. […] So you see that I place freedom, not in free decision, but in free necessity. (Ep. LVIII, p. 261).

Spinoza expected that the conception of freedom he proposed, and to which the quoted passages refer, would not satisfy many of his readers. Most people, he wrote, would reject this view as absurd and would refuse to give it careful enough consideration. They would assume that freedom consisting in merely internal determination falls far short of activity that can truly be regarded as free (E II, theorem 49, footnote). The reasons for this state of affairs are to be sought in the above quoted universally accepted notions concerning the world and man. These uncritical assumptions make people believe that elimination of free will means, *mutatis mutandis*, doing away with freedom, whereas things, in truth, are not so. True, freedom presupposes certain ability in man, an ability, owing to which man takes an active posture with respect to actions that it has fallen to his share to perform. This ability, however, is not free will but reason (Ep. XXI, p. 121; Ep. LXXV, pp. 320–321).

Spinoza supported this claim with a very complex and involved reasoning, which there is no point to present here in detail. His leading idea is as

follows: he assumes that we are active with respect to these actions of ours, whose adequate cause we are, and we are passive with respect to those actions, in the causation of which we participate, yet only as partial and not adequate causes. Next he demonstrates that we are adequate causes of our actions when we are in possession of adequate ideas concerning these actions and we are inadequate causes of actions, when our ideas related to them are inadequate. The outcome of his reasoning is that our being active comes from adequate ideas, which dwell in our reason, while being passive is related to inadequate ideas whose source is imagination and senses.

Assuming such understanding of what it means being active or passive, we arrive at the conclusion that man is active insofar as he is guided by reason and makes reason the principle of his activity. The more a human being acts under the directing influence of his reason, which means the more his actions are based on his adequate ideas, which truly represent his real situation in the world, the more active he becomes. What is more, owing to reason, which is the faculty following the path of unerring rational thought, man gains his autonomy, for he gets liberated from external conditions and restrictions, which may always induce him to actions that he would not like to undertake when in the correct appreciation of his real situation. Thus the true source of activity is reason which includes the adequate ideas. This is how Spinoza himself sums up this reasoning in the fifth part of his *Ethics*:

> But the power of the Mind is defined by knowledge alone, whereas lack of power, *or* passion, is judged solely by the privation of knowledge, i.e., by that through which ideas are called inadequate. From this it follows that that Mind is most acted on, of which inadequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that it is distinguished more by what it undergoes than by what it does. On the other hand, that Mind acts most, of which adequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that though it may have as many inadequate ideas as the other, it is still distinguished more by those which are attributed to human virtue than by those which betray man's lack of power. (E5 p20s).

Spinoza was perfectly convinced that this conception, which conflates autonomous activity with reason, that is with the fullest knowledge of reality as contained in the adequate ideas, makes it possible for us to comprehend and explain the true nature of freedom and the difference between freedom and lack of freedom. Moreover, he believed that this union of reason and freedom not only corresponds to the actual order of reality, but it also makes the recognition of that order the fundamental principle of action that can be called free. As the consequence of this

conception and the terminological shift involved in it, he could have held with all force of conviction that the statement to the effect that there is no freedom where there is no free will is far from being true. The essence of freedom does not require as its necessary condition the existence of such a faculty as free will. The faculty that provides the foundation for freedom is reason in proportion to the quantity of adequate ideas it contains. It is only through reference to reason that one can comprehend what the true freedom of a human being consists in and how it differs from the condition of enslavement. Let me quote one of many passages in Spinoza's writings where this thought is found:

> […] our freedom lies not in a kind of contingency nor in a kind of indifference, but in the mode of affirmation and denial, so that the less indifference there is in our affirmation or denial, the more we are free. For instance, if God's nature is known to us, the affirmation of God's existence follows from our nature with the same necessity as it results from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Yet we are never so free as when we make an affirmation in this way. […] hence we may understand after a fashion how we act freely and are the cause of our action notwithstanding that we act necessarily […]. (Ep. XXI).

Thus a man turns out to be free when he penetrates the world with his comprehension, correctly identifies his place in the Universe and makes this knowledge the principle of decisions made by himself and actions which he undertakes. Naturally, life according to reason does not mean allowing oneself to be guided by one's own private ideas, but by ideas that are clear and distinct (which is what Spinoza takes to be adequate ideas). These ideas not only set a man apart from harmful passions, which tend to obscure his comprehension of his condition and situation where he finds himself they also help him to get rid of decisions which fail to contribute to the preservation of his being. Thus, the more use man makes of his reason, the more independence he gains from external causal factors and the more causal autonomy he acquires in all actions he undertakes. By contrast, lack of freedom is the condition when actions of a human being are governed by confused and indistinct thoughts. Such indistinct and muddled ideas not only fail to describe the world and man as they really are, they are also certain to direct his actions towards that which is disadvantageous for him. The upshot of this is, according to Spinoza, that a human being finally succumbs to passions that coerce him to certain actions of whose true import and consequences a man remains ignorant. In this way a human

being's self control and self government decreases, while the determining influence of external causes gains force and this regardless of whether a human being yields to this external compulsion of his own accord or is coerced through the use of force by other men. In both cases he becomes a victim of alien compulsion.

Thus the most characteristic and fundamental conclusion of Spinoza's concerning freedom is the following: the true meaning of freedom is adherence to reason. This sounds Stoical, yet it would be a distortion to construe Spinoza's meaning in purely Stoical way as if freedom was for him merely a kind of mental state, consisting in a comprehension of the necessity governing things, processes and events in nature.[10] Such an interpretation would imply that freedom for Spinoza is only a matter of thought or mental states and does not at all concern the real action as occurring in nature. Moreover, this interpretation, reducing freedom to a kind of cognitive state, would lead to the conclusion that there is no real connection between Spinoza's theorem stating that 1) freedom presupposes adherence to reason and another theorem, namely that 2) freedom presupposes the power to exert influence upon things flowing from the inside. However, if one takes into consideration the whole of Spinoza's thought, it does not seem plausible to accept this interpretation as representing his intended meaning. Above all, one must not forget that, for Spinoza, reason and nature are but two expressions of one and the same striving. This implies that in Spinoza reason and nature cannot be viewed as forces opposed to each other, two powers vying for the dominion of the Universe. "To act from nature" and "to act from reason" are two equivalent statements for Spinoza. More than that, reason for Spinoza, otherwise than in Descartes, is not merely the power to acquire knowledge. Beside the cognitive force, reason also entails a causal force which is revealed in affections it generates. Owing to this causal force, reason is able to form a motive for action and determine the direction thereof. Moreover, an adequate idea, that is the idea capable of generating activity, is, on the one hand, sufficient to give the adequate knowledge of an effect, on the other hand, however, it is also sufficient force to produce that very effect. In view of this assumption, we may truly affirm, that we become active in these actions that we generate, concerning which we possess adequate ideas, while we remain passive relative to those acts, which are prompted by only inadequate ideas. For these reasons the conclusion

[10] H. De Dijn, "Naturalism, Freedom and Ethics in Spinoza," *Studia Leibniziana* 22 (1990), s. 142.

that freedom consists in adherence to reason is, in Spinoza's philosophy, equivalent to the statement, that freedom consists in exerting influence flowing from the inside towards the outside. Thus we remain free with respect to our own activity precisely to the degree to which we allow our lives to be guided by reason.

Translated by Roman Majeran

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ: FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM

Przemysław Gut

INTRODUCTION

In what follows I discuss Leibniz's key and most characteristic theorems concerning human freedom.[1] I begin by ascertaining what the exceptional import of Leibniz's discussion of this problem consists in, then I move to discuss the conditions that must be fulfilled, as Leibniz thought, for freedom to be possible. These conditions come in two orders: anthropological conditions, which I consider first, and metaphysical ones, which I present subsequently. I round off my discussion with a survey of some difficulties that Leibniz's proposed theory encounters.

[1] The question of freedom was one of the chief philosophical problems which fell within the area of Leibniz's philosophical interests. It is no exaggeration to say that discussion of both human and God's freedom occupied him throughout his whole philosophical career. In his letter to Jacques Basnage de Beauval dated 19 January 1706 he wrote that already as a youth of seventeen, while reading Martin Luther's *De servo arbitrio* and Lorenzo Valla's dialogue *De libero arbitrio* he was already pondering over the meaning of human freedom (GP III 143). However his first recorded thoughts on this subject came in his *Confessio philosophi* (1673) an then in *Dissertatio metaphysica* (1686), in his correspondence with A. Arnauld (1686–1687), in *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (1703–1705), *Théodicée* (1710), and finally, shortly before his death, in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke (1716). Remarks and observations concerning freedom are also scattered in his lesser writings, the most important of which being: *De contingentia*; *De libertate fato gratia Dei*; *De libertate*; *Fato, Gratia Dei et Connexis*; *Letter to P. Coste* of 19 December 1707 .

EXCEPTIONALITY OF LEIBNIZ'S DOCTRINE

It seems that Leibniz's view of freedom and determinism stands out among other solutions of this problem that appeared in modernity in that it combines an uncompromising defence of freedom of will taken in the strong sense, nowadays termed libertarian, with assumption of universal validity of the principle of sufficient reason.[2] I believe it can safely be assumed that Leibniz's whole discussion of the problem of human freedom was subordinated to one overriding concern: namely to provide a decisive proof, against the opinion of the majority of philosophers, that there is no incompatibility between the affirmation that 1) some human actions are free in the sense that we have the power both to perform them and to hold ourselves back from performing them and another affirmation, namely that 2) all human actions have sufficient reasons, that is some reasons explaining why they should have come to be rather than not be. (In other words, for every statement of the form "Person P undertook action A" we can point to reasons explaining why the person P undertook this precise action and not another.")

This point is clearly elucidated by the famous statement from *Theodicy* where he directly formulates the principle that true freedom rests upon three mutually connected elements: "*intelligence*, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, [...] *spontaneity*, whereby we determine, and [...] *contingency*, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity" (*Theodicy*, § 288).

The quoted passage can be taken as a rough outline of a definition of freedom: each of the three mentioned elements taken separately being a necessary condition of freedom, while the three of them taken together forming a sufficient condition thereof. The first element, intelligence, indicates that freedom is a real feature of an act of decision making in so far as it stands in a close relation with the power to comprehend the object of a planned action and to recognize its objective value, whence a judgment is generated which identifies the reason for the appropriate decision and subsequent action (*Theodicy*, § 34).[3]

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[2] Cf. G.H.R. Parkinson, *Leibniz on Human Freedom*, (Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 2), Wiesbaden, 1970; *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*, ed. D. Rutherford and J.A. Cover, Oxford, 2005.

[3] Leibniz, naturally, noted, that do not always follow the verdict of our right reason in the real acts of making decisions and undertaking our actions. We may well follow,

The second element (*spontaneity*) constitutive of the nature of free efficiency, or, in other words, the nature of subject capable of free decisions and actions means that freedom is possible if and only if the primary source of actions of a human being is will conceived as an inner power capable of originating action and of making choices (*Theodicy*, § 291; NR, II, 21, § 72).[4]

The third constitutive component of the tentative definition of freedom, namely *contingency* refers to the nature of the world in which free actions are possible and indicates that possible freedom of action presupposes a world that does not exist out of logical or metaphysical necessity (it is a contingent and not necessary world), nor is it an outcome of pure chance.

Given that these three conditions as identified in the quoted passage from *Theodicy* are indeed necessary conditions of freedom and free action, the question arises, whether these three conditions are met in Leibniz's own philosophical system. If we were to find out that his philosophical vision of the Universe falls short of fulfillment of any of these requirements, the essence of Leibniz's proposed conception of freedom would be exploded. Leibniz himself was convinced that his system securely meets all the requirements of freedom set forth in *Theodicy*, although he was also aware that each of these conditions poses a challenge to philosophy. The crux of the problem as regards the first two conditions, which could be described as anthropological conditions, is the difficulty of showing that there exists a kind of determination shaping our behaviour, which not only does not rule out freedom, but opens the way for the assumption that it is our will that is the ultimate principle of actions undertaken by ourselves. As for the

as we often do, stimuli deriving from our passions (*Theodicy*, § 51). This fact, however, does not imply that we can choose against our judgement. What is here implied, however, is that in the case of finite beings that we, humans, are, our judgments are never entirely free from the influence of passions and inadequate notions. It is only in God that one can assume with certainty, that His will is always directed by the pure judgment of reason (*Theodicy*, § 310). In *Nouveaux essais* Leibniz introduces the concept of a "freedom of reason," by which he means reason's independence from passions. Given the nature of both God and man, only God can be considered perfectly free, whereas man can only be thought free in a higher or lower degree. Human decisions are in most cases determined by a judgment, which is a mixture of reasoning and passion (NR, II, 21, § 8). Nevertheless, Leibniz writes in *Theodicy*, regardless of how we arrive at an appreciation of our good, "acting according to judgment" constitutes the "*essence of will*" (ibid., § 311).

[4] Cf. E. Sotnak, "The Range of Leibnizian Compatibilism," in *New Essays on the Rationalists*, ed. R.J Gennaro, C. Huenerman, Oxford, 2003, p. 216; D. Rutherford, "Leibniz on Spontaneity," in *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*, pp. 159 and 168).

third condition, which can be called metaphysical, the challenge consists in the demand for a convincing proof that there really exist possibilities that are not materialized (possible worlds), for if the decisions concerning our actions are to be regarded as free, we must be given choice among many options related in such a way, that a selection of one option does not annihilate the possibility of all the other ones.

Such are, I believe, the main component parts of Leibniz's conception of freedom. The points of particular interest in this theory are not only the assumption that a metaphysical grounding of freedom requires that metaphysical necessity of the world in which we act on the one hand, and absolute chance character of the same on the other be both ruled out, but also the idea that although spontaneity is a necessary feature of free action, pure spontaneity, divorced from any relation to causal order and from any source of determination involves contradiction. However, probably the most important feature of Leibniz's attitude to the problem of freedom is his conviction that freedom of action is not a feature related only to the order of will and willing. It is of the essence of free action that it is both *spontaneous* and *intended.* This feature sets Leibniz's conception apart from theories of both Descartes and Molina, who held that freedom is a feature of a non-determined act of willing or choice which a free willing subject issues for himself; it also makes for the difference of his conception from that of Spinoza, according to which the meaning of freedom is adherence to reason. Leibniz believed both of these conceptions to be one-sided and, however different these theories may be between themselves, they represent the same erroneous assumption that *the reason which directs our choice towards one of the given options and the sheer power of choice* clash each with the other and thus cannot cooperate in the production of a single act of choice.[5]

[5] Polemics against Descartes, Molina and Spinoza were by no means the only ones Leibniz engaged in. Equally absorbing were also his disputes with Hobbes, Malebranche and Locke. All these confrontations had an effect upon Leibniz's mature position on freedom and all of them should be taken into account in an attempt to make a full synthetic theory reconstruction of Leibniz's definitive theory of will and the freedom of will.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM

Leibniz endorsed some traditional commonplace arguments in favour of the existence of free will. He shared the commonsense view that only on the assumption of the reality of free will we can claim to have some real input into the personal acts of volition and into our personal activity. He also shared the view that without free will we would find it difficult to make any sense of morality. If our actions were produced without free choice on our part, there would be no way to hold us responsible for what we did or failed to do and consequently we would deserve neither praise nor reproof. Morality thus makes any sense only on the condition that there are moral subjects that are endowed with free will. Like other modern philosophers, Leibniz expressed the view that an assumption of the existence of free will is an indispensable component part of religion, and above all of theodicy.

In contrast, however, to many other authors, medieval as well as modern, he was convinced that freedom of choice entailed by free will does not by any means authorize the conclusion that the freedom of the human will consists in lack of complete determination (*libertas indifferentiae*). The main objection to this conception, in his opinion, is that on this theory any choice would amount to a kind of "chance, lacking any determining reason, either evident or concealed" (*Theodicy*, § 303). The situation of "indifferent balance" is contrary to the principle od sufficient reason. Pure chance, absolute accidentality is no more than a phantom, it never occurs in the nature of things (*Theodicy*, § 303). Moreover, no decision, not even a seemingly chance one, can be taken without some decisive reason (see *Theodicy*, § 349; *Discourse de Métaphysique* § 2), In a situation where none of the two alternatives outweighs the other in its value, the subject will remain inactive.[6]

> If, for liberty to come into being, an absolute indifference (*omnimoda indifferentia*) was needed, probably no free act would ever occur in reality. For I take it, that there never comes into being such a case in which all relevant factors were absolutely equal on either side of the alternative. For even if, by an improbable chance, the motive factors were to be equal on bothe alternative

[6] On Leibniz's polemic with Molina's conceptions see R. Sleigh, Jr., V. Chappell, M. Della Rocca, "Determinism and Human Freedom," in *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-century Philosophy*, ed. D. Garber and M. Ayers, vol. 2, Cambridge, 2008, p. 1259.

> sides, equal will not be the chooser's own impelling motives [...] Nor do I think that an example of a choice by will between completely indifferent options could be given; there would always have to be some reason why the will chose one thing rather than anothr, (Grua, pp. 287-291 (*De Libertate*)).

This is not to claim, however, Leibniz cautions, that a free act requires no more than that this act be produced solely by our own will and not by forces external to our willing (NE II, xxi, § 10). Against J. Locke's opinion, Leibniz argued that such an explanation of freedom is insufficient. Being derived solely from one's spontaneous willing is necessary and enough to account for the voluntary character of an act, and the concept of being voluntary has different content from such concepts as "freedom" or "freedom of will." Thus it is perfectly possible for an action to be voluntary and yet un-free (NR II xxi, § 10). For an act to be free still another condition must be met, namely there must be a real possibility of a choice between different courses of action; while it is enough for an act to be voluntary if it is spntaneously approved by one's will even if there are no alternative course of action.

Equally unacceptable to Leibniz was a reduction of freedom to mere possibility of unhampered action. Possibility of action obtains when there is nothing to prevent a person from acting in accordance with his/her wishes. This freedom of action may vary as to degree (a person in possession of greater means has more freedom of action than someone deprived of required means) and as to kind (for there are many kinds of barriers or impediments which may prevent freedom of acting according to one's will) and it concerns primarily the ability to control and use one's own body. Freedom of unhampered action is but a superficial dimension of freedom in the proper sense. The essential feature of human freedom concerns not whether we are able to carry out our wishes, but whether we can really influence our own acts of willing. This involves liberty in shaping one's own decisions, which is only possible when there is the faculty of free choice, that is free will, present (Grua, pp. 287–291).

Taking all the above considerations into account, Leibniz believed that freedom of will is more than just ability to transform one's wishes into action, but neither can it be reduced to an absolute liberty in governing one's acts of will. What does freedom of will consist in, then? It is a faculty of self-determination construed as the basic source of our activity. Its power is to transform our willings through looking for new premises, creating predispositions and adopting an attitude of distance and reserve towards already

known reasons.[7] What is essential, therefore, is the fact that free will, although original and underived in its activity, always acts in view of certain reason presented to it by cognition and thus is crucially related to reason.

Now the key point in understanding Leibniz's conception of will is precisely to define what kind of determination is will's self-determination. Leibniz distinguished three kinds of determination that are relevant to shaping any activity:

a) first, necessary determination, which he called metaphysical or unconditional (absolute) determination,

b) secondly, physical determination, also referred to as mechanical or efficient,

c) thirdly, moral determination, which is determination with respect to a purpose, a purposive, final or teleological determination.

Let me quote some of Leibniz's best known formulations of his thought regarding this question

Necessary determination (negation of which implies contradiction) is wholy incompatible with freedom for the reason that it leaves no room for any choice whatever. Likewise physical determination, even though it admits of negation that is free from contradiction, cannot be brought into agreement with freedom, the chief reason being that it is the kind of determination external to the subject. In fact, physical determination is a form of efficient causality whose operation is restricted to the realm of nature. It is not so with moral determination, although this kind of determination also admits of negation that is contradiction free. In contrast, however, to physical determination, moral determination arises from the inside, so to say, of the moral subject. Moral determination is by nature purposive or purpose-oriented; it does not affect the agent in isolated instants, but its effect extends upon the whole proces of coming to a decision and then realizing this decision in concrete action. Last but not least, moral determination, otherwise than physical determination, is rooted and operates in the sphere of values.

Taking all these considerations into account, Leibniz concluded, we may safely acknowledge that moral determination functions by inducing the agent subject to act in a certain determinate way, without imposing any necessity on the subject and equally without exercising any compulsion. In the final analysis this means that moral determination not only does not remove the dependence of our spontaneous actions on our will, but also

[7] Some interesting comments on the nature of will are found in Leibniz's *Theodicy* and in his discussion of Th. Hobbes's "On Freedom, Necessity and Chance."

meets the first of the three conditions of free action identified by Leibniz, namely *intelligence.*

THE METAPHYSICAL CONDITION OF FREEDOM

As has already been stated, freedom is only possible if there really exist non realized possibilities. For it is only when there somehow exist, independently of one another, alternative possible orders of reality enabling choice between them, that an acting person is given the possibility to decide on more than just one course of action.

Rejection of the reality of pure possibilities would totally remove metaphysical grounds for justifying freedom.

> If we were unconditionally to reject pure possibilities, we would thereby destroy chance, for if there were nothing apart from what God actually created, God's creation would become necessary the moment God decided to create something. (*Correspondence with Arnauld, Remarks on the Letter of Mr Arnauld* […], GP II, p. 45).

It follows clearly from the above statement that the principal part of the theoretical task Leibniz set himself, namely providing metaphysical grounds for freedom, consists in proving the existence of pure or non-realized possibilities.

Leibniz distinguished three kinds of possibility, forming the following order: 1) the most extensive possibility is pure logical possibility which is the same as metaphysical and conceptual possibility; in this sense everything is possible which is free from internal contradiction. 2) More restricted than logical is natural possibility; in this sense everything is possible that is allowed by the existing order of nature (among other things, by the laws of physics). 3) The most restricted kind of possibility is real possibility or potency; in this sense possible is that which is compatible with the nature of a given particular being. Actually existing reality is even narrower than real possibility, as potential existence includes more than pure actual existence. Naturally, logical possibility is all-inclusive: whatever is possible in any other sense is also logically possible.

Crucial for the correct grasp of Leibniz's meaning appears to be his statement that to be real a possibility need not materialize. A mere possibility admits of forever remaining unrealized. Possible is not only that which once existed as a concrete entity, or that which exists so now or will exist in future: also that which never was, is not, and will never be such an entity,

and is destined forever to remain a pure, contradiction-free project of thought, belongs to the sphere of real possibility. Thus it is not necessary for a possible being that it be realized as a concrete solid thing. Leibniz was positive that commit an error those authors, who believe that only that is possible which becomes fact at some time.[8]

The main argument for the existence of pure possibilities is, to Leibniz's mind, lack of any reason "why we should not legitimately and exactly state that intellect is able to comprehend what is possible and what could fail to come to existence in the real world" (*Letter to Bourguet,* December 1714, p. ??). For instance, we can easily represent to ourselves personages from fairy tales, who will never come to exist in real life (Cf. *On Chance,* p. 53); likewise there probably are conceivable geometrical figures and imaginary numbers which do not and never will exist, and nevertheless are open to study and knowable. Also, we can as well imagine that things and persons which form our surroundings in the real world exist in quite another way apart from the manner in which they exist in actual fact. To sum up, one sees no unshakable principle excluding some sort of reality of substances, persons and entities other than those which happen to exist in the actual world. The persuasive force of these arguments rests upon the fact that thinking about entities that are purely imaginary is something natural, which we do on various occasions. We know novels and fictitious stories that we are perfectly aware have never occurred and never will anywhere in the real world, and yet who would deny that these stories are possible (*Theodicy*, § 173). More than that, our thinking, Leibniz thinks, is by nature oriented towards something already there, it is a kind of discovering things rather than producing them. If this be true, it follows that not only actually existing entities, but also those that only are conceivable as purely possible are somehow found out by the thinking subject rather than simply made up.

If reality in a deep metaphysical sense is not to be identified with actual existence, but with only possible one, there is reason enough to consider

[8] „Thus commit a grave error or, at least, express themselves in a harmful way those who call possibility only those things that once become fact, that is, those things which God selects for realization; this error was the Stoic Diodorus's (according to Cicero), and among Christians, Abelard's, Wycliff's and Hobbes's (*The Cause Deriving from God* […], p. GP II, p. 34). "I believe that those clever men do harm to the truth and to themselves when they use novel and offending formulations without any discernible reason. In our own times it was Mr Hobbes who defended the view that what never happens is utterly impossible. […] Spinoza went even further than that and, it seems, openly taught the doctrine of blind necessity […]" (*Theodicy*, § 172, p. 237).

Leibniz's possible worlds as real beings in this sense. The possible worlds are some kind of reality then, and the actual world is but materialization of only one among an infinite number of possible worlds existing in God's mind. God's intellect is a *pays des possible* (country of the possible), where possible worlds exist *sub ratione possibilitatis* (in the form of pure possibility). The divine intellect is that which imparts reality to all the pure possibles.[9]

Given their nature and their mode of existence, the possible worlds are, in the final analysis, as real as the actual world. They may never become actualized and nevertheless they will never cease to be real. Thus, when one considers the ultimate ground of existence, the possible worlds do not differ from the actual world in their fundamental ontological aspect. The difference between the purely possible worlds and the actual one is constituted by the fact that the latter is completely filled with actually existent objects, whereas the former only contain possible non-actualized objects.

However, the true importance of the conception of the possible worlds for the task of providing metaphysical foundations for freedom is found in Leibniz's affirmation that the possibility of each possible world is the inherent property of that world and entirely independent of whether it actually exists and which one among the possible worlds does actually exist (in other words, has been selected for actual existence by God).[10]

[9] "For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which gives reality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein. All reality must be founded on something existent. It is true that an atheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry would have no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible." (*Theodicy*, § 184).

[10] "Yet it ought to be affirmed, that God, by virtue of His nature, wills that which is the best. 'Consequently, He wills by necessity' you are saying. — I do acknowledge, following St. Augustine, that this is blessed necessity. However, it seems to follow hence that any existent thing exist by necessity. — How come? — For there would be contradiction involved in non-existence of that whose existence were willed by God. — Now, I deny that this last affirmation be absolutely true, otherwise impossible would be all those things which God wills not. Now, they undeniably remain possible, even though God chose them not for existence. For the existence of that, whose existence God wills not, is by all accounts possible, and this is because it would be capable of existing by virtue of its nature, had God but willed it to exist. — And yet God cannot will it to exist. — Nevertheless I claim that this thing still remains possible by virtue of its own nature, even it be impossible in consideration of God's will. For we have called possible by virtue of its own nature anything that does not contain contradiction in itself. Yet one must always mind the meaning of the words in order to avoid all kinds of absurdities in one's utterances (*On Freedom*, p. 179).

Each one among the possible worlds is possible by virtue of its own nature. The characteristic of possibility marking the possible worlds is such, that it remains unaffected by actual existence or lack of it. The mark of possibility in itself depends in no way on actual existence, neither is the content of pure possibles determined by any relationship with the actually existing world.

Such ontological status of the possible worlds, making them totally independent of that which actually exists, and the conception of reality not limited to actuality are the twin assumptions grounding in Leibniz's theory the existence of freedom. Since not all that is possible does actually exist and not all that never actually exists is impossible, the existence of other worlds than the actual one is a distinct possibility. And this possibility provides us with a real alternative, a chance to choose between a number of equally possible options.

As concerns the metaphysical grounding and treatment of contingency, the discussion of this problem involves in Leibniz three main aspects. First of all there is the thesis that the actually existent world is contingent (not necessary) in itself. Secondly, there is the thesis that the actual world is contingent as to the property of being the best of all possible worlds. Thirdly and lastly, it is stated that the actually existing world is contingent with respect to God's choice.

Leibniz based the proof of the first thesis on his conception of the possible worlds; he argued for the second using his conception of the infinitesimal proof in conjunction with the principle of perfection; while his case for the third reposed on carefully drawn distinctions between the spheres of reason, will and power.

Thus, in a rough outline, runs Leibniz's core argument intended to demonstrate not only that freedom in the sense defined by himself is possible, that is contradiction-free, but also that it really is a real feature of the Universe as it actually exists.

DIFFICULTIES

A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS have been raised to Leibniz's theory as sketched above. I will limit my discussion to a few of them, namely those that still remain the objects of lively controversy.

The first objection points to the fact, that freedom of choice as envisaged by Leibniz, really requires significantly stronger assumptions than mere reality of a kind of non-realized possibilities (possible worlds). In fact what it calls for are possible worlds in which persons, who actually exist in the present world also exist and take decisions and perform actions other than those they take and perform in the present world of ours. Only on this condition can their decisions and actions be considered really contingent, which is of course a necessary condition for them being regarded as free. For instance, if we are to consider Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon as a free act, we have to assume that he could have decided otherwise at that very moment, which means, in Leibniz's terms, that there is a possible world in which this very Caesar failed to cross the Rubicon. Yet this is not possible on Leibniz's own metaphysical assumptions, since, to all intents and purposes, he ruled out the existence of trans-world individuals, that is individuals existing in more than one possible world.[11] And, as is easily seen, if Julius Caesar could not exist as the same personage in another world as taking an option contrary to the one he took in this world, this only means that his seemingly contingent decisions are in fact necessary for his identity, and so they are no longer contingent and, consequently, no longer free.

Another difficulty concerns the fact that moral determination, which in Leibniz's opinion should not annihilate our freedom, *de facto* only complicates the proposed account of causality without introducing any essential modification. On that conception our decisions and actions remain as determined as on the grounds of the traditional account of causality, even granted that the determination in question is internal and

[11] The impossibility of trans-world individuals results from the fact that in Leibniz's conception every possible world is a self-contained collection of individual substances that are mutually compatible by virtue of their essences. On this conception any given possible world is maximally consistent in that it contains every individual substance which is compatible with all other substances belonging to that world and every substance incompatible with all the substances in the given world is excluded. For that reason even the slightest change in the set of properties of a given substance would result in changes affecting the whole world; in consequence, this world would no longer be the same world. For this reason and given the unique essence of every person, no person can belong to many different possible worlds but must remains enclosed within the boundaries of only one world (See Perzanowski [1989] pp. 262–364). A like conclusion is suggested by the Leibnizian principle of identity of indiscernibles; on the presuppositions lying at the basis of this principle any person and indeed any substance is a being complete in itself and does not admit multiple concretization.

purpose-oriented. For the crux of the problem is not what particular form takes the influence determining our behaviour, but whether this influence is sufficient to generate the relevant decision or action. If so, the freedom of this decision or action is only illusory. Thus true freedom is possible only in a situation of absence of determination, that is when it lies in our power to go beyond all determining influence.

The third difficulty arises in conjunction with Leibniz's philosophical assumption according to which the full notion of a person includes all that can ever happen to that person. Thus whatever a person comes to be or to do is already contained in the idea of that person prior to any free motions taken by that person, that is independently of all his/her decisions. In this perspective it is hard to agree that a person spontaneously and independently decides on what action to take. Thus, contrary to Leibniz's assumption, real freedom of decisions and actions requires that not all things in which a person comes to share should be considered as included in the individual notion of that person.

One more difficulty consists in the objection, that if all true propositions describing human decision making and action are analytical in structure, as Leibniz wished to assume, there is no room for true freedom (contingency) in the human species. Analytical nature of a proposition is what makes this proposition necessarily true, only the synthetic structure of propositions leaves room for either falsity or truth thereof. Thus if all propositions describing human acts are by nature analytical, that is: necessarily true, there is no room left for contingency and freedom in the sphere of human behaviour. Thus freedom (contingency) is only possible outside of the realm delimited by analytical statements. The oppositions: analytical/synthetic and necessary/contingent are equivalent.

What can we make of these difficulties?

To my mind, the first of these can be avoided in the following way. It is true that within Leibniz's system a person cannot exist in more than one world, however, there is nothing to prevent the assumption that a person existent in one world can have counterparts in other worlds. The relationship between counterparts of the same person in different possible worlds would have to be grounded in similarity and not in identity (cf. *Theodicy,* § 414). This conception would perhaps offer a way of escape to Leibniz as far as the first of the mentioned difficulties is concerned. Of course, there immediately arises the question whether such conception of counterparts could be squared with other aspects of Leibniz's theory. The conception of

counterparts would have to assume that there are some common features, shared by individuals belonging to completely different worlds. Now we know that in Leibniz's metaphysics features inherent in a given substance are as individual as the substance itself. It is not possible for a single property to inhere in two different persons. Furthermore, all persons are unique and differ from one another from the very beginning of their existence. Every person, taken individually, is subject to its individual law of series which ensures that all properties of that person form an order in which every following property is a consequence of the immediately preceding one. Thus all the properties of a given person are correlated and, consequently, it is not possible for a person in one world to be identical with some person in a different world to a certain point of development.

Without ignoring this difficulty, it is still possible on the ground of Leibniz's doctrine to hold that it is possible for a person in one world to have counterparts in other worlds, if that person is considered in its generalized concept (*sub ratione generalitatis*). Thus, to take the above example of Julius Caesar, we need not consider him as a definite individual, that is we need not take into account all particular circumstances and features which complete his individuality in one of the possible worlds. We may, for instance, attribute to Caesar having been the ruler of the greatest empire of his day, having lost his life in an attempt on his life and yet we need not precisely name Rome or Brutus or other singular circumstances. Thus we might speak of many Caesars, all of whom would perfectly fit all of the selected predicates. Each of these Caesars would be able to carry out a slightly different activity in a corresponding possible world, different from the other possible worlds. In one of these worlds Caesar will cross the Rubicon, while in another he will not.

As far as the second objection is concerned, Leibniz could reply that any theory upholding determinism is indefensible in the last analysis, for the reasons I already pointed out above. Next, he could subjoin, that a theory affirming that no possible reasons are sufficient to generate action or that the very same reasons could induce a person to perform entirely different actions is contrary to treatment of persons as intelligent subjects, whose motives for acting could in principle be understood.

The third and fourth objections could be countered with the statement that some of the features following from the individual idea of a person are not necessary unconditionally but only hypothetically and they presuppose free decisions of that person whence follow the relevant features. Thus

events deducible from the individual notion of a person are not in fact derivable in the same way as e.g. properties of a sphere are deducible from the specific concept of the sphere. From the fact that in a true proposition there obtains a close relationship between the subject and the predicate of that proposition does not follow necessity of that proposition. The structure of an analytical proposition is not a sufficient ground for real necessity. Analytical nature of a proposition is a genus, whose mutually opposed species are necessity and contingency. The adjectives "necessary" and "contingent" function, as it appears, in Leibniz's way of speaking as determiners rather than modifiers in the phrases "proposition necessarily true" and "proposition contingently true."[12]

Futhermore, as Leibniz pointed out, we can consider any object (substance) from the point of view of a general concept or an individual notion of that object. This is true of actually existent objects as well as of purely possible ones. Thus not all our predications related to a subject, say, Caesar, are necessary. Whether our predication is necessary or contingent depends on the point of view, that is on the kind of notion, that we take as the basis for our consideration of Caesar. When we predicate of Caesar that he is "capable of thinking" we consider Caesar in terms of the general notion of him as a human being and thus our affirmation is necessarily true. If, on the other hand, we state that "Caesar crossed the Rubicon," we affirm a contin-

[12] In his *Remarks on the Letter of Mr Arnauld* Leibniz writes: *"*I go so far as to believe that the road to conciliation lies open before us. I imagine Mr Arnauld flinched from accepting this proposition only because he took the relation which I firmly uphold for both: internal and necessary, whereas my meaning is that this link is internal, yet not necessary, as I have explained at great length, because based on free decisions and acts. What I have in mind is no other relationship between subject and predicate than that which is found in the most contingent truths. I mean: there is always something ascertainable in the subject, which gives the reason why a given predicate or an event belongs to that subject, in nother words, the reason why the relevant event did take place rather than not. Yet these reasons for contingent truths only incline and do not compel. Thus it remains true that I could not make this journey, although it is certain that I will make it. This particular predicate or the event corresponding to it, does not stand in a sure relation to other predicates that are predicable of myself, if these predicables are considered abstractly or *sub ratione generalitatis,* nevertheless, this predicate does stand in a sure relation to the complete individual notion of myself. This is so because the complete individual notion of myself has been formed on purpose to serve as the fundamental starting point making it possible to deduce from it everything that happens to myself; this notion is undoubtedly found *a parte rei*" (GP II, p. 51)

gent proposition. The feature of having crossed the Rubicon belongs to the concept of Caesar as an individual human being and it is Caesar as an individual that stands as the subject of our affirmation. Thus not all that we predicate of Caesar is necessary predication.

Translated by Roman Majeran

JOHN LOCKE ON WILL AND FREEDOM

Marcin Iwanicki

Although the title of John Locke's main work: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)[1] might suggest that it will apply only to the power of understanding, in the second book we also find an extensive chapter devoted to the concept of the will, entitled *Of Power*, in which the author presents his views on freedom.

Until recently, this chapter was not of particular interest to Locke scholars, especially when compared to the carefully examined chapters on substance, primary and secondary properties or personal identity. It is not surprising, considering the fact that it is not only the longest, but also the most extensively revised chapter of the whole work, recognized by many Locke's contemporaries as a complete fiasco.

During Locke's lifetime, or more precisely in the years 1690–1704, four editions of *An Essay* were published; the fifth edition, published shortly after his death, introduced corrections suggested by the author. The most important changes in the chapter were made in the second edition (1694), the remaining ones in the fourth (1700) and the fifth one (1705). Locke was encouraged to introduce the changes when exchanging letters with two of his friends, William Molyneux and Philip van Limbroch, who accused the author of excessive intellectualism and attributing too little autonomy of will to the judgements of reason.

The inconsistency in the standardization of the corrected text sometimes explains the complexities, or even alleged contradictions, which modern and contemporaneous readers of *An Essay* point out. Establishing Locke's

[1] J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975. Quoted further according to the scheme: part, chapter, paragraph.

final view — both its nature and coherence — is, as we will see, one of the most serious research challenges.[2] The aim of this essay is to present the structure of Locke's considerations, including the conceptual apparatus, and to signal the main interpretative disputes.

In the chapter *Of Power,* three general parts can be distinguished. After preliminary remarks about the concept of power, Locke proceeds to a more detailed consideration of two specific powers, namely will and freedom. Then he ponders the freedom of the will and its acts, to finally move to the part devoted to factors affecting the will, namely judgements of reason regarding our good, as well as the states of desire and distress. Most of the changes introduced by Locke in the subsequent editions concerned the latter part and, more specifically, the relationship between the judgements of reason and the states of desire and distress. The layout of this essay will follow the structure of Locke's analysis.

1. THE WILL AS AN ACTIVE POWER

Locke begins his analysis with the introduction of the concept of active power, by means of which he defines the concepts of will and freedom. The powers of a substance are not something directly observable, but we infer their existence on the basis of observations of changes taking place regularly in bodies and in one's own mind. Accordingly, we assume the existence of permanent properties that enable substances to initiate changes (active powers), and permanent properties that allow them to be subject to change (passive powers).[3]

We get a clear idea of the active power only through reflection on the activities of our own mind, and more specifically, on the acts of wanting or wishing (willing, volitions) (2.21.5). Volitions are actions that concern other activities, both physical and mental, both positive and negative — their ini-

[2] For contemporary readers, a great help is the critical edition of J. Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, prepared by Peter H. Nidditch, which allows the reader to get an idea of the changes that Locke puts in subsequent editions.

[3] Observation of the bodies does not give us a clear idea of active power, because it does not decide whether the bodies are capable of initiating changes, or only to transmit them. Locke admits both the possibility that matter is completely passive (2.23.28), and the possibility that it possesses active powers given to it in a special way by God (4.3.6).

tiation, continuation, forbearance or termination (2.21.8.8).[4] Reflection also teaches us that the scope of our willing power is limited and, on this basis, we create the ideas of freedom (*liberty*) and necessity (2.21.7).

In the first edition of *An Essay*, Locke does not specify the relationship between volition and desire. Sometimes he treats them as if they were identical, which is difficult to reconcile with the definition of volition as an activity, since desire is a passive state. In later editions, he clearly distinguishes between them, and introduces a definition of volition as self-aware issuing orders to oneself (*commanding*, *ordering*, *directing*) to perform an action (2.21.5, 28). Locke points to a few differences between volition and desire. First of all, they may occur separately, or even be in conflict with each other. For example, a person may, because of an earlier commitment, want to convince someone of something, even though they do not want it at all (we have will without desire here), or want to stop the pain, but for the fear of the negative effects of its cessation, want it to last (in this case, we have desire without will) (2.21.30). Secondly, the objects of wanting are only those of one's own actions, which are to be carried out in the near future and about which the subject thinks they are within his power, while desire can concern various states of things, including those belonging to the future, considered impossible, as well as those which, although considered possible, are the actions of other subjects (2.21.33). The range of will is therefore much more limited than that of desire.

2. FREEDOM AND VOLUNTARINESS

Having introduced the concepts of active power and volition, Locke proceeds to the analysis of freedom. After distinguishing freedom (*liberty*) from

[4] At this preliminary stage of the reconstruction of Locke's views, two terminological remarks are worth making. (1) When giving away the terms "volition" and "willing" as "act of will," it must be remembered that Locke does not recognize the existence of a real, power-laden power of will (attributing such error to scholastics), and considers the whole person as the subject of these acts. subject of moral action. Talking about the will is at best imprecise and brief way of speaking about certain powers of a person, about its relational properties. In the quotations from Reflections, I leave the term "act of will," while in the main text I use the terms "will" and "want." (2) Locke understands the term "acting" in a broad sense, including also negative actions, or forbearances). Abandonment is something different from nonaction (nonaction) because it combines with the desire that the positive action does not take place.

voluntariness, he argues that the right subject of freedom is man, not will, then he gives his definition of freedom, and finally he wonders if freedom can be attributed to volitions.[5]

The fact that Locke acknowledges the existence of freedom on the basis of Revelation is beyond doubt, as is the fact that he regards freedom as a condition of moral responsibility and the justice of divine reward and punishment (1.3.14). In a letter to William Molyneux of January 20, 1693, the same conviction is justified by reference to inner experience.[6] Locke admits, however, that he does not know how man can be a free subject of an action, taking into account the nature of the world. Therefore, he limits his analyses to determining the psychological conditions of freedom.

The first step to determining the nature of freedom is, in his opinion, understanding the difference between freedom and voluntariness. However, before we get to this distinction, it is worthwhile to at least enumerate the main philosophical questions regarding voluntariness which occupied the minds of his contemporaries, because they constitute the background necessary for proper understanding of Locke's view. Here is a representative sample: Which body movements are voluntary? Does voluntariness require prior consideration? Can voluntary activities be habitual, carried out under duress, or without knowing the relevant circumstances? Do voluntary actions have causes or not? And if they do have causes, are they desires, inclinations, judgements of reason about what is best, or maybe volitions? And if they are volitions, do they themselves have causes or not? If they have causes, are they internal or external to the subject? Can voluntary actions have causes or be causally determined? Can voluntariness be assigned to volitions? Is there such a state as the weakness of the will, in which the subject chooses and voluntarily performs the action, although he knows that it is not the best option available to him? Are all voluntary activities free, and vice versa? What is the subject of freedom, and is freedom a matter of degree? If will exists, can it be described as free? Does the causal determination of action or volition exclude freedom?

[5] See S.C. Rickless, "Will and Motivation," in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, ed. P. Anstey, Oxford, 2013, pp. 393–414. An overview of the seventeenth-century debate on free will can be found in R. Sleigh, Jr, V. Chappell, M. Della Rocca, "Determinism and human freedom," in *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. D. Garber and M. Ayers, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 1195–278.

[6] *The Correspondence of John Locke*, vol. I–VIII, ed. E.S. DeBeer, Oxford (further abbreviation *CL*), vol. IV, 625.

In Locke's understanding, the subject acts in a voluntary way, when the cause of action is his will, and acts freely when his action is voluntary and at the same time he has the power to forbear it according to his own volition. Locke introduces the notion of liberty as follows:

> Thus the idea of freedom is the idea of man's power to do something or not to do it, according to his decision or thought, in which the mind translates one possibility over the other. Where he is not in his power to act according to his will, he has no freedom there, but he is under the pressure of necessity. There can not be freedom where there is no thought, no will, no will; but there may be a thought, there may be a will, there may be a will, where there is no freedom (2.21.6).

A clearer version of this notion can be found in the correspondence with Philip van Limborch:

> In my opinion, freedom is the power of a man to act or not to act according to his will: in other words, if a man is able to do it when he wants to do it and, on the other hand, refrain from doing it when he wants to refrain from doing it. (*CL* VII, 406).

Voluntariness is therefore a necessary but insufficient condition of freedom. Freedom is a double or a two-way power, available only to rational beings: a subject is free when he has the power to act according to his own volition, and at the same time the power to forbear according to his own volition. Slightly more precisely, we can present this understanding of freedom as a combination of two conditions:

> Subject *S* freely executes the action *a* only if (i) *S* executes *a*, because *S* wants to execute *a* and (ii) if *S* did not want to execute *a*, then he would not have *a*.[7]

In other words, a subject is free in relation to a given action only if this action is voluntary and meets the counterfactual or hypothetical condition expressed in (ii) (2.21.8,9). An activity that satisfies condition (i), but does not satisfy condition (ii) is voluntary but not free. Condition (ii) shows, that Locke's understanding of freedom is not just a slightly retouched version of Hobbes' position, for whom freedom requires only condition (i). According to him, it consists in the compatibility of action with volition, and the only factors taking away the subject's freedom are external obstacles.

The opposite of voluntariness is involuntariness, and the opposite of freedom is necessity. The two main types of necessity are coercion and restraint

[7] See A. LoLordo, *Locke's Moral Man*, Oxford, 2012. p. 27, where this term is presented as a necessary and sufficient condition of freedom.

(2.21.13). Coercion takes place when the initiation of an action, or its continuation, is against volition (a subject must do something that he does not want to do); while restraint takes place when the cessation of action or placing an obstacle against it is incompatible with volition (a subject cannot do something that he wants to do). Necessity also encompasses mindless things.[8]

Locke illustrates these distinctions with examples. First, he cites phenomena that are neither free nor voluntary, like the movements of a tennis ball, the functioning of body organs and the behaviour of a man who falls into the water as a result of the collapse of a bridge.[9] Secondly, he presents a situation in which voluntariness occurs without freedom: the action of a man who voluntarily remains in a locked room, not realizing that it is locked. And thirdly, he indicates an action that is both voluntary and free: the behaviour of a man who voluntarily stays in an open room. These examples can be grouped as follows:

ACT	FREE	NECESSARY
VOLITIONAL	open room	locked room
INVOLUNTARY	(impossible)	tennis ball; bridge

That voluntariness is not a sufficient condition for freedom is indicated by the famous example of a closed room. Here is its wording:

> Let us now imagine that a man deeply asleep has been brought to the room where the person with whom he appears to see and talk is; and that in this room it was closed so that it was impossible to get out of it. This man wakes up and is glad that he has found himself in the company so desirable, he also willingly stays in this room, that is, he would rather stay in it than leave it. Well, I ask: is not his being in this room voluntary? I think that no one will doubt it; but that it is firmly closed there, so it is obvious that it is not possible to stay in this place and that it can not leave freely from there. Freedom is not, therefore, an idea that would involve wanting or translating one into another; it is connected with a person who has the power to do something or to give up, depending on how the mind chooses or decides. (2.21.10).

[8] Locke understands necessity differently than e.g. Hume and Hobbes, who identify it with causal determination and see it as compatible with freedom. For Locke, necessary action by definition cannot be free. The difference, however, is only verbal and concerns the use of the term "necessary" — Locke does not rule out that free activities are causally determined.

[9] In this example, there is a snag: as we have seen, Locke assumes that acts of will may only concern actions that we consider feasible under the circumstances (2.21.23), and stopping the fall is impossible in the accident described.

This action, Locke says, is voluntary, but it is not free, because a man in a closed room does not fulfil one of the conditions of freedom, namely he is unable to realize his counterfactual will. It is not that if he wanted to leave the room, he would have been physically able to do so.

There were several objections to this example regarding the relationship voluntariness–necessity. In particular, it is worth asking whether the behaviour of a person in this example is voluntary, taking into account Locke's understanding of voluntariness, and whether it is necessary. According to Locke's view, staying in a room would be voluntary only if it were preceded by a volition to stay in the room — otherwise we would not deal with forbearing (*omission*) here, but only with the absence of action. In the example, however, there is no mention of such volition. Nevertheless, this difficulty can easily be resolved. It is enough to accept that a person is tempted to leave the room, but he overcomes the temptation and decides not to leave.[10] However, there remains a different, more interesting philosophical problem, concerning the nature of a voluntary negative action (*forbearing*) — if it requires a volition whose object is not leaving the room, the causal relation between this volition and not leaving the room becomes mysterious because one of its elements, namely the effect, is absent (*absence*). To overcome this objection, one can replace the condition of a causal link between volition and acting by a weaker condition of a temporal sequence. It seems, however, that Locke would not accept such a modification. Although he does not explain the relation between volition and acting, in a few places he at least suggests that it is of a causal character (2.21.19; 4.10.19). This can be inferred his claim, that our experience of volition is the only source of the idea of *initiating* movement (2.21.4).

Even assuming that it is possible to describe satisfactorily the relation between volition and action, another doubt arises: in the situation mentioned above do we observe a necessary action? It would be the case if a person stays in the room voluntarily, but if he wanted not to stay in it, he would not have been able to do it. The person's action is both voluntary and necessary, suggests Locke, because he wants to stay in the room, and at the

[10] Such a modification is proposed by Vere Chappell ("Power in Locke's Essay," in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding,"* ed. L. Newman, Cambridge, 2007, p. 143). Note, by the way, that this example shows that coercion and restraint (2.21.13) are not the only forms of necessity, because in their case the subject acts against his will, while the person in a closed room acts according to his own will.

same time if he did not want to stay in it, he would not be able to do so, because the room is locked. Locke's suggestion, however, does not seem accurate, because it is in the person's power to *attempt* to leave the room. Therefore, staying in the room is not a necessary activity, which makes the example inadequate. The failure of the example does not undermine the thesis that it is supposed to illustrate. However, Locke's advocate should provide a better example, preferably of a positive action, and not a negative one, such as forbearance.[11]

3. FREEDOM OF THE WILL

After making a distinction between voluntariness and freedom, Locke addresses the issue of freedom of the will. First, he asks whether the will is free (*freedom of the will*) (2.21.14-21), and then, he examines whether we have freedom in relation to our volitions *(freedom to will*), that is, whether the subject is free to make his volitions, and not just to act in accordance with them (2.21.23-25).

To the question whether the human will is free Locke responds negatively. As he explains, "freedom, which is only power, can not belong to anything else than the acting entity; it cannot, however, be an attribute or feature of the will, which is also only power" (2.21.14). The argument against freedom of the will is therefore based on two key premises: (a) will and freedom are powers, not substances or subjects of action, and (b) power is always an attribute of substance, not another power (2.21.16-17). Hence the question about freedom of the will contains a category mistake, similar to the one which occurs in the expression "square virtue," and at best indicates an imprecise use of words. The proper subject of freedom is the whole person (2.21.21).

In this case, unlike in the case of understanding of the freedom of action, Locke agrees with Hobbes. Hobbes is a materialist who believes that all things, including human minds, are material. He rejects the immaterial soul

[11] It may be difficult to give such an example. See E.J. Lowe, "Necessity and the Will in Locke's Theory of Action," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 3 (1986), pp. 158–160. Note that contrary to Locke's suggestion in the example of a person falling off the bridge, we also do not have, as it might seem, a necessary action, because the person in this example does not act, but is passively subjected to certain forces. The core of this example, however, remains clear: the action of a person is not voluntary in this case because it is not in accordance with his will.

and, consequently, the will, understood as one of the powers of such a soul. According to him, actions are determined by desire *(appetite*), and the subject's will — in relation to a given action — is simply the strongest of the competing desires that immediately precede this action. Because in this approach will is a form of desire, and man has no choice as regards his desires, Hobbes rejects the freedom of will, and only permits freedom of action which, as we have seen, he identifies with voluntariness.[12] It is not difficult to notice that Locke's position differs from the one of Hobbes' on several issues. Unlike Hobbes, Locke distinguishes desire from volition and free action from voluntary one. He also accepts the existence of will, although he agrees with Hobbes that attributing freedom to it is a misunderstanding, as well as is treating it as an independent subject of action.[13]

4. FREEDOM OF VOLITION: TWO QUESTIONS

After giving a negative answer to the question of whether the will is free, Locke goes on to ask whether a subject has freedom in relation to his volitions (2.21.23–25). This is undoubtedly the most mysterious and contentious part of the entire chapter. Locke divides this question into two more specific ones: (a) whether a subject, in relation to the action which was proposed to him for immediate implementation, has the freedom to take up volition (*engage in willing*) to execute or forbear doing so (2.21.23–24); (b) whether a subject has freedom of volition in relation to that for which he has the freedom to act. Let us note right away that, if it turns out that the answers to both questions are negative, it would mean that, according to Locke, one can only talk about the freedom of the subject in relation to external or visible actions (*overt*) and not in relation to volitions.

[12] See *Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity*, ed. V.C. Chappell, Cambridge, 1999. Hobbes is also a causal and compatibilist determinist, that is, he thinks that all events, including human actions, are necessary effects of previous causes, which, however, does not exclude their freedom. And finally, Hobbes is a soft determinist, or determinist, who thinks that some actions are actually free. Regarding Locke's view of causal determinism and compatibilism, see the last part of this essay.

[13] Locke does not object to the determination of will as a power (*faculty*), but warns against the understanding of power as an independent subject of action (*agent*) (2.21.6). Such powers do not exist, and the explanations referring to them are completely sterile, as evidenced by Scholastic explanations (2.21.18–20).

Let us start with the first question. In Locke's opinion, in a situation where an action was proposed for immediate implementation and became the subject of attention, man has no freedom as to the volition regarding this action. Locke provides the following argument to support this thesis:

> It is, after all, absolutely inevitable that a person either prefers acting or forbearing the action which is in his power, as soon as it has appeared in his mind; he must necessarily want one or the other, and after such selection or devotion, this action or his omission is certainly and is really voluntary. And because the act of will or the choice of one of the two can not be avoided, so man is subject to necessity for this act of will, he can not be free unless necessity and freedom could exist together and that man could be free and bound at the same time. (2.21.21).

In other words, in this situation, man is not free to want or not to want, because he is not able to avoid one of the two: either the volition ordering to execute the action, or the volition ordering to forbear it. Volition is an act, and freedom in relation to a given act, requires two-way power. Since a subject must want to perform the proposed action or to forbear it, he is not free in relation to it.[14]

Locke's argument seems to overlook the possibility that the action does not take place, not because a subject has so decided, but because he made no decision, or at least postponed it. In other words, in addition to the action and forbearance, which are the consequence of volition, a non-action situation is also possible, in which no decision is made.g. W. Leibniz pointed to it, commenting on Locke's view in his *New Essays on Human Understanding*:

> I would think that you can suspend your choice and that it often happens, especially if other thoughts stop pause. Therefore, although it is necessary that the act we are thinking about exists or does not exist, it does not follow that it is necessary to decide: existence or non-existence. Non-existence can also be attributed to the lack of a settlement. This is how the members of the Areopag actually released a man whose trial seemed too difficult to judge, deferring the case to a very distant date and taking a hundred years to think. (2.21.23).[15]

Leibniz's allegation is indeed ingenious but irrelevant, because the thesis of the inevitability of wanting is limited in the Locke's intention. It concerns only such activities that have already been proposed, are the subject of re-

[14] A detailed reconstruction of this argument is presented by Vere Chappell ("Locke on Freedom of the Will," in *Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context*, ed. G.A.J. Rogers, Oxford, 1994, pp. 105–106).

[15] See S.C. Rickless, "Locke on the Freedom to Will," *Locke Newsletter* 31 (2000), pp. 49–55; D. Garrett, "Liberty and Suspension in Locke's Theory of the Will," in *A Companion to Locke*, ed. M. Stuart, New York, 2016, pp. 274–277.

flection, and are to take place in the near future. The example given by Locke — the situation of a walking man who has been proposed to end his walk — may also suggest an additional restriction, namely to the actions already taken and currently performed. Locke's thesis, therefore, would only concern the continuation or cessation of the action that the person has already undertaken.[16] In that situation, it can be assumed that failure to decide whether to act or postpone it in time is tantamount to the decision to abandon it. In fact, this line of defence of Locke's position can be strengthened, recalling that, according to him, volitions can *only* concern activities that are to be carried out in the near future.

Determining Locke's answer to the second question - does the subject have the freedom of volition in relation to what he is free to act for — poses a particular problem for scholars. Locke considers this question to be absurd, and the affirmative answer to it as leading to regress. Here is what he writes about this absurdity:

> This question so clearly carries the mark of absurdity that it would be enough to convince that freedom is not about will. Asking whether a wolf man is wanting to move or to rest, to speak or to be silent, depending on what he likes, *ask if a man can want what he wants, or if he can like what he likes*. I think that this question does not require an answer […]. (2.21.25, italics added).

The argument for the thesis that volition is not free assumes the form of an infinite regress and uses two key premises: (a) the principle of heteronomy, according to which voluntary volition must be determined by prior volition and (b) the principle of inheritance in relation to free actions, according to which every action, including volition, is free only when it is triggered by free (and not only voluntary) volition. These principles generate a regress in which volition, if it were free, would inherit the property of being free from the infinite series of volitions of higher and higher orders. This interpretation of Locke's argument implies that the will cannot be autonomous and have the capability of self-determination. Moreover, it seems inconsistent with the concept of the suspension of desire, as discussed below, insofar as this concept implies that some volitions are free.

In the paragraph from *An Essay* quoted above (2.21.25) there appears a fatal ambiguity. Locke asks if man can be free to want what he wants, but provides no direct answer to the question. So what is his answer? Two possible interpretations can be considered, depending on whether we think

[16] Zob. S.C. Rickless, "Locke on the Freedom to Will," pp. 49–55; D. Garrett, "Liberty and Suspension in Locke's Theory of the Will," pp. 274–277.

that the question "does not require an answer" because it is meaningless (literally absurd), or because the answer to it is trivially true (the answer is so obviously affirmative that the question itself becomes absurd). Although the difference between these interpretations is significant, both have their advocates among Locke's interpreters.

Vere Chappell, the main advocate of the first interpretation, argues that Locke changed his position as a result of correspondence with a Dutch theologian Philip van Limborch, conducted in the years 1701–1702. Initially, he rejected the freedom of volition, but eventually recognized its possibility in some situations. As a consequence, he recommended the introduction of appropriate changes in the fifth posthumous edition. An example of this is the following added paragraph:

> There is a case where man is free not to do an act of will, namely, when he chooses a distant good as a goal of striving. Here a man may suspend the act of choice, postponing the decision for or against the thing he considers, until he ascertains whether the nature of the thing itself and its consequences are indeed such that they can make it happy or not (2.21.56).[17]

As a result of these changes, says Chappell, chapter 22 contains theses from different periods of Locke's considerations, which creates the impression of inconsistency.

On the other hand, according to a rival interpretation defended by Samuel Rickless[18] and Don Garrett[19], Locke from the very beginning acknowledged man's freedom towards volition, and called the question 'absurd' because the answer to it is obviously affirmative — it is, after all, in the form of a tautology. Proponents of this interpretation try to neutralize the argument from regress, noting that Locke's definition of freedom consists of conditional sentences, and therefore does not require the current implementation of an infinite series, but only the *ability* to perform it. Don Garrett also suggests that Locke could have avoided regress by claiming that freedom in relation to volition is not based on a separate volition (which would lead to regress), but simply taking action, whose necessary predecessor is this volition.

[17] See also *CL* VII, 680.

[18] S.C. Rickless, "Locke on the Freedom to Will."

[19] D. Garrett, "Liberty and Suspension in Locke's Theory of the Will."

5. MOTIVES OF ACTIONS

The theory of human motives, or determinants of action, complements Locke's deliberations on freedom. It was in this part that Locke made particularly important revisions, extending it significantly. As we find out, the main reason for the change of the position was the remark of William Molyneux, expressed in a letter of December 22, 1692. Molyneux notes that the thread of freedom and necessity in *An Essay* is:

> so wonderfully intricate [...] that in the end a great question about freedom and necessity seems to disappear, and all sins seem to come out of reason, not from the willfulness of will, and are inconsistent with conscience. To say that man will be condemned because his understanding is limited seems to me too harsh. *CL* IV, 600-601).[20]

The accusation is, therefore, that Locke's concept does not allow assigning moral responsibility for actions to perpetrators, and more precisely, makes divine rewards and punishments unjust.

To dismiss this allegation, Locke rejects, among others, the initially accepted thesis that the factor which determines volition is the greatest good. In later editions, he defends the view, that a subject may regard something as a greater good, and yet not be motivated by it, if the lack of this good does not cause him distress (*uneasiness*), "because nothing else stimulates us to change the state or to act, than any ailment or distress" (2.21.29). This distress may take the form of mental anxiety (*disquiet*), caused by the desire for some absent good, or of physical pain, which always leads to mental anxiety in the form of a desire to stop it (2.21.29). Will is defined or determined at a given moment by the most severe distress, which the subject considers to be removable (2.21.40). The concept of pain as a motivating factor can be treated as "psychological equivalent of the principle of inertia," because it claims that the only motive to change the current state of mind is the distress it causes.[21]

[20] Stephen Darwall suggests that it was Molyneux who inspired the changes in this chapter, but the shape of them was influenced by the reading of Ralph Cudworth's manuscripts. See S. Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought'*, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 172–175.

[21] N. Jolley, *Locke: His Philosophical Thought*, Oxford, 1999, p. 140. Locke leaves open the question whether annoyance is a desire or something that necessarily coexists with desire or whether it is its cause or effect (J. Bennett, "Locke's Philosophy of Mind," in *The Cambridge Companion to Locke*, ed. V.C. Chappell, Cambridge, pp. 96–97). The position attributing such a distinguished role to annoyance is referred

There are a few reasons behind this new view on motivation. Firstly, there is an argument of "acting at a distance," based on two premises: (a) what is absent cannot influence what is present; (b) good, being the object of an activity is, as belonging to the future, absent at the moment of its operation; therefore, good cannot influence will, in any case not directly (2.21.37). Locke, however, avoids this difficulty by noting that greater good can affect the subject through its idea or representation in the mind (2.21.48). However — and this is Locke's second reason — the very idea of good in the mind, even if that good were "ineffable heavenly joys," is not enough to get a person to act unless it is accompanied by the desire for this good, which in turn is combined with pain for the lack of it (2.21.35). Without the proper desire for possessing the good and the pain because of its lack, we can understand what the greater good is, and yet not strive for it. Expectation of greater good, explains Locke, even if we present it to ourselves and recognize it as such, "determines the will only when a proportionate desire arises, which makes us anxious because of the lack of this good" (2.21.35). As an example, Locke cites a person in whom anxiety associated with earthly goods dominates the pursuit of eternal good, and directs his activities, although he possesses the ideas of the expected heavenly joys and recognizes the possibility of their existence. If the will were always determined by a representation of a greater good, such persons could not exist because they would "permanently and invariably keep heading towards the sky" — even if the probability of achieving eternal good were smaller than achieving earthly goods as the value of eternal good is infinitely greater. However, we know from experience that this is not so (2.21.38, 44). And finally, there are situations of the weakness of the will, in which man, under the influence of a current distress, consciously chooses a smaller, but more attainable, good. As an example of this phenomenon, Locke mentions a drink lover who squanders health and wealth, and exposes himself to the loss of the joy of a future life, tormented by the unpleasant anxiety associated with the lack of drink and company. We are dealing here with a situation in which there is a conflict between the assessment of good and motivation, and not only, as in the case of Locke's second reason, with a situation in which the assessment of good is not accompanied by the right motivation.

to as "negative hedonism." See P. Krauss, "Locke's Negative Hedonism," *Locke Newsletter* 15 (1984), pp. 43–63. It must be remembered that Locke's position in the first edition is also a form of hedonism, because he identifies good with happiness or pleasure, and this happiness is understood subjectively, that is, its nature can be different for different people (2.21.55).

One may wonder whether the view that will is determined by the present distress means a complete rejection of the earlier thesis which claims that the will is determined by the expected good or is its clarification. The latter approach is confirmed by the fact that Locke emphasizes, namely that the removal of distress is the first step to achieving happiness, that is the greatest good (2.21.42). It seems, therefore, that the removal of unpleasantness determines the will directly, whereas the concept of good determines it indirectly. And indeed, Locke emphasizes that reason can influence the will indirectly, carefully considering the greater good and thus awakening the desire. He writes:

> For good, though it seemed not to know how great and such was recognized, then only acted upon our will, when lust aroused in the soul, thus causing unpleasant anxiety because of its lack; without this, we are not within its influence, as only the nipocities that we experience in a given moment influence the acts of will. These (when we experience them) always move the will and are ready to get her to the nearest decision (2.21.46).

Locke also admits that we have the power to change the pleasure or distress of a given thing or action not only by reflection, but, more often, by practice and habit (2.21.69).

In the final part of the chapter, Locke goes back to the question why people sometimes consciously choose what is worse for them, and what leads them to unhappiness, that is to the question about the weakness of the will (2.21.57). In his answers, Locke discusses a few selected cognitive errors that we make when assessing the greatness of various goods. First of all, we attach disproportionately greater importance to a present good than to a future one. In particular, we tend to overestimate the severity of the present pain. The illusion that a present good is greater than a future one is, according to Locke, analogous to perceptual illusions:

> For good, though it seemed not to know how great and such was recognized, then only acted upon our will, when lust aroused in the soul, thus causing unpleasant anxiety because of its lack; without this, we are not within its influence, as only the nipocities that we experience in a given moment influence the acts of will. These (when we experience them) always move the will and are ready to get her to the nearest decision. (2.21.46).

Secondly, we tend to diminish the greatness of goods which contain an admixture of distress. Thirdly, we incorrectly assess the consequences of our actions, thinking, for example, that they will not cause as much evil as they actually do, or that bad consequences can be somehow avoided. Yet

another type of error concerns the necessary components of our happiness — we make it when we omit what is really necessary for happiness, or we make a bad choice of the means to achieve it.

6. FREEDOM OF WILLING: THE POWER OF SUSPENSION

As we have seen, Locke's answer to the question about the freedom of a subject in relation to volitions is not unambiguous. The conclusion that he allows such freedom at least in certain situations can be justified by his comments on the power to suspend the realization of desire. It turns out that the thesis about the determination of action by distress is not of universal scope for Locke. The pains that at the given moment are present in the mind are of various intensity, and usually the strongest among those which, we think we can remove, determines the volition (2.21.33, 40). Usually, but not always. We know from experience, that we have the power to suspend or restrain the fulfilment of even the strongest desire in order to more accurately consider its relation to good. Such a reflection may change the relative strength of various desires, and thus it may also change the direction of our actions. "This," says Locke, "is what man's freedom is" (2.21.47). The importance of reason in Locke's concept of freedom is revealed in the following passage:

> If we had no freedom, reason would be useless; without reason, and freedom (if it were possible) would not matter. When a man sees what would bring him good and what harm would make him happy or unhappy, then what will come of him, if he is not able to take at least one step to approach the first or take away from the other? And if any man is wandering in complete darkness, is his freedom better than it would be if the wind thundered up and down like a soap bubble? A small difference is whether the blind force from the outside or from the inside moves us. The first and very important use of freedom is to prevent excessive haste; they are used primarily because the man stops, opens his eyes, looks around and makes an overview of the consequences of what he intends to do, to the extent due, as the seriousness of the matter requires. (2.21.67).

Both, action without reflection and total indifference to the conclusions of our reflection would be, according to Locke, imperfections, belittling our freedom instead of increasing it. A free person treats the judgement of reason as a "guide" in action (2.21.48, 50). The ability to suspend it is closely connected with the ability of reason to reflect, that is to review, compare

and evaluate the available options for the choice of the greatest good, and the ability to change one's own desires under consideration, so that they are proportional to the greatness of the goods they concern.[22]

Locke's position regarding the relationship between judgement of reason and volition is a certain version of motivational intellectualism. However, it can be interpreted in two ways; as extreme or as moderate intellectualism. In accordance with the extreme version, the judgement of reason about a greater good is necessary and sufficient for the appearance of volition (thus an erroneous moral action implies a cognitive error). On the other hand, in the moderate version, the judgement of reason is necessary, but not sufficient in the process of motivation. Vere Chappell, for instance, interprets the development of Locke's view as a transition from extreme intellectualism in the first edition to moderate intellectualism in the later editions, and then a return to a slightly different version of extreme intellectualism in Locke's letters and the fifth edition (Chappell (1995)). Intellectualism opposes anti-intellectualism, according to which the judgement of reason is not even a necessary condition of volition. The representative of anti-intellectualism or voluntarism is Philip van Limborch and other supporters of the concept of freedom as indifference (*freedom of indifference*) and the self-determination of will.[23]

> My freedom is the power of a man to act or not act according to his own will […] from which it follows that the "indifference preceding the decree of will" […] in no way matters to the problem of freedom." *CL* VII, 407).

The ability to suspend desire and reflection allows Locke to explain the moral responsibility of a subject for beliefs about good as well as a responsibility for his actions - it includes both freedom of volition and freedom in relation to one's beliefs about good. In a situation where a shock or a strong passion prevents us from such a suspension, freedom and moral responsibility get eliminated (2.21.53).[24] This is Locke's response to Molyneux's ob-

[22] According to Locke, animals have active power defined as will and perform voluntary activities, and perhaps even free (3.3.8; *CL* IV, 462), but they are not subjects of moral action, because they do not have the power of suspension.

[23] You can talk about the freedom of indifference in two senses. Traditionally, it is understood as a contra-causal freedom, permitting the possibility that two people in the same motivational state make different choices. (This is how the term is used, for example, D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2.3.2). Locke, however, means indifference not to causes, but to reasons.

[24] See 2.28.4–20 on the subject of freedom as an assumption of moral responsibility.

jection, that in his concept evil results from ignorance or cognitive error, for which the subject cannot be held morally responsible. We are responsible for our erroneous judgements about good and our actions motivated by distress, because we could have avoided them by suspending the realization of desire and more careful reflection on which will really leads to the greatest good. Thanks to the power of suspension, we do not always have to fulfil our most intense momentary desires, but we can also pursue a distant good.

Let us point out three cases that do not get explained by Locke and which need to be resolved. Firstly, the concept of suspension contains a gap that makes it difficult to assess, and may lead to the problem of regress. Locke does not define what determines the will for suspending the realization of a desire. Is suspension a voluntary activity, i.e. is it caused by volition? And if so, is this volition determined by some sort of distress, such as anxiety that as a result of not suspending the subject may lose some greater good? In this case, the suspension of the realization of desire is determined by another desire, namely that of suspension, which generates an infinite regress of desires and volitions regarding their suspension. One way to avoid this regress is to accept that suspension is an exception to the thesis of the determination of volition by distress. The answer to the question of whether, according to Locke, freedom can be attributed to volitions, depends on the outcome of this issue.

Another matter which is not clarified by Locke is the relationship between the concept of suspension and the definition of freedom as a two-way power of action and forbearance. That leaves the issue open for various interpretations. According to one interpretation, the power of suspension is simply a variation of one of the powers constituting freedom which is understood as a two-way power, namely the power of a subject to forbear volition according to one's own will. In other words, suspension is a variation of forbearance: the forbearance of wanting to do what is prompted by the strongest distress. Suspension considerations are, in this approach, simply a complement to previous considerations, not a modification thereof. According to another interpretation, the power of suspension is supplemental to two-way freedom and transforms it into full freedom. It combines two-way freedom with rationality and it makes the subject a moral entity, capable of self-determination. Indeed, a number of Locke's interpreters claim that, according to his theory, full freedom requires something more than two-way freedom, "something elusive" (*an Elusive Something*). For some authors, that "something" is the freedom of volition, for others it is the abil-

ity to suspend desires and to reflect, and for yet others, something that is not itself a form of freedom, for example, the compatibility of volition with good (2.21.48). (This has nothing to do with the compliance with the subject's concept of good, because if one's volitions are determined by a wrong concept, then he is not free).[25]

This brings us to the third and final issue: Locke does not specify what determines the will after reflection and "unsuspension," is it the practical judgement which is the result of reflection, or the pain which is at its strongest after reflection, or perhaps a combination of both.

7. FREEDOM AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM

In contemporary debates about freedom two basic questions can be distinguished, the first one concerning its existence, and the other one the possibility of its reconciliation with causal determinism (in Locke's times called necessitarianism). After this rather detailed presentation of Locke's answer to the first question, it is appropriate to at least mention the other one. Locke himself does not pay much attention to it, which is partly due to the fact that in his philosophy he moves the focus from metaphysics to empirical psychology, and partly because in his approach to freedom, he deliberately tries to remain neutral in metaphysical matters; both in the dispute over the nature of the human mind, and in the determinism-indeterminism dispute.[26] Such neutrality is appropriate, taking into account the relationship between freedom and morality, since it makes moral truths independent of metaphysical disputes. As a consequence, it is difficult to determine how he would answer the question about the reconciliation of freedom with causal determinism. Based on different circumstantial evidence, scholars

[25] The term "something hard to read" comes from Gideon Yaffego. According to his original, though controversial interpretation of Locke, based on 2.21.48, full liberty consists of "double perfection": firstly, action is made up of volition and, secondly, liberty is made by the greatest good for the subject. See G. Yaffe, *Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency*, Princeton, 2000, pp. 12–74, idem, "Free Will and Volition," in *The Continuum Companion to Locke*, ed. S.-J. Savonius-Wroth, P. Schuurman and J. Walmsley, London, 2010, pp. 150–153.

[26] For this reason, there is no good basis to assign Locke causal determinism. Although Locke talks about "determining" the will many times, it should not automatically be understood as "causal causation." Locke uses this concept in a broad sense, allowing also the possibility of a weaker relationship, such as "moving" the will or influencing it.

interpret him in every possible way; as a compatibilist or advocate of reconciliation, as an incompatibilist, i.e. an opponent of reconciliation, as well as an agnostic who does not take a position in this matter.[27] Considering this issue it is worth noting that if Locke's view is conceived as neutral in the determinism-indeterminism dispute, it is a form of compatibilism, not agnosticism, because the approach to freedom that does not depend on the settlement of the determinism dispute is *ipso facto* reconcilable with determinism. Locke is certainly a theological compatibilist, that is, he accepts the compatibility of human freedom and divine omniscience. As he claims, we know we have free will, but we do not understand how to reconcile it with divine omnipotence and omniscience (4.17.10; *CL* IV, 625–626). However, causal compatibility is not entailed by theological compatibility.

9. CONCLUSION

At the end it is appropriate to present the main points regarding Locke's concept of freedom. (1) Freedom is understood as an active, two-way power of action and forbearance, which is different from voluntariness and indifference. (2) Attributing freedom to the will is a category mistake. (3) In the first edition of the book, the judgement of reason about good determines a volition that is not clearly distinguished from desire. In later editions, volition, as something different from a desire, is directly determined by distress, and the judgement of reason can only affect it indirectly. (4) The issue of a subject's freedom in relation to his volitions is not clear. The concept of suspending the realization of the desire introduced in later editions indicates, however, that such freedom exists. (5) Despite some similarities, Locke's views on freedom are fundamentally different from Hobbes's position.

Translated by Barbara Kulicka

[27] Zob. Harris (2005): 20.

Part Two

Present time: From Charles Hartshorne to Alvin Plantinga

THE RELIGIOUS AND METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF GOD IN CHARLES HARTSHORNE'S PROCESS THEISM

Piotr Gutowski

The characteristic feature of sciences is that they limit themselves to investigation of a definite fragment of reality and leave out all other interests, which significantly facilitates reaching a meaningful agreement as to the nature of the subject matter of a given science, its research methods and the results obtained therein. Speculative metaphysicians do not have this luxury: in their conceptions they attempt to cover the whole of reality and take into account even these dimensions of it that most sciences can afford to disregard, e.g. the dimension of our everyday life, in which we tacitly assume existence of libertarian freedom and responsibility, the causal influence of our minds upon our bodies as well as the objective nature of some fundamental distinctions, such as the disctinctions between truth and falsehood and good and evil. Possibly these beliefs governing our everyday lives will one day come to be regarded as mere prejudices, yet, together with the persistent belief of a significant part of humankind in the existence of God, or, more generally, in some creative or at least ordaining power governing the Universe, they do not appear to be manifestly false. A significant part of humankind would like them to be true and it is logically possible that they are true. The final shape of a given metaphysical system is in a large measure decided by the choice of one of the particular perspectives on reality as the basis for that system and also by the selection from among the theses available in the chosen perspective of those intended for inclusion in the constructed metaphysics. The fundamental human perspectives on reality that may provide the groundwork for a possible metaphysics are: scientific, commonsense, moral or religious perspectives. Presently, the type of metaphysics whose influence is dominant among philosophers is the one assuming science (mainly physics or biology) to be the most important, or, perhaps, the only, source of genuine knowledge of reality and, not surprisingly,

representing reality in the spirit of non-theistic naturalism. In this perspective religion, and also morality, is most often treated as an expression of non-cognitive dimensions of human life and diverse, sometimes very refined, theories (e.g. expressivist) are invoked to provide conceptual tools for justifying this position. Yet in this article it is not these naturalist metaphysics that I shall concern myself with; the conception I present herein is that elaborated by Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000), whose opinion on what a metaphysics should refer to was altogether different. He believed that in building metaphysics we should take into account what religion as such is to tell us. His conviction was that from the many religions existing in the world it is possible to distill the *religious* idea of God, which should subsequently be treated metaphysically, that is examined and modified in strict metaphysical terms both as to its internal consistency and as to its coherence with the non-religious knowledge we possess (for example, with our historical and critical knowledge of the Bible, with the moral and scientific knowledge), and the possibility of the existence of the referent of the idea of God should be investigated. While steadfastly defending theism as such, Hartshorne, nevertheless, rejected the classical idea of God and tried to replace it with a conception he himself developed, which is usually described as neoclassical. Hartshorne's idea of God lay at the foundation of the current in philosophy and theology known as process.[1]

In what follows I will first (1) discuss Hartshorne's project to identify and disentangle the religious idea of God and then (2) I will proceed to present the essential features of his philosophical conception of God which is a development of and a complement to the former. As this cannot be done without reference to Hartshorne's metaphysics, and his metaphysics cannot be presented in sufficient detail in a short paper like the present one, I will confine myself to enumeration of the most important features of his metaphysical conception; I will discuss in more detail his conception of compound individual, which is of significance for the problem I set out to discuss in this paper.

[1] In order to get acquainted with an outline of the whole philosophical conception of Charles Hartshorne and with a complete bibliography of his works as well as a bibliography of English language works on his ideas one can consult the excellent and comprehensive articles: "Charles Hartshorne" and "Process Theism" by Daniel Dombrowski in the internet *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Synthetic presentation of Hartshorne's philosophy in Polish can be found in my own work of 1995: *Filozofia procesu i jej metafilozofia. Studium metafizyki Charlesa Hartshorne'a*. In the present article I draw heavily on the analyses carried out in that book.

1. THE RELIGIOUS IDEA OF GOD

According to Charles Hartshorne, one of the tasks facing metaphysics is building a rational theory concerning the central religious idea, namely the idea of God.[2] Given its generality, this description of the purpose of metaphysics may seem acceptable to theists and atheists alike, as the latter, confronted with the omnipresence of religious ideas, seek to provide an explanation for the origin, durability and practical significance of religious attitudes and ideas. However, atheists usually assume in advance that religious theses, including the one that seems the most widespread, namely the affirmation of the existence of God, or, more generally, of some extra-empirical reality, are false and thus the only sensible explanation of religion and religious ideas is the one showing the natural genesis of them. They may see the principal cause of religion in fear, need for consolation, sexual frustration, neuroses, they may regard religion as the effect of a peculiar "virus" present in the mind or of stimulation of some areas of the brain (or of some states of the brain). Hartshorne believed that such narrowly naturalist treatment of religion is misguided and he thought that religions, despite their differentiation and involvement with extra-religious spheres of life, tell us something not only about man and his innermost needs, but also about the sole object that can fulfill these needs, that object being most often referred to by the name of God. In brief: in Hartshorne's opinion not only science, but also religion has a cognitive dimension, which the metaphysician has to unveil and take into account in his conception. This cognitive dimension present in religion is not primarily given in the form of proofs or reasonings, it rather appears in the form of immediate awareness or intuitive vision, which is subsequently reflected upon and elaborated on in thology with the use of philosophical concepts.[3] Thus, when taking up the problem of God as the subject of one's investigations, one ought first of all turn to religion with the question about the *religious idea of God*.[4]

[2] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?," in *Religious Lan-guage and Knowledge*, ed. R.H. Ayers, W. Blackstone, Athens, 1972, p. 62.

[3] Ch. Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy," in *Talk of God: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures*, vol. II: *(1967–68)*, London, 1969, p. 16. Also cf. idem, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, Chicago, 1941, p. 86. This approach was a characteristic feature of Willam James's position, which was very influential in investigations concerning religion. Cf. W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Cambridge, London 1985.

[4] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?," p. 62; idem, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, La Salle, 1967, pp. 2–3.

At this place it may be observed to observe that Alfred North Whitehead, the founder of process philosophy,[5] whose ideas Harshorne referred to, also addressed religion with some question and assumed that religion is a datum that must be taken into account by a philosopher in his research. However, Whitehead's question addressed to religion was somewhat different from Hartshorne's, it concerned precisely the essence of *religious experience.* The answer to Whitehead's question was not some definite idea of God but the constatation that religion is subjectively conditioned. In an oft-quoted definition, Whitehead affirms that "religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness" and that it is "the art and theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things."[6] Thus Whitehead focused his attention on definition of the kind of experiences, which, to his mind, were the source of religion. By contrast, Hartshorne aims to concentrate on the objective condition of religion which he supposes to be the idea of God understood as the pre-philosophical answer to the question "Who is God?"

> Today we wish to know […] what is the core of religious doctrine […] independently of any philosophy and without assuming infallibility or perfect coherence of religious texts. We do not assume that religion in general has a sensible core, yet we accept the methodological principle, that we ought to look for such a sensible core, for only someone who has honestly searched for something has the right to proclaim the fiasco of the search. Yet he has to conduct his research without previous assumptions, such as recommendation of some church, assumption of the truth of the doctrine of Plato, Aristotle or certain interpreters of Holy Scriptures.[7]

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[5] The term "process philosophy" functions in twofold sense. In the narrow sense this term designates the philosophy developed by A.N.Whitehead and his intellectual successors and continuators, in particular Ch. Hartshorne. In the broad sense it refers to any philosophy that acknowledges variability, becoming, creativity and time to be the fundamental dimensions of reality. Heraclitus of Ephesus is considered the patron saint and one of the earliest proponents of this kind of philosophy. Cf. J.B. Cobb, L.S. Ford, "The Prospect for Process Studies," *Process Studies* 1 (1971), 1, pp. 3–8.

[6] A. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, New York, 1971, pp. 16, 57–5. An analysis of these definition has been carried out by D.A. Crosby in his paper "Religion and Solitariness," in *Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy*, ed. L.S. Ford, G.L. Kline, New York, 1983, pp. 149–169.

[7] Ch. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, s. 90–91. Naturally, there is no contradiction between Whitehead's and Hartshorne's approach to religion.

There are obvious difficulties in carrying out a project like this. History of religions is closely bound with history of philosophy, and because of this fact one can entertain doubts whether the task of isolating the purely religious idea of God that would be free of philosophical complements of any sort can really be successfully completed.[8] Hartshorne believes this not impossible, although he is fully aware of the attendant difficulties:

> One may focus on what is classified as a revelation, e.g. on Scriptures: Hindu, Chinese, Islamic etc. and also Christian, one may also take into consideration the official creed of particular churches. A possible objection suggests itself that the very notion of divine revelation is philosophically conditioned, that some of the authors of the supposedly revealed writings were influenced by definite philosophies and that surely the creeds of particular churches are not free of philosophical imprints. […]. Nevertheless, there is little technical philosophy in the biblical scriptures, or at least in the more popular parts of them, as, for example the Acts of the Apostles. Moreover, we can check the results obtained with this method by means of another method. What is needed is ask oneself what idea of God is presupposed in the commonly assumed religious functions and attitudes, such as prayer, awareness of sin, salvation.[9]

According to Hartshorne, these two methods combined are able to produce the result of effectively isolating the religious idea of God, which can subsequently be made the object of further philosophical elaboration.[10]

The attempt to arrive at the definition of the most general, common to all religions, idea of God means that Hartshorne does not intend to develop what is sometimes described as a "confessional" (that is related to a definite religious confession) philosophy of religion.[11]

Yet the question inevitably arises, how far can this pluralism be brought. Are the scientologists and the worshippers of UFOs representatives of some religions? This objection Harstshorne answers by pointing out, that at the outset of his rational theology he investigates the idea of God that is not

8 Cf. ibid., p. 91.

9 Ibid.

10 Cf. ibid., p. 92

11 J. Hick writes about different ways of interpreting religion. He distinguishes, inter alia, naturalist and religious interpretations, and among the latter cofessional (which are developed within the framework of particular religious confessions and view all other religious traditions from the point of view of a particular creed) and non-confessional (which interpret religion in all plurality of its form without privileging any particular form of it). Cf. J. Hick, *An Interpretation of Religion. Human Responses to the Transcendent*, Houndmills, p. 1.

common to all religions in general, but that can be shown to be shared by higher or more mature religions, which in his opinion are Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism.[12] This implies that a feature of his non-confessional philosophy of religion is the view assuming that religion as such undergoes development, just as other domains of culture, e.g. science; as a result of that development there is lack of exact correspondence or symmetry between particular religions representing different stages of that development.

Given this view it is interesting to observe what criterion he employs to distinguish the "higher" from the "lower" forms of religion. This criterion is provided by the way a given religion antropomorphizes the object of its worship. Hartshorne believes that every religion somehow or other anthropomorphizes the divine, yet not all faiths are alike in that respect. While "lower" or 'primitive" religions (for example: politeistic ones) are crudely anthropomorphic, the "higher" types avoid at least some elements of anthropomorphization. All religions conceive of the respective objects of their worship as superhuman in a way, yet the divide between the human and the divine is construed as radical in higher religions, so that it becomes something like an indefinitely approachable limit in mathematics or an absolute maximum of certain qualities.[13] This feature of higher religions Hartshorne believes to be the hallmark of their higher status, however, interestingly, he makes it clear that his is not the position affirming an absolute de-anthropomorphization of the divine. In his opinion, the idea of God as a "thing in itself" or "absolute Transcendence" is derived not so much from religion as from philosophy and is not consistent with the elementary practices and attitudes in religions.[14]

Unsurprisingly, the criterion of selection of maturer types of religion proposed by Hartshorne gives rise to doubts. One can readily agree with Hartshorne that representing God or deities in a grossly anthropomorphic way is a sure sign of immaturity in a religious doctrine, but the question arises, why the doctrine of *absolute* divine transcendence with respect to the human mode of knowing, or, in other terms, consistent negative theology or a pantheist conception of God should be excluded from our consideration even though they appear to represent the extreme limit that can be reached in the process

[12] Cf. S. Sia, *God in Process Thought. A Study in Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God*, Dordrecht, p. 16.

[13] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, p. 89.

[14] Cf. ibid. and Ch. Hartshorne, "Can We Understand God?," *Louvain Studies* 7 (1978), 2, p. 77.

of moving away from primitive anthropomorphism. In my opinion, Hartshorne is guided here chiefly by intuitions coming from the Judeo-Christian tradition which accepts an analogy obtaining between the creator and the creation: man is in a sense an image of God, so the way of thinking about God which abstracts from *all* man-like features would be far from purifying the idea of God, in fact it would introduce distortion into our conception of God.

Another reason, in Hartshorne's view, for using such criterion is his conception of the relationship obtaining between metaphysics and the ordinary language of our everyday life, which is the language in which religious notions and ideas are normally expressed. According to him, ordinary language embodies the assumptions of human practice and are part of human commonsense *knowledge.* This knowledge is in principle correct, but unclear, so one of the tasks of metaphysics is introducing some degree of clarity into it, by making its notions more precise and by generalization of some of the concepts involved in it.[15] Of course, it can hardly be denied that in our everyday thinking God is usually represented in an anthropomorphic way; given Harstshorne's assumption mentioned above this implies that the process of making our commonsense intuition of God more precise cannot go as far as entirely to exclude all anthropomorphic features from our conception of God; for example, it should not eliminate the personhood of God.

There might possibly have been yet another reason for Harstshorne's refusal totally to dis-anthropomorphize God and regard a wholly dehumanized concept of the divine as a criterion for distinguishing higher religions from more primitive ones, this reason being the methodological precept of moderation or the golden mean adopted by him, which allowed him to look for solutions located in the middle between the opposed extremes.[16]

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[15] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, "Philosophical Language and Ordinary Language," typescript of a lecture in Kyoto in 1958 (collections of Center for Process Studies in Claremont), pp. 1–3. Thus, for instance, in metaphysics the notion of *feeling* is given more precise meaning while the notion of concrete object is generalized. According to Hartshorne, concrete individual units as properly understood are not durable substances of classical metaphysics but momentary units of feeling, which combined make up the relatively enduring complex individuals, the substances of the classical philosophy. Naturally the sort of specification and generalization referred to by Hartshorne is a characteristic feature of process philosophy and serve the interests of a metaphysics that is process-oriented and panpsychic.

[16] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way*, Albany, 1987.

Thus if we take crude attribution to God of ordinary human features as one extreme and negative theology as the other one, then, according to Hartshorne's golden mean precept, we ought to seek the right way of representing God to ourselves in a concept that, while excluding grossly material human features from the idea of God, nevertheless does not represent the divine as something lying totally beyond the scope of human cognition. However, it ought to be stressed that a definition of the proper intermediate moderate position depends in a large measure on how we conceive and where we locate the extremes. Yet the identification of the extremes may be far from obvious, and Hartshorne himself occasionally adopted surprising solutions, e.g. he rejected the mind-body dualism to replace it with panpsychism, even though the dualist view may reasonably appear as the middle way between materialism and panpsychism. Likewise, negative theology might be regarded as the golden mean between theism and atheism.

The details of his theology aside, Hartshorne's assumption remaining throughout his work is that all theistic religions take God to be the One worthy of unbounded, total or *highest* reverence and love.[17] This idea has best been expressed in the Old Testament, in the commandment to love God with all one's heart, with all one's soul and with all one's strength, that is with the *whole* being of a human person. Hartshorne does not omit to emphasize that what this Old Testament formula refers to is the *idea* or the *ideal* of such perfect love and not any really accomplished acts of love.[18] If the ideal of such perfect worship is sensible, that is contradiction-free, and Hartshorne assumes this to be the case, then the characteristics of its intended object are implied in and can be read out of it. Any act of absolute reverence presupposes radical asymmetry obtaining between God and the worshippers.[19] Moreover, God, as the object of the *highest* reverence, must be in a sense all-embracing or all-inclusive; in other words, the ideal of loving God with one's whole being only makes sense if God is, in a sense, present in everything and everything is somehow included in God.[20] The ideal act of the highest worship also presupposes that its object is not merely all-embracing but also unique: the only such entity of its kind. No wonder, therefore, concludes Hartshorne, that all higher religions speak of one and

17 Cf. e.g. Ch. Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 3.

18 Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?," p. 62.

19 Cf. ibid, p. 121.

20 Cf. S. Sia, *God in Process Thought*, p. 13.

only God as the correlate object of the *highest* worship.[21] The ideal act of worship reveals one more feature of the idea of God, namely, the notion of the divine unsurpassability.[22] That God is unsurpassable means there can be no other being that might exceed the divine perfection in any respect, for if that were the case, that other being would be worthy of total worship. The impossiblity of there being any more perfect being than God does not, nevertheless, warrant the conclusion that God is perfect in the sense of being actually infinite (being a maximum) with respect to such divine attributes as knowledge or power. The divine unsurpassability in this respect only means that there can be no being possessing greater knowledge or more powerful than God, it does not mean that God actually *knows* all there is to know, or that he has the power to produce *everything* that can be produced, especially if that *everything* is understood to include conceivable results of arbitrary interference with past, present and future events. That is why Hartshorne employs the term "unsurpassability" as his interpretation of traditional "perfection." At the stage of investigation of the *religious* idea of God we do not yet know, whether it is at all possible for God to be perfect in the sense of possessing all attributes to a maximum degree.[23]

It needs to be stressed that the radical all inclusiveness, oneness, asymmetry between God and all the rest of intelligent subjects, and the unsurpassability as features of God, for all the philosophical associations they may carry with themselves, still belong to the *religious*, and not to the *philosophical* idea of God. All these characteristics follow, in Hartshorne's opinion, from the analysis of the *ideal* act of worship, which the real acts of worship performed by religious people strive to approach. Obviously, from the *philosophical point of view,* the actually performed acts of worship constitute no proof of God's existence: we do not know, at this stage of investigation, whether there exists any God. The conclusion reached so far is conditional: if the essence of religion is the ideal act of worship and if that act is

[21] Cf. e.g. Ch. Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, pp. 14 ff.

[22] Cr. e.g. Ch. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, pp. 92 ff.

[23] Hartshorne in his metaphysics will ultimately arrive at the conclusion that God's perfection conceived in terms of the *summum* of his attributes, each attribute being actually infinite, is contradictory with the fact of spontaneous creativity and freedom as manifest in the world (cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*, Albany 1984, pp. 3, 12). He will also admit that the impossibility of God being surpassed by any other being does not imply that God cannot surpass himself, that is become more perfect. At this point some affinities of Harshorne's conception with Hegel's philosophy are clearly noticeable.

not without its object, that object, i.e. God, possesses the attributes enumerated above. Yet even this conclusion is open to question, when one takes account of the fact that conclusiveness of a reasoning from the features of an *ideal* act to *actual* attributes of the object of that act is doubtful.

To the set of characteristic features of God that are deducible from the analysis of the ideal religious act Hartshorne adds attributes that are presupposed by universal religious practices. For example, supplication or prayer of request only makes sense, if there exists mutual interaction between God and the world: God can affect the world and, conversely, the world can affect God. While the action of God upon the world is not usually disputed, the action the other way has often been questioned by theologians on the grounds that the idea of perfection as attributed to God entails omniscience, which in its turn entails foreknowledge of all concrete temporal events, regardless of whether these events, as seen from our perspective, belong to the past, present or future. This divine foreknowledge, naturally enough, would extend to the content of concrete requests addressed by the faithful to God. Yet if any action by worldly agents upon God was ruled out, human supplications would have no effect upon God. According to Hartshorne, such an idea of God would be contrary to one of the most widespread religious practices. So if there is a God to whom humans address their prayers, he cannot remain unmoved by human sin and calamity which have their place in the world, or by the loyalty and honest conduct of those who put their faith in Him. Yet if God is moved by the acts and predicament of his faithful, this simply means that he must be subject to change. The only kind of immutability or absoluteness that religions imply is the unchangeability of God's goodness. Divine goodness or benevolence is the attribute the trust and feeling of safety of the faithful rest upon, which does not mean God's goodness is conceived in religions as a perfect safeguard against all suffering.[24]

The *religious* idea of God as deduced from the concept of the highest worship and completed by the divine attributes revealed in the analysis of religious practices Hartshorne takes to constitute the datum which must be taken account of by any serious metaphysical systems. A development and completion of the religious idea of God is the task of philosophical theology, which in his conception forms an essential constituent part of metaphysics. The advantage of such research procedure is that — provided that the features of the object of *religious* worship have been correctly identified by

[24] Cf. S. Sia, *God in Process Thought*, pp. 14–15.

Hartshorne — it allows to avoid, or at least to minimize, discrepancy threatening to arise between the God of the philosophers and the God of simple believers. Such discrepancy used to appear in the past, among other contexts in connection with philosophical proofs concerning the existence of God, and in particular with the ontological argument which Hartshorne develops in an original way.[25]

The starting point of that argument is the concept of a being than which no greater being can be conceived, in the course of subsequent development identified with God. In contrast to Hartshorne some adherents of the ontological proof, e.g. Descartes did not regard the concept of the highest or perfect being as a *religious* concept and, therefore, faced the problem of identifying the perfect being as given in that concept with God of believers. As a matter of fact what they did was tacitly to assume as a starting point some idea of God taken from the Christian theology and then to proceed to prove the existence of the referent of that idea. In this situation a shadow of doubt fell on the neutrality of this initial idea of God with respect to religion or on the well foundedness of the final identification of the idea of the perfect being with the religious idea of God. The procedure proposed by Hartshorne made it possible to get rid of the problem of the relationship between the God of philosophers and the God of religion, provided, of course, that Hartshorne's method of determining the content of the initial idea of God was accepted.

With respect to the conception of the religious idea of God as proposed by Hartshorne the doubts that we already have mentioned above arise; namely concerning the method of distinguishing between "higher" and "lower' religions by the criterion of the way they anthropomorphize the object of their acts of worship, and also concerning the method of determining the essence of those "higher" religions according to the measure in which they recognize God as worthy of the highest and unbounded worship. In either case suspicion arises that the criteria applied are in fact determined by the metaphysical idea of God that has tacitly been presupposed, and which, according to Hartshorne's program of research, should follow the religious idea as its development. Hartshorne, to give him his due, does not claim that in research of the kind he has undertaken total neutrality of method is possible. He believes that the only alternative to rational investigations of the essence of religion is scepticism, totally unjustified "confidence in our good

[25] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics*, La Salle 1973.

luck, whose manifestation would be the fact that we have supposedly been brought up in the right religion, or confidence in our ability to make right decisions without previous careful consideration of appropriate arguments."[26]

If one were to sum up the religious idea of God in the simplest way, one would probably find that it reduces to the idea of the perfect being. In this general sense the content of that idea agrees with the dominant conceptions of the Judeo-Christian context. Nevertheless, when one attempts to specify the concept of divine perfection, at least two different intuitions, both present in the religions actually existing in the world and seemingly opposed to each other, make their appearance. Hartshorne seems to develop one of these insights at the expense of the other.

According to one of these conceptions, the perfect being has to be simple and immutable, since any complexity in its constitution would make for a possibility of its destruction, and any change in God, be it a movement towards greater perfection, would be a sign of some privation and, therefore, imperfection. This naturally implies that God's mind is forever in the perfect state which cannot be surpassed, and, being already absolutely perfect, God cannot become yet more perfect. According to this view God must also wield absolute power of creating things out of nothing, and full knowledge not only of abstract principles of creation, e.g. of the laws governing the Universe, but also of all concrete realities, including all temporal events: past, present and future ones. This in turn calls for recognition that God exists beyond time and can "see" all things at once in a single all-comprehensive vision, without the temporal distinction of the past, present, and future. Possibly, at the root of this conception of perfection lies a vulgar and underpinned by fear representation of God as a monarch, who owing to his might can defend his people against external threats and at the same time rule it with an iron hand, who is possessed of all-knowledge and remains unmoved in his designs by any external circumstances.

The second intuition of divine perfection is related to the conception of God as a person and his personal attributes, such as benevolence, charity, inexhaustible creativity. A perfectly good God is one that understands the persons he has created, is always compassionate to them and ready to help them. He does not have to know every particular future event, he does not have to control everything that goes on in the world; nevertheless he remains a living, sympathetic God who exists in time although he neither has

[26] Ch. Hartshorne, "Two Levels of Faith and Reason," *Journal of Bible and Religion* 16 (1948), 1, p. 31.

a temporal beginning nor will he ever have an end. This conception of divine perfection is built chiefly around some founding moral themes, especially those widespread in the democracies of our times, it is also related to the view that perfection conceived in terms of eternal immobility would rather be like the frozen world in the tale of the Sleeping Beauty: this kind of perfection would deprive God of his feeling, compassion and creativity, that are crucial for human life and human relationship with God. God's action with respect to humans does not consist in exerting irresistible pressure but in attracting them toward desirable ideal goals, so that they may pursue these goals of their own accord. The model of God's relationship to human beings is not that of an overpowering monarch, but rather that of a loving parent, whose love makes him encourage his child to good rather than use coercion, and who always respects the child's autonomy. According to this second intuition of God's perfection, God remains respectful of human freedom, yet this respect may follow either from self imposed restrictions on the exercise of divine omnipotence, or else from more fundamental impossibility of annulling the freedom of creatures.

The religious idea of God in the sense spoken of by Hartshorne is an introductory articulation of the second of the two visions of divine perfection briefly discussed above, although Hartshorne himself — probably to remain in accord with his golden mean methodology — represents the religious idea as containing the seeds of both conceptions of God's perfection. As already hinted above, this religious idea defines the borderline conditions for the metaphysical idea of God.

2. THE METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF GOD

The central metaphysical doctrine in Hartshorne, taken over from Whitehead and only slightly modified, concerns the ontologically primary component elements of reality. These elementary components are microparticular, momentary entities, becoming and not enduring, arising from previous such entities. In Hartshorne's parlance they are *creative synthesis* of data deriving from the past; the past also being treated as belonging to the province of actuality. In the domain of actuality, however, the full status of being is attributed not to that which has been actualized and thus forms the past — therefore fully constituted — record of becoming, but only to that which *is actually becoming*. It is the *becoming*, and not enduring, that is the

focus of the metaphysical description of actuality in Hartshorne. Herein lies the distinctive characteristic of this metaphysics, which is process-oriented in direct opposition to substantialist metaphysics which assumed the elementary constituent of reality to be a durable, changeless reality, unaffected by time.

To Hartshorne, time is the fundamental metaphysical dimension of reality. By this statement he does not mean that time imposes a necessary insurmountable limitation on *human knowing (*or even *knowing as such*; what he means is that time is an essential element of the deepest structure of reality. Spatial relations Hartshorne's treats as generated from temporal relations,[27] and he regards the idea of extra-temporal reality as logically impossible. Essential to that conception is not merely the emphasis laid upon time and becoming, but also the assumption that the content and final results of a process of becoming cannot be deduced from the conditions external to the becoming microcosmic entity, which constitutes the core of reality as a whole. Hartshorne writes: "to be is to create,"[28] or more precise: to *become* an actual entity is the same as to create. An entity generated in the past, actual as it remains, is only a petrified outcome of creativity; as something already constituted, closed and objectified, it can only be used in the forming of some presently becoming actual entity. Creativity does not belong to that which has already been objectified, it belongs to that which is not yet a fully constituted object. Creativity is in Hartshorne associated with spontaneity and indeterminacy, or better, with only partial determination by external causes, characteristic of an actual entity in the state of becoming. Some degree of determinacy by external factors must be allowed for; as a matter of fact no entity is ever wholly determined, just as no entity is ever entirely indeterminate, spontaneous and creative.

To Hartshorne, the model of an actual entity is a single human experience; the features of a single instance of human experience are the features of all actual entities.[29] One of these features is the ability to transform plurality into unity; this ability is often referred to with Whitehead's term *prehension*, but usually it is simply labelled as "experience." Becoming actual entities "lay hold of" or "experience" some plurality of past events and transform this plurality into a unity. Essential to the correct understanding

[27] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, London, 1970, pp. 218–219.

[28] Ibid., p. 1.

[29] Ibid., p. 2.

of Hartshorne's concept is the fact that this transformation of plurality into unity is not a process that is external to becoming actual entities. This transformation of plurality into unity is the very process of becoming of relevant entities: they transform corresponding pluralities of past events into *their own* unities. Of course, in the case of becoming entities we may use the term *ability* to prehend only metaphorically, strictly speaking we should not say that an actual entity *has* ability to experience, but that it *is* an experience: for there is nothing in it other than experience: it is nothing but a case of experience. This idea forms the meaning of the famous formula according to which an actual entity is a droplet of experience.

The conception here described is the basis of the position that Hartshorne labelled with the term "psychicalism" (in contradistinction to physicalism), which also came to be known as "panexperientialism"[30] and is sometimes referred to with the traditional general term "panpsychism." Creative synthesis taking place in reality presupposes something like the ability to memorize, desire, or pursue a goal. These "abilities" may occur with varying degree of intensity in diverse actual entities, yet they can never be totally absent from anything real, they have to be present, be it in a minimum degree. Harthsorne tried to find the primary source of the differentiation found in single actual entities, as well as obtaining between particular things in what he referred to as affective continuum. This conception assumed that primary and secondary qualities ultimately derive from qualities traditionally designated *tertiary qualities*, at the basis of which lies the primitive *feeling*.[31]

Relationships into which enter actual entities are generalized mental relations, yet it must be observed, to avoid possible misconceptions, that these relationships do not apply to all objects in a broad sense; for instance they do not apply to colours, geometric figures, numbers, human productions or aggregates. "Of course tables do not feel; but it does not follow that there is no feeling in them. There is feeling in a flock of birds or in a swarm

[30] Cf. D.R. Griffin, "Some Whiteheadian Comments on the Discussion," in *Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy*, ed. J.B. Cobb, Jr., D.R. Griffin, Washington, 1977, pp. 97–98; also idem, *Charles Hartshorne's Postmodern Philosophy,* in *Hartshorne, Process Philosophy, and Theology*, ed. R. Kane, S.H. Phillips, Albany 1989, pp. 5–15.

[31] Hartshorne developed his conception in his early book *Philosophy and Psychology od Sensation*, Chicago 1934. Cf. also W. Viney, *Charles Hartshorne's Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, in *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne*, ed. L.E. Hahn, La Salle 1991, s. 91–112.

of bees, but the flock or the swarm feels nothing. So there can be feeling in a swarm of molecules, though the swarm does not feel."[32]

On the other hand Hartshorne does not affirm that feeling is *exclusively* an attribute of single momentary actual entities, for he readily admits that there are also such compounds of elementary actual entities which possess ability to feel of their own. These compound individuals correspond to the substances of classical tradition. One can say of an individual person or a single animal that they too are communities of autonomous microcosmic actual entities, yet they are not such communities as a swarm of insects, a flock of birds or a swarm of ants. Their ability to endure in time, the unity of their internal subjective organization are reasons enough to regard them as individuals rather than mere aggregates, although, naturally, they are compound, and not simple, individuals.[33]

I must here leave out discussion of Hartshorne's metaphysical conception of the way compound individuals are formed from microcosmic actual entities and all the diverse problems attendant upon it.[34] Suffice it to ob-

[32] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, p. 142.

[33] Whitehead in describing objects belonging to macroscopic reality employed the terms *nexus* and *society.* The former term refers to an "individual fact of togetherness of actual entities, which is real, individual and particular in the same sense in which actual entities and prehensions are real, individual and particular" (A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, New York, 1978, p. 34). it does not follow from this that nexus is also actual and concrete in the same sense as particular actual entities. The concepts of actuality and concreteness are more fundamental in process philosophy than those of reality, individuality and particularity.

[34] I discuss these matters in more detail in my book *Filozofia procesu i jej metafilozofia. Studium metafizyki Ch. Hartshorne'a.* In the present discussion I have to omit Hartshorne's conception of matter. The metaphysics of panpsychism admits of at least two different developments of the subject of matter. It can either affirm that matter construed in terms of stuff that fills or constitutes space simply does not exist or that every portion of matter includes some mental or at least proto-mental properties. The problem of the nature of matter is closely connected with the question concerning the relationship between time and matter. In his description of the metaphysical concrete entity (the becoming actual entity), Hartshorne gives precedence to terms denoting temporal or quasi-temporal succession, and he attempts to derive spatial relations from temporal ones. It must also be stressed that in Hartshorne the relationship between matter and mind is not the same as relationship between body and mind. In the case of compound individuals body is treated as composed of microcosmic actual entities whose creativity is significantly smaller than the creativity of actual entities making up mind (although it can never be nil). This means that the difference between body and mind is one of degree rather than sub-

serve that in his conception the problem of compound individuals, such as for example human beings, is not, strictly speaking a metaphysical problem; it belongs instead to cosmology. The reason for this is the fact that this problem does not concern anything necessary in the constitution of reality, only some contingent form of it. Reality as such could exist without humans, it could by no means exist without actual entities.

The metaphysics constructed by Hartshorne can be described as pluralist and idealist: reality is thought of as consisting of real (and not merely apparent) plurality of separate actual entities, whose nature is not that of passive matter but which are some sort of active momentary micro-minds which have the power to synthesize plurality of data (deriving from the past) and transform it into their own unity. All the complexity of the internal world of actual entities is grounded in the primary reality of affective continuum, whereas the complexity of the external world is produced by actual entities combining to form ranks of relatively durable societies, which may ultimately form, among other things, compound individuals. However, one has to note that the very distinction between what is internal and what is external is hardly appropriate for this context. This distinction is usually associated with the differentiation of reality into the material and the spiritual sphere; the material being often regarded as ontologically primary, while the spiritual as a more or less autonomous derivative of matter. It is not so in Hartshorne: in his conception spatial, synchronic relations, which form the basis of material reality are only a special case of the more basic temporal relations, which in turn are formed from plurality of actual entities succeeding one another.

How did these metaphysical conceptions influence Hartshorne's metaphysical development of the religious idea of God, given the assumption that God cannot be treated as an exception to the rules of the system but rather as the foremost exemplification thereof? First, since the whole reality is temporal, God being no exception to the rule, it follows that God cannot be eternal in the classical sense of being atemporal; his being eternal means in fact being everlasting, that is lacking a beginning and an end in time. If reality in the fullest sense consists in development or becoming, God must exemplify this characteristic to the highest possible degree, thus he has to be subject to change, but change in the case of God is never change for the

stance, thus in explaining the genesis of compound individuals it is not necessary to refer to such concept as emergence or supervenience taken in the strong sense, that is as signifying processes of generating qualitatively new features.

worse, it cannot be corruption or degeneration.[35] If succession in time of actual entities is metaphysically necessary, a situation in which only God exists and there is no world is impossible. Creation of the world by God *ex nihilo* is thus excluded on the basis of Hartshorne's metaphysical assumptions. Yet there is one more reason why creation of the world out of nothing is unacceptable to him: such creation would be tantamount to total determination of created beings by their creator, and these entities, by virtue of another metaphysical assumption are always creative to some, be it minimum, degree. This last point is, of course, open to debate: total determination of creation need not follow from the idea of *creatio ex nihilo*: it is not logically inconsistent that God, having created the world out of nothing, should perform an act of self limitation and thus admitted freedom and creativity of all or at least of some created beings into the world. However, such justification of freedom and spontaneity of creation is not satisfactory to Hartshorne who seeks to vindicate these qualities in creation and provide the strongest possible safeguards for them. In his opinion spontaneity and creativity are universal characteristics and they are independent of God's will. To him God is not an absolute being which exemplifies diverse perfections to the infinite degree; his main function consists in introducing order into the world of actual entities, which are creative in their own right, although to different degrees, and he performs this function by luring them to objectives that he finds desirable. One can say about God that he guarantees that there should be no chaos in the world and that he sets the objective towards which the world is to strive.

Since God does not call the world into being *ex nihilo*, he is also unable to extend the duration of the existence of any compound individual beyond its natural end (and even less that of an actual entity, which is *ex definitione* momentary). This implies that immortality of human persons, being compound individuals is impossible from the metaphysical point of view. Thus one of the principal motives for embracing religion, or at least some forms of it, which was the hope of achieving salvation construed in terms of eternal life in heaven, turns out to be untenable. However, it must be observed

[35] This of course generates a question concerning the relationship obtaining between the divine change and the change affecting all other actual entities and compound individuals. Having discussed this problem, Hartshorne admits that he possesses no satisfactory solution to that problem. Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, "Charles Hartshorne on Metaphilosophy, Person and Immortality, and Other Issues. An Interview with Charles Hartshorne by P. Gutowski and J. Kennedy," *Process Studies* 19 (1990), 4, p. 263.

that this motive was no part of the religious idea of God in the sense defined by Hartshorne; the key point of his conception was that God is worthy of supreme worship for his own sake and not for the sake of assuring immortality to human beings. To be more precise, on the strength of Harshorne's metaphysical assumptions some sort of immortality is not only possible but also inevitable. However, this kind of immortality concerns enduring of our lives in God's unlimited memory and not an indefinite prolongation of the individual existence enabling us to have ever new experiences. Immortality of this kind is usually described as objective immortality, in contradistinction to the traditional conception of subjective immortality (immortality of a living and conscious subject).

In contrast to Whitehead's conception, in which God was a *singular* actual entity, Hartshorne takes God to be a *compound individual*. Whitehead's conception was closer to the classical: as a simple being, God was involved in the process of endless, *extratemporal* concrescence. This conception, however gives rise to a problem within the framework of process metaphysics concerning possible action of thus conceived God upon the world, given the assumption that within that framework the function of causation can only be performed by fully actualised (past) beings. Whitehead facing the choice between adherence to the principle, formulated by himself, that God should not be an exception to the metaphysical principles of the system and adherence to his intuitions concerning the nature of God, opted for the latter alternative.[36]

By contrast, Hartshorne prefers to remain faithful to the assumed principles of his system and as a result accepts the conception of God as a compound individual, that is a series or a society of successive actual entities. This step removed, or at least minimized, the problem of God's causal action upon the world[37]; however, at a price: Hartshorne's conception of God has thereby been made more anthropomiorphic than Whitehead's. Nevertheless, Hartshorne himself does not find this disturbing as, in his opinion, his conception remains within the limits of dis-anthropomorphization stipulated by the rule applied by himself in his investigations aiming at the extraction of the religious idea of God.

[36] Cf. A.H. Johnson, *Some Conversations with Whitehead Concerning God and Creativity,* ed. L.S. Ford, G.L. Kline, New York, 1983, pp. 9–10.

[37] That the problem is not entirely removed is pointed out, among others, by L.S. Ford – cf. L.S. Ford, "God as a Temporary-Ordered Society: Some Objections," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 34 (1986), pp. 44–50.

It can be said of God, insofar as conceived in terms of a beginningless and endless society of actual entities, that he possesses a body of a kind. In contrast, however, to all other compound individuals, the body of God is the whole of the world. There is no "external" environment for God to subsist in, as in the process of his actualization he includes the whole universe, whereas all other compound individuals have only access to a limited set of adjacent and antecedent actual entities. Hartshorne affirms that, although God has to possess some world as his own body, yet this world does not have to be the one in which we live and which we experience; it could, in principle, be organized according to different principles and governed by different natural laws. The world is characterized by unity and order only as the body of God, if the world lacked that fundamental relation to God, it would be plunged in chaos. God's mind transcends the divine body in the same way as human mind transcends human body; yet God is more than merely the mind of the world: he is mind together with the body which is the Universe.[38] God also transcends every other compound individual, which, in contrast to God, has temporal limits and forms at best a fragment of the divine body. Moreover, no compound individual can possess such extensive and profound knowledge and such great power as possessed by God, and in this sense divine knowledge and power are unsurpassable. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that God is omniscient and omnipotent in the classical sense of these terms, implying that he possesses detailed knowledge concerning all particular events, including future events, as well as full control over them; such a conclusion is not allowed by the temporal structure of reality as a whole and by the natural creativity of actual entities. In this way, when carrying out his design concerning all the other compound individuals and all actual entities, God has to take into account the developments that in every instant take place independently of himself in the world — his own body. It is in this affirmation that the foundation is found for the process theodicy, which effectively deals with the problem of evil, and not only the evil caused by human beings, but also with so called natural evil.

[38] Cf. Ch. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, pp. 235–236.

CONCLUSION

According to Hartshorne, metaphysics, when its ideas are adequately expressed, is theology and vice versa: theology is metaphysics.[39] Naturally, what Hartshorne means by theology is not theology in the sense of the doctrine of a certain religious faith or, in other words, confessional theology, but natural theology in the sense presented above, that is a philosophical theory of the divine based upon the religious idea of God. The difference between natural theology and metaphysics consists not in diversity of starting points, objects given to be explained or methods of research, but only and exclusively in difference of cognitive attitude with which one approaches the task of explaining reality. Metaphysics is natural theology when we strive to grasp its subject matter in the light of the ideal of comprehensibility and clarity of concepts employed.[40] To be sure, it is perfectly possible to develop metaphysics without including in one's investigations problems concerning God, yet, according to Hartshorne, this would only mean that the meaning of metaphysical categories has not been fully explicated. In such case the concepts used in metaphysics must remain confused and ambiguous and the whole metaphysical system will not be able to withstand rational criticism.[41] However, inclusion of problems concerning God in metaphysics is not a neutral step with respect to religion, for it is precisely religion that provides us with the initial data regarding God. Here Hartshorne continues Whitehead's thought concerning the relationship between philosophy and religion. In *Process and Reality* Whitehead says: "Philosophy finds religion, and modifies it; and conversely religion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into its own scheme."[42]

On the other hand Hartshorne has a different vision of the nature and method of metaphysics from Whitehead's. Although his effort to find and disentangle the religious idea of God may be seen as a nod towards empiricism, both the way he isolates it, and the manner he subsequently employs it in his philosophical theology, as well as his treating metaphysics as a repository of metaphysical truths that are necessary, non-restrictive and existential (like the conclusion of his own reformulated version of the ontological proof of God's existence) rather point to his being an adherent of the

[39] Cf. ibid., p. 40.

[40] Cf. ibid., p. 276.

[41] Ibid., p. 39.

[42] A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, pp. 15–16.

rationalist method in philosophy. Yet according to Whitehead, metaphysics is not a set of mutually independent true statements, but a speculative *system,* that is hypothetical in nature (a system, whose theses depend on a hypothetical assumption or assumptions), which means that its theorems are in principle refutable. Somewhat paradoxically, for an eminent logician and mathematician that Whitehead was, flights of imagination inspired by poetry were more important in building a metaphysical system than strictly rational procedures. However, one must not exaggerate in representing the differences between the two philosophers: in Hartshorne, too, rationalist rhetoric and a rationalist viewpoint, manifest in his belief in the existence of true metaphysical propositions which are a priori true and thus necessary coexists side by side with a scepticism as to whether we are able correctly to identify such propositions. The impression of the two systems being significantly different is perhaps heightened by the fact that the metaphilosophical remarks made by Whitehead refer above all to the stage of developing a metaphysical system, whereas Hartshorne's metaphilosophy rather concerns the procedure of justification of metaphysical propositions.

Bearing this in mind, one ought to approach with some degree of scepticism the rationalist jargon employed by Hartshorne. The very project of beginning his research by fixing the pre-philosophical, religious idea of God, to be used later as a criterion in evaluating metaphysical conceptions, situates him on the side of empiricism rather than rationalism, regardless of how we evaluate the method itself of identifying and isolating this idea. In Hartshorne's meta-metaphysics the religious idea of God forms an outline that must be elaborated upon to acquire the adequate clarity. In practice, this means subjecting this idea to analysis in terms of the metaphysical vision of the world which Hartshorne considers the most successful. The key insight of that vision is the idea of inherent creativity of all actual entities and compound individuals; he tries to provide for this core insight of his the strongest support at his disposal. Proponents of the classical conception of God see the possible basis for relative autonomy of creatures in God's self-imposed restriction limiting the scope of God's power, yet Hartshorne finds such guarantee unsatisfactory, given the conception of creation *ex nihilo* which is paramount in classical theology. According to him, a God creating the world out of nothing must practically control every aspect of it.

Let me finish my discussion by some observation from the domain of psychology of philosophers. In philosophers' reflections upon the idea of God one can see manifestation of a quest for what I would describe as

a double guarantee for those views that philosophers regard as the most basic. If such a basic view concerns the eternal survival of the human self, it is not enough to ground the possibility of such survival in a God, who owing to his omnipotence, omniscience and all-embracing memory would be able to extend our life beyond death; another assurance of immortality has to be found. This is found in the conception of God creating man as a soul that is substance in its own right and thus capable of surviving the death of the body. By way of a joke we might perhaps say that the conception of the human soul as substance looks like an additional safeguard of immortality in case God should forget to prolong the existence of a certain person (the case absolutely unimaginable assuming the classical conception of divine attributs).

If the cherished philosophical intuition to be preserved at all costs concerns, as is the case with Hartshorne, real, although non-absolute, creativity of all actual entities and compound individuals, then God, who is omnipotent and omniscient in the classical sense, who produces the world *ex nihilo* and thus wields absolute and unrestricted power over his creation, and yet chooses to restrict his own might in order to make place for freedom and autonomy, is again not enough of a safeguard. Hartshorne believes that to ensure freedom and autonomy of creation God must be a God whose power and knowledge are naturally restricted by the fact that the world contains elements and aspects that are independent of his will.

Again, if, as in Sartre, the central philosophical intuition is that of absolute freedom of human beings, then the non-existence of the God of classical theism is not enough, what is required — just to be safe — is the non-existence of any God whatever.

In fact there is nothing unusual in this seeking for double-guarantees for the fundamental views commanding our representation of reality; we usually desire to ensure ourselves multiple guarantees for all things we value: for persons that are dear to us as well as for our possession of valuable things. In a situation when we can have multiple safeguards, logical arguing (however justified) that a single safeguard would be enough in this given situation will probably carry no persuasive force.

Translated by Roman Majeran

DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM: N. PIKE CONTRA A. PLANTINGA

Marcin Iwanicki

According to our natural commonsense conviction, any person, and in particular human person, is a moral subject that bears responsibility for what he or she consciously and voluntarily does, and it appears to be true that moral responsibility presupposes free will. The faculty of will, in turn, can only be regarded as free if it has access to diverse alternative ways of action and it depends solely on its own decision which one of these alternative options becomes actual. It is precisely on account of this freedom of choice that a human person is essentially different from, on the one hand, non-human animals, which, it is assumed, are driven by instinct and, on the other hand, from purely mechanical devices, whose actiona are programmed in advance. Thus arguments which aim at refutation of the reality of free will can be construed in a sceptical way and taken to question the very existence of persons.[1]

In what follows I discuss first one of the classical arguments against the reality of free will which can be construed precisely as refutation of the reality of personhood in general and then a certain response to this argument. The author of the argument is Nelson Pike, while the response is authored by Alvin Plantinga. I begin the discussion by explanation of the main assumptions underlying Pike's argument (part I), I follow this by formulation of the argument itself (part II) and by presentation of a number of responses to it (part III). Next I present a more detailed account of Plantinga's response to Pike's argument and set it against the background of the more general approach to the relevant problems, the so-called Ockhamism (parts IV-V). To finish my discussion, I briefly quote some criticisms of Plantinga's solution (part VI).

[1] J.M. Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control*, Oxford, 1994, p. 11.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. THEOLOGICAL INCOMPATIBILISM

Some problems within philosophy of religion have the general form of the question whether the existence of God possessing definite attributes can be reconciled with the existence of a world as characterized by certain features, e.g. whether the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God is compatible with the existence of a world in which there is much apparently gratuitous suffering; or whether God's omniscience can be viewed as compatible with the freedom of will of created beings. The particular version of theological compatibilism which is the object of discussion in what follows is the thesis asserting the possibility of the coexistence of God, who foreknows all temporal events (including all contingent events), and the created worlds in which there are creatures endowed with free will; in a briefer and perhaps more exact formulation, it is the thesis that God's foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom of will. Naturally, incompatibilism is a negation of compatibilism. Incompatibilism can, though by no means has to, be taken as a reason for rejection of divine omniscience.

A controversy between these two opposed positions typically assumes the following form. First, the incompatibilist takes upon himself the burden of the proof and proposes an argument against compatibilism. In response, the compatibilist counters with an argument, which is usually a criticism of the incompatibilist's argument rather than a positive proof of his own position. Let us observe, however, that to undermine even the best argument for incompatibilism is not in itself to justify compatibilism. A positive argument for compatibilism, that is for possible coexistence of two things, must include arguments for possible existence of each of these things separately (since possibility distributes over conjunction); in the present case this means that an argument for theological compatibilism in the sense stated above should include an argument for the possibility of God's existence.[2] If, however, in accordance with classical theism, we assume that God, if He

[2] As Jeff Speaks observes, "any argument for the compatibility of two propositions must also be an argument for the possibility of each of those propositions. Hence it is impossible to argue for the compatibility of two propositions, one of which is necessary if possible, without arguing for the truth of that proposition. Arguments which fail to establish the truth of the relevant proposition must therefore also fail to establish the relevant compatibility claim." J. Speaks, "Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments," *Faith and Philosophy* 28 (2011), p. 291.

exists, is a necessary being, an argument for God's *possible* existence will amount to an argument for His *actual* existence. Thus a successful proof of the compossibility of an omniscient and omnipotent God and human free will would have to include as its constitutive part an argument for God's existence. In order to avoid such commitment, arguments for compatibilism should better be construed as arguments for conditional compatibility: either as criticism of definite arguments for incompatibilism or as proofs of metaphysical mutual independence of prescience (of the contigent events) and free will, that is as proofs of the thesis that the divine foreknowledge of what we decide and do does not make our decisions and doings unfree, rather than as arguments for compatibilism absolutely conceived.[3]

A very elegant version of the argument for incompatibilism, which is in fact a detailed development of Boethius's argument contained in his *Consolation of Philosophy* (V, III) is found in Nelson Pike's essay "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action." This essay was published in 1965 and became a point of reference for most subsequent debates concerning divine omniscience and human free will.[4] Pike's argument is based on certain assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge, God, human freedom, the structure of the Universe, and, in particular, the nature of the past. To clarify the structure of Pike's argument, I present here its main assumptions.

2. THE SOURCE OF PRESCIENCE AND DIVINE PROVIDENCE

I BEGIN BY A BRIEF MENTION of some other related problem, though. The problem of the relationship between divine prescience and human freedom is not to be confused with the problem of the source or the mechanism of precience.

[3] The conditional compatibility thesis has the following form: If God exists and is by His essence omniscient, it is possible that compatibilism be true (which means: it is possible that necessarily existing and essentially omniscient God has beforehand knowledge of a given action and this action is nevertheless free).

[4] N. Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," *Philosophical Review* 74 (1965), pp. 27–46. Pike's essay was reprinted, together with the most important responses to it, in Fischer (1989). Pike revisited the topic in another essay, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 33 (1993), pp. 129–164, published nearly thirty years later; in the meantime he responded to some criticisms and comments in several other of his publications. In presenting his argument I make use of his original statement of the argument as well as of his later texts.

The problem of the sources of foreknowledge is indeed puzzling, especially in the light of the thesis enjoying widespread acceptance in epistemology, according to which knowledge requires a causal relation between the knower and the object known. The assumption of omnipotence as one of God's attributes, the necessity of the causal relation, the assumption of divine impassibility," that is of the thesis that nothing can causally influence God, logically ground the conclusion that God is the sole ultimate cause of everything in the world, including human actions. Yet this obviously appears to contradict the assumption that human beings are persons responsible for their actions, since this could only be the case provided they are free in the sense of not being determined (in their decisions and voluntary actions) by anything external, indeed, by anything apart from their own faculty of free choice. [5]

Another riddle concerning the source of divine prescience appears when we assume a measure of indeterminism in the world: the puzzling question is how God can possibly possess in advance knowledge of events that are logically and causally contingent i.e. neither follow from the laws of logic nor from natural laws nor from human history. If we accept what seems self-evident, namely that only a fully actualized or ontologically perfectly determined reality can be an object of knowledge, it appears to follow that future contingent events cannot be objects of anyone's knowledge.

In contemporary analytical philosophy the problem of the causal relation between the object known and the knowledge thereof in the knower is dealt with independently from the problem of the source of foreknowledge; accordingly, I only mention the latter to say I am going to omit it in what follows and to concentrate on the former. Yet, to make the picture complete, it is apposite to observe, that some authors involved in the relevant debate consider the problem of the compatibility of divine prescience with human freedom to be logically secondary to the problem of the source of divine foreknowledge, while the problem of the source to be inseparable from the problem of divine providence.[6]

[5] M. Adams, *William Ockham*, Notre Dame, 1987, pp. 1115–1116.

[6] E.g. A. Freddoso, "Introduction," in L. Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, Ithaca, 1988, p. 2, note 1.

I. THE ASSUMPTIONS OF PIKE'S ARGUMENT

The argument we are about to discuss relies on three important assumptions: (a) all properties attributable to God belong to Him essentially; (b) omniscience and eternity are among God's properties; (c) freedom of will necessarily entails ability to act otherwise than one actually acts, and this ability is to be construed in the libertarian sense, and not merely in the compatibilist sense. Let us start our discussion by explaining these three assumptions.

1. ESSENTIAL DIVINE PROPERTIES

Pike assumes (in accordance with classical theism) that whatever properties God possessses, including the property of being omniscient, He possesses them essentially. However, the statement "God possesses the property *P* "can be interpreted in two ways: either *de dicto* or *de re. De dicto*: The individual called God necessarily possesses the property *P*; He possesses this property in every possible world in which it exists. *De re*: Necessarily, whoever is God, possesses the property *P*. This twofold interpretation applies also to the property of being omniscient: thus the statement "God is omniscient" may be taken as meaning (interpretation *de dicto*): "The individual called God is necessarily omniscient, He is so in every possible world in which it happens to exist," or, alternatively (interpretation *de re*), "Necessarily, whoever is God, is omniscient." The former interpretation states that the person who is God is necessarily, and thus essentially, omniscient, He is omniscient in all possible worlds in which He exists. The other interpretation allows for the possibility of the person being God being only contingently omniscient: suppose that the person being God acquires a false belief and thus loses the property of being omniscient, in this case He will still continue in existence as the very same person, although He will no longer be God. In his essay, Pike takes the proposition "God is omniscient" in the former *(de dicto)* of the two quoted possible meanings.[7]

The term "God" is thus used in Pike's essay as a proper name, which means that it is a rigid designator, and not as a title, in other words not as a non-rigid descriptive expression. A proper name in every possible world refers to one and the same individual, whereas a title refers in every possible

[7] N. Pike, "Fischer on Freedom and Foreknowledge," *Philosophical Review* 93 (1984), p. 608.

world to an individual who fulfils some definite role in the given world (if there is such an individual in this world), and it does not have to be the same individual in every possible world in which that role is fulfilled. The individual fulfilling that role and bearing the appropriate title on account of that is only contingently.

In the interpretation assumed by Pike, God's status and His role (and, by the same token, the descriptive content of the term "God") is determined by God's attributes (which are all essential), including the essential omniscience and essential eternity. Given, thay the name "God" is a proper name, the possibility that God makes a mistake and acquires some false belief is logically ruled out. But this also means that for a created free agent freedom entails the ability to act otherwise than God eternally knows that agent will in fact act, that is the ability to act in such a way, that were this way of action implemented, God would cease to exist.

2. GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE

Pike assumes that God is a person and possesses knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. The statement that God is omniscient means that God holds no false beliefs (thus if God holds that *p*, necessarily *p*) and His knowledge is complete (if it is the case that *p*, God holds that *p*).[8] In other words, God recognizes as true all and only true propositions, including propositions concerning temporal (future) events. An essential feature of God's omniscience (especially from the point of view of our discussion) is its infallibility, meaning that God cannot hold false beliefs[9].

However, these remarks call for a clarification. Although Pike's argument concerns the relationship between divine foreknowledge (of temporal

[8] It seems clear that no mention of false propositions is required in the definition of omnisciencer, since to every false proposition *p* corresponds the true proposition *It is not the case that p*. However, if we admit the possibility that some being could know all true propositions and yet believe some falsehood, we should add to the definition of omniscience either a clause stating that an omniscient being does not believe any falsehoods or a clause stating that all beliefs of such a being form a logically consistent set. Pike adds the former statement to his formulation of the definition of omniscience.

[9] Pike distinguishes infallibility, defined, as above, in terms of exclusion of all false beliefs, from inerrancy, which is modally contingent. God's inerrancy is guaranteed by the second part of the conjunction in the definition of omnipotence, which is the statement of God's infallibility (God holds no false beliefs).

contingent events) and human freedom, yet in the concluding formulation of his thesis the concept of foreknowledge (of temporal contingent events) is replaced with the concept of forebelief. This modification of the traditional argument Pike considers to be his most important contribution to the reformulation of it and explains it in the following way:

> In the traditional literature on the foreknowledge problem, the argument for theological determinism is invariably formulated in terms of God's knowledge which, because it is specifically God's is usually described as "certain" or "infallible" [...] however, there is a sense in which all knowledge is certain — "*S* knows that *p*" entails "*p* is true" — whoever *S* may be. And, of course, "*S* knows for certain" or even "*S* infallibly knows" does nothing to strengthen the *entailment* connection. That God *foreknows* what Jones will do thus does not seem to have any clear implication as regards Jones' *power* to refrain [...] Maybe all we need say is that what was, in fact, foreknowledge would not have been *knowledge* had Jones exercised his power to refrain. The picture changes, however, when the foreknowledge argument is framed in terms of God's *beliefs*. This is because previously held beliefs differ from previously possessed knowledge in that it is hard to see how they could fail to count as firm ingredients in the "unalterable" past. And allowing that God *beliefs* are like cases of *knowledge* in that they *entail* the truth of the propositions believed, the upshot is that the problem remains though its most obvious solution suddenly fails. I think that this is the feature of the foreknowledge argument presented in "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" that has given it place in the contemporary discussion of theological deter-minism. In its belief-formulation the argument seems anchored on an item in the "hard" past relative to the time of action. But the item in question has been so fashioned that it still logically excludes alternative action.[10]

Briefly to restate Pike's idea: God's infallible belief implies that the proposition believed by God is true and belief as such seems better to fit the immutable past than (fore)knowledge.[11] A reasoning starting from God's infallible forebelief presupposes that God's belief at the instant t_1 related to a certain action by a certain person at t_2, logically determines the relevant action of the relevant person at the instant t_2, whereas an argument from

[10] N. Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem," p. 158. Pike refers in this passage, not entirely consistently, to an argument in favour of theological determinism, and not of incompatibilism. Yet in other contexts of his essay he leaves no room for doubt that what he is concerned with is an argument for incompatibilism.

[11] I say "belief *seems* better to fit" rather "better *fits*" because, as we shall see, it is legitimate to hold that God's belief, in virtue of its inerrancy and its power absolutely to determine the future fact it concerns, is soft to the equal degree with God's knowledge. The distinction between hard and soft facts will be explained in more detail further on in this essay.

God's essential omniscience makes a stronger presupposition, namely that God's belief at t_1 is logically equivalent to the action of the relevant person at t_2. Pike chooses the former, that is the weaker, presupposition, which he thinks sufficient for justifying incompatibilism.[12]

Pike underscores the fact that the argument he proposes completely leaves out any consideration of the causes of human actions; no assumption is made as to whether human actions have natural deterministic causes, neither is any presupposition made as to the source of the divine foreknowledge of future events, e.g. whether it is based on the divine knowledge of these natural causes and the natural laws governing the Universe.[13] Pike's argument remains valid even if (a) the divine foreknowledge is taken to be based not on any testimonies, principles, reasonings or calculations, but on some kind of immediate perception, and (b) human actions are thought to have no (deterministic, natural) causes at all. This clearly demonstrates Pike's intention to remain neutral with respect to the question concerning the way God knows future.

[12] This is what William Alston wrote as a comment on Pike's modification of the argument from divine foreknowledge: "And now we can see the point of framing the argument. The argument [for the in compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom in terms of divine beliefs] does not work for divine knowledge just because knowledge at *t* of a later event, not being a hard fact about *t*, does not place any real constraint on what happens at that later time. But beliefs would seem to be a different matter. Surely the fact that *R believes* at *t* that *S* will do *A* at a later time, *u*, is a hard fact about *t*. How could *S*'s belief be even partially constituted by what happens later? A belief seems completely self-enclosed at the time of possession in a way that knowledge is not. Hence if God's believing at *t* that I would do *A* at a later time, *u*, should entail that I do *A* at *u*, this would seem unequivocally to rule out freedom of choice. Since a belief held at *t* is a hard fact about *t*, we cannot dispose of this argument in the way we disposed of the argument from divine foreknowledge. But if God is essentially omniscient and temporal and *if* divine knowledge involves belief, then for every action I perform God does believe in advance that I will do it, and it is logically impossible that any of these beliefs is false. Hence, given those assumptions, every action of mine is necessitated by a prior fact that is to no extent constituted by my action; my action is necessitated by a past fact that is what it is apart from my decision to perform the action. This argument from divine forebelief would seem to succeed, given its assumptions, where the argument from divine foreknowledge fails." W. Alston, "Does God Have Beliefs?," *Religious Studies* 22 (1986), p. 303.

[13] N. Pike, *God and Timelessness*, New York, 1970, p. 64.

3. GOD'S ETERNITY

Pike assumes God to be eternal. However, he does not construe eternity as a mode of existence beyond our temporal framework (or, indeed, beyond any temporal mode); to him eternity is existence in all instants of our time. God always existed, He exists now, He will always exist, which means that He exists (the same, whole and indivisible) in every temporal moment of the same temporal scheme as human beings.[14]

Moreover, if God is essentially omniscient, He holds infallible beliefs at every moment of time, in all possible worlds, as to what has happened, is happening, and will happen in the given possible world. From this assumption it follows, that God has always had infallible beliefs concerning future free actions by human beings, naturally also before these actions were undertaken and performed.[15] As the past is already completely determined and beyond anybody's power to change, God's beliefs cannot change. And since God's beliefs are infallible, the future human actions, which these beliefs concern and which they logically predetermine, also cannot change. Thus nobody can forbear from performing an action, which has eternally been believed by God to be performed by that person at that particular time: there is no access open to anybody to alternative possibilities of action. There is only one future consistent with the actual past. Thus, given our universally accepted conception of freedom (as involving possibility of alternative actions), no created being can be said to possess free will.

4. FIXITY OF THE HARD PAST

Alongside the thesis affirming that God is eternal, Pike introduces an assumption related to the nature of time, namely the thesis of the fixity of the past: the past, unlike the future, is already decided, set and beyond anybody's power. Nobody can make it so that a certain fact in the past should cease being a fact, and every possible version of the future cannot but be an extension of what is now the past, or, in Carl Ginet's words: "Our freedom is the freedom to add to the given past."[16]

[14] Plantinga ("On Ockham's Way Out," *Faith and Philosophy* 3 (1986), pp. 235–269) and other commentators point out that the argument for incompatibilism can also be formulated if one assumes atemporal view of God.

[15] N. Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom and Possible Worlds," *Philosophical Review* 86 (1977), p. 210.

[16] C. Ginet, *On Action*, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 102–103.

As a result, Pike believes that any attribution to an agent of a power to perform some definite action should respect the condition of the fixity of the past: however great his might may be, no agent has the power to change the past. This exclusion of the past from any possible causal influence is captured in the statement that propositions concerning the past are accidentaly necessary, that is they only become necessary after the events they refer to have actually taken place. Propositions about the past are by no means logically necessary: after all the past might have been different or it could have never existed at all. If this were the case, the actual propositions about the past would have different truth value from the one they have in actual fact.

Notice, however, that the principle of the fixity of the past as presented here only concerns some facts about the past, namely the so called hard facts. To give some intuitive idea of the term, hard facts about the past are those past facts, whose content is not related to any other point in time and does not depend on anything that happens after them.[17] Pike, who was the first to introduce the term "hard fact about the past," did not give any criterion of the division of all facts into "hard ones" and "soft ones," appealing instead to our "pre-analytical understanding" of the difference between the former and the latter, and providing some model examples. For instance, the fact that Julius Caesar was killed in 44 B.C. is a hard fact, whereas the fact that he was killed more than one hundred years before my completing of this essay is soft, for I can still do something to make this projected fact fail to become an actual fact: namely I can give up the work on this essay and go instead on holiday to Rome.

Pike defends two basic claims which serve as the foundation for his argument: (a) all hard facts about the past are fixed; (b) however we may define hard facts, the facts concerning holding beliefs in the past by an intelligent subject will turn out among hard facts. As the next step, Pike invokes God's essential omniscience and the principle of the fixity of the hard past to justify his third claim, namely that (c) there is no possible world such that its past, which includes God's relevant forebelief, is the same as in our world, and yet which contains an agent who refrains from performing an action foreseen in God's forebelief. To accept the existence of such a world would require attributing to that agent a power over some hard fact about the past, namely over God' s relevant forebelief. According

[17] The terms "hard fact" and "soft fact" are Pike's, yet the intuitive notions thereof and the distinction between them were introduced by earlier authors. See N. Pike, "Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder," *Philosophical Review* 75 (1966): 369–370.

to Pike, in order to find out whether a person really has the power to perform an action, one should take into account the whole hard past in the *actual* world: an agent can be shown to possess the power to perform a given action, only if there is a possible world with the same hard past as the actual world, in which that agent performs that action.

5. HUMAN FREEDOM AS CONCEIVED IN AN INCOMPATIBILIST WAY

The last of the assumptions accepted by Pike for his argument concerns the nature of human freedom. This assumption states that freedom requires ability to act otherwise than one actually acts, or, in other words, an access to alternative possible ways of action in exactly the same circumstances. The concept of alternative possibilities is related to our representation of the future as an open, branching structure, containing nodes in which a number of different ways of action are open to and really within the reach of a person, whose choice will be the sole factor to decide which of these possible ways is actualized. A person is free only if he/she has the power either to perform an action within his/her reach (at a given moment) or to hold back from performing it. In his essay, Pike does not explain this assumption in much detail, he only writes:

> Although I do not have an analysis of what it is for an action to be *voluntary*, it seems to me that a situation in which it would be wrong to assign Jones the *ability* or *power* to do *other* than he did would be a situation in which it would also be wrong to speak of his action as voluntary.[18]

In particular, Pike does not explain whether a person's power to perform or to refrain from action can be reconciled with determinism (causal compatibilism) or not (causal incompatibilism). It seems natural to think, though, that he presupposes the incompatibilist conception and accepts the libertarian conception of freedom. Libertarianism is a view ascribing free will to at least some human agents and conceiving of free will as ruling out causal derminism.

[18] N. Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," p. 33.

II. PIKE'S ARGUMENT

The assumptions we have presented form the backbone of Pike's argument. The aim of this argument, let us emphasize, is to support incompatibilism, that is a theory holding that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are irreconcilable: they cannot coexist in reality; it is not the aim od Pike's reasoning to argue against the existence of either God's prescience or human free choice. As a matter of fact, Pike's goal is not even to prove incompatibilism: his intended objective is more modest: he seeks to propose a precisely formulated argument for incompatibilism which will compel the theist to make more precise his conception of God or to modify it.

Pike formulates his argument around an example of a particular human agent performing a definite action, but wants to generalize it to all voluntary agents, actions and instants, and to conclude that if God exists, nobody has the power to act otherwise than he/she actually does.

1. A NON-FORMALIZED VERSION OF PIKE'S ARGUMENT

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that a prescient and infallible God exists and there is a human agent performing some voluntary action, say, cutting roses in the garden. Given His infallible omniscience, God believed beforehand (say, in the instant t_1) that the agent in question (let us call him X) would perform his cutting of the roses in the future (say, at the moment t_2). Given the fixity of the hard past, God's past belief cannot be changed at present, and being a belief of an essentially infallible God, it cannot be proved false; thus necessarily: if God believed in the past that X would cut his roses at t_2, X will cut his roses at t_2. Whatever logically follows from the unchangeable is itself unchangeable, so X's cutting his roses at t_2 is inevitable. In the face of this evidence, Pike concludes that given the existence of a prescient and infallible God, X could not refrain from performing the action in question, which means that his action of cutting the roses at t_2 was not free. To conclude otherwise would amount to assuming that X has one of the following three counterfactual powers: (a) the power of making God not to have existed at t_1, (b) the power of making God have entertained false beliefs at t_1, (c) the power of making God have entertained, at t_1, another belief than the one concerning X's cutting the roses at t_2. This statement contains the leading assumption of Pike's argument, referred to by himself

as "the controlling assumption," which is a conditional, whose antecedent is the proposition "If God exists and, nevertheless, *X*'s voluntary action is free," and whose consequent is a disjunction, its members corresponding to the three counterfactual suppositions (a), (b) and (c) mentioned above. Pike claims that neither of the powers described in (a), (b) and (c) can be possessed by an agent in the actual world. The assumption (b) is necessarily false given God's essential infallibility: if God is essentially infallible, the proposition "God entertains a false belief" is self-contradictory, so the supposition (b) must be false: nobody can be thought to possess the power to effect a state of affairs containing a contradiction. (Pike underlines the fact that in order to rule out the supposition (b) it is not enough to invoke infalliblity of God's beliefs, but reference must be made to the quality of infallibility; for this reason Pike's argument does not apply to human subjects of prescience, who entertain true beliefs about the future, but exclusively to God (whose infallibility is necessary). The assumptions (a) and (c) are ruled out by the fixity of the hard past: nobody can have any power over what existed, or over what was believed by anyone in the past. In brief: if theological compatibilism were true, one of the three states of affairs as described in (a), (b) or (c) would have to be the case. Yet all these states of affairs are ruled out, as shown by our discussion. Thus theological compatibilism is false: if there is a prescient and infallible God, no voluntary agent (other than God himself) is free.

As this brief restatement of Pike's argument has shown, it is a kind of *reductio ad falsum* argument: it purports to demonstrate that theological compatibilism entails a thesis that can be shown by logical analysis to be false, therefore compatibilism as such is false; according to the logical law that a proposition implying falsehood must be false itself.

2. A FORMALIZED RESTATEMENT OF PIKE'S ARGUMENT

In a stricter and somewhat formalized way Pike's argument can be restated as follows:

1. "God existed at the moment t_1" entails "If X performed the action Y at the moment t_2, God at t_1 believed that X would perform t_1 at t_2."
2. "God believes that Y is the case" entails "It is true that Y is the case."
3. At the given moment it lies in nobody's power to perform an action, which description contains contradiction.

4. At the given moment it lies in nobody's power to effect anything whose effect would be that somebody who held a definite belief at some instant in the past did not hold that very belief at the same instant in the past.
5. At the given moment it lies in nobody's power to effect anything that would cause a person who existed at some moment in the past not to have existed at this very moment in the past.
6. If God existed at t_1 and believed that X would perform t_1 at t_2, then, if at t_2 it was still in X's power to hold himself back from performing Y, one of the free possibilities holds true: either (1) at t_2 it lay in X's power to effect something that would cause God to have held a false belief at t_1, or (2) at t_2 it lay in X's power to effect something that would cause God not to have held the belief He entertained at t_1, or (3) at t_2 it lay in X's power to effect something that would cause every person who at $t1$ had believed that X would perform Y at t_2 (by our assumption, one of these persons was God Himself) to have held a false belief at t_1, that is not to have been God at t_1 (thus God, who by our assumption existed at t_1, would have been made, by X's action, not to have existed at t_1).
7. The option 1 in the consequent of 6 is false (from 2 and 3).
8. The option 2 in the consequent of 6 is false (from 4).
9. The option 3 in the consequent of 6 is false (from 5).
10. Hence, if God existed at t_1 and if God believed at t_1 that X would perform Y at t_2, it was not in X's power at t_2 to hold himself back from performing Y (from 6-9).
11. Thus, if God existed at t_1 and X performed Y at t_2, it was not in X's power to forbear from performing Y.

The opening two assumptions of the argument (1, 2) concern God's omniscience (prescience) and infallibility; the following three (3, 4, 5) relate to human freedom and fixity of the past. The sixth assumption, which is the controlling assumption, is taken by Pike to be an analytical truth. The compatibilist is made thereby to confront the necessity to choose from among three options, none of which turns out to be acceptable, as shown in the steps 7, 8, and 9. The final two steps (10 and 11) conclude to the incompatibility of divine omniscience and freedom of non-divine beings.

3. THREE INEFFECTIVE OBJECTIONS

Pike anticipates a number of objections to his argument and responds to them. The first objection concerns his alleged failure properly to accomodate in his reasoning the distinction between absolute and conditional necessity. The former is necessity of a whole conditional statement (e.g. *Necessarily, if God has foreknowledge of human action, the action by a hu-*

man agent is not free), while the latter is necessity of the consequent of a conditional (e.g. *If God has foreknowledge of human action, then necessarily the action by a human agent is not free*). This distinction is relevant to modal analysis of conditional statements and corresponds to the medieval distinction between "necessity of the consequence" (*necessitas consequentiae*) and "necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentis*) which was frequently applied in medieval discussions of statements concerning divine foreknowledge, human freedom and the relation between the two. In reply to this criticism, Pike points out that his perspective upon divine prescience and human freedom is not concerned with the modal aspects of the question: the notion of accidental necessity is related to voluntary or non-voluntary nature of an act and not modal necessity as exemplified by instances of absolute and conditional necessity. In the modal sense the action by an agent, God's relevant belief and the relation between the two can be contingent.

Another objection rests on the claim that human freedom is already "incorporated" in divine prescience; Pike dismisses this view as lacking internal coherence.

The third criticism of Pike's reasoning refers to analogy between divine foreknowledge and human foreknowledge of future actions. The reasoning behind this criticism is as follows: human foreknowledge of a future human action does not make that action necessary; divine foreknowledge is like human knowledge a future event, so divine foreknowledge no more makes an event necessary than does its human counterpart. In his answer to this criticism Pike points to an essential difference between these two kinds of foreknowledge: while a human belief concerning the future, even if true, could in principle be false (it is only contingently true), a divine belief, which is of a being that is infallible by its essence, cannot be falsified, since it is necessarily true. The crucial difference between human and divine beliefs consists in the nature of the relation between belief and truth: in the case of human beliefs the relation is only contingent, while whatever God holds as true is necessarily so. The power of a non-divine agent to act otherwise than in accordance with God's forebelief cannot be actualized, which means, according to Pike, that it is no power at all.[19]

Pike also addresses himself to the criticism that in his argument he has ignored the distinction between the power to change the past as such and the power to act in different ways so as to make the past resulting from this

[19] N. Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem," s. 153.

action different depending on the chosen course of action. The former kind of power is merely imaginary and unreal, while the latter, referred to as counterfactual power over the past, is possible with respect to soft facts about the past. In his answer Pike acknowledges the legitimacy of that distinction, but replies that it does not apply to his discussion of the problem of divine foreknowledge versus human freedom since, as has already been stated, divine forebeliefs concerning future voluntary actions by the creatures belong to the domain of hard facts about the past.

4. SOLUTION VERSUS DISSOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY

According to Pike, what lies at the root of the controversy between theological compatibilism and incompatibilism is a certain conflict between our basic intuitions about God. On the one hand we entertain an intuitive belief that what God believes belongs to the hard past and is once and for all "settled," on the other, however, we cannot help believing that God's forebeliefs concerning future actions by humans depend in a way, not only factually, but also logically, on future acts and thus are not settled in a definitive way until these actions are actually performed.[20] Pike's argument highlights the former of these intuitions: the facts concerning God's past beliefs are hard facts. By contrast, Plantinga's response to Pike, which we shall presently discuss, is to throw into relief the other side of the story: the facts related to God's relevant beliefs do depend in part on the future and so belong to the domain of soft facts about the past.

Does the controversy between theological compatibilism and incompatibilism admit of a solution? As for Pike himself, he believes that at least one of the basic assumptions concerning God's nature is false and ultimately the end of the controversy will be not so much a theory providing an adequate solution to it, but what he terms a *dissolution* thereof, by which he means an identification and abandoning of the false assumption(s) underlying the whole debate. This dissolution may consist in the rejection of one of the following theses: (a) God is everlasting; (b) God's omniscience includes foreknowledge of future human actions; (c) divine foreknowledge is essential to God; (d) God holds beliefs. According to Pike, the assumption marked (c) deserves particular attention as a likely candidate for elimina-

[20] N. Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem," p. 136.

tion from the set of basic assumptions concerning God.[21] In fact, the spectrum of likely solutions is even richer. The great number of plausible answers to the argument may mean, on the one hand, that the set of the basic presuppositions thereof may contain more than one erroneous assumption, while on the other hand it suggests that probably none of the possible answers is fully satisfactory.[22]

III. SELECTED NON-OCKHAMIST RESPONSES

Plantinga is considered to be one of the proponents of the standpoint in theology described as Ockhamism, which provides one of the most plausible answers to Pike's argument. Before we start a detailed presentation of Plantinga's Ockhamist position, it may be wortwhile to outline the most important non-Ockhamist responses to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, including Nelson Pike's own preferred response.

1. OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT BELIEFS

According to one of the responses to Pike's challenge, God's knowledge does not consist in beliefs but in immediate awareness of facts.[23] Immediate awareness is a more perfect kind of knowledge than mere belief, therefore it is natural to attribute it to God. Pike, however, counters this objection with the assertion that the concept of belief undergoes profound modification when applied to God. Although divine beliefs related to future events are, like human beliefs, part of the past, yet they are also different from the latter by the fact that they cannot be false. Also the concept of person is significantly modified when referred to God, since none of the persons we know by experience has the attribute of omniscience. Given these shifts in the meaning of the crucial terms as applied to God, we should, according to Pike, take into account the possibility that the assumption that God is a person possessing beliefs may turn out to be false, or at least be cautious about assuming that God's beliefs are part of the fixed past.[24]

[21] Ibid., pp. 158–159.

[22] W. Hasker, "The Foreknowledge Conundrum," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*" 50 (2001), pp. 98.

[23] W. Alston, *Does God Have Beliefs?*

[24] N. Pike, *Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder*, pp. 378–379.

2. OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT FOREKNOWLEDGE

Another way of getting rid of the problem of compatibilism versus incompatibilism consists in assuming that future contingent events, such as human free acts, do not fall within the scope of divine omniscience. This theory holds that it is far from the case that God in every instant of the past had beliefs concerning future human acts. A proponent of this approach can invoke analogy between omniscience and omnipotence: an omnipotent being does not have the power to effect absolutely everything (which would be self-contradictory), it only has the power to effect all that which is logically possible (or possible to be caused by it). Likewise, an omniscient mind need not have the power to know absolutely everything, but only that which is logically (epistemically) possible to know. Arguably, knowledge concerning future free (that is contingent) actions is not part of knowledge of the whole of the epistemically accessible domain, since future acts, which do not exist as yet, can legitimately be considered to be epistemically inaccessible.[25] Anyway, this position is variously justified. For instance, it is plausible to affirm that logical value of propositions concerning future contingent events remains indeterminate until the relevant events actually take place; before these events actually happen, the propositions about them are neither true nor false, so that even God Himself is not able to know their logical value. Alternatively, it is possible to maintain that although the logical value of propositions concerning future free actions is already settled before these actions are actually performed, yet even the omnipotent God does not know the logical value of these propositions since this is logically impossible: if He knew this value, the relevant actions would cease to be free.[26] Yet another plausible way of justifying this position is as follows: although the logical value of propositions concerning future free acts is already decided in advance, and it lies within God's power to know the value of these propositions, yet He deliberately excludes them from the scope of His knowledge (presumably, to preserve the free nature of the acts they describe).[27]

[25] A.N. Prior, "The Formalities of Omniscience," *Philosophy* 32 (1962), pp. 119–129.

[26] R. Swinburne, *The Coherence of Theism*, Oxford, 1993; W. Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge*, Ithaca, 1989.

[27] P. van Inwagen, "What Does An Omniscient Being Know About the Future?," *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion* 1 (2008), s. 216–230.

3. ATEMPORALISM

Another way of dissolving the problem of omniscience versus freedom is the position known as atemporalism. According to this theory, God does not exist in the temporal framework of our Universe and is not related to the temporal order in any way. Therefore it cannot be said that God holds beliefs about future actions *before* these actions actually take place.

Yet another way of dealing with this problem, which deserves a brief mention here rests upon the controversial idea that propositions in grammatical future tense can change their logical value; in other words, the future changes and God's beliefs concerning the future change accordingly.[28] This theory is called the "mutable future view."

4. ANOTHER CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

A dissolution of the problem of prescience versus freedom may be attempted not only by a modification of the concept of God, but also by an alteration of the conception of human freedom. This strategy comes in two main varieties, known as compatibilism and Frankfurt-libertarianism. Compatibilism is a well-known position which holds that freedom and causal determinism are not mutually exclusive: it is perfectly possible that every event in the Universe is causally determined and yet it makes sense to believe that we are free and responsible subjects. Frankfurt-libertarianism is a view holding that freedom rules out causal determination of free acts, yet freedom itself does not require possibility to act differently from what one actually does. Harry Frankfurt, who introduced that conception, supported it with a number of examples, the so called Frankfurt-examples, which are thought experiments applicable to considerations of the relation between causal determinism and moral responsibility.

5. INERRANCY INSTEAD OF INFALLIBILITY

Pike himself favoured a solution of the problem of prescience versus freedom which consisted in giving up the assumption of God's essential infallibility. In one of preceding paragraphs we have already mentioned him responding to the objection invoking analogy between divine prescience and human foreknowledge of future free acts. He argued then that human

[28] P.T. Geach, "The Future," *New Blackfriars* 54 (1973), pp. 208–218.

foreknowledge does not imply that the relevant voluntary actions are not in fact free, since the human agent performing them has the power to act otherwise than foreseen in human foreknowledge and thus prove the relevant human forebeliefs false.

We have reasons to think that sometimes we are able to know in advance what another person will freely do in the future and yet we do not question the fact that the foreseen act will be genuinely free. Starting from this obvious observation it is argued that just as human foreknowledge does not render the future human act unfree, neither does divine prescience diminish in any way the free nature of human voluntary acts; and just as the human agent has the power to prove human forebelief false, so does he possess power to show divine forebelief erroneous. In his answer to this objection, however, Pike pointed out that this conclusion, based upon an analogy between divine and human foreknowledge was wrong, and this because the analogy between the two terms was not perfect: in contrast to human subject, who is always prone to error, God is infallible and His beliefs must always come true. God's beliefs are true in a necessary way, in contrast to contingently true beliefs of human subjects. God's belief in the past is a hard fact about the past and its truth is guaranteed by God's essential infallibility.

Still, Pike does not fail to observe that the contradiction between divine prescience and human freedom is avoided once an assumption is made that God is error-free contingently and not necessarily. He acknowledges that the conception of divine infallibility, assumed by him for the sake of the argument and by definition excluding any possibility of error from God, although in agreement with classical theism, is much stronger and more demanding than the intuitive concept of inerrancy. Once assumed that God is *de facto* inerrant rather than necessarily infallible, the contradiction between God's prescience (which is always correct, though not necessarily so) and human freedom (which implies possibility to act otherwise than one actually acts) seems to vanish. Thus the core of the problem lies not in the question, whether God's forebeliefs are hard or soft facts about the past, but in the question whether they could in principle be wrong, even if they are always right in fact.[29] One great advantage of this solution is that it does not

[29] In another context Pike ("Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 6 (1969), pp. 208–216) proposes a similar modification of the conception of God's perfect goodness: he argues that the individual that is God has the power and the ability to sin, although He never does it in fact.

require rejection of the conception of God as existing in time and possessing genuine foreknowledge.

IV. OCKHAMISM

The contemporary position referred to as Ockhamism draws its inspiration from certain ideas advanced by the medieval philosopher William of Ockham, whose writings contain the distinction between propositions that concern the past both in their form and in their content ("according to the virtue of speech and according to reality") and those that relate to the past only in their form (only "according to the virtue of speech"). In contemporary Ockhamism this distinction, suitably clarified and modified, has assumed the form of the distinction between hard and soft facts about the past, which we have already introduced in the preceding parts of this essay.[30]

1. OPEN SOFT PAST

The fixity of the past can be questioned in at least two ways. According to the so called multiple-pasts compatibilism all facts about the past can undergo change and human beings are able causally to influence the past.[31] In contrast, Ockhamism introduces the distinction between facts about the past whose content does not depend on temporal relations and is already beyond anybody's control (hard facts about the past) and those facts about the past whose nature is dependent on some relations extending in time and which may still be controlled (changed) by some agents (soft facts about the past). According to Ockhamism, the latter facts are not fixed. Thus there is some part of the past that is still open to change and amenable to influence. The fact that God possesses beliefs concerning future free actions is a soft fact and, therefore, no part of the hard and immutable past.

[30] The contemporary revival of interest in Ockham's ideas was prompted by, among other factors, the publication in 1969 of his work *Predestination, God's Foreknowledge and Future Contingents* (New York, 1969), translated into English by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann shortly after Pike's essay came out.

[31] Thus this theory assumes more than mere possibility of retroactive causation, which in itself does not require the power to change the past. On this and related matters see temat J.M. Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will*, pp. 79–83.

Unlike multiple-pasts compatibilism, Ockhamism does not hold that we could act in such a way that hard facts about the past should no longer be facts. According to Ockhamism our power over the past is merely counterfactual; it is not a real causal power to change the already fixed past. We can (in the sense: it is in principle possible to us) act so, that some soft fact about the past should not obtain, yet as a matter of fact we shall never act in that way; this possibility, open to us in principle, will never be actualized. To put it in another way: there is a possible world (or there are possible worlds), in which we act according to these various alternative possibilities open to us, yet these worlds remain merely possible and never become the actual world.

Like Pike, an Ockhamist acknowledges the validity of the principle of the fixity of the hard past, unlike Pike, however, he considers God's beliefs about future contingent events to be soft (and not hard) facts about the past.

In brief, Ockhamism is a view that presupposes the division of all facts about the past into hard ones and soft ones, and affirms (a) that the principle of the fixity of the past does not apply to soft facts, (b) God's beliefs about future free acts are to be counted among soft facts.

Moreover, we can distinguish Ockhamism insofar as it relates to belief from Ockhamism concerning existence.[32] The former maintains that the performer of a free action sometimes has the counterfactual power to act in such a way that God would possibly not hold a belief He actually held, whereas the latter prefers the view that the performing subject at least occasionally has the power to act so that the individual who in fact is God would not have been God in the past, because either he would not have existed or he would not have fulfilled the role of God. The common denominator of both views is the fact that both consider some facts concerning God to be soft facts.

Let us make one more point more precise. The mere fact that a given state of affairs is a soft fact about the past does not imply in itself that we have the (counterfactual) power to act in such a way that as a result this fact would not have existed. In other words: not every soft fact about the past can be controlled by ourselves. One ought to distinguish two aspects of the past that are distinct and mutually independent (even though clearly related), namely (a) temporal relatedness versus non-relatedness (softness and hardness) on the one hand, and on the other, (b) being or not amenable to our causal influence, or controllable or uncontrollable (openness and

[32] J.M. Fischer, "Ockhamism," *Philosophical Review* 94 (1985), pp. 81–100.

closedness). An example of soft facts about the past which we do not and cannot control are past facts (beliefs) concerning future changes of seasons or revolutions of celestial bodies. Ockhamism thus contains the thesis that only *some* of soft facts about the past are amenable to control by free agents (controllable by free agents).

2. THE OCKHAMIST THEORY OF MARYLIN McCORD ADAMS

Marylin McCord Adams formulated in 1967 one of the first Ockhamist responses to Pike's challenge.[33] In her essay Adams proposed a criterion of distinction of hard and soft facts in the light of which God's existence and some of God's beliefs turn out to be soft.

Adams's proposed explanation of the distinction between hard and soft facts is as follows:

(a) Proposition p at least in part concerns the instant $t =_{df}$ occurrence or non-occurrence; actuality or non-actuality of something at the instant of t is a necessary condition of proposition p being true.
(b) Proposition p expresses a hard fact about the instant $t =_{df} p$ does not concern even in part any instant later in time in relation to t.[34]

With the help of this distinction Adams distinguishes two meanings of the thesis that God is essentially eternal and omniscient, and then proceeds to argue that Pike's argument fails no matter which meaning of that thesis we take for the basis of our considerations. In the first of the distinguished meanings of the affirmations "God is eternal" and "God is omniscient," both these propositions are analytically true, in the second, stronger meaning, they are not only analytically true but also the personal identity of the individual X who is God, depends on possession by X of the attributes of eternity and omniscience: if X happened to lose either of these attributes, X would not only cease to be God, X would also cease to be that very individual person He in fact is. (We probably remember that Pike uses the concept of God in this second, stronger sense). Granted the first meaning

[33] M. Adams, "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?," *Philosophical Review* 76 (1967), no. 4, pp. 492–503. Adams's response met with incisive criticism by John Martin Fischer nearly two decades later, in 1983 ("Freedom and Foreknowledge"). The ensuing debate found a continuation in Pike and Fischer.

[34] M. Adams, "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?," pp. 493–494.

and conception of God, a free agent in Pike's terms would have the power to make a certain individual lose the feature of being God; whereas given the second conception, a free agent would have the power to cancel the personal identity of the individual that is God.

Adams begins by arguing that God's existence is not a hard fact in the first sense. Any affirmation to the effect that a certain individual *X* is God always concerns in part the future, since God exists in all moments of time, including all the future moments. Thus, if Pike's affirmations concerning restrictions on the power possessed by a voluntary agent do not apply to soft facts, they, by the same token, do not apply to facts concerning God"s existence. (It might be useful to remind ourselves that Pike gives three descriptions of the power a human subject could possess with respect to divine beliefs finally to rule out an attribution of this power to a human agent in any of the three identified senses. His conclusion is that a human agent cannot possess any power over existence of God, as God's existence is part of the hard past.)

According to Adams, Pike's argument also fails on the assumption of the second understanding of God and God's relation to His attributes. Pike assumes that both being a person and being this individual person are hard facts, yet his understanding of essential properties is clearly at odds with the common understanding of the conditions of personhood and of being this individual person. Normally a person does not cease to be a person, nor does he/she lose his/her identity while losing some attributes, be it the attributes of eternity and omnipotence. And if Pike invokes a very particular conceptions of personhood and personal identity, there is no reason for us to accept that being a person in this particular sense is a hard fact. Therefore, Adams's final conclusion is that Pike's argument fails regardless of which of the two interpretations we adopt.

Not all participants in the discussion were convinced by Adams's criticisms. In particular the criterion of the distinction of soft versus hard facts proposed by her, based on the notion of logical entailment, met with pertinent criticism by John M. Fischer. He pointed out that logical entailment cannot be considered a distinctive feature of soft facts, since hard facts about the past no less than soft facts entail certain facts about the future, so if we accept Adams's criterion, all facts about the past will turn out to be soft. For instance: the fact that *X* is sitting at t_1 is, intuitively, a hard fact about t_1, yet it follows from this fact that when *X* is sitting at t_2, he is not

doing it for the first time. Similar counterexamples can be multiplied and appropriate generalizations can be made.[35]

V. PLANTINGA'S THEORY

The author of the the most penetrating and significant response to Pike's argument is Alvin Plantinga. Like Adams, Plantinga creatively develops certain of Ockham's ideas. His view was first in the book *God, Freedom and Evil*[36] and then, in more detail, in the essay "On Ockham's Way Out."[37]

1. PLANTINGA'S CRITICISM OF PIKE'S ARGUMENT

In the book *God, Freedom and Evil* Plantinga restates the main assumption of Pike's argument, the so-called controlling assumption, in the form of a disjunction comprising three conditionals. He agrees that the affirmations of God holding a false belief and the non-existence of God are unacceptable, but he denies that they logically follow from theological compatibilism. The third alternative consequent in Pike's controlling assumption, the one affirming God holding another belief in place of a previous one is, according to Plantinga, ambiguous and in need of disambiguation. On one reading thereof, in which we take the free agent's power as real causal power to influence God and change His mind, this consequent turns out to be unacceptable, yet once again, its offending content is not a logical conclusion following from compatibilism. If we follow the other possible interpretation of this statement and take the human agent's power to influence God's beliefs as counterfactual, the statement does indeed follow from the assumptions of theological compatibilism, but is no longer offensive and is acceptable from the point of view of theism. Plantinga's final conclusion is that Pike's argument fails; on one possible interpretation of its terms it is formally incorrect, while on the other it turns out logically correct, but based upon a false assumption.

[35] Fischer criticizes Ockhamism in a series of essays: already cited "Freedom and Foreknowledge" of 1983 and "Ockhamism" of 1985, as well as "Hard-type soft facts," *Philosophical Review* 95 (1986), pp. 591–601, and "Snapshot Ockhamism," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991), pp. 355–371. Some of these essays are collected in J.M. Fischer, *Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will* (New York, 2016).

[36] A.C. Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil,* New York, 1974.

[37] A.C. Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," *Faith and Philosophy* 3 (1986), pp. 235–369.

Let us consider the above cursory statement in more detail, starting from the first interpretation. The power to act otherwise than one actually acts need not be the power to make God belief false; it is simply the power to make false the belief, which God in fact entertains. However, if the human agent acted differently, God, correspondingly, would hold a different, true belief. The power to act otherwise than one actually acts need not be the power to bring into existence a self-contradictory state of affairs either, namely the fact of God simulateneously holding and not holding the belief He originally held. All it has to be is the power to act in such a way (other than the one actually chosen) that, were this different way followed, God would hold a corresponding, different belief from the one He actually holds. Finally, the power to act otherwise does not entail the power to make God entertain a false belief and, consequently, make Him cease to be omniscient and thus to be God.

To sum up: the three alternative conclusions pointed out by Pike in his controlling assumption as the unacceptable consequences of theological compatibilism are far from exhausting all the relevant possibilities of theoretical representation of the relations between omniscient God and a free human agent. Moreover, none of them does really follow from the assumptions of theological compatibilism. In particular, Pike ignores the possibility that if a free agent subject acted in a definite way different from what he actually does, God would not hold the belief (concerning that subject and his action) He actually has (since then this belief would be false), but another belief, namely the one corresponding to the actual fact and therefore true. To put it slightly differently: in the possible world in which the free agent in question refrains from performing the action he does perform in the actual world, God does not entertain the belief He does in the actual world, but another belief, which is true in that possible world.

If we accept the terms of the second interpretation of Pike's conditional, we have to grant that we, humans, have some power over the past, namely the power of doing some such thing, that if we did it in fact, some person in the past, in the case under discussion God, would not have held a belief He actually did hold in the actual world. Pike's error apparently consisted in a failure properly to distinguish between actual causal power and merely counterfactual power, which resulted in the fact that rejecting the former, he rejected also the latter.

No matter, which one of Plantinga's two interpretations of Pike's conditional is accepted, the final conclusion remains the same: a compatibilist

need not grant any of the three unacceptable conclusions allegedly following from the premise of theological compatibilism in Pike's interpretation.

Plantinga rounds off his criticism of Pike's argument with a general remark upon the leading argument for incompatibilism which in his view resembles the general argument for logical fatalism. According to Plantinga, incompatibilism and logical fatalism are very much alike, in fact they are equivalent: the proposition "God cosiders proposition *p* to be true" is equivalent to the proposition "Proposition *p* is true." The leading argument for logical fatalism starts from the assumption that all propositions that are logically true are always true, they have also been true in the past. Since we have no power over the past, we cannot change the truth of propositions reporting present and future events: so just as we do not control past states of affairs, we do not in reality control present and future states of affairs. In the final analysis, logical fatalism concludes, we do not control anything; all things, future, present and past, are immutably settled by logic. This seemingly plausible argument is almost universally held to contain some flaw which invalidates it, Plantinga observes, yet if this is held with respect to logical fatalism, there is every reason to think that a like error underlies and invalidates the argument for another kind of fatalism, namely for theological incompatibilism.

Plantinga also attempts a sort of diagnosis of the intuition underlying the incompatibilist view. Recall that according to Pike, involved in the controversy over divine prescience versus human freedom there are two equally legitimate yet diametrically opposed insights into the nature of God's relation with the world: compatibilist and incompatibilist. Plantinga points out that one likely source of the incompatibilist intuition is the assumption that God, being essentially omniscient, must hold the same beliefs in every possible world. This assumption, however, is wrong, for God's essential omniscience requires only that in every possible world God should hold only those beliefs that are true in the given particular possible world, and the set of propositions that are true in this given possible world need not be the same in every other possible world[38].

[38] A. Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil*, p. 72. Philip Quinn ("Plantinga on Foreknowledge and Freedom," in *Profiles: Alvin Plantinga*, ed. J.E. Tomberlin, P. van Inwagen, Dordrecht, 1985, pp. 271–287) points to another likely source of the incompatibilist intuition. If we grant that God is a necessary being, we are committed to the conclusion that He is omniscient in every possible world. And if we assume that God's beliefs are essentially unchangeable, they are unchangeable in every possible world. Given these assumptions, it may seem that attributing to a moral subject the

2. PIKE'S RESPONSE TO PLANTINGA'S CRITICISM

Pike considers Plantinga's reconstruction of his argument inexact, as Pike's controlling assumption is intended as having the form of a conditional whose consequent is a triple disjunction; the relation of logical inference is supposed to obtain between compatibilism and the whole triple disjunction. However, he accepts Plantinga's interpretation, according to which the whole disagreement reduces to just one question, namely: does it lie in the power of a human agent to cause God not to have held a belief He did in fact hold?.[39] What argument for such a possibility does Plantinga offer?

As Pike observes, whether Plantinga's key affirmation, that is:

> 8. At the moment t_2 it was in X's power to do some such thing that if X had done it, God in t_1 would not have held the belief He actually did hold.

is true, depends on two things: (a) the counterfactual, backtracking conditional "Had X at t_2 refrain from doing Y, God would not have had the belief He had at t_1" being true; (b) the affirmation that X had the power to refrain from doing Y at t_2 being true.

William Alston calls the power of the non-divine agent referred to in the antecedent of the quoted counterfactual conditional retroactive power and takes the view that possession of such power by an agent acting at a certain moment in time does not accord with the libertarian theory of free will.[40]

power of performing a different act from the one he actually performs is tantamount to attributing to him the power to change the past or, at least, to exert some influence on it (to be more precise, on God's beliefs related to future free actions). Quinn points out, that this way of thinking is also erroneous (as is the one criticized by Plantinga). Quinn highlights in particular two points: (a) counterfactual power over the past need not be actual causal power; (b) in order to be able to attribute to a moral subject real causal power over the past, one would have to refer to some version of the following principle: If a moral agent has the power to effect p, and p entails (some contingent) q, then this moral agent has the power to effect q. In this principle p stands for a free action by the moral agent and q for God's belief concerning that action. However, this principle hits against counterexamples and it is no easy task to modify it such a way as to avoid them all.

[39] N. Pike, "Alston on Plantinga and Soft Theological Determinism," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 27 (1990), pp. 20–21.

[40] W. Alston, "Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 18 (1985), pp. 19–32. According to the libertarian conception of free will, an agent has the power to perform a given action, if the non-performance of that action is not made necessary, physically or logically, by some antecedent (hard) states of affairs. According to the rival

The reason for this incompatibility is the fact that the condition for such a counterfactual conditional being true, namely God's belief at t_1 entailing and making necessary the agent's action at t_2, rules out the libertarian free will. According to Alston, Plantinga is committed to the compatibilist conception of freedom.

Pike[41] in turn believes that Plantinga's argument for attribution to the (non-divine) agent of such counterfactual backtracking power reduces, in the final analysis, to the affirmation that there exists a possible world in which this agent forbears from his/her action at t_2 and God does not hold the forebelief He entertains in the actual world. Pike takes this to be an "extremely optimistic assessment of the scope of human abilities"[42], as this way of thinking equates an agent's ability with logical possibility, and he goes on to argue that on this view an agent appears free with respect to actions which even proponents of classical compatibilism would consider unfree, for there exist possible worlds in which the agent performs such actions.

Eventually, we are left with the question which subset of possible worlds is adequate for analysis of power. To say, at one end of the spectrum, that all possible worlds form the domain, seems too weak a specification; to say, at the other end, that only the possible world having exactly the same past are concerned, appears to be too strong a condition. Thus Plantinga's early analysis is too weak, whereas Pike's is too strong.

Pike also stresses that in his argument from the fixity of the past he ruled out the possibility of ascribing to an agent any counterfactual retroactive power not because this kind of power could be seen as the power to bring about a self-contradictory state of affairs, but because such power itself would be inconsistent with God having had the relevant belief in the past.

Responding, in turn, to Plantinga's observation concerning the alleged analogy between theological incompatibilism and logical fatalism, Pike points to an important difference: the assumption of the leading argument for logical fatalism is that all true propositions are unconditionally necessary, whereas the argument for incompatibilism only attributes necessity to some propositions, namely to those concerning God's forebeliefs related to future events.

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compatibilist conception, an agent has the power to perform a given action if and only if he would perform that action at a given moment provided he wished to do so at this very moment.

41 N. Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom and Possible Worlds," *Philosophical Review* 86 (1977), pp. 209–216.

42 N. Pike, "Alston on Plantinga and Soft Theological Determinism," p. 31.

3. COUNTERFACTUAL POWER OVER THE PAST

This is how Plantinga summarizes his position in his later essay "On Ockham's Way Out":

> The Ockhamite claim that not all propositions about the past are hard facts about the past seems correct; among those that are not hard facts would be propositions specifying God's (past) foreknowledge of future human actions, as well as propositions specifying God's past beliefs about future human actions, if God is essentially omniscient. Only hard facts about the past, however, are plausibly thought to be accidentally necessary; hence neither God's foreknowledge nor God's forebelief poses a threat to human freedom. Accidental necessity is a difficult notion, but can be explained in tenns of the power of agents.[43]

In order better to comprehend this position, it is worthwhile briefly to formulate the essential point of the controversy under consideration: there are two parts in the past; over some past things we have no power whatever, while over some other things in the past we retain a measure of control; to help us to distinguish the latter from the former the Ockhamist introduces the division of all past facts into hard and soft facts. However, it has proved notoriously difficult to formulate an exact criterion of this division, in particular, the criterion of logical entailment proposed by Marilyn McCord Adams appears to be impossible to defend. If the Ockhamist fails to produce a suitable criterion, his thesis affirming that the past facts concerning divine beliefs about the future contingent events decides the matters to his advantage.

Plantinga responds to this difficulty and advances a fairly complicated standard by which one can roughly decide whether a given fact about the past is hard or soft. He distinguishes two senses of changing the past: the past can be said to be changed causally, that is in actual reality (and in this case some kind of retroactive causation would be presumed) or counterfactually. He then affirms that we (finite free intelligent beings) have some counterfactual power over the soft part of the past (that is the power to act in such a way that the past would be different if we did), but not any causal power over the past (that is the power to change the actually existing past). He agrees that it is hard to give an exact yardstick by which to find out the dividing line between the mutually exclusive domains of hard and the soft facts. In particular logical entailment fails as a criterion, for, according to Plantinga, any proposition whatsoever about the past entails some pro-

[43] A.C. Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," p. 261.

position(s) about the future. Without going into detailed consideration of the problem, he nevertheless expresses confidence that we can make do with a rough intuitive grasp of the difference between these two kinds of facts. He also expresses firm belief that facts concerning divine beliefs related to future free acts will turn out to be soft under any adequate analysis thereof.

4. ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTAL NECESSITY

A QUESTION it is well worthwhile to consider, even though it makes only a marginal appearance in Plantinga's essay is the problem whether accidental necessity is closed under the relation of entailment. In the light of Plantinga's discussion of accidental necessity, such closedness does not obtain.[44] The closure of the set of accidentally necessary propositions that is referred to in the formulation of this question can be explained as follows. Let us assume that the divine belief concerning a future free act is accidentally necessary and nobody in the future has the power to falsify it. Now, if a proposition is entailed by another proposition which is accidentally necessary, this (entailed) proposition is also accidentally necessary; in other words: if one proposition is entailed by another, then in every possible world in which the latter proposition is true, the former one is also true. This means that the set of true propositions is closed under the relation of logical entailment.

Instead of explaining accidental necessity in terms of temporal non-relatedness, Plantinga proposes directly to refer to the concept of an agent's counterfactual power: thus an accidentally necessary proposition is a proposition that no agent has power to falsify. He then goes on to point out that in terms of this definition not only (a) many soft facts about the past turn out not to be accidentally necessary, but also, and against Ockham's assumption, (b) even not all hard facts about the past are accidentally necessary. To explain and justift this latter thesis Plantinga gives the following famous example:

> Let's suppose that a colony of carpenter ants moved into Paul's yard last Saturday. Since this colony hasn't yet had a chance to get properly established, its new home is still a bit fragile. In particular, if the ants were to remain and Paul were to mow his lawn this afternoon, the colony would be destroyed. Although nothing remarkable about these ants is visible to the naked eye, God, for reasons of

[44] See T. Flint, "The Varieties of Accidental Necessity," in *Reason, Metaphysics and Mind. New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga*, ed. K.J. Clark, M. Rea, Oxford, 2012, pp. 38–54.

> his own, intends that it be preserved. Now as a matter of fact, Paul will not mow his lawn this afternoon. God, who is essentially omniscient, knew in advance, of course, that Paul will not mow his lawn this afternoon; but ifhe had foreknown instead that Paul *would* mow this afternoon, then he would have prevented the ants from moving in. The facts of the matter, therefore, are these: if Paul were to mow his lawn this afternoon, then God would have foreknown that Paul would mow his lawn this afternoon; and if God had foreknown that Paul would mow this afternoon, then God would have prevented the ants from moving in. So if Paul 'rere to mow his lawn this afternoon, then the ants would not have moved in last Saturday. But it is within Paul's power to mow this afternoon. There is therefore an action he can perform such that if he were to perform it, then the proposition [that colony of carpenter ants moved into Paul's yard last Saturday]would have been false. But what I have called "the facts of the matter" certainly seem to be possible; it is therefore possible that there be an agent who has the power to perform an action which is such that if he were to perform it, then [this proposition] would have been false-in which case it is not accidentally necessary. But [this proposition], obviously enough, is strictly about the past.[45]

This example leads to the conclusion that we (free agents) have power over hard facts about the past as well. Clearly, the fact of an ant colony having moved into a garden is a hard fact about the past, which, nevertheless, turns out not to be accidentally necessary in the sense of the quoted definition. As a matter of fact, Plantinga believes that almost no fact about the past is accidentally necessary in this sense.[46]

How does he overcome this difficulty? He proposes a modification of the concept of accidental necessity, which, to his mind, better captures our intuitive belief that the past, in contrast to the future, is beyond our control. The shift in the meaning of accidental necessity advocated by Plantinga is subtle and highly technical. In order better to grasp it, let us compare two definitions of accidental necessity found in his essay:

> (Initial) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if p is true at t and it is not possible both that p is true at t and that there exists an action A and an agent S such that (1) S has the power at t or later to perfom A, and (2) *necessarily* if S were to perform A at t or later, then p would have been false.
>
> (Modified) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if p is true at t and it is not possible both that p is true at t and that there exist agents $S_1 \ldots , S_n$ and actions $A_1 \ldots , An$ such that (I) A_i is basic for S_i , (2) S_i has the power at t or later to perform A_i, and (3) necessarily, if every S_i were to perfom A_i at t or later, then p would have been false.

[45] A.C. Plantinga, "On Ockham's Way Out," p. 254.

[46] Ibid., p. 257.

The purpose of this modification is to produce a definition of accidental necessity that would ensure that an agent person should only have power over soft facts about the past and none over hard facts. The initial formulation of the definition does not fulfil this condition, for it implies that we (free intelligent agents) also have power over hard facts (e.g. the fact of Abraham having once existed, or an ant colony having moved into the garden). This is so because, given God's pre-cooperation, we can perform such an action, that Abraham will have never existed as a result, or an ant colony will have never moved into the garden.

Plantinga wishes to rule out such possibilities. To this end he alters the intial formulation in two points: (a) he restricts the range of a free agent's relevant actions to elementary actions, that is such that to their accomplishment they do not require performance of other actions than themselves; (b) he takes into account possibility of cooperation of many agents. The condition (b) refers in particular to God as the agent who fore-cooperates with the human agent. Some hard facts about the past are not accidentally necessary according to the initial definition, because an acting human person has the power to change them owing to God's fore-cooperation, even though this human person has no power to change them by his/her own action alone — as was the case in the quoted example of an ant colony moving into the garden. As for the condition (a), making an ant colony not to move into the garden is not an elementary action, for, although its result (the ant colony not moving into the garden) can be effected by a human agent, yet not by that agent's action alone, but only with other actions and other agents, in particular God, cooperating.

5. OCKHAMISM AND MULTIPLE PASTS COMPATIBLISM

Is Plantinga really an Ockhamist or is he rather a multiple pasts compatibilist? The following riddle calls for a solution: how Plantinga can argue, on the one hand, that divine beliefs about contingent future are soft facts, and affirm, on the other hand, that even intuitively hard facts are not fixed. Patrick Todd and John Martin Fischer suggest the following solution: Plantinga accepts the possible-worlds version of closedness of the past (or at least he could do it without falling into inconsistency), yet he rejects the counterfactual version thereof. The following are the respective definitions of the both versions of the principle of the fixity of the past:

(Fixity of the past: the possible worlds version) For any action *Y*, agent *S*, and time *t*, *S* can perform *Y* at *t* only if there is a possible world with the same "hard" past up to *t* as the actual world in which *S* does *Y* at *t*.

(Fixity of the past: the counterfactual version) For any action *Y*, agent *S*, and time *t*, if it is true that if *S* were to do *Y* at *t*, then some hard fact about the past (relative to *t*) would not have been a fact, then *S* cannot do Y at *t.* [47]

Having defined these different conceptions of the closed past, they continue as follows:

In Paul's case, for instance, the contention would be this. There is a certain possible world that is needed in order for it to be true that Paul *can* mow: this is a possible world with the same past as the actual world (up to the relevant time) in which he mows. (And, Plantinga may say, there is no reason, given his story, to suppose that there is no such world; that the ants were in his yard [a hard fact about the past] is in itself *consistent* with Paul's mowing. As Plantinga says, Paul's mowing "does not *entail* the falsehood of the proposition that the ants did move in.") However, this is not the world that *would* be actual, were Paul actually to exercise his freedom to mow; rather, the world that would be actual is a world with a different past from the actual world, viz., a world in which ants never moved into his yard. Thus, the given possible world that is required for the "canclaim" to be true (a world with the same past) is not the world that would be actual were that power to be exercised.[48]

Plantinga can accept the possible-worlds version of the principle of closedness of the past, because facts concerning God's past beliefs are soft facts and, being so, do not enter into the description of the past: two worlds can be indiscernible as to their past, and it is possible that only one of them should contain an omniscient God.

VI. SELECTED DIFFICULTIES FACING PLANTINGA'S THEORY

1. PROBLEMS OF ARBITRARINESS AND CIRCULARITY

According to John M. Fischer, Plantinga, in his example of an ant colony does nothing but repeat the claim he wishes to argue for, namely that God possesses prescience (of future free acts) and a (non-divine) agent possesses

[47] On these two versions see J.M. Fischer, *Metaphysics of Free Will*, pp. 87–11.

[48] P. Todd, J.M. Fischer, "The Truth about Foreknowledge," *Faith and Philosophy* 30 (2013), p. 292.

the power needed to perform a free act. Fischer points out that it is not enough to presuppose that the given backtracking counterfactual is true. There are two claims that must be taken into account: (a) a thesis concerning power: an agent has the power to refrain from action in a given situation; (b) a backtracking counterfactual affirming that had the agent refrained from action, God would have had a belief that that agent would refrain from it. However, the incompatibilist objects that truth of the latter claim is incompatible with the former being true: both claims are mutually exclusive. Plantinga, Fischer argues, does not really tackle this objection and simply assumes it rests upon a false premise.[49]

A similar criticism of Plantinga's argument has been made by William Hasker[50], who also detects circularity in his reasoning. As he points out, it follows from the assumption of divine infallibility that had an agent acted differently, God would have had a (suitably) different belief. What is at stake, however, is whether the agent really can act differently. Plantinga does not give any direct answer to this question and appears simply to assume that the agent is free to act differently, as he/she acts under no compulsion to act, either external or internal. As an answer to the argument for incompatibilism, this is hardly satisfactory since it is based on a circular procedure: Plantinga can safely reaffirm his position, but only because he fails properly to take into consideration the incompatibilist's claim that it is precisely God's infallible prescience that rules out the agent's power to act in a free way.

2. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS LUGGAGE

Are the facts concerning God's beliefs related to future free acts hard or soft facts? The earliest criticisms of Pike's argument focused on this question and, generally, were attempts to, first, show that contrary to Pike's claim these facts are not hard, and, secondly, to propose such a criterion of the division of the past into the hard past and the soft past that would ensure that the facts concerning God's beliefs about future contingent events are soft facts about the past.

In point of fact, involved in dispute here are two conflicting intuitions about God's beliefs. On the one hand, God's relevant beliefs are essentially

[49] J.M. Fischer, "Soft Facts and Harsh Realities: Reply to William Craig," *Religious Studies* 27 (1991), p. 528.

[50] W. Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge*, Ithaca 1989.

related to the future, they entail the events concerned really taking place at appointed moments of time, which makes them, according to the criterion of entailment, soft facts. On the other hand, they form the content of particular instants in the past (although they do not wholly belong to any particular instant in the past), for they entail that God's mind was really in a definite state at particular moments in the past. Yet states of mind belong to the hard past, so acting in a way that would require God's mind to have been in a different state than the one it in fact was in (in this case: divine belief would have been falsified) would be tantamount to changing the hard past. How to break the deadlock generated by the clash of intuitions?

The incompatibilist can argue that facts concerning God's beliefs about the contingent future are either (a) hard or (b) soft yet founded upon hard facts in a way that makes any power over them on the part of a free contingent agent impossible. One of the most interesting objections to compatibilism rests upon the claim that even if God's beliefs (about the contingent future) are soft facts, they remain still beyond any possibility of control by any agent. According to John Martin Fischer facts concerning God's beliefs entail a hard component, namely God's mind being in a definite state of mind; holding a definite belief at a given point in the past. Fischer calls the past facts with such excess luggage hard-core soft facts. Thus, according to Fischer, the only way for God's belief to be a soft fact requires that one and the same state of mind of the person that is God was one definite belief when a free agent performs the foreseen action and another and opposite belief when the relevant agent holds himself back from performing it.[51] This, however, he finds impossible.

3. THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE DECREE

According to Patrick Todd[52] the proposed criteria for dividing all past facts into hard and soft ones that appeal to logical entailment fail to capture the idea of asymmetrical dependence which is essential to soft facts. The counterexamples he dwells upon are divine promises and creative decrees, which are soft according to these criteria (since they entail some future facts), yet obviously do not depend in any way on future decisions made by humans. So it turns out that the notion of logical entailment is not suf-

[51] J.M. Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," s. 76–79.

[52] P. Todd, *Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence*, „Philosophical Studies" 164 (2013), s. 829–844.

ficient to capture and adequately express the asymmetrical dependence which is an essential property of all soft facts[53].

4. THE PROBLEM OF INFALLIBLE PROPHECY

Alfred Freddoso asks the question whether Plantinga's conception would be acceptable to Ockham himself: "For on this account it seems to follow *straightforwardly* that the past-tense proposition *Jesus uttered the prophecy that Peter would denny hi mat T*, even if true, is not accidentally necessary at any time before *T*; and although Ockhamists would welcome this result, they might nonetheless worry that the victory had been won too easily. For most of them struggle with the intuition that the past physical utterance of a given string of words is a paradigmatic instance of a 'hard' fact about the past." [54] According to Freddoso, Ockhamism is unable to produce an adequate solution to the problem of infallible prophecy concerning future contingent events and is compelled to affirm either that God is able change the future or that God-inspired prophecies can be misleading or even erroneous.

5. THE PROBLEM OF PRESENTISM

One of the recent criticisms directed against Ockhamism is that it is incompatible with presentism (and more generally, with any view which does not accept the existence of future objects). Presentism is a view that only present objects exist, and it is opposed to eternalism, according to which past and future objects exist on equal terms with present ones. The argument intended to show the incompatibility of Ockhamism with presentism runs as follows: a future free decision does not exist at present, which implies that it cannot form the explanatory basis for any belief related to it, since something non-existing cannot explain anything existing. To put it differently; presentism rules out any relations between different points in

[53] This general objection to all versions of the criterion of the division of past facts into hard ones and soft ones makes its appearance in *God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom*, ed. J.M. Fischer, p. 43, and the quoted counterexample was first introduced by David Widerker ("Troubles with Ockhamism," *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1990), pp. 462–480).

[54] A. Freddoso, "Introduction," in L. Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, p. 60, note 80.

time, which, however, are crucially assumed in Ockhamism. Hence, it is concluded, Ockhamism has to include (some version of) eternalism.[55] This conclusion, if correct, would prove troublesome for Plantinga, who declares himself a proponent of presentism.

Translated by Roman Majeran

[55] A. Finch & M. Rea, *Presentism and Ockham's Way Out*, (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion), Oxford, 2008.

WILLIAM HASKER'S OPEN THEISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Dariusz Łukasiewicz

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The purpose of this article is to present and assess the philosophical views of William Hasker concerning the problem of evil in the context of Hasker's philosophical standpoint referred to as *open theism* or *free will theism.*[1] To carry out possibly adequate examination and assessment of Hasker's position on evil, it is advisable to include in the discussion an overall presentation of his philosophical views as well as the context which fostered the growth and development of his ideas. This context mainly includes the philosophical standpoints he takes issue with and in opposition to which he forms his own position.

The order of the discussion is as follows: first, the most important concepts widely employed in debates concerning the problem of evil are

[1] William Hasker (born 1935) is an American philosopher of religion, considered one of the foremost proponents of the so called open theism. Open theism is, generally speaking, a view concerning the nature of God and affirming that the God of the Christian theism is a personal God; He is a person that is free, existing in time; He changes in some respects and He does not possess of detailed and infallible foreknowledge of future contingent events. In general future is not yet determined in all of its aspects either by God himself or by the state of the world, it remains open. More on the fundamental assumptions of open theism will be said further on in this article. An extensive presentation of the characteristic features and assumption of this philosophical position can be found in my book: *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii*, Kraków, Poznań, 2014, and, above all, in works by Hasker himself: *Providence, Evil and the Openness of God*, London, New York, 2004, and *The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering*, Downers Grove, IL, 2008.

introduced, in the second place the anti-theodicy positions of J. Roth and D.Z. Philips are discussed, to be followed by a presentation of Alvin Plantinga's Free Will-Defense and criticism thereof formulated by Hasker. The next step is discussion of the criticism of William Rowe's evidential argument formulated by Hasker; this discussion will also include consideration of objections advanced against the so called sceptical theism, conceived as a strategy designed to refute the evidential argument. Also in the context of Hasker's critical examination of Plantinga's Free-Will Defense and Rowe's evidential argument we will present Hasker's argument known as *natural-order theodicy*; the purpose of this argument is to show that God does not bear moral responsibility for the existence of natural evil as found in the world. The next step in our discussion is a presentation of Hasker's own version of theodicy, known as a *free-will theodicy.* Diverse component parts of Hasker's theodicy as broadly conceived are expounded; we conclude this comprehensive discussion by advancing the thesis, that Hasker's theory is not immune to objections that can be advanced against the theodicies of classical theism and molinism. To defend this thesis we propose arguments consisting in pointing out essential points of the conception of open theism that lack sufficient clarity. We shall even go further to argue, that the theory itself of open theism could be regarded as lacking coherence, unless completed with a convincing version of the conception of sustaining the world in existence by God (continuous creation). In the concluding section of this article we explain what, according to Hasker, the ultimate "triumph of God over evil" consists in. We shall argue that Hasker's vision is both attractive and convincing, even if we do not consider open theism a correct view, or a well-founded one.

The contemporary debate on the problem of evil is conducted, especially in analytical philosophy of religion, with the utmost regard for precision and exactitude of language, and employed in it are the refined instruments of contemporary logic. This, however, may sometimes lead the discussion to the point of being abstruse, overly technical and abstract, especially to a reader that is not familiar with the highly formalized methodology of contemporary philosophy. However, our discussion of Hasker's theodicy will be conducted in the spirit of non-formal analysis, without introducing highly formalized devices; one exception being a certain thesis of modal logic, which is helpful in discussing Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense.

2. SOME TERMINOLOGICAL DECISIONS

Our introductory remarks contained the word "theodicy," also, we used the phrase "theodicy as broadly conceived" and the names; "natural-order theodicy" and "free-will theodicy." Let us explain therefore, that the names "theodicy" and "theodicy as broadly conceived" are to be regarded as having the same meaning. Theodicy (as we shall understand the term) is any philosophical reflection that jointly considers the following matters: the nature of God, the ways God acts in the world and the fact of the existence of evil.[2] However, this is not the sense in which the word "theodicy" is typically used in contemporary philosophical debate. "Theodicy" as usually understood in philosophical contexts, is a word signifying any (philosophical) consideration of reasons that God may possibly have in permitting the existence of evil. Taken in this sense "theodicy" has a narrower content than its former meaning, as now its consideration is limited to the reasons fir there being evil in the world and does not have to consider proofs of God's existence nor the nature of God, even though in many cases these matters are difficult to separate from its own problem area. So, when in what follows the word "theodicy" is used without any restrictive qualification, it is to be taken in the former, large sense, unless the context clearly shows otherwise; on the other hand, when this word is accompanied by a qualifying attribute, as in the phrase "free-will theodicy," it is to be understood in the latter, narrower sense, as is used in the contemporary philosophical debate. For example, free-will theodicy is the kind of theodicy assuming that the divinely approved reason for permitting evil (as such) into the world is freedom of created reasonable beings. If God possesses an adequate reason for permitting evil into the creation, he is morally justified to have done so, and, consequently, the existence of evil does not impair his

[2] Theodicy thus defined is more comprehensive than theodicy as defined by Wincenty Granat, and also different as to the content. Granat's definition is as follows: "theodicy is the science concerning God's existence and His nature insofar as knowable starting from observable facts as interpreted in the light of the primary principles of reason." W. Granat, *Teodycea*, Lublin, 1968, p. 32. In the definition we propose the concept of science is not used, introduced is instead the fact of the existence of evil. In what follows, motivated by the consideration of style and a wish to avoid being overly repetitious, we will employ phrases as "theodicean thought" or "theodicean doctrine" intended as strictly synonymous with "theodicy" as taken in a larger sense (see division 2 of this article). Theodicean thought, as intended by us, comprises also the so called anti-theodicies and criticisms thereof.

perfection, including his perfect goodness and justice. Such was the meaning of the word "theodicy" in Leibniz, who introduced this word into Western philosophy (see footnote 2). It is in this sense of theodicy that the following phrases are used: "theodicy of the best of all possible worlds," "soul-making theodicy," or, as in Hasker himself, "free-will theodicy."

Another essential term to be used in what follows is "the problem of evil." This, too, is ambiguous; one can speak of the philosophical problem of evil or of the existential (or pastoral) problem of evil. The former sense of "the problem of evil" is implied in the question whether or not the existence of evil in the world is sufficient reason for rejecting the affirmation that God exists; the existential problem of evil instead, concerns the question how to help persons that experience evil in various forms; and what is meant is not technical or medical help, but spiritual one. In the following article we assume that the philosophical problem of evil comprises the so called "argument from evil," the "defense" (of God's existence against the argument from evil) and the criticisms of various defenses. The argument from evil can be cast in the form of a deductive proof, as exemplified by the logical argument formulated by John Mackie.[3] The core idea of that argument is the affirmation that any occurrence of a great evil (intense suffering) is a sufficient reason for assuming that God does not exist. The term "defense" as used in debates over the problem of evil as philosophically considered signifies *de facto* criticism of arguments from evil.[4] This criticism consists in

[3] J. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," in *The Problem of Evil*, ed. M. McCord Adams and R. Merrihew Adams, New York, 1990.

[4] The terminology here proposed slightly differs from the one used in the contemporary debate concerning the problem of evil. In contemporary discussions on evil the term "defence" refers to pointing out various reasons that may possibly exist for admitting evil into the world, while theodicy is fixing the actual reasons God has had for allowing evil into his creation. This, however, seems objectionable as implied here is the presupposition that the proponent of a given theodicy really knows what precise reasons motivate God to allow evil into the world, however, the assumption that someone (the proponent of a theodicy) has access to the will and wisdom of God appears, to put it mildly, doubtful. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that every theodicy can at best only point out possible reasons for there being evil, and not the unmistakably true ones. Likewise, the name "Defense of Free Will" can be somewhat misleading, since it suggests that the conception designated by that name is a philosophical defense of reality of free will, while what is really meant by this phrase is defense of theism against the argument from the existence of evil concluding to non-existence of God. Hence our proposal to understand the term "defense" as designating any instance of criticism of the argument from evil.

disputing the truth of the premises forming the starting assumptions of the proposed reasoning leading to the conclusion that in the face of the existence of evil God does not exist. The problem of evil thus construed is part of theodicy in the larger sense. Theodicy in the narrower sense, according to what we assume, does not concern the problem of evil, since any defense of God's existence against arguments from evil is just criticism of the formal or material correctness of these arguments and need not concern God's possible reasons for permitting evil in the creation, which precisely is the subject matter of the narrower sense of the term "theodicy." On the other hand, it is often the case that a defense against an argument from evil carries with itself a suggestion concerning possible reasons for the existence of evil and thus provides premises for theodicy in the narrower sense. Thus the dividing line between both kinds of theodicy is fluid and a defense against arguments from evil may easily pass into theodicy in the narrower sense. In the debates concerning the problem of evil there exists some confusion as to the employed terminology and thus it is worthwhile to undertake some effort to order the vocabulary. Accordingly, from now on we will assume that the philosophical problem of evil, further on called shortly the problem of evil is part of theodicy in the large sense, or simply theodicy *tout court*.

In the dabates concerning the problem of evil one more distinctions makes appearance: it is the distinction between *defeating* evil and *balancing* it *off* as introduced by R. Chisholm.[5] A certain evil state of affairs is said to be *defeated* by good if and only if the positive value of some good state of affairs, for which a particular evil state is a necessary condition, is greater than the negative value of that evil state. Thus, for instance, the negative value of fear is defeated by the positive value of courage and of course there would be no courage without fear: there is a necessary relationship between these two states, since fear is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for there being courage.

According to Plantinga, it is enough in order to refute the argument from evil to point out some possible reasons for the existence of evil, since the argument from evil refers to a thesis in modal logic (LML), according to which it is enough to adduce an affirmation that is logically possible and not necessarily true in our actual world. However, we ought not to forget, that the Free-Will Defense is meant first of all, let us repeat, as a defense of theism and not of human free will.

5 R.M. Chisholm, "The Defeat of Good and Evil," in *The Problem of Evil*, ed. M. McCord Adams and R.M Adams, New York, 1990, pp. 189–208.

An instance of balancing off of a certain evil occurs when a certain evil state of affairs coexists with certain good, although its occurrence is not a necessary condition for the existence of that good. An example of such a situation is the case when a parent buys a favourite toy for a child who has hurt his knee: the pleasure resulting from the possession of a toy counterbalances the pain caused by the hurt knee, yet this pleasure could exist without that pain. Defeating evil is of course more valuable than just balancing it off. The notion of defeating evil will be important in our discussion of the conception of "God's triumph over evil." As will turn out, God's triumph over evil in Hasker's construal does not and cannot consist in *defeating* evil, and this is so for essential reasons.

3. A REFUTATION OF ANTI-THEODICY

The philosophical problem of evil has been questioned in the second half of the 20th century, mainly by the authors inspired by the "theology of the Holocaust" based upon the "new revelation of our times" which was the genocide of the Jews.[6]

The leading idea of this "theology" is the conception that the evil of the Holocaust was so great, that now, after the Holocaust, the problem of evil can no longer be formulated in the traditional way. It is no longer possible to ask the question, how an evil of such immense magnitude can be reconciled with the existence of all-powerful and all-benevolent God. In his anti-theodicy John Roth assumes that the evil existing in human history makes the assumption of the perfect goodness of God untenable. He

[6] J. Roth, "A Theodicy of Protest," in *Encountering Evil*, ed. S.T. Davis, Atlanta, 1981, pp. 7–22. It is not clear, who is the author of the said "new revelation" or what has been revealed, at least so much has not been indicated in the texts of the authors making direct references to the "theology of the Holocaust." Bogusław Wolniewicz, who, in our opinion, cannot be counted among the proponents of the "theology of the Holocaust," says plainly that what is meant is a "great epiphany of the devil" that went on over the whole 20th century and was not limited to just one, albeit terrible, historical event which was the Holocaust; besides Treblinka and Auschwitz there was also Katyń, the Gulags, and many other "epiphanies" of this kind. The devil Wolniewicz speaks about is rather an impersonal; a power that is destructive throughout, actively and "disinterestedly" opposed to the good in any form, and not the personal evil spoken about in the Bible. Cf. B. Wolniewicz, "Epifania diabła," in *Filozofia i wartości*, Warszawa, 1993, pp. 219–223.

himself does not deny God's existence and argues from a theistic position, yet he refuses to attribute perfect benevolence to the God whose existence he upholds.[7] Thus he refers to a certain strand of thought which acknowledges the presence of evil in God and attributes to Him sin and activity causing evil things. The rationale behind this position is as follows: if God is not perfectly benevolent but contains some evil (there is a "dark side" to Him) and, accordingly, may cause evil, then the existence of evil in the world can be reconciled with God's existence. Roth, on the other hand, does not question the omnipotence of God, within whose scope lies possible prevention of all forms of evil. Roth discards as groundless all traditional theodicies of free will which explain the evil as committed by human beings by reference to the fact that human beings possessing free will are capable of doing good things as well as terribly evil ones. According to Roth, the human freedom is too large, for it contains capability for utterly bestial deeds.[8] Yet at the same time, from some statements by Roth it can be concluded that the same human freedom is too small, for it does not suffice for people of goodwill to put up efficacious resistance to evil. Roth quotes as an example illustrating his point the harrowing case of the heroine of William Styron's novel, Zofia Zawistowska.[9] She was confronted with the choice of one of her two children, the son Jan and the daughter Ewa, to be saved from death in the gas chamber of a concentration camp. She had to choose; either she chose one of her children to go to the death chamber and then the other would be spared or, if she failed to point out one, both would die. She chose the first alternative and saved one of her children (Jan), yet by the same token she "condemned" the other child to death. Within the limits of her freedom there was no possibility to choose the option she really desired: to save both her children. Although the choice she made seems rational and she bears no moral responsibility for the death of her daughter, yet till the end of her life she felt she shared in the guilt of that death. The like feeling of sharing in the guilt of the crimes perpetrated in the concentration camp on fellow inmates is mentioned in Jankiel Wiernik's memoirs, whose testimony is referred to by both Roth and Hasker.[10]

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7 J. Roth, "A Theodicy of Protest."

8 Ibid, p. 17.

9 Namely Styron's famous novel *Sophie's Choice*, New York, 1979. On this novel a film under the same title was based.

10 W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 34. Jankiel Wiernik was an inmate of the concentration camp in Treblinka; he was first compelled to participate in the

Roth questions not only the problem of evil in its traditional formulation, he also challenges free-will theodicy. He himself describes his own position as "anti-theodicy" or "theodicy of protest." This protest is addressed to God himself as an accessory to the perpetrated evil. Referring to Roth's position Hasker introduces the notion of *intrinsically unredeemable evil*, an evil from which one cannot be liberated.[11] All attempts to exculpate God in the face of such an enormous evil Roth deems immoral; at the same time, nevertheless, he believes that a protest addressed to the almighty God in the face of evil may prove effective, since it can have for the effect God changing his way of operating in the world in the future. It is permissible to surmise that God, moved by human protest will more often intervene in the course of history preventing crimes from happening and in particular stopping intrinsically unredeemable evil. By contrast, Roth considers morally improper the hope cherished by Christians and expressed by St. Paul in the epistle to the Romans; "I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us" (Rom 8:18): he forcefully affirms that "the glory to be revealed in us" is not worth the torment of the victims of concentration camps.[12]

To summarize Roth's position: he proclaims, within the frame of "protest theodicy" that God is not perfectly good and does evil in history, that free will is not convincing justification of evil, that there is a kind of evil that is past redemption and reparation, and that all attempts to justify God in the face of the evil that has emerged in history are in themselves immoral. Yet at the same time he hopes that a protest formulated along these lines and addressed to God himself may move the good part of His nature and incline Him in future to a different activity towards the world. Thus he claims that although theodicy narrowly conceived is in fact meaningless, anti-theodicy has a definite and appreciable sense.

Hasker shares Roth's view that theodicy aiming at justification of an evil of the proportion of the Holocaust is hard to accept.[13] Theodicean thinking assuming *necessity* of evil as a starting point is, according to him, morally

work on the construction of the camp and then he took part in the revolt of its prisoners in 1943, as a result of which he succeeded in escaping from the camp. Based on his experiences in the camp is the book he wrote entitled *Rok w Treblince* [A Year in Treblinka] (Warszawa, 1944).

11 W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 35.

12 J. Roth, "A Theodicy of Protest," p. 19.

13 W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 36.

dangerous and false throughout. Yet he considers unfounded the claim that God be evil or that there be a "dark side" in God. The fact that there are persons who raise doubts as to God's goodness in the face of the evil present in the actual world is far from being convincing for the thesis that God is not perfectly good.[14] He also considers groundless Roth's expectation that a protest (theodicy of protest) may induce God to change his attitude towards the world in future:

> Hitherto God has not changed in spite of numerous protests having been raised for ages. What premises are there for a hope that things will be different now? Is such a premise constituted by the fact that the protesters were joined by J. Roth with a scanty group of his followers?[15]

Hasker observes that Roth's view has had little resonance with either contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians (Roth himself is a Protestant)[16] or with the contemporary American faithful of Judaism.[17]

Another critic, besides Roth, of the possibility of theodicy, whose views Hasker discusses is D.Z. Phillips (Dewi Zephaniah Phillips). Phillips questions God's moral perfection for the reason that God gave his assent to the kind of evil that no perfectly good being could ever have allowed to happen. God, having consented to that sort of evil bears moral responsibility for it happening. Phillips quotes the case of Zofia Zawistowska mentioned above and goes on to affirm that, it was morally absolutely correct for Zofia to experience guilt for the choice she had made, even though it is true that the situation in which she found herself was unimaginably difficult. The fact is, Phillips affirms, that anyone consenting to a great evil, be it with the intention of preventing an even greater one from happening, or achieving some great good, is morally defiled. Zofia's choice was morally impure and morally impure is God who admitted this evil to happen.[18] According to Hasker, Phillips's position is a result of his rejection of utilitarianism and consequentialism in ethics, the positions holding that moral evaluation of

14 Ibid., p. 38.

15 Ibid.

16 In Poland a similar way of thinking, based on the assumption of impossibility of any theodicy in the narrow sense has been represented for some time by Ireneusz Ziemiński (see e.g. I. Ziemiński, "Zło a życie wieczne. Czy zbawienie usprawiedliwia cierpienie w życiu doczesnym," in *Eschatologia filozoficzna. Wokół książki Ireneusza Ziemińskiego*, ed. M. Przanowski, Kraków, 2016).

17 W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 41.

18 D.Z. Phillips, *Problem of Evil and the Problem of God*, London, 2004, p. 57.

an act depends on the evaluation of the consequences of that very act.[19] As Phillips maintains, all theodicies assuming that God permits evil to happen in the world in order to enable moral development of human beings are counterproductive and incoherent.[20] This is to be understood in the sense that anyone believing in a theodicy like that will undergo demoralization. Thus instead of moral development there ensues moral corruption. To unfold Phillips's thought in more detail: if a believer in such a theodicy does good and correctly reacts to the evil he/she encounters (for instance offering help to those in need) with the sole purpose of becoming morally more mature, this means that he/she undergoes moral degradation. Hasker attempts to take away the strength of this argument of Phillips's by arguing in his turn that moral development can be a secondary, with respect to the intention of bringing relief to a sufferer, consequence of reaction to evil.

Hasker's theodicean conception will be an attempt at a refutation of both the quoted anti-theodicies, yet an attempt acknowledging both Roth's moral intuitions concerning intrinsically unredeemable evil and Phillips's anti-utilitarian axiology.

4. THE FREE-WILL DEFENSE

The set phrase Free-Will Defense is a name signifying the class of responses to the argument logically developed from the existence of evil. J. Mackie, who formulated the contemporary version of that logical argument wrote as follows:

> In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere, and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[21]

Developing this idea in order to explain what precisely this contradiction would consist in, he adds:

> However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the

[19] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 47.

[20] D.Z. Phillips, *Problem of Evil and the Problem of God*, p. 57.

[21] J. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," p. 25.

> terms "good," "evil," and "omnipotent." These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evils as far as it can, and there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From this it follows that a good omnipotent thing can eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exits, and that evil exists, are incompatible. [22]

One of the most significant, perhaps the most significant of the contemporary responses to this argument from evil is Alvin Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. The gist of the Free-Will Defense is demonstration that God's existence is not contradicted by the existence of evil and hence all forms of the logical argument from evil are in fact inconclusive; in other words, no argument assuming the existence of evil as one of its premises leads necessarily to the conclusion that God does not exist since evil exists. Mackie's argument would be logically effective only in the case the additional premise(s) referred to in Mackie's second passage quoted above was a necessary truth. Let us repeat: the premise in question is the affirmation that:

(*) a good being always eliminates evil insofar as it is possible to it, and an omnipotent being can effect everything possible; for its power has no limits.

However, Mackie was well aware that this statement can be challenged by reference to the free will of reasonable creatures made by God: a good and omnipotent being may have a reason not to do away with every kind of evil this reason being the omnipotent being's will that there should exist beings that are free and, being free, capable of producing evil. To eliminate this possible challenge to his line of thinking Mackie attempted to prove that freedom of will is impossible and thus every challenge to the truth of the premise (*) based on a reference to free will of created beings is ineffectual.

In his construction of the Free-Will Defense Plantinga made use of the law of modal logic (the logic exploring relations between logical necessity and possibility) stating that given two mutually non-contradictory propositions which are possibly true and which jointly entail a third proposition, it follows that this third proposition is non-contradictory to each of the two former ones. Written down with logical symbols this law looks as follows:

[22] Ibid., 26.

$(\Diamond (\alpha \,\&\, \beta) \,\&\, \Box ((\alpha \,\&\, \beta) \rightarrow \gamma)) \rightarrow (\Diamond (\alpha \,\&\, \gamma) \,\&\, \Diamond (\beta \,\&\, \gamma))$ (LML).[23]

Plantinga pointed out the following three theses that can be substituted for the variables α, β, γ in LML:

α: God exists (by God we mean a being that is omnipotent perfectly good and omniscient).

β: God creates a world containing moral good and all possible persons are morally depraved

γ: Evil exists

The proposition β requires some comment. In a debate over the logical argument (from evil) and in defense of it Mackie advanced the thesis that God, being omnipotent, could create free persons that would always choose good over evil. In fact, being perfectly good, it is such persons exclusively that he should have created. Yet to this Plantinga responded, that God as an omniscient being, knew in advance, before he proceeded to create the world containing definite persons, that among all the possible persons he could actually create there was no one who would not perpetrate any evil (Plantinga 1974).[24] Thus creating a world containing exclusively morally perfect persons that would always do good and never commit any evil was not possible even for God. It is in the context of this debate that Plantinga's affirmation that all possible persons are depraved should be considered. More precisely, Plantinga does not speak about possible persons but about possible beings and introduces a distinction between possible worlds as such and worlds that could possibly be created by God or *feasible worlds*. The set of worlds that could possibly be made by God is contained within the set of all possible worlds, which also contains worlds that God could not create.[25] One more comment has to be made, namely that the proposition β can be true if an additional assumption is made, namely that God, before deciding to create one definite world had the complete knowledge of how

[23] The symbol '◊' means "possibly…; it is possible that...," the symbol '□' means "necessarily..., it is necessary that…"; the symbol '&' designates logical conjunction, that is the connective 'and'. LML stands for "law of modal logic."

[24] A. Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil*, Grand Rapids, 1974.

[25] The concepts of possible world and other related concepts are presented in Polish literature by Krzysztof Hubaczek (*Bóg a zło. Problematyka teodycealna w filozofii analitycznej*, Wrocław, 2010, pp. 72–75) and Plantinga himself (e.g. *God, Freedom and Evil*).

every possible person would behave in every possible situation.[26] Let us mark this statement with the sign (**). In another formulation, God knows the truth value of all statements of the form "if *p* were the case, *q* would be the case"; this kind of statement is called in logic "counterfactual propositions." Examples of this kind of statements are all affirmations saying what a certain person would freely decide and do in a given situation if he/she found him/herself in that situation, for instance the sentence: "If John were offered a grant he would accept it of his own accord." Plantinga believes that God knows the logical value of all possible propositions of this form, which is tantamount to saying that God knows about every possible person what choices this person would make if confronted with any possible situation. Counterfactual conditionals which purport to describe free decisions made by persons in imaginary, non-existing situations are sometimes referred to by the phrase "counterfactuals of freedom."[27]

Consequently: given the fact that God knows all possible decisions of all possible persons and that He knows that no possible person would ever remain clear of some defilement by moral evil, it obviously follows that if God wanted the world containing free persons to exist, He could not make this world free from evil. The knowledge "what would be, if...." was given a distinct name as long ago as the Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535–1600) who was the first to introduce this sort of speculation into theological discussions, this name is *media scientia* (middle knowledge). Owing to this sort of knowledge God knows all possible worlds, all the worlds he could create, that is all possible situations and all possible beings as involved in all these

[26] Strictly speaking, I use the phrase "the proposition *p* can be true" for stylistic reasons; strictly formal considerations would require "proposition/affirmation *p* is logically possible" or "possibly *p*." A proposition *p* is logically possibly if and only if *p* is true in at least one of all the possible worlds. If a proposition *p* is true in the actual world it is true *tout court* (or contingently true); if a proposition is true in every possible world, including this world of ours, this proposition is necessary or necessarily true. Essential for this terminology is that a logically true sentence need not be true in the actual world, though it has to be true in some possible world. If a proposition is not true in any one of possible worlds, it is logically impossible. A proposition *p* is true in some possible world if and only if it corresponds to some state of affairs obtaining in this possible world. Thus when it is said "the proposition β can be true" what is meant is simply that the proposition β is logically true in the sense here described.

[27] W. Hasker, "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," in *Middle Knowledge*, ed. W. Hasker, D. Basinger and E. Dekker, Frankfurt, 2000.

situations. Thus God knows, beforehand as it were, before he decides to create particular persons, how these persons would behave in definite settings and what choices they would make if endowed with freedom of choice. The essence of Plantinga's position consists in the affirmation that God cannot make the persons otherwise than described by the relevant counterfactual conditionals that had been true, as it were, "before" God's making his decision to produce this definite world and not another. He cannot intervene in the sphere of free decisions of created persons, for if He did, he would curtail or annihilate the freedom of these persons; their acts would no longer flow from their own free decisions. Neither can God change the logical value of relevant counterfactual conditionals, not even "before" his decision to create this and not other possible world. For these counterfactual propositions are eternally true independently of God's will, however, their truth depends on the will of relevant possible persons. This follows from the libertarian conception of freedom of will adopted by Plantinga; according to this conception a person that freely chooses a certain option, *can*, at the instant of choice, refrain from that choice (or choose otherwise) (***). If God wished to make a person act otherwise than that person intends to and, consequently, He *did* make him/her act otherwise, that person would no longer act in a free way. For such is the essence of freedom and even all-powerful God cannot make it different than it does consist in, just as He cannot make 2 + 2 equal 5. Thus, assumed that God wills free persons to exist and that He knows beforehand, by virtue of his middle knowledge, that regardless of which possible world He chooses to create, evil deeds will be perpetrated, evil will exist as the result of creation. To put it in a different way: the very nature of freedom makes it impossible for God to create any world He might wish to create, for the freedom of other beings than Himself dramatically narrows down the choice of worlds possible to create.

The question inevitably arises here, whether among all persons possible to create not a single one could be found that would *always*, in all possible circumstances, freely opt for good rather than evil? Plantinga's answer is that we do not really know for sure, however, we may legitimately assume that it really is so. To demonstrate that the theses α, β i γ fulfill the conditions defined by the LML it is enough that possibly all possible persons are depraved and it is not required that things necessarily be so (for thus β is logically possible and non-contradictory to α, which are the conditions set by the LML).

Plantinga's firm opinion is that it is not possible to demonstrate by logic alone, as Mackie believed it was, that the theses α and γ are mutually contradictory.[28] By logical analysis Plantinga has demonstrated, or at least himself and many contemporary philosophers believe he has, that the theses α and γ are not mutually contradictory, nor do they imply any contradiction. To demonstrate this it suffices to assume the proposition β as an additional presupposition, which need not be true; it is enough to assume that β possibly be true. Then to refute β one would have to show that for some reasons β could not be true and thus must be false.[29]

The thesis β would of necessity be false if it were impossible for God to know that all possible beings to create were depraved. To put it differently, according to Plantinga, β would be false if God had no middle knowledge.

One ought here to add that the purpose of Plantinga's Free-Will Defense is not only to prove that the theses "God exists" and "moral evil exists," "moral" meaning here caused by free human agency, are not mutually contradictory; Plantinga intends to show more: namely that God's existence does not contradict the existence of natural evil. We understand by natural evil all harmful effects caused by events and processes that are beyond the influence of human free choices (such as earthquakes, typhoons, floods, plagues, diseases etc.). However, within his project of Free-Will Defense Plantinga treats natural evil as related to, indeed a particular case of moral evil; thus he replaces the original theses β and γ with their following modifications:

β': God creates a world containing moral evil effected by persons other than human, and all possible persons that are not human beings are morally depraved. All natural evil existing in the world is the effect of morally wrong acts of choice perpetrated by those non-human persons.

γ': Natural evil exists.

Theses α as well as β'and γ' also fulfill (LML). The other than human persons are angels, including fallen angels (demons). Earthquakes and other disastrous phenomena are a result of demons operating in the natural world. Plantinga does not positively affirm that this indeed is the case, he limits himself to the claim possibly this may be so, in other words, the thesis β' is

[28] Two propositions *p* and *q* are contradictory if and only if they are not both true or false in any one of all possible worlds, thus if *p* is true, *q* is false and vice versa.

[29] In other words it would have to be demonstrated that no possible world exists in which β is true.

logically possible. For it is enough to prove Mackie's argument from evil ineffectual to admit possibility of the state of affairs described by the thesis β'.

Let us sum up our discussion of Plantinga's case against Mackie's argument from evil: both β and β' are *possibly* true if (**) *is* necessarily true.[30] If (**) is not necessarily true, then β and β' cannot be true and Plantinga's Free-Will Defense does not work. Thus the thesis (**) affirming the existence of *media scientia* in God is shown to be the key thesis of Plantinga's argument. Every standpoint presupposing (**) is designated in the current debate concerning God and the problem of evil as Molinism. A necessary condition for the thesis of Molinism is that propositions of the form "If *p* were the case, then *q* would also be the case" were true, and in particular the counterfactuals of freedom mentioned above.[31]

Nevertheless one has to bear in mind that the problem of the logical nature of counterfactual conditionals can be and usually is investigated entirely independently from its import for the philosophical problem of evil as a problem in its own right relevant to logic, epistemology and ontology. As already mentioned above, Plantinga's Free-Will Defense gained considerable acknowledgment among contemporary philosophers, who have fairly unanimously agreed in considering it a logically effectual response to Mackie's logical argument from evil. There has been, however, a group of philosophers who dismissed Plantinga's "defense" as misguided and one of those philosophers is William Hasker. Hasker rejects the thesis (**) and, as a consequence, he refuses to endorse the theses β and β', but he accepts the thesis (***). In other words, he rejects the existence of divine middle knowledge, while accepting the libertarian conception of freedom of will. Hasker refuses to accept β' not only in consequence of his denial of the thesis (**), but also he takes the surmise that depraved demons of their own accord and out of spite work natural evil to be false. Natural evil can adequately be explained by reference to such sciences as geology, medical science, and finally biology and physics.[32] The thesis (**) is rejected for two

[30] God is understood to possess middle knowledge in every possible world in which He exists and therefore knows all possible situations and all possible responses of all possible persons

[31] The sufficient condition of Molinism being true is the existence of God possessed of the attribute of all-knowledge, including counterfactual truths.

[32] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 65. The explanations offered by these sciences need not be taken by a Christian theist as final and sufficient in every case. It can even be questioned whether they are at all probable given the assumption of the Bible's authority, which Hasker himself considers very important. After all Jesus

mutually independent reasons. One of these is not related to the problem of evil, instead it has to do with difficulties in grounding the truth of statements of the form "if *p* were the case, then *q* would be the case." Propositions of this sort, that is counterfactual conditionals cannot be true, as there is no objective reality corresponding to them. To put it very simply: there are no purely possible persons nor purely possible situations. If there are persons, they are actual persons, and if there are facts, they are actual facts.

The other reason for Hasker's rejection of (**) has to do with the problem of evil. In his opinion the thesis (**) far from providing adequate defense against arguments from the existence of evil, tends instead to strengthen their force. As one of the foremost contemporary Molinists, Alfred Freddoso, states:

> God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact, the created universe with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization. Since God is the perfect artisan, not even the most trivial details escape His providential decrees.[33]

Hasker suggests Freddoso's statement is to be construed in the sense that God making his choices with attention given to every, even the smallest detail, had some reason or purpose for every single event to be admitted into existence. Thus He must have had not only some reason for all tiny details of the universe (e.g. for the trajectory of every single neutrino in the cosmos) but also a sufficient reason for every single instance of evil admitted into the created world. However, given this assumption questions inevitably arise as to the divine reasons for singular definite cases of evil which on this assumption must have been known by God from eternity and selected in advance for existence.[34] Thus Molinism implies that every instance of evil, even of the greatest evil, must have such sufficient reasons. Yet it is hard to find any reasons for the "intrinsically unredeemable evil" mentioned above.

Like Plantinga, Hasker advocates the libertarian conception of freedom of will and advances some arguments in defense thereof. These arguments

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cast out demons from sick and possessed men. It is also possible to offer possible accounts of operation of supernatural beings within the natural order of nature. Such accounts have been given by Plantinga in his work of 2011 (*Where the Conflict really lies. Science, Religion and Naturalism*, Oxford, 2011).

[33] A. Freddoso, "Introduction," in Louis de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*: *Concordia IV*, New York, 1988, p. 3.

[34] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 174.

possess import of their own, independently of the contribution that the libertarian doctrine can bring to the discussions on the problem of evil. In defense of this doctrine Hasker quotes an important and characteristic statement by John Searle:

> For reasons I don't really understand, evolution has given us a form of experience of voluntary action where the experience of freedom, that is to say, the experience of the sense of alternative possibilities, is built into the very structure of conscious, voluntary, intentional human behaviour. For that reason, I believe, neither this discussion nor any other will ever convince us that our behaviour is unfree.[35]

Another argument in support of freedom of will is derived from moral responsibility. This argument consits in the following reasoning: if the libertarian doctrine was false, then either the doctrine of compatibilism or that of hard incompatibilism would be true.[36]

Yet if any of these two theories was true, there would exist no grounds whatever for attribution to human beings of moral responsibility for their actions. The doctrine of compatibilism holds that freedom of will exists even though our voluntary acts are determined or conditioned by factors over which the person performing these acts of decision has no control whatever. In fact all our acts of decision are determined by some non voluntary factors and have some psychological (the strongest motive), physical (states of the brain) or social causes. These causes or a combination thereof constitute a sufficient condition for every decision we make. Compatibilism in turn rejects the libertarian assumption that a choice is free only in the case where a number of substantially different courses of action or ways of behavior is open to the decision making subject. For if a seeming decision is determined independently of the subject, this means that there exists only one option. One (paradoxical) consequence of compatibilism is the affirmation that we carry the responsibility for actions over whose real causes we exercise no control.[37] The true causes of our actions may have already been in existence long before we were born.[38]

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[35] J. Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science*, Cambridge, Mass., 1984, p. 98.

[36] D. Pereboom, *Hard Incompatibilism*, in J.M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, M. Vargas, *Four views on free will*, Oxford, 2007.

[37] Mackie, characterizing freedom of will as construed by compatibilism, writes that an act of free choice is an act which emanates from the very nature of the acting subject and is not determined by some external sources of compulsion nor by internal mental condition that would hinder the correct expression of the subject

Hard incompatibilism, on the other hand, maintains that both libertarianism and compatibilism are false theories and there is no such thing as free will. There is even no such thing as the apparent freedom admitted by compatibilism and consisting in taking decisions and performing actions without any external compulsion and in accordance with one's own nature, albeit fully determined by diverse factors. According to hard incompatibilism, either rejected theory fails to provide adequate grounds for the notion of moral responsibility.[39] On the other hand, as Hasker stresses,

(what is meant here is such conditions as e.g. mental illness). Thus construed freedom can be reconciled with determination as the nature of an acting subject can in fact be determined by diverse factors over which this subject has no control and no influence (cf. K. Hubaczek, *Bóg a zło*, p. 89). Compatibilist theories also claim that an act of choice is free if the subject *could not* choose otherwise than he/she did because actually there was no other option available (given that all, including the individual nature of the subject is strictly determined in advance).

38 W. Hasker, *Metaphysics: Constructing a World View*, Leicester, 1983, p. 44.

39 To be more precise, hard incompatibilism proclaims that, regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism be the true theory of the Universe, man is not free, because man has no control over his/her own will and his/her own decisions. For if determinism is true, there are adequate external causes for every decision and for every act of will and there is no room for true freedom. But even if a voluntary act is not fully determined by such factors as external compulsion, a subtle neuronal manipulation or some natural brain dysfunction, either innate or acquired, it has its ultimate determining cause in man's individual character (nature). Yet the definite character of a given person is formed by its own causes, such as that person's upbringing, genes, environment, culture etc. No man has any influence upon anyone of these factors which shape his/her character. Thus no man is free in the strong libertarian sense, for no man is the ultimate cause of his/her own decisions since no man is the maker of his/her own character. Hard incompatibilism does not shy away from the conclusion that since no man is a free cause of his/her acts, no man bears moral responsibility for his/her decisions and actions.

On the other hand, if indeterminism is the truth, then there is no exhaustive causal explanation for a given human decision or a given instance of human behavior. A person in a given situation might act thus or otherwise; the case of making a choice is in some respects analogous to a case of a quantum leap of an electron, which changes its position in atomic orbits without any discoverable and knowable cause. One can determine all possible positions of an electron in atomic orbits as well as calculate the likelihood of this electron being in each of those positions, provided one knows the state of the whole atomic system at a given moment, yet one cannot figure out which one of these possible variants of the electron's behavior will in fact occur at the moment of observation. In other words, if indeterminism is true, it is *chance* that "decides" which option is taken by the will.

there exists strong experience of moral responsibility and concomitant experience of moral guilt or moral satisfaction.[40] The best explanation of this experience is, in Hasker's opinion, a recognition of the fact in a given case *it was possible for one to act otherwise than one in fact acted.*

Neither of the discussed anti-libertarian positions (hard incompatibilism and compatibilsm) has succeeded in indisputably gaining the upper hand in the philosophical debate on freedom of will. Thus an assumption of the libertarian theory and defense thereof, entirely independently of the importance of this theory for discussion of the problem of evil, is a perfectly legitimate and rational decision.

Rejecting the thesis (**) and defending the thesis (***), Hasker puts forward the following variety of Free Will-Defense. He agrees with Plantinga in accepting the LML:

$$(\Diamond (\alpha \,\&\, \beta) \,\&\, \Box ((\alpha \,\&\, \beta) \rightarrow \gamma)) \rightarrow (\Diamond (\alpha \,\&\, \gamma) \,\&\, \Diamond (\beta \,\&\, \gamma)),$$

yet instead of the proposition

β: God creates a world containing moral good and all possible persons are depraved

he substitutes for β the following:

β″: God decided to create a world in which moral good will appear. To this effect He created free and reasonable beings and allowed them to choose between good and evil. It is not possible for God to allow free beings to choose between good and evil and at the same time to cause

Yet chance, or "blind chance" as it is often called, lies beyond control by the decision making subject, so the necessary, and according to some, also sufficient condition of freedom of will conceived in the libertarian sense, namely the condition that the subject be the ultimate *source* and cause of his/her decisions and actions, is not fulfilled. In particular, the fundamental decisions that account for the self-formation or autodetermination of a human being's character do not depend on the human being's free initiative but on chance.

[40] W. Hasker, *Metaphysics: Constructing a World View*, p. 45. Another argument Haker advances for freedom takes as the starting point the rational nature of our thinking. If physicalist determinism were true, rational thinking would be impossible; since rational thinking is a fact, physicalist determinism must be false (ibid., p. 49–50). Rational thinking consists in the thinking subject evaluating and selecting the assumptions of and the steps in a process of reasoning and the subject, in doing so, refers to some *chosen* criteria and assumptions (logical laws, proposition acknowledged as true, etc.)

them always to choose good. At least some of the relevant free beings in at least some circumstances will choose evil rather than good.

Thus, if we assume α: God exists (by God we mean a being that is all-powerful, perfectly good and all-knowing) and β″, we may, by virtue of logic, without generating contradiction, conclude to γ: Evil exists.

To refute the logical argument in the version advanced by Mackie, the statement β″, need not be actually true, it will be enough if it is possibly true (logically possible, see footnote 12) and does not contradict the affirmation α (see footnote 13), in other words, it does not contradict the proposition that there exists a perfectly benevolent and omnipotent God. Nonetheless Hasker is firmly convinced that β″[41] is actually, and not only possibly true. [42]

One also ought to bear in mind that he rejects Plantinga's thesis β′ and thus his conception does not extend to natural evil. He does consider natural evil, however, and he firmly rejects all endeavors to explain away natural evil by simply reducing it to being a consequence of sin.[43] In this way he leaves open the question why God should permit natural evil if it is not a result of sin nor is it intended as divine punishment of sin. This vast topic will be discussed as part of his treatment of "natural-order theodicy."

Let us briefly sum up the discussion accomplished in this sub-chapter. We presented the problem of evil in its logical formulation (the logical problem of evil) or J. Mackie's so called argument from evil, then we considered the criticism of that argument carried out by A. Plantinga: Plantinga's Free-Will Defense. As the next step, William Hasker's criticism of Plantinga's defense was explained, and finally Hasker's own version of the Free-Will Defense was presented.

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41 The thesis β″ corresponds to a certain set of states of affairs really obtaining in the actual world.

42 W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 65.

43 For instance William Dembski suggests that natural evil is a result of original sin and it is to be assumed that the power of sin works, so to say, backwards, that is its efficiency extends to the times when man was not yet existent as a species, while numerous other species of living organisms and creatures already existed in nature (W. Dembski, *Christian Theodicy in Light of Genesis and Modern Science*, Louisville, 2006).

5. WILLIAM ROWE'S EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT AND "THE DEFENSE OF THE NECESSITY OF GRATUITOUS EVIL"

William Rowe's evidential argument is the following reasoning:

(1) There are cases of *very intense suffering*, which could be prevented by an omnipotent and omniscient being in such a way that no greater good would be lost, nor any evil of the same magnitude or greater admitted thereby.

(2) An omniscient and perfectly good being would prevent an occurrence of any intense suffering if it was able to do it, provided that no greater good would be lost nor any evil of the same magnitude or greater admitted thereby.

(3) There exists no being that is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good.[44]

The intense suffering mentioned in the premise (1) of that argument is referred to as gratuitous evil or pointless evil.[45]

In order to refute this reasoning theists must invalidate at least one of the two premises of the evidential argument quoted above. In principle there are two main strategies adopted by theists in order to show that the evidential argument is inconclusive.

[44] W.L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and some Varieties of Atheism," in *The Problem of Evil*, ed. M. McCord Adams and R.M. Adams, Oxford, 1990. This paper was first published in 1979 in *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 16.

[45] It may be worthwhile briefly to consider here the points in common and the differences between Rowe's and Mackie's respective arguments. The difference consists in the fact that Mackie based his reasoning on three assumptions that must be acknowledged by every proponent of theism: (a) God is omnipotent, (b) God is perfectly good, (c) evil exists. By contrast, Rowe does not need these assumptions, instead he incorporates in his reasoning the premise (1), which need not be accepted by a theist. The point in common of these two arguments is that both instances of reasoning are *de facto* strictly deductive inferences, which means that once we accept their premises, the conclusion of necessity follows; thus if we accept their premises as true, we thereby commit ourselves to rejection of theism as false. As for the evidential argument, its premise (1) states that gratuitous evil exists, and the premise (2) that God, if existed, would never allow any case of gratuitous evil to happen (W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 178). The evidential argument is sometimes referred to as an inductive argument, its inductive nature allegedly resulting from the fact we start with only *one* or *a few* ascertained particular cases of intense suffering to conclude to non-existence of God.

One of these strategies attempts to reject the premise (1) in the following way: if we have sufficiently strong reasons for the belief that God (an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good being) exists, we have sufficient reasons for the conclusion that gratuitous evil does not exist. It follows from this that the cases of intense suffering are not in fact gratuitous: they are either means to effect a greater good or to avoid an evil equal to or greater than the evil actually suffered; and this also implies that even the almighty God cannot accomplish this greater good by other means than the actual intense suffering. Hasker disapproves of this way of dealing with evidential argument, for he thinks even if somebody has a strong conviction that God exists, juxtaposing a great evil and the epistemic reasons in favor of God's existence may effect a weakening of the belief that God exists in a mind entertaining this belief, while a weak and uncertain belief of God's existence may be shaken and even dropped altogether by a person in the face of the evidence of a great evil.[46]

The other strategy that may possibly be adopted by a theist faced with the evidential argument is what is called sceptical theism.[47] In general, sceptical theism, to make its point, invokes evident limitations of human reason, and in particular the limitation of human ability to recognize and correctly evaluate the moral aspects of human behavior in various complicated situations. Stephen Wykstra, who was the first to put forward an analytical account of sceptical theism gives the following example as an illustration of the human cognitive situation:

> Searching for a table, you look through a doorway. The room is very large — say, the size of a Concorde hangar — and it is filled with bulldozers, dead elephants, Toyotas, and other vision-obstructing objects. Surveying this cluter from the doorway, and seeing no table, should you say: "It does not appear that there is a table in the room?"[48]

Not surprisingly, Wykstra himself answers this question in the negative; we have no sufficient evidence for affirmation that there actually be no table in the room before us. We see too little and know too little, there are too

[46] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 179.

[47] A very penetrating and comprehensive analysis of this position is found in Krzysztof Hubaczek's monograph *Bóg a zło. Problematyka teodycealna w filozofii analitycznej* (2010).

[48] S. Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Argument from Suffering: on Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 16 (1984), p. 86.

many obstacles and restrictions to our insight for us to give a well-founded judgment. An analogous situation obtains, from the standpoint of sceptical theism, in the case of an alleged instance of gratuitous evil. As a rule we fail to notice exceedingly complex relationships between things in the world and for this reason we are not in a position to make out the greater good whose necessary condition is some observable evil. Yet from the fact that we fail to identify that good, it by no means follows that no such good exists in reality. Wykstra's insights are developed by William Alston. Alston makes a survey of possible kinds of good that could be considered as instances of greater good impossible to accomplish without paying the price of intense suffering. He points out that suffering may be related to punishment for sins, it may be a condition for moral and spiritual development or may be the means by which God leads us to conversion and ultimate salvation, it may also serve as a test of loyalty to and trust in God or open access to the inner life of God Himself.[49] Nevertheless, Alston acknowledges that as for the known cases of intense suffering no connection can be seen with the kinds of greater good that are known to us. He concludes from this, that there may exist kinds of good of which we are entirely ignorant and because of which God allows evil to happen in the world. We do not know these mysterious kinds of good, and thus we are not able to represent them to ourselves and it is possible we will never be able to comprehend the profound ties of the known instances of suffering with these unknown kinds of good. Nevertheless God, being omniscient and perfectly good, knows these ties as well as all kinds of good and infallibly recognizes that for every case of suffering there exists a higher good (goods) for whose accomplishment that case of suffering is a condition. The existence of these unknown and possibly altogether incomprehensible to us goods and relationships is precisely the reason for God allowing evil in the world. Hence, no evil in the world is gratuitous and, consequently, the premise (1) of the evidential argument is false. The difference between Wykstra's and Alston's respective variants of scepticism consists in the fact that Wykstra affirms that we cannot grasp the connections between instances and kinds of evil that are *known* to us, and kinds of good that are also known to us, while Alston goes a step further and admits that possibly there are kinds of good different from those familiar to us, which we are wholly unable to comprehend. Naturally, neither can we comprehend the relationship obtaining

[49] W. Alston, "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991), p. 182.

between the cases and kinds of evil that we know and those kinds of good we are ignorant of.

In the context of his discussion of the argument advanced by sceptical theists Hasker observes that the limitations of human cognitive powers may become a hindrance to correct appreciation and understanding of facts involved in all sorts of situations requiring a judgment of value. For instance, it may be the case that a concrete evil that occurred contributes to the emergence of an even greater evil, which, nevertheless, we are unable to notice or comprehend. It may also be the case that we can identify a certain evil but are unable to grasp the connection of that evil with another one. We may also be able to grasp the relations between diverse cases of evil, but still remain unable to evaluate the gravity or importance of that evil in a more comprehensive context. A given concrete evil may be a necessary condition for another and greater evil of whose nature we may fail to have any representation.[50]

The point made here by Hasker is that just as it is possible for a given evil to be a condition for some greater good which nevertheless remains incomprehensible to us, it is also possible for a given particular evil to condition some even greater and incomprehensible to us evil. Thus if we follow sceptical theism in assuming that because of some inherent limitations of human reason we are unable to notice some higher good and the essential relation of that higher good to some known evil, we by the same token commit ourselves to the assumption that we are unable to notice some kinds of evil and the relationship of those kinds to the known instances of moral action. In brief: if we agree that we cannot grasp the essential relations of some definite evil and some possible good, we must agree to the conclusion that we are in fact unable to evaluate the consequences of our actions for good and/or evil and thus the true moral value of our deeds. Yet if this were the case, human morality would lose its foundations, since there is no morality without the supposed moral subject's ability to assess the moral value of his/her actions.[51]

Of course, in Hasker's opinion, one has to admit that human reason is subject to limitations, yet it by no means follows therefrom that the judgments of human reason are not to be trusted in whatever matter it considers. If some kind of evil clearly appears as pointless, one ought not in consideration of our cognitive limitations immediately assume that things are not so and the evil in question is not really gratuitous. On the basis of critical

[50] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 184.

[51] Ibid., p. 185.

examination of our cognitive powers and in the light of the evidence we possess, we have to acknowledge that at least some of the known cases of evil may qualify as cases of gratuitous in the sense explained above; thus sceptical theists' conclusion gives no ground for challenging the evidential argument.

In Hasker's opinion, the false step made by the theists trying to refute the evidential argument consists in regarding the premise (2) of that argument as an axiom that is as good as irrefutable, while he believes there are at least two good reasons to challenge precisely that premise.[52] For one thing, the premise (2) is true on the assumption of the truth of ethical utilitarianism and consequentialism. According to the ethical theory of utilitarianism and consequentialism the moral value of an act depends on the results (consequences) of that act. The more good or the greater the good that follows as a result of an action, the better that action is. This sort of ethical theory assumes the existence of one universal scale of values which enables evaluation and comparison of all sorts of goods. Only on such an assumption one can legitimately speak about a "greater good" or an

[52] Adoption of the premise (1) as true is a distinctive trait of open theism and process theism. Let us quote here a statement by another of the pioneeres of open theism, David Basinger: "Like process theists, we do believe that much of the pain and suffering we encounter in the world may actually be futile and contribute to no greater good" (*Practical Implication*, in C. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker, D. Basinger, *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Understanding of God*, Downers Grove, 1994, p. 170). On the other hand, Richard Swinburne, even though he shares the main presuppositions of open theism and in particular those concerning the nature of God's knowledge of future and the nature of human freedom, rather inclines to reject the premise (1) of the evidential argument (R. Swinburne, *Providence and the Problem Evil*, Oxford, 1998). For more on this see Łukasiewicz 2001. There are also theists who, while not wanting to be included under the label of open theism (for instance Peter Van Inwagen), accept the premise (1) and admit the possibility of gratuitous evil (P. Van Inwagen, *The Problem of Evil*, Oxford, 2006). Van Inwagen's treatment of the problem of evil is discussed in Łukasiewicz 2007a. It is worthwhile here to remark that Swinburne and Van Inwagen formulated and provided justification for the positions concerning God's knowledge and human freedom which are key tenets of open theism before the already quoted book *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Understanding of God* co-authored by Pinnock, Rice, Sanders, Hasker and Basinger, regarded as a sort of manifesto of open theism was published in 1994.

Already in 1979, in his work *Coherence of Theism* R. Swinburne argued that God's foreknowledge of the future cannot be reconciled with the libertarian doctrine of free will and Van Inwagen in 1982 argued that freedom of human will cannot be reconciled with any kind of determinism (*An Essay on Free Will*).

evil that is "equal in magnitude or greater than another evil." Once the existence of such a universal scale of values is questioned, the premise (2) may easily be regarded as false or at least not sufficiently justified.[53] An objective assessment of which one of some given values is higher than the others (occupies a higher place in the hierarchy of values) is no longer possible if there is no one objective measure, whose application would give an unequivocal result. As it is, there may exist diverse and mutually not comparable kinds of values as well as different incommensurable hierarchies thereof. Thus an evaluation of a good may be possible only as a result of a subjective choice made by the evaluating subject.[54]

The other reason to challenge the premise (2) is the fact that it contradicts "the principle of divine moral intention." This principle states that

> It is an extremely important part of God's intention for human persons that they should place a high priority on fulfilling moral obligations and should assume major responsibility for the welfare of their fellow human beings.[55]

This principle, Hasker affirms, has a strong foundation in the Bible (the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount) and forms an important component part of Christian doctrine. However, if one assumes the truth of the premise (2), there follows immediately the offsetting good principle which affirms the following:

> Any harm resulting from a morally wrong action will be offset by a "greater good that God could not have obtained without permitting the evil in question.[56]

According to this principle any evil allowed by God is a necessary and sufficient condition for some good that is greater and more desirable than the allowed evil. No evil would be admitted by God into the creation and thus no evil would exist, unless it were a condition for a greater good. Naturally, our moral duty is, according to the Christian doctrine based on

[53] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 191.

[54] It is possible to raise objections to this view. The very fact of the existence of incommensurable values does not entail the affirmation that appreciation of those incommensurable values would have to be arbitrary. Spiritual values may well be considered as lacking a common measure with hedonistic values as to their quality as values and one can affirm that no amount of pleasurable goods, however great, can top any spiritual good, nevertheless the realization that any spiritual good is more valuable than however great amount of pleasurable goods is certainly not a question of an arbitrary decision.

[55] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 191.

[56] Ibid., p. 192.

the Bible, to do good and fight evil. To fight evil means to avoid doing harm to oneself and other beings and bring help and relief to other persons. If there occur, however, cases of intense suffering, they have been admitted by God and are necessary for the accomplishment of some greater good. Yet if evil is necessary for accomplishing some greater good, we ought not to oppose it. Thus we are in a quandary: on the one hand we have moral duty to help others, on the other hand, however, we ought not to help them, for the evil visited on them by God is a necessary evil. We face a contradiction: we ought to aid others (in accordance with the principle of divine moral intention) and we ought not to aid others (in accordance with the principle of offsetting good).

Yet there is a way out of that quandary: the principle of divine moral intention has a strong foundation in the Bible, while the principle of offsetting good only follows from the premise (2) of Rowe's argument, so evidently the former is better justified than the latter. And one ought to bear in mind that the premise (2) itself is only based on the questionable ethical theory of utilitarianism. This consideration shows that the assumption of the premise (2) leads to contradiction with the principles of the Christian moral belief and presupposes a very controversial moral doctrine (utilitarianism); in fact it tends to undermine all morality (Hasker: "morality is undermined").[57]

If, on the other hand, the premise (2) is rejected and the premise (1) retained, the conclusion that God does not exist does not follow with necessity. The premise (1) may be held true, since the criticism of it from the standpoint of sceptical theism is inconclusive. Thus it is possible, that there be an all-powerful, perfectly benevolent, and all-knowing being, and at the same time there exist cases of intense suffering that could be prevented by this omnipotent and omniscient being without any consequent loss of a greater good or admission of another evil of equal or greater magnitude. In other words, God and gratuitous (irrational) evil are compossible (can exist together in reality). In this way Rowe's evidential argument has been proved inconclusive.

Consequently, in accordance with the logic of Hasker's argumentation, if necessary evil existed, (Christian) morality would be undermined, so if Christian morality is assumed, one has to conclude that necessary evil does not exist. Nevertheless, in the light of the above discussion of the truth value of the premise (1), the conclusion "Necessary evil does not exist" is tantamount to the affirmation that there exists in the world such thing as

[57] Ibid., p. 193.

gratuitous (not necessary) evil. It follows that a necessary condition of (Christian) morality is the existence of gratuitous evil, that is an evil that does not serve any purpose (is not necessary for an accomplishment of any good). The existence of gratuitous evil is thus shown to be in perfect agreement with the principle of divine moral intention, since the existence of that kind of evil can be inferred on previously assuming this principle. Hasker is careful enough to stress, that his position does not imply for example the assertion that the Holocaust as such is a necessary condition of morality.[58] All his standpoint implies is that the existence of *some* gratuitous evil is a condition of morality. And we have to bear in mind, taking into account the limited nature of the cognitive powers of human reason, that not *every* evil that appears to us as futile is *always* really a gratuitous evil.

His position elaborated in the course and as a result of his critical examination of William Rowe's evidential argument, Hasker calls "defense of necessity of gratuitous evil."

The question here arises, whether this defense against the evidential argument is in itself coherent, and in particular, whether gratuitous evil, which, according to this defense, is a necessary condition of morality, is in fact gratuitous. The answer to this question is the following: every particular instance of gratuitous evil is indeed gratuitous, yet the whole class of all the cases of gratuitous evil is not gratuitous. The properties of the elements of a certain set are not properties of that set as such, so it is by no means inconvenient that the set of all particular cases of gratuitous evil should not be gratuitous. Still there remains the question that is not so easily answered: is it indeed true that the existence of gratuitous evil is a necessary condition of morality? Hasker himself does believe that this indeed is the case: for if we were really convinced that every case of suffering serves some higher purpose, some greater good, we would have no motivation whatever to give help to others and to fight evil encountered in the world. Yet if this were true, the world would be worse than it actually is.

A sceptic could still raise the objection that our world would be better, be it in the smallest possible degree, if there were at least one instance of gratuitous evil less in it. This objection could, in our opinion, be answered, as part of the case in defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil, by stating that God, in his work of creation, chose the general strategy of non-prevention of gratuitous evil (as wanted and effected by his creatures). If God prevented some instances of gratuitous evil from happening while allowing

[58] Ibid., p. 197.

others to take place, he would act in an arbitrary, immoral way, unjust and non fair with respect to those creatures whom he would refuse his protective assistance; so if He were to prevent any case of pointless evil, He would be obliged to prevent all such cases.[59] Then gratuitous evil would cease to exist and one of the following two alternatives would hold: either evil would no longer exist altogether, or every particular case of evil would be necessary evil. Yet for there being no evil at all, the world would have to organized in a completely different way from the actual and we have no idea what this different way would have to be like.[60]

6. NATURAL-ORDER THEODICY

Natural evil (physical evil) existing in the natural world, consisting in pain, passing away, death, brutal struggle for survival, killing of sensitive creatures by other creatures, generates the question whether nature as such is not cruel, or, at best, wholly indifferent to pain the fate of sensitive beings ("cold"). If one assumes that nature has been made by a creator, does not the conclusion follow, that the evil present in the world of nature is to blamed on the creator himself?

This is the problem Hasker undertakes in his discussion of natural-order theodicy. The leading idea of natural-order theodicy is to point out some fundamental and universal properties of the world of nature as known by us and to argue that the world is the better for having precisely these properties. Yet one of the consequences of the world possessing certain definite features is the existence of evil in nature. Nonetheless, the admission of this special kind of evil is no sufficient reason to challenge God's perfect benevolence and even less to raise doubts as to his existence.

Within this general project of natural-order theodicy Hasker starts his discussion by the assumption of a number of statements (postulates) that provide the basis and the starting point for his own version of natural-order theodicy[61]:

[59] Cf. J.A. Keller, *Problems of Evil and the Power of God*, Hampshire, Burlington, 2007, and J. Salamon, "Atheism and Agatheism in the Global Ethical Discourse: Reply to Millican and Thornhill-Miller," *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*" 7 (2015), 4, pp. 197–245.

[60] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 137. Cf. (NOT4) in section 6 below.

[61] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 122–125.

(T1): It is good for there to be a world.
(T2): It is good for the existing world to be complex, natural and multi-leveled.
(T3): It is good for a world to contain sensitive (that is capable of feeling pleasure and pain) and reasonable beings
(T4): It is good for created beings to possess a significant degree of autonomy.
(T5): It is good that there should be an evolving world, a world in which the universe as a whole as well as its parts develop from within using their inherent powers and potentialities.

Each of these affirmations has some justification behind it. According to Hasker, negation of (T1) is tantamount to a declaration of axiological nihilism. (T1) is very general as it does not specify what the existing world should be like; it admits the existence of many diverse possible worlds. The strength of (T1) lies, according to Hasker, in there being an only negligibly small number of persons ready to reject (T1).[62]

(T2) introduces three different properties of a possible world: complexity, a multi-leveled structure and naturalness. Complexity means here the feature of there being many different creatures belonging to many species and yet mutually interrelated in a possible world. Multi-leveled structure consists in the creatures contained within a possible world, of different structures (simple, complex and very complex), of different potential for action (causal potential) form a certain hierarchy. Worlds containing only atoms and nothing else, or only spirits and nothing else, would not be as good as a world in which creates of diverse natures and diverse levels of perfection existed.

Naturalness of a world consists in the beings of that world acting and causing effects solely by their own powers and faculties, not being manipulated, steered or otherwise causally assisted by supernatural powers.

(T3) does not necessarily follow from (T2), although (T2) provides some support for (T3). If it is intrinsically good for a world to be complex and multi-leveled, a world would be better if it contained beings with different degrees of sensibility and reasonability including beings both sensitive and reasonable, such as human beings and the like.

The autonomy invoked in (T4) means the "self-steering" of a being and activity as contained within the limits of powers and abilities left at that being's disposal. Hasker, however, does not omit to emphasize that every

[62] "The denial of this affirmation, while conceivable in the abstract, would be an expression of utter nihilism, *for most of us, I hope*" (ibid., p. 122).

created being totally depends on the Creator for its very existence.[63] This dependence on the Creator for existence means that no being in the world would originally come into being were it not for God's action and the fact that every created being in every moment of its existence is sustained in being by God himself. The construal of autonomy adopted by Hasker in (T4) is in fact identical with the traditional (classical) doctrine of conservation or "continuous creation" (*creatio continua*).

This is an important coincidence, which we here only remark in passing, but shall presently come back to later on in this article.

In his justification of (T5), Hasker quotes the following statement by Charles Darwin:

> There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and wonderful have been are being evolved. [64]

Naturally, he does not fail to observe that over long centuries the dominant view on the origin of life and the diversity of life form has been the creationist view that God created instantaneously, with only one act of creation, all species of living things. Yet he also points out that in the tradition of Western theology there were views which treated a successive, gradual and evolutionary emergence of new forms of being as exactly corresponding to God's project of creation. As an illustration he quotes the ideas of Gregory of Nyssa and of one of Darwin's contemporaries, the theologian Henry Ward Beecher.[65] As a matter of fact he could invoke more illustrations of that kind, e.g. the thought of St. Augustine, and in particular Augustine's conception of seminal reasons: *rationes seminales.*[66] Understandably however, of key importance for his justification of (T5) are the data provided by contemporary science. According to these data nature as we know it, both animate and inanimate, is a result of the evolutionary process that has continued over billions of years. Certainly, the bare fact that nature as we know it has emerged as a result of evolution is by itself no sufficient justification of the statement that this state of things is necessarily good, especially in view of Charles Darwin's statement that higher life forms

[63] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 125.

[64] Ch. Darwin, *The Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 490.

[65] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 126–127.

[66] Cf. E. McMullin, *Ewolucja i stworzenie*, transl. J. Rodzeń, Kraków 2014, p. 65–79.

emerge as a result of "war of nature, famine and death." Would it not be better in fact, if God created species simply and directly as the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis suggests, without "war, famine and death"? Would not the world be better, if lions and antelopes coexisted peacefully and the former did not hunt the latter? Now, Hasker states his opinion, that we cannot think, in a consistent and sufficiently detailed manner, the world of nature, in which all the advantages of our actual world of nature would exist without the evil attendant on these advantages in the present reality. If a lion is truly to be a lion, what is it to feed on to ensure its survival? Of course, we may invent all sorts of scenarios, more or less fantastic, yet these will never amount to a complete description of an alternative world, for a detailed representation of such a complete world with all its natural laws, exceeds by far the scope of human reason. Our present world is the only one about which we are in a position to affirm something in a justified way and in which the definite laws of nature as known to us hold. Laws of nature are not intelligent subjects, their nature is *impersonal*. They thus have no designs or plans (either good or evil). Hence nature operating according to those laws is neither cruel nor benevolent, it cannot even be said to be indifferent or "cold" to the pain and suffering of beings living and dying within its domain. And yet it can be said in the light of what we know nowadays about these beings that should they be minimally different from what they are now, the history of the cosmos would be entirely different and (possibly) the Universe would contain no life at all. In that case there would be no death nor suffering, yet by the same token there would be no life, no joy, there would not be ourselves, our relatives and friends, no living, sensitive being would be found anywhere.

However, Hasker leaves open the question whether the evolution of nature is a process entirely free from any kind of divine intervention and so it is "blind," that is effected exclusively by the forces inherent within nature itself, or possibly it is steered directly by God. He affirms:

> No decision need be made here concerning whether the world's development, and especially the appearance and evolution of living creatures, occurred entirely through the operation of natural forces or whether special divine interventions were required in order for the desired goal to be reached . The first alternative has an undeniable aesthetic appeal, but aesthetic considerations need not be decisive here, and arguably it has not been shown that a purely autonomous development is possible.[67]

[67] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 201.

Let us here just take note of this hesitation as to the essence of the evolutionary process in the Universe, let us also remark that this reserve stands in a certain disagreement with the thesis (T2) which postulates *naturalness* of the world.

The assumptions (T1)–(T5) provide the foundation on which Hasker's natural-order theodicy is based. It is expressed in the following four theses:

(NOT1): The universe is a complex, multi-leveled and natural whole containing sensitive beings, of which some are not only sensitive but also intelligent

(NOT2): The universe so organized enables the existence of great good which is manifested in the order and beauty of the physical world and in the development and flourishing of countless living things. Yet this universe also contains death and much suffering.

(NOT3): We have no reasons whatever to think that some alternative forms of nature's order that could possibly be created by Almighty God would outdo our universe as to the magnitude of good they contained or as to a better proportion of the contained good to the contained evil.

Bearing in mind the these (NOT1), (NOT2) and (NOT3) we can acknowledge:

(NOT4): It is good that God has created this very world of which we are a part. Thus there is no reason to find fault with God for having made the actual world, nor to affirm that a perfectly benevolent God could have arranged things in a completely different way.[68]

Natural-order theodicy explains the very fact of there being natural evil such as physical pain, passing away and death. What it does not explain is why particular beings experience particular instances of intense suffering.

[68] Ibid., 138. This refers to the question whether our present world is the very best of all possible ones or could a better world be created. A detailed consideration of this question far exceeds the scope of this paper; we can only observe that the concept of the best of all possible worlds is hard to defend and also that the ultimate assessment what kind of world would be essentially better than ours lies beyond the range of legitimate human judgment. Perhaps there may be some worlds, possible to be created by God, that in some respects may be better than the actual world; still, the fact remains that God decided to create precisely this world of ours. Having so decided, God bears no moral responsibility for not having made a better world. Cf. D. Łukasiewicz, "Wolność," in *Przewodnik po filozofii i religii. Nurt analityczny*, ed. J. Salamon, Kraków, 2016, pp. 109–121.

According to the natural-order theodicy God has no reason nor any purpose in admitting particular cases of natural evil, hence particular cases of natural evil may be pointless and gratuitous. On the strength of (T2) the world is natural, while in accordance with (T4) it is autonomous. In a natural and autonomous world everything happens according to laws of nature. Laws of nature are impersonal, they have no intent nor will. Even so, God, who intentionally decreed these laws, is entirely free of moral guilt in the face of necessary evil in nature, since the world operating according to the laws of nature is natural and autonomous and this is good in itself. Moreover, if we make an additional assumption that the laws governing the actual world are in all likelihood indeterministic and probabilistic and allow occurrences of chance events, then we are free to assert that at least some cases of intense suffering are outcomes of pure chance rather than any design.[69]

While considering the part played by chance in nature as a whole Hasker mentions the conceptions of John Polkinghorne and Peter Geach and refers to the kabbalistic doctrine of *Tzimzum*. According to the kabbalistic conception the necessary metaphysical condition for the possibility of the world is this world's autonomy with respect to God and in creating the world God imparted a measure of autonomy to His creation. Yet it ought to be borne in mind that the autonomy possessed by the world is only relative, it is a kind of circumscribed autonomy contained within the scheme of continuous conservation (God's continuous sustaining the world in existence). The existence of everything other than God himself is the outcome of God's conserving activity: "each creature is totally dependent on the Creator for its very existence."[70]

7. FREE-WILL THEODICY

Free will theodicy is based upon some description of characteristic features of the world forming the immediate environment of human life. The axiomatic assumptions (axiological postulates) that form the foundation of free-will theodicy not only identify some general properties of that human world but also give some evaluation of these properties. These

[69] We address the problem how to incorporate the notion of chance event as allowed for by indeterministic laws of nature in the discussion of the problem of evil and in particular how to use this notion to reduce the significance of evil in our 2015 article: Argument from Chance.

[70] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 125.

assumptions are as follows:

(T6): It is good for there to exist free, reasonable and responsible persons.

(T7): It is good for these persons to have the possibility to develop their potential

(T8): It is good for these persons to be able to come together to form families, communities and larger societies and within these groups to be able to take responsibility for other persons.

(T9): It is good for the structures and processes that characterize life in human society to be effected by the members of human societies and not to be imposed on them from above as it were, by some "superior power."[71]

These statements appear perspicuous enough and also well assembled by Hasker and so they do not stand in need of much arguing by way of justification. The idea of human beings' responsibility for their own destiny and that of their fellow human beings is deeply rooted in Western anthropological thought. This idea has been given particularly strong emphasis by the twentieth century philosophy of dialogue (Buber, Levinas), to whose thought Hasker, as well as other proponents of open theism, refer directly. One should also keep in mind that Hasker construes freedom of human will in the libertarian way, as expressed by the thesis (**). It is good for human persons to possess freedom, but this should be the libertarian freedom, not the one propounded by compatibilist doctrines of all sorts; needless to say, it is better to possess the libertarian freedom than no freedom at all with a mere illusion of freedom as taught by the doctrine of hard incompatibilism.

In a number of his works Hasker develops a separate discussion of libertarian freedom and represents the conditions that must be met if freedom of will construed in the libertarian way is to be at all possible. Essential for his consideration of freedom in the framework of free will theodicy is his firm rejection of theological determinism, that is the position claiming that whatever happens in the world is determined by God Himself and remains under His strict control.[72] If everything is determined by God, there remains no room whatever for freedom of created will. The notion of

[71] Ibid., s. 159.

[72] This position (theological determinism) Hasker attributes to Lutheranism, Calvinism and Thomism (Hasker 2008, 153). Whether this attribution and the understanding of these theological doctrines, so different among themselves, this attribution is based upon, is correct and just, is a question in its own right.

being determined by God extends not only to direct causation by God but also to God's infallible foreknowledge of future events. For if God infallibly knows beforehand all decisions made by human beings, all of their voluntary acts and the actions emanating from them, these acts and decisions can no longer be considered free in the sense postulated by libertarianism.[73] If God knows, without any possibility of error on his part, what will happen at a given moment before it actually happens, then this very event cannot fail to come about, then this very event *must* come about at its foreknown time and place; therefore it has to be considered necessary. Now, necessity and freedom are incompatible with each other. This consideration makes Hasker reject the traditional doctrine, long present in Western theology and philosophy as an indispensable component element of the classical theory, referred to since a certain moment as classical theism,[74] namely the doctrine proclaiming that God possesses unlimited and infallible knowledge of all events, actual as well as merely possible, including all future events. According to Hasker, God does not know future with a beforehand, infallible and unlimited comprehension, as future is something that does not yet actually exist, it is something that merely will exist. Even God cannot know something that does not exist in the same way He knows things that actually exist. Another assumption introduced by Hasker into this discussion is the assumption of God's temporality.[75] God's existence in time (of a kind) entails the fact that God is changeable in some respects. In particular, the aspect of God that undergoes changes is His knowledge of the actual world,

[73] This Hasker's argumentation I discuss extensively in my publications:: "Wszechwiedza Boża a problem zła z perspektywy teizmu otwartego," *Filo-Sofija* 2012, 19, pp. 117–129; "Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii," Kraków, Poznań, 2014; "Fatalizm logiczny i teologiczny a przedwiedza Boża. Krytyka argumentu antyredukcyjnego Lindy Zagzebski," *Analiza i Egzystencja* 26 (2014), pp. 5–19.

[74] Allegedly the first philosopher to have used the name "classical theism" was one of the pioneers of process theism (neoclassical theism), Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). To define classical theism more precisely, it is a set of views concerning God, His nature and His relations to the world as proclaimed by St. Augustine, Boethius, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas and all those who followed in their footsteps. Classical theism views God as possessing the following attributes: uniqueness, life, being the Creator (of all existing things other than Himself), omnipotence, timeless eternity, infinity, omniscience, will (and, consequently, personhood), perfection, immutability, incorporeality and simplicity. See D. Łukasiewicz, *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek*, pp. 27–31.

[75] W. Hasker, *Providence, Evil and the Openness of God*, London–New York 2004, s. 153.

as new events come successively into it the cosmos and the human history go on developing. The theological position on God's nature asserting that God exists in time, undergoes changes in some respects and does not infallibly know beforehand the future of the world is called open theism or free-will theism. Together with other open theists Hasker refuses to adopt the assertion of proponents of classical theism reiterated since at least the times of St. Augustine that far from striping man of his free will or limiting his freedom, God's omniscience is a necessary condition for human freedom. Augustine-style argument affirms that if God knows in advance, eternally and infallibly that a given person will act in a free way, that person of necessity will act in a free way and will precisely do what God knows in advance will be done.[76] Thus, according to that classical position, God's foreknowledge of man's future deeds does not stand in contradiction with human freedom of will. However, open theists remain unconvinced by this argument and object that in fact God's foreknowledge removes the possibility for a person facing a decision to choose between diverse alternative courses of action (the person will have to choose precisely the course of action foreseen by God in his foreknowledge). This problem of compatibility of God's infallible foreknowledge with human freedom is a very complex one and its discussion involves many sub-themes and strands; here we confine ourselves to indicate some aspects of it relative to the concept of free will, as this concept is of key importance for Hasker's theodicy. However, it is relevant for our purpose to make it clear right away that this theodicy, based as it is on the principles of open theism, does not attempt to exonerate God from the evil produced by free actions of created persons by invoking God's supposed ignorance of the commission of that evil beforehand or with a sufficient advance for Him to be able to prevent it being committed. It is not the case, open theists claim, that had God known what evil created people would commit using the gift of free choice, He would have prevented it in advance or even have created an entirely different world in place of the present one.

Taking into account the postulates (T6)–(T9) describing the world containing human beings, free-will theodicy entails the following affirmations:

(FWT1): There are free and intelligent beings in the world that live in communities and bearing mutual responsibility for each other. Human societies developed by making use of the potential of the

[76] Por. D. Łukasiewicz, *Bóg, wszechwiedza, wolność*, Bydgoszcz 2007.

persons constituting theses societies and as a result complex systems of organization of social life and culture came into being. Thus organized human beings enhanced their control over their social environment

(FWT2): The world containing human beings opens the possibility of realization of good which consists in a development of human potential and abilities and in evolution of human culture. Yet this very world also opens possibility for doing great evil, as human beings are able to use their abilities and potential to produce evil and for a rejection of good; they can prefer ephemeral advantages to durable common good, and may opt for ways of hatred rather than love.

(FWT3): No conceivable alternative world lacking the attributes defined by the postulates (T6)-(T9), offers a potential for an achievement of good that is comparable with the potential offered by our present world.

(FWT4): Conceivable frequent interventions by God in the human world designed to prevent instances of abuse of freedom by created free persons or to redress wrongs done by human bad choices and deeds would have the effect of undermining the structure of the human world and human societies as preconceived by God Himself in His project of creation. Such interventions, therefore, are not to be expected.

Hence:

(FWT5): It is good that God has created a world containing communities of persons of the kind described above. God is not to be charged with blame for having created a world with features and attributes of our present world; in fact there exist no grounds whatever for reproaching the perfectly benevolent Creator for not having made a different universe or indeed for not having done other than He in fact did.[77]

Free-will theodicy, as is evident from the reconstructed Hasker's statements, does indeed offer some reasons explaining why God allows evil perpetrated by free persons in his created world, while at the same time clearly assuming that God can always intervene in human history. God's power to intervene in human history lies within the scope of His omni-

[77] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, pp. 162–163. The here presented restatement of free-will theodicy reproduces the original formulation with only slight modifications, in fact only some formulations have been simplified for the sake of clarity.

potence, nevertheless it is not to be expected that He will ever use that power as there are good reasons for Him to forbear from doing so (FWT4). This assertion of Hasker's goes hand in hand with the stress he lays upon human responsibility for the fate of the world and the importance of that responsibility. In other words, history of the human world and all that is good or bad within that world depends on human free decisions and actions; if these decisions and actions were different and at least in some cases better, this world of ours could be better as well, be it by a minimal degree. This shows that free will theodicy entails no determinism or fatalism. However, neither does it justify the conclusion that every single instance of moral evil has been admitted by God into the world because the surpassing *value of the free will* of the perpetrators outweighed the evil of the harm caused by their wrongdoing to their victims, or that the exceptional *value of the suffering* of the victims was more than the evil of the wrongdoing causing that suffering. Or else, that the transcendent value of one human being's responsibility for the fate of other human beings is such as to outbalance the evil of the wrongs done by some humans to others. It is not Hasker's intention to affirm that every single instance of evil committed by free persons has been allowed by God because of some special reasons for such an admission. On the contrary, free will theodicy frankly assumes that at least some cases of abuse of free will have no justifying reasons behind them and serve no accomplishment of some greater good. In this respect free-will theodicy is in agreement with the defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil and with the Free-Will Defense.

8. THE COHERENCE OF HASKER'S THEODICY

Hasker's theodicy — and open theism in general — makes the assumption, as is well known, that God exists in time (of a kind) and is subject to some changes. This assumption remains in perfect agreement with the representation of God found in the Bible, as a person acting in history and entering into direct relations with particular human beings and nations. God in the Bible responds emotionally to the behavior of free created beings; He may be overjoyed, saddened, he may express regret, surprise and also anger.[78] This is to be construed as signifying that God remains open to

[78] I write more on the Biblical premises for this representation of God, with reference to the statements and texts by a number of various representatives of open theism

creatures he has endowed with freedom of will, that He does not exercise complete control over these creatures and does not know beforehand how they will act, and all this because He does not know the future infallibly and in advance.[79] Yet this gives rise to some doubts concerning the coherence of Hasker's theodicean doctrine as comprising his two defenses and his two theodicies.

Now if:

(A) God is a being of "unimaginable wisdom and power" [80];

(B) He sustains *everything* in existence: every single individual being as well as the totality made up of all such beings;

(C) He selects one definite kind of world for creation and creates precisely this chosen world;

then:

(D) Even if God possesses no infallible knowledge of the future, but has infallible and complete knowledge of the past and present, He will have notions concerning the future that will suffice to permit Him to foresee with a precision giving certainty every future event before it takes place.

Yet if this were the case, the Biblical representation of God as a person that is spontaneous in His reactions and responses to decisions and actions performed by human beings, a person that can on occasion really regret

in my monograph *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek. Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii*, chapter IV.

[79] As for God's knowledge of the future there is a certain additional difficulty resulting from the problem of the status of propositions regarding future events and their logical value. Hasker himself shows certain indecision on that point: there are two different and mutually incompatible conception of the nature of such propositions to be found in his texts. According to one conception, propositions regarding the future are true or false (they have logical value), yet God does not know it (He does not know whether they are true or false – W. Hasker, "A Philosophical Perspective," in C. Pinnock, R. Rice, J. Sanders, W. Hasker, D. Basinger, *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Understanding of God*, Downers Grove, 1994, p. 136); according to the other conception propositions concerning the future are neither true nor false, they have no logical value at all, as the future does not yet exist (W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 29). This conception presupposes that the future and time in general are dynamic in nature; time being in constant flow. What actually exists in principle is the present, the past is no longer, while the future does not yet exist. This conception of time is Augustine's and nowadays usually referred to as presentism.

[80] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 25.

something, be filled with joy, or sorrow, or surprised by something turns out to be unconvincing. Indeed, it is hardly convincing to affirm that God, having "unimaginable wisdom and power" should be surprised and angered like, for example, a husband discovering that his wife is unfaithful to him.[81]

This Biblical picture of God becomes unconvincing also in the context of the view that God is the Creator of all things (other than Himself) and the one who conserves everything in existence. Hasker does not enter into a precise explanation of how God's creative activity in the world ought to be construed. Generally speaking, the understanding of creation and conservation that is currently accepted in analytical philosophy can be reduced to the following theses: to create a certain being x is to be the cause of this being's very existence (as opposed to this being's form or essence) while conservation (sustaining or upholding in existence) is causing a created being to continue in existence over some extension of time.[82]

Thus if God is the cause of everything that exists (both in the collective and distributive sense) and His dealings with every being to which He imparts existence are guided by the designs He has with respect to it, then He must possess definite designs concerning every particular created thing (He wills that thing to exist). However, the danger of incoherence appears here, for the conception of conservation (continual creation) seems hard to reconcile with the libertarian conception of free will as well as with Hasker's thesis concerning the relative autonomy of the created world (T4). Within this framework of relative autonomy every created being has its own power of action and self-determination at its disposal, yet all these "powers of its own" have been imparted to that being by God and their measure and extension predetermined by Himself. If God had no design and no will for every existing being to continue in existence and to operate according to its own powers, nothing would exist and nothing would act and operate *as* it actually acts and operates.

Hasker, as we have already mentioned, rejects the traditional, compatibilist account of freedom of will and autonomy of created being like the one put forward by Thomism, which Hasker considers to be a kind of theo-

[81] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 205. This is a metaphoric expression referring to God's hurt feelings caused by Israel's unfaithfulness.

[82] We discuss the problems attendant on the classical (Augustinian and Thomistic) doctrine of God's continuous conservation of every being in existence in our article "Continuous creation in the probabilistic world of the theology of chance," *Analiza i Egzystencja* 2015, nr 31, pp. 21–35.

logical determinism.[83] Thomism, being a determinism of a sort, does not give a satisfactory account of the nature of human freedom and it magnifies the philosophical difficulties attendant on the problem of evil. It magnifies the problem of evil since according to its assumptions God alone determines everything happening within creation and thus is made to bear the total and immediate responsibility for the evil happening in the world.

If Hasker's account of the Thomist theory of freedom and determination by God is correct, Thomist theodicy does not fare much better than the theodicy of classical theism.[84]

It does not fare any better especially if the reasoning represented in the theses (A)-(D) is correct. In order to diminish the threat posed to theodicy by the lurking spectre of determinism and defend Hasker's free-will theodicy from suspicion of inconsistency, some modifications of the way the doctrine of conservation is construed should be proposed.[85]

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[83] A Thomist construes freedom of choice in the following way: a free choice is independent of any factors and agencies at work within the created world, however, it is not independent of God, since there is nothing that is independent of God. A being that were totally independent of God would be self-contradictory, given the assumption that no being other than God is independent of Him. Cf. B. Davies, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Oxford, 1993, pp. 174–178.

[84] It would be difficult here to give an account, however cursory, of various theodicean conceptions, older and newer, formulated by adherents of Thomism. Some of them are discussed in D. Łukasiewicz, "Metafizyczne podstawy chrześcijańskiej wizji cierpienia," in *Rozumieć cierpienie. Wokół myśli Jana Pawła II i pytań o przyszłość chrześcijaństwa*, ed. D. Łukasiewicz, M.K. Siwiec and S. Warzyński, Bydgoszcz, 2010, pp. 88–108. Perhaps of the most importance is the conception formulated by Eleonore Stump. She advanced the thesis that God allows suffering to in order to free the persons afflicted from bondage to sin. Such a doctrine is located in the current of thought assuming that suffering as such ennobles and perfects man.

[85] Hasker himself proposes another way of refuting this objection. In creating the world God selects general strategies and not detailed projects (W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 204). An analogy may illustrate this point: an engineer working on a project of a motorway may content himself with giving a general outline of the planned road or may take into account detailed descriptions of car accidents that might possibly occur on the road and include detailed improvements designed to avoid such accidents in his project. In the former case this engineer is like the God of open theism, while in the latter he rather acts like the God of theological determinism (Thomism) and Molinism. However, if we take into account the 'unimaginable power and wisdom of God" and the fact of continuous conservation of all things by God, we ought rather to conclude that the God of open theism is closer to a God giving completely detailed and finished designs (the God of theo-

There seems to be a number of ways to introduce such modifications.[86]

Some theologians propose to limit God's immediate contribution to creation to the original creative act at the beginning of all things; afterwards the world develops by its own powers and even upholds itself in existence by its own strength; this is possible because the world has been endowed by God with the ability to sustain itself in being.[87]

Another proposal comes from Michał Heller, according to whom the notion of conservation, as well as many other notions of traditional metaphysics, ought to be reinterpreted in the light of our contemporary science. Interpreted in this way, conservation could be construed simply as the continuous operation of the natural laws established by God. Natural

logical determinism) than to one limiting himself to a general design and leaving the details to be filled in by creatures. Thus the proposed analogy is defective and fails to convince as a means of defending the assertion that open theism works better as a theodicy than theological determinism and Molinism. Moreover, Hasker himself admits, that although God's chosen project of creation was good as a general outline, yet in its realization so much evil, chaos and disorder came to being, that to counteract this evil God would have to intervene on a mass scale. This however, a shrewd critic might point out, seems to cast doubt on God's infinite wisdom and creative imagination. Thus, let us explicitly stress, this line of defense is inefficient and unconvincing.

86 The traditional way, elaborated already by classical theists and known under the designation of concurrentism is the conception assuming that God is not the total cause of all aspects of a created being, but only the first cause of the existence of every contingent being and also the cause of the power to act of every being. God's causal import in a being coexists and cooperates with the action of secondary causes (the causal actions exerted by created beings). The doctrine of concurrentism has been elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas, who was well aware of and wished to counteract the threat posed by determinism or occasionalism, like the one espoused e.g. by some Arab thinkers. One of the problematic points of concurrentism that has ever been an object of controversy concerning concurrentism is the problem of delimiting the contribution of God and the one of secondary causes in the world. The principles of God's action in the created world according to St. Thomas Aquinas are extensively discussed in M.J. Dodds, *The Unchanging God of Love*, Washington, 2008. Especially important in this approach is the explanation of the changes occurring in the world and caused by unchangeable God existing beyond any time. According to the Thomist conception God eternally and immutably wants certain things in the world to change and for this reason the changes desired by God really occur.

87 See T.D. Miller, *Continuous Creation, Persistence, and Secondary Causation: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Theism*, Ocklahoma, 2007.

laws never stop to operate, they hold without any breaks, and since they have been laid down by God Himself, it can be easily assumed that the doctrine of continuous conservation of the world by God refers in fact to the exceptionalness operation of natural laws. [88] However, within the framework of this conception more should be said on the possibility of God's extraordinary interventions in the world, such as miracles worked in response to petitionary prayers. Hasker's open theism, as has already been stated, is a doctrine attempting to minimize God's direct interventions in the world, without, however, ruling them out altogether. Anyway, the nomological conception of divine conservation needs to be completed with a model of extraordinary divine action in the world in the context of the assumption of the constant validity of natural laws in this very world. In this respect the most promising, although rejected by Heller and other theists engaged in a dialogue with contemporary science, theoretical proposal is the conception of God acting directly yet within the framework of the established natural laws (without contravening any of the existing natural laws). This conception is possible on the assumption of an indeterministic and probabilistic interpretation of the elementary mechanisms of the quantum world. According to this conception divine direct intervention in the world would consist in determining some events that are not strictly predetermined by the indeterministic natural laws in the direction corresponding to His chosen objectives.[89] It is equally possible, that God can effect some events in the world apart from the existing laws or "above" them, as it were, without suspending or breaking these laws in the instance of His intervention. It is, finally, possible for God directly to act in the world at every level of its structure: both, as it were, within the (probabilistic) natural laws and independently of them; it is possible to conceive God as intervening in the world at His own chosen time and in His own chosen manner with the autonomy imparted by Him to all the created beings being totally preserved. All these things are conceivable as perfectly possible, if some further assumptions are made concerning the nature of natural laws and divine causation . According to Hasker natural laws are expressions of the causal powers of the objects existing in the world.[90] Thus the existence

[88] M. Heller, *Sens życia i sens wszechświata*, Kraków 2014, p. 155.

[89] D. Łukasiewicz, "O założeniach filozoficznych opatrzności kwantowej i jej niektórych konsekwencjach," *Filo-Sofija* 2015, 31, pp. 205–215.

[90] „This embodies the idea that the natural laws that obtain are expressions of the essential causal powers of the kinds of objects that exist." W. Hasker, *The Emergent*

of natural laws depends on some objects in the world possessing causal powers. In its turn the existence of the very objects in the world complete with their causal potential is effected by God, the universal creator conserving every created being in existence. By contrast, the nomological redefinition of the doctrine of continuous conservation of creatures by God would have to acknowledge that the causal power of objects existing in the world and the very existence of these objects is not effected directly by God but is a result of the way the autonomous world is and works.

In order to uphold such a version of the doctrine of divine conservation of the created world one needs to distinguish three aspects of God's causal relationship to the world, distinguished according to the effects produced in the object of the divine causation. Firstly, God as a creator (the first and transcendent cause) is the cause of the existence of the world in the sense that God makes the world exist which would not exist at all were it not for the creative act of God. Secondly, God as the first and transcendent cause is the cause of the world's existence in that He continuously upholds the world in existence. Thirdly, God as the first and transcendent cause, is the cause of the world's existence in the sense that He makes this world, created and continuously sustained in existence, be what it is and have the features and powers it has. Moreover, one would have to assume the *intransitivity* of the relation of divine causation or *exceptional* nature of God's creative activity meaning that, contrary to ordinary causal relationships, the fact that God is the cause of the world's existence does not entail God's being a cause of every event occurring in the world nor His participating as a causal factor in every real cause-effect relationship. Such a principle of the intransitivity of divine causal action would not imply, on the other hand, that God is never a cause of any event happening in the world created by Himself. God is the first and transcendent cause of the existence of the world and, additionally, can be the cause of any event specially willed by Himself in this otherwise autonomous world. It is good to bear in mind that a corollary to the principle of intransitivity is the affirmation that the world's property of being created by God does not entail that every feature of the world has this property. It seems that it is only on these assumptions that one can meaningfully speak of the "relative" autonomy of every being as well as of the real possibility of chance events occurring in the world and of the human faculty of making free choices construed in the libertarian way.

Self, Ithaca and London, 1999, p. 71.

Another key assumption introduced by Hasker in the interest of his Free-Will Defense and the construction of free-will theodicy is his dynamic theory of time (referred to as time theory A). However in contemporary metaphysical and scientific discussions of the nature of time, the conception of dynamic time is far from a universally accepted and uncontroversial theory and can easily be challenged both from the standpoint of the theory of relativity and of quantum mechanics. True, the dynamic conception of time fairly well corresponds to our intuitive perception of time, according to which time is in constant flow, yet from a more sophisticated perspective, say, Einstein's relativity, present and future are relative notions, not absolute ones, while in quantum mechanics the very flow of time is a sort of fiction or, as Michał Heller puts it, "anachronism."[91] A scientifically better founded conception of time is the Eleatic theory (so called time theory B), according to which the past, present and future are all real and in an equal degree so, even though from the human viewpoint they are not equally accessible, since a human being is always set in a definite present and in a concrete time. It is conceivable, nevertheless, that God is in a position to view all times, the whole course of history simultaneously and in a single view and thus He knows equally well not only the whole past and present but also what for us, humans, still remains the future. Thus God's knowledge is not limited to what was in the past and what is in the present, but encompasses also the totality of what will be at any future time. This conception of God's knowledge as constituted by a timeless vision is also in perfect agreement with the tradition of Western metaphysical thought and theology. It has been proposed by Boethius, Anselm and, to a certain extent, Thomas Aquinas.[92] However, in order to accept this conception we have to assume that God is a timeless being, in other words, we must reject

[91] The fact that time does not flow at the quantum level does not imply that the quantum world is static; on the contrary, reality which is free from the passage of time is very dynamic. This is how Heller comments on the problem of the flow of time: "If contemporary physics more and more assuredly represents to us a domain of the world (the so called fundamental area below "Planck threshold") in which time does not flow (in the usual sense) and the very notion of time becomes meaningless, and in which, nevertheless, authentic dynamism is possible, then extending to God the category of "being subject to time" rather appears an *anachronism*. Nowadays it is not merely philosophical speculations but the evidence taken from physics seem to indicate that the flow of time is closely bound up with certain laws of physics. M. Heller, *Sens życia i sens wszechświata*, p. 178.

[92] See D. Łukasiewicz, *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek*, chapter I.

the thesis of God existing in time; yet if we do that, shall we not shake the foundations of Hasker's Free-Will Defense and free-will theodicy?

Hasker himself has distinguished a number of fundamental positions concerning God's nature and God's providence: theological determinism (already referred to above), which is a typical feature of classical theism (which, according to Hasker, encompasses also Thomism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism), Molinism, open theism, simplicism (the view that God simply knows the future in a way totally beyond our comprehension) and eternalism (the view that God possesses a timeless vision of the whole history, both cosmic and human). Determinism (Thomism) and Molinism cannot, in his opinion, be reconciled with the theodicean conception of open theism, while open theism and, simplicism and eternalism each have a "theodicean potential" that is close to that of the others. One can agree with this last view on condition that the notion of continuous conservation is suitably redefined. God allows gratuitous evil in the world not because He is ignorant of it going to take place in the world He creates or of it being in fact gratuitous (rather than purposeful), but because of His assumed general strategy of non-intervention, already entailed in His creative project. The spiritual development of human beings and providing a firm basis for moral life are the essential component elements of this divine design. This view can perfectly be accommodated within the framework of simplicism and eternalism and thus one can, on the ground of either theory accept the possibility of the existence of gratuitous evil and Hasker's Free-Will Defense and his free-will theodicy.

Nevertheless the justification proposed for the leading assumption of open theism, which is the existence of God in time and God being subject to change in some respects, as well as the dynamic nature of time is not wholly satisfactory and does not convince. Inconsistency can be avoided in Hasker's theodicean conception provided that the notion of divine conservation, potentially generative of determinism, be suitably defined, yet on the whole it is difficult to defend both the Biblical representation of God as a person existing in time and the theory of time as remaining in a flow. The Biblical picture of God as a person subject to affections and excitable is all too anthropomorphic, very difficult to square with other theological tenets, and in particular with the affirmation that God is a being "of unimaginable wisdom and power" that causes all existing things to exist.

In recapitulation of this part of our discussion we ought to state that Hasker's theodicy taken in its broad context (together with its assumptions

and implications), that is understood as a metaphysics of God designed to deal with the problem of evil is not a wholly successful effort. For besides some notions and statements that need to be made more clear and precise (e.g. the notion of conservation), which can conceivably be done, there are more difficult problems to solve, such as God's relation to time and the problem of correctness of the Biblical representation of the divine nature. Still, one may feel entitled to advance the claim that Hasker's theodicean thought (his defenses and theodicies taken in the narrow sense) remains defensible even when the metaphysics of God found in open theism is rejected. In other words, theodicy in the narrow (strict) sense remains a possibility even without theodicy taken in the large sense (the framework of open theism as a whole). In particular, it is possible to maintain a free-will theodicy and a natural-order theodicy and invoke a defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil on the assumption of eternalism (the thesis that God possesses an atemporal vision of the whole history, both human and cosmic) and a complete and unlimited knowledge of the future on the part of God.[93]

[93] Eternalism neither presupposes nor implies Molinism and even less theological determinism. There is a view claiming that given the assumption that God is the only creator of reality and is an omniscient being, the philosophical problem of evil is an enormous challenge to theism (and provides a good case for atheism). This view, however, is not right. A more extensive and in-depth treatment of the problem how eternalism can be brought into agreement with the thesis that God is the sole creator of the world without making the problem of evil even more difficult to deal with is contained in my work *Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek: Studium z analitycznej filozofii religii.* That God has eternal vision of the behavior of persons acting in the created world does not imply that these persons have no possibility to choose between diverse projects and courses of action, nor that they are no longer free in the strong libertarian sense. It is also worthwhile to point out that open theism as such faces the problem of providing an explanation for the Biblical (and possibly other) prophecies, given the assumption that is essential for that position, namely that God does not infallibly know the future. The fact of prophecy is very easily and clearly explained on the ground of eternalism by reference to God's infallible vision of the whole of history; as an omniscient being, God can occasionally reveal parts of His knowledge to persons of His choice.

9. GOD'S TRIUMPH OVER EVIL AND FREEDOM OF HUMAN WILL

However we assess the internal coherence of open theism or the well-groundedness of the metaphysical premises it is based on, we ought to bear in mind that open theism is a theism, whose ultimate point of reference always remains Christianity. Yet Christianity does not speculate on a compossibility of God and evil, nor does it rely on producing conceivable reasons for God admitting various kinds and instances of evil. Christianity is neither a defense (of a theory) nor a theodicy: it is a religion proclaiming God's final and ultimate victory over evil. As we are about to see, however, in Hasker's philosophical conception, God's triumph over evil is bound up to a certain extent with the *freedom of human will* in the eschatological reality, that is in the life in the world to come, which, according to the religious revelation, is to come after death.

To present the role of human free will in the ultimate triumph of God over evil we have to refer to the distinction introduced at the beginning of this article between *balancing off* an evil and *defeating* it. Now, according to Hasker, victory over evil is not reducible either to balancing it off or to defeating it.[94] It may well happen in some cases that God's victory over an evil will entail defeating that evil, still, the victory over the evil will be something more than and qualitatively different from mere defeating that evil.[95] The thesis that *every* evil will be defeated by some greater good would be incompatible with a defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil; that is why Hasker rejects all theodicies which identify God's *triumph* over evil with defeating that evil.[96] For defeating evil presupposes the necessity of the defeated evil for realization of some greater good, if God's triumph over evil

[94] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 200.

[95] An example showing that God's triumph over evil entails defeating that evil yet cannot be reduced to it is that of a person bravely struggling against an incurable and fatal illness. The effort to overcome the illness strengthens the man spiritually and opens to him new, hitherto unknown axiological horizons. This amounts to an inner positive change and development of a new spiritual quality, that is some good which outweighs the evil of sickness and death. Thus the evil of the illness is defeated because these new spiritual perfections could not possibly come to being without that illness. Yet the ultimate triumph over evil can only be accomplished with God's assistance: for it is only God that can return life to a man who died and annihilate death altogether, which will take place in the future life.

[96] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, pp. 199–220.

were to be identified with His defeating every singular case of evil, this would mean that every instance of evil is *necessary* for an achievement of some greater good, whereas any defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil relies on the admission of the possibility of the occurring some evil that is *unnecessary* and gratuitous. Hasker also repeatedly points out that all arguments in defense of the necessity of evil and all theodicies which assume that *every* single instance of evil is a necessary condition for some greater good run the risk of giving support to morally unacceptable consequences as they seem to encourage inactive attitudes towards human wrongs and injustice widespread in the world. He illustrates this point by quoting the example of many white Christians in America, especially in the South, who remained inactive when the struggle went on for civil rights for Afro-Americans.[97] Those Christians sought a justification of their inactivity pleading God's will and arguing that things are as they are because God wills them so.

To give a brief and comprehensive restatement of Hasker's theodicean thought, in his opinion, *defeating* evil implies in fact defense of evil and a devastation of human morality.[98] If this really be the case, one ought to acknowledge that there exists evil that cannot be *defeated.* This conclusion, however, stands in full agreement with the defense of the necessity of gratuitous evil and with the moral intuitions expressed by the proponents of anti-theodicy, such as Roth or Phillips. On the other hand, the import of this conclusion should not be extended to all singular instances of evil; it is not Hasker's meaning to imply that *every* particular evil will remain undefeated or gratuitous in the sense defined in the defense of gratuitous evil, only *some* cases of evil are futile and unnecessary.[99]

[97] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, p. 194.

[98] The word "implies" is here taken in a very large sense, exceeding the limits of its strictly logical usage as indicating a material or strict consequence.

[99] A critic of Hasker's thought could object here that Hasker's own position can be construed as entailing devastation of morality, since the reason adduced in defense of gratuitous evil is that gratuitous evil is a device serving to preserve moral motivation in human acts, that is a means of accomplishing some good, no matter whether this gratuitous evil be conceived only generically or as a concrete, particular instance of evil. From this point of view it is good that gratuitous evil exists. To answer this criticism one might invoke a kind of scepticism: the inadequacy of our knowledge results in our failure to recognize (at least to know in all relevant instances) with a sufficient degree of certainty, whether the concrete instance of evil we face is an example of gratuitous evil or not; this granted, we ought to conduct ourselves in all our encounters with evil as though the evil we face actually were an example of gratuitous evil. The awareness of the possibility of the given instance of evil being a pointless evil

Nevertheless, the question naturally arises: if there exists an evil that remains undefeated, what does the ultimate triumph of God over all evil consist in? To give an answer to this question Hasker introduces the perspective of eschatology and considers two widely known eschatological conceptions of God's victory over evil. One is the conception of joy formulated by Julian of Norwich, the other the theory of retrospective affirmation of one's temporal life put forward by Marilyn McCord Adams.[100] Julian's conception of joy consists in the idea that when we finally stand before God face to face with the whole memory of our lives preserved intact, and in particular with the recollection of the most important, most memorable events, every man who suffered in life will experience profound joy when God Himself offers her/him thanks for the experienced suffering. That joy occasioned by God's gratitude and His recognition of the deserts of those who have patiently borne their ordeals will be so great that all the experienced evil will be triumphed over (overcome) by the quality and intensity of that joy.

The retrospective affirmation of one's temporal life will occur when a person who has experienced "intense suffering" in her/his life, seeing her/his whole life from an eschatological perspective acknowledges that this very life of hers/his, taken as a whole, has been meaningful and valuable. If such an acknowledgement is made, the whatever evil was present in that life will be defeated or triumphed over.[101]

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should motivate us actively to oppose it. Thus a doctrine assuming reality of gratuitous evil can really inspire human beings with energy to act against all appearances of evil rather than encourage a passive attitude on their part. A recognition that a given evil may possibly be pointless and serve no hidden good purpose will always incite morally sensitive and thoughtful human beings to struggle against it. This is a good philosophy, as opposed to a bad one, e.g. Nietzschean philosophy, in which suffering is assumed to have no meaning at all, yet at the same time rejected is freedom of will, moral responsibility for one's actions, contrition, remorse etc. All subjects are but passive participants in some fatalistic theatre show, repeating itself an infinite number of times, and ultimately based upon casual arrangements of mindless atoms. Nobody is to blame (nor to praise) for anything, nobody is responsible for anything, things simply *happen* as they do, and that is all that can be said of them.

[100] See D. Łukasiewicz, "'Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God' (by Marylin McCord Adams, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1999)," *Filo-Sofija* 2003, 3, pp. 267–273.

[101] The notion of *defeat* as used in McCord Adams is not equivalent to the notion of *defeat* as used by Chisholm. In this case the same English word carries with itself two different philosophical meanings. *Defeating evil* in the sense of Chisholm takes place within the framework of temporal life while *defeating evil* in the sense of

In both of the quoted theories of God's eschatological triumph over evil, the final victory over evil depends not only on God, but also on the created persons concerned in the struggle. God will finally triumph over evil on the condition that the created persons concerned will be overjoyed over God's gratitude or will acknowledge their lives as precious even in the face of the evil the experience of which formed part thereof.

However, Hasker finds fault with both these theories of the final overcoming of evil, and the chief reason for his objection is the fact that both conceptions only take into account the victims of suffering and wrongdoing and totally leave out the perpetrators of evil and those who cause the suffering. How can we apply the notion of God's gratitude to a wrongdoer? Or the notion of retrospective affirmation of one's life to the lives of the SS henchmen responsible for the crimes of Auschwitz or Treblinka? God cannot be thankful for the commitment of evil, neither can the perpetrators of monstrous evil be satisfied with their earthly lives: their satisfaction would only mean that they remain unrepentant of the evil deeds they committed. Yet, according to the theory of retrospective affirmation, a committed evil would be overcome also in the case its perpetrators failed to regret having committed it.

Seen from this perspective, the consequences of both the theories (the conception of joy and the conception of retrospective affirmation of one's temporal life) appear as morally unacceptable. Hasker does not reject them altogether, but suggests an essential modification: there is, according to him, an additional necessary condition, though not sufficient one, for the ultimate triumph over evil, this condition is *forgiveness* offered by the victims of a wrongdoing to its perpetrators. An act of forgiveness, however, presupposes *repentance* on the part of the wrongdoers, and both repentance and an act of forgiveness presuppose freedom of will construed in the libertarian way: the concept of freedom applying both to wrongdoers and their victims in this life. It is worthwhile to note in this place that if compatibilism was right in its conception of the nature of will, such phenomena as repentance, in particular repentance of a committed horrible evil, and forgiveness of such an evil, would be hard to explain.[102]

McCord Adams can only take place in eternal life, or at least supratemporal one. As for Hasker, he only uses the noun (and the corresponding verb) *defeat* (of evil) with reference to temporal reality, while he reserves the noun *victory* or *triumph* over evil (with the corresponding verb) for the eschatological context (the sphere of afterlife).

[102] It would be difficult to attempt a reasonably complete phenomenological description of such human attitudes and acts as repentance and forgiveness, yet it is im-

It remains a possibility, nevertheless, that among the wrongdoers guilty of committing great evil there will be such as will refuse to repent for their wrongdoings. In that case forgiveness will not be possible, neither will God's ultimate and complete triumph over evil. If, however, repentance does appear in the wrongdoers, one of its manifestations should be an acknowledgment by them that their lives, such as it was, were not wholly worth living because of the evil they have committed. At this point the conception of retrospective affirmation of one's life faces a difficulty: repentant wrongdoers would have to question the value of their lives: in this respect McCord Adams's conception cannot be applied to wrongdoers as Hasker wished to do. This difficulty can, nevertheless, be made less acute by assuming that perpetrators of crimes will recognize their temporal lives as worth living as such, yet they will repent of having made wrong use of them: they will wish it were possible for them to live their lives once again (or to put the clock back) so that they could act differently. This would be retrospective affirmation of one's life combined with regret that one has failed to live this life differently, in a better way.[103]

If God's ultimate triumph over evil were to consist in wrongdoings being repented of by the wrongdoers and forgiven by the victims, this would mean that the final overcoming of evil depended not exclusively on God, as the cause of afterlife, but also on beings created by Himself and on the choices these beings made in their afterlife.[104] It is a possibility that all per-

mediately obvious that such acts have to be spontaneous and result from some fundamental decisions by the subject, decisions not predetermined by God or by circumstances, nor by the nature of the subject performing these acts. Possibly it is in acts of repentance and forgiveness that the nature of free will as conceived in the libertarian way is manifested: the persons made victims of a grave wrongdoing and the consequent suffering may be determined by their experiences to a refusal of forgiveness even when faced with the wrongdoers' repentance, while the wrongdoers themselves may be so formed by the evil they have been perpetrating that they will fail to repent of their evil actions. If repentance and forgiveness should appear after all in the perpetrators and the victims respectively, it will rather be against the course of their previous experiences than as a result of it. Thus if such axiological events as repentance and forgiveness do occur, it is precisely they that manifest freedom of will, which can rise above the most painful and traumatic experiences of one's life: for what is forgiven in such acts is the very unforgivable.

[103] Hasker fails to take into account difficulties attendant on an attempt to extend the doctrine of retrospective affirmation of one's life in its generalized version to the perpetrators of horror-inspiring evil. Hence our suggestion of overcoming this difficulty.

[104] Hasker defends the theory of emergent dualism, according to which the soul is

petrators of crimes will repent, and that all victims will forgive their wrongdoers. Consequently, it is possible that ultimately all human beings will retrospectively acknowledge their lives as valuable and purposeful, or, at least, will acknowledge that it was worthwhile to live their lives, albeit not in the way they actually lived them. It is also possible, that God could forgive all humans their transgressions, or that He could forgive some of them while refuse to forgive others, regardless of how human persons relate to each other and to their earthly lives in the eschatological perspective. He could do all that, that is He could save or damn according to His own will and judgment. However, Hasker, and some other contemporary religious thinkers emphasize the importance of *free decisions* made by human beings in the afterlife. They incline rather strongly to the conception that the instant of death of a human being is not the definitive moment in which the ultimate destiny of that human being is irrevocably decided forever.[105] If freedom of will construed according to libertarianism will be preserved in the afterlife, it remains a possibility that some persons guilty of wrongdoing will refuse to repent of their crimes and even reject the forgiveness of God himself. If such be the case, these persons will choose to go to hell, which can possibly last forever.[106] This in turn means that in that case there would exist (as seen from the eschatological perspective) some past evil that remained forever gratuitous and *undefeated* as well as the eternal evil of hell.[107] All this would be a possibility because of the existence of the freedom of human will, whose power would include a rejection of God's forgiveness of sins committed by humans. God, let us repeat, could in principle forgive the perpetrators of the most horrible evil their wrongdoings, regardless of the attitude of other persons, in particular those who were themselves victims of the wrongdoings committed by those perpetra-

derived from the body (the brain) and is itself physical in nature. The soul's existence after death requires a special intervention by God (W. Hasker, *The Emergent Self*, p. 233).

[105] Various doctrines treating of possible afterlife and the role of human free will in the life after death are discussed in the article: D. Łukasiewicz, "Piekło – kara czy wolny wybór?," *Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL*, 2010, kwiecień-wrzesień, pp. 90–105.

[106] It does not have to be eternal, though: in principle God could stop it by annihilating those recalcitrant persons; yet it is also possible that God will preserve them in existence. See ibid.

[107] Past evil could exist either as preserved in the past that would retain some sort of real existence or as preserved in the memory of God and human beings.

tors, on condition, however, that these sinners repented of their transgressions and asked for forgiveness.

However, even assuming a scenario according to which at least some of the victims of horrible evil forgive their wrongdoers as the latter repent of their crimes, still the question can be asked: is this scenario wholly convincing and does it allow hope for God's total and ultimate triumph over evil? The answer to this question is based upon the crucial distinction between negative and positive evil. Negative (or privative) evil is simple absence (or lack) of good, whereas positive evil is a *force* that is destructive of good and actively opposing good.[108]

In Hasker's conception, God's ultimate triumph over evil consists in a total annihilation by God of every force tending to destroy good. All ultimately damned beings (if there be such), will be made *powerless.* Thus if they go on willing to perpetrate evil, they will no longer be able to carry out their will. They will be condemned to eternal impotence. It is also conceivable that God, in an act of grace, will reduce them to eternal nothingness: thus if they persist in existence at all, it will be solely in the memories of God and the saved persons, although even this is uncertain.

Thus the ultimate triumph of God over evil can be conceived as depending solely on God if we construe evil as a positive force striving to destroy good, as only God can annihilate the virtue of that force and that force itself. If we conceive of evil negatively as lack of good, then God's triumph over evil depends on the free will of created beings, who may opt for the way of reconciliation and forgiveness or for that of hatred. Gratuitous evil as found in our temporal lives may forever remain undefeated, because not forgiven and, possibly, never forgotten.[109]

[108] W. Hasker, *The Triumph of God over Evil*, s. 218. According to this insight hell is only negative (privative) evil, it is mere absence of God and heaven. It is worthwhile to note, that the doctrine of evil as entirely consisting in lack of good has recently been defended from the standpoint of classical theism e.g. by Jacek Wojtysiak in *Spór o istnienie Boga* (Kraków, Poznań, 2012).

[109] God has power over time and memory and may cause memory to disappear without destroying the identity of the individuals concerned. There are plenty of things we experienced in our lives which we do not remember nor wish to remember; there are experiences of ours we simply never think about, but does this fact make us lose our identity and makes us other persons than we hitherto have been? We may possibly only remember good things and still remain the very persons we have been before. It may be appropriate here to quote the statement by Tadeusz Czeżowski expressed in 1940 in the context of his polemic against the view he himself named "pessimistic nihilism," upholding impossibility of happiness: "In

There are some thinkers nowadays, who put forward arguments in defense of "pessimistic nihilism," the theory affirming that the memory of experienced evil will go on forever in the minds of all those who were implicated in that experience, be it as victims or as wrongdoers. Hence, argue the proponents of this theory, salvation conceived as uncontaminated happiness, absolutely free of the slightest evil is not a possibility at all; indeed, such happiness would in itself be something bad. This is the objection raised by Ireneusz Ziemiński.[110]

To illustrate his point Ziemiński quotes a passage from Isaac Bashevis Singer, a fragment of a monologue by one of his protagonists, a survivor of the Holocaust. This is what the man asserts:

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this case, as it seems to me, one can as well respond, that although fear of the uncertain future and dread of death are ubiquitous in the sense that every human being can be subject to them, yet it is far from true they are experienced unceasingly all the time. Here things are like the way we entertain the conviction that the Earth is spherical. This conviction inheres in myself as a disposition of a kind, and it is only in rare moments, on suitable occasions that it is experienced as an actual judgment. Likewise, there are long stretches of life in which we neither experience apprehension about the uncertain future nor a fear of death and one can easily imagine that in such periods of life a human being could be completely happy (T. Czeżowski, "O szczęściu," in *Odczyty Filozoficzne*, 2nd ed., Toruń, 1969, p. 168).

Why not suppose that such a situation might be the case in afterlife, with the sole reservation that these periods of forgetfulness would be very long, would indeed amount to everlasting experience of happiness? However, it is also possible that things would not be so in afterlife, perhaps those who wished to retain the memory of horrible things would preserve it intact. Let us recall Jankiel Wiernik's words from his *Year in Treblinka: "*I carry a hundred centuries upon my shoulders. Hard it is, o how unspeakably hard. And yet, for now, I have to carry. I *want* to carry and I have to. I, who have seen the extermination of three generations, I have to go on living for the future. The whole world has got to know the atrocities of those barbarians. Centuries and generations to come have got to condemn them."

It may be so, that in the light of God's ultimate triumph over evil the memory of all those terrible evils will no longer be necessary for any purpose and such persons as Wiernik will decide that they are free to throw off the burden of their recollections and will no longer want or feel obliged to remember. Of course all these conjectures are but our speculations that are permitted in so far as very little has been revealed as to what the eternal life will be like in the eternal reality. At any rate, the thesis that salvation and memory of terrible things are not possible together seems far from sufficiently justified.

[110] I. Ziemiński, "Kryzys chrześcijaństwa z perspektywy filozofii religii," *Filo-Sofija* 2014, 25, pp. 109–138; "Zło a życie wieczne. Czy zbawienie usprawiedliwia cierpienie w życiu doczesnym."

> After what has taken place, it takes a complete idiot and a man devoid of sensitivity to believe in God and all that rubbish [...] A belief in a merciful God is the worst betrayal of the victims. Here came a rabbi from America and proclaimed that six million Jews live in Paradise, stuffing themselves with Leviathan's meat and studying the Torah with the angels. You do not have to be a psychologist to understand what kind of problems such beliefs are meant to compensate for [...] If afterlife really existed, this would be the worst cruelty. What use would it be for a soul to remember the misery of its existence? Would that indeed be so splendid if my father's soul continued in existence and went on remembering how his partner cheated him out of his money, how his house perished in fire, how my sister Mirełe died in childbirth, and then those ghettos, camps and Nazi crematoria? If there is any justice in nature, it is the soul's vanishing at the moment of the body's dissolution. I cannot understand how anyone could think otherwise.[111]

With due understanding given to these words and the bitterness contained therein, one should nevertheless ask: would it really be an evil if deceased persons, be it under circumstances totally exceeding human ability to comprehend, met again in the afterworld as fully alive and conscious, free of all physical pain and without fear of any enemies or traitors?

If God is able to make it so that there will no longer be death, evil shall perish, it is at least possible, if not likely or even certain, that memory of terrible things, even if it were to last forever (cf. footnote 62), will not destroy the joy coming from the possession of eternal life to the persons granted with it. Let us repeat: the bitter feelings of those disillusioned with the world and the course of its history and led to doubt the all-power and perfect goodness of God can be understood, yet the mere fact of there being pessimists and sceptics publicly proclaiming their disbelief in itself does not constitute any argument for the negative thesis that God's ultimate victory over evil is not possible.

Let us quote in this context the passage from the Book of Isaiah with which William Hasker rounds off his, to our mind *convincing*, description of God's final triumph over evil (Isaiah 25:6-9):

> On this mountain, the Lord of hosts will prepare for all peoples a banquet of rich food. On this mountain he will remove the mourning veil covering all peoples, and the shroud enwrapping all nations, he will destroy Death forever. The Lord will wipe away the tears from every cheek, he will take away his

[111] The quote comes from the short story: I.B. Singer, *The Teache*r, in idem, *A Friend of Kafka*, transl. E. Petrajtis-O'Neill, Warszawa, 2004, pp. 114–115. Quoted after I. Ziemiński, "Kryzys chrześcijaństwa z perspektywy filozofii religii," p. 135.

people's shame everywhere on earth, for the Lord has said so. That day, it will be said. See, this is our God in whom we hoped for salvation, the Lord is the one in whom we hoped. We exult and we rejoice that he has saved us.

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The theodicean thought of William Hasker is firmly set in the tradition of western Christian metaphysics. This is shown by the presence in Hasker's philosophy of the doctrine of creation of the world out of nothing in a free and sovereign creative act by God complete with the doctrine of constant conservation in existence of all of the created beings. The world is autonomous, but its autonomy is only relative. Thoroughly Christian is Hasker's doctrine upholding the primary importance of human free will and human responsibility for sins committed by human beings, that is for what in philosophy we call moral evil. Profoundly Christian is also Hasker's belief that the world as we know it, being God's creation, is essentially good. Creation is not in its ground, in its principles, in the profoundest "abyss of the world," evil, nor predetermined to turn out evil.[112] Christian is also Hasker's conviction that there is a power in the world that actively opposes good. This power is not merely an inert absence of good, as some great theologians of the West have been wont to assert, it is rather an evil might capable of initiative of its own. Hasker does not provide a closer description of that power and he thinks of it in terms of an impersonal reality rather than a person. This evil power may manifest itself in appalling human acts of hatred, destruction and crime. But equally in accord with Christian faith is Hasker's belief that this evil power will ultimately be totally and decisively annihilated with the sovereign act manifesting God's omnipotence. The doctrine of human will and its freedom, that is so important for the whole western philosophical tradition, is also one of the most important parts, if not the most important part of Hasker's theodicean thought. Yet Hasker conceives freedom more radically than it was the case in the main current of Christian classical theism which was formed in late antiquity by the Church Fathers and especially by St. Augustine. Hasker, like Molina and contemporarily Alvin Plantinga and his followers, adopts the libertarian conception of freedom of will, whereas the conception that dominated the

[112] Such a thoroughly pessimistic representation of the world is depicted by Bogusław Wolniewicz in his works (see his "Epifania diabła," p. 217).

classical theism was theological compatibilism. The libertarian conception of freedom attributes a higher degree of autonomy and independence with respect to God to human will than the theory of theological compatibilism asserting not only that God eternally and in advance knows all human free decisions, but also that He in a way participates in the generation of every human decision. Thus theological compatibilism is a view upholding that human freedom coexists with God's activity determining the very operation of that freedom. The libertarianism of open theism, which Hasker resolutely sides with, rejects the assertion that is essential for classical theism, namely that God eternally knows all future events, including human free decisions and actions. Hasker is convinced that God's total foreknowledge of the future and true freedom of human will are not compatible. The price of the defense of the libertarian doctrine of freedom of human will is a rejection of the assertion that the absolutely perfect God is a being that is unchangeable and that exists beyond and above time, an assertion that has been so crucial for traditional theism for more than two thousand years. Hasker also rejects the assumption that has been so characteristic of the western theodicean thought and already found in St. Augustine, that every evil admitted by God into the world serves to bring about some even greater good and there is no evil that God could not turn into an even greater good. The core thesis of Hasker's theodicy is the claim that there exists *gratuitous evil*, an evil that serves no good purpose and is no condition for any greater good. The most horrifying is the appalling gratuitous evil that is generated by human beings consciously, deliberately and *free.* Hasker adduces two arguments in defense of his view concerning the existence of gratuitous evil in the world created by God. First, it is not possible to conceive what greater good could ever emerge from an evil so horrible as e.g. the Holocaust, and consequently one has to acknowledge that this kind of evil is absolutely pointless and irrational. Secondly, the belief that every evil is in fact necessary for some good and serves some good purpose encourages inert and inactive attitudes towards evil, passive acquiescence in it and even positive acceptation. In other words, the faith in the necessity of evil disintegrates the foundations of morality and leads to fatalism. The way of thinking such an assumption suggests is as follows: if evil things happened in the past and go on happening, this means that things have to go on like that, it is all God's will and one should accept it without complaint. Hasker develops his point by arguing that God's creative design was not to create submissive and passive beings, but free and capable of their own initiative, ready to undertake

a struggle against evil and actively to assume responsibility for their own destiny as well as for the destinies of other persons. On the other hand, Hasker does not affirm that every instance of evil in the world is gratuitous, nor that we know in every case and beyond doubt that a given evil does not serve as an instrument in bringing about some greater good.

In the course of our discussion we have also observed that Hasker's theodicean thought contains some unclear points. It remains unclear how one can make the libertarian doctrine of freedom of human will consistent with the traditional doctrine of divine conservation of the world. Further, it is unclear what logical status possess affirmations concerning the future: do they possess logical value (e.g. are they true), but God remains ignorant of that value until the relevant future becomes the present, or have they got no logical value at all, that is are neither true nor false? Again, it is unclear what precisely the relative autonomy of the world respecting God consists in, in particular it remains an open question whether and how God intervenes in the process of cosmic and biological evolution. Hasker does not rule out the possibility of such interventions, he even thinks they may be necessary, as the evolution effected by the powers of nature alone could turn out to be unable to produce such complex entities as free and reasonable human beings. From the point of view of Christian theism and the authority of the Bible unsatisfactory remains Hasker's rejection of the possibility of some supernatural powers tending to evil, both physical (natural) and moral (sin) being active in the world of nature and in the human world.[113]

[113] It should be emphasized, however, that identifying some unclear points or expressing doubts as to certain component elements of Hasker's theodicean doctrine should not be treated as calling into question the meaningfulness and rationality of the doctrine as a whole. One can reasonably accept a system of beliefs even though one lacks convincing and unambiguous answers to all the objections and queries that system may give rise to. If only those systems of beliefs that generate no serious doubts or reservations or ones whose principles would allow one to answer every objection in a way leaving no room for any further doubt were to be treated as rationally acceptable, then one would be able to entertain rational beliefs only with respect to trivialities and remain an agnostic in very many questions, including the fundamental questions concerning world-views, life and also scientific matters. It does not appear likely, though, that such a rigorous agnosticism could itself be regarded as a rational attitude. Also there can possibly exist a rational disagreement concerning many questions and some of the questions likely to be give rise to such rational disagreement are among the vital and essential ones.

Hasker's theodicy wholly naturalizes and depersonalizes physical evil in assuming that the only cause of the emergence of physical evil is the impersonal operation of natural laws. Natural laws make it possible for all kinds of physical evil to occur, yet these very same laws provide the ground for the occurrence of innumerable good things. In this point Hasker's theodicean thought breaks with the strong Augustinian tradition that represents physical evil coming about in nature as a result of the activity of some free will, both human and superhuman, that is as a result of sin.

It is our conviction that at least some of the unclear component elements of William Hasker's thought we have mentioned above could be removed, some of the doubts and reservations eliminated or at least weakened, still preserving intact his essentially correct appreciation of the actual state of the world, which takes into account the irrational and enormous evil present in it. And it is not only possible, but also worthwhile to defend his vision of God's definitive triumph over evil which makes room both for a contribution from free human beings to that final overcoming of evil and for a sovereign and supremely powerful act by the perfectly benevolent God forever destroying evil conceived as a positive power actively opposing good.

Translated by Roman Majeran

FOREKNOWLEDGE, FREE WILL, RETROCAUSALITY

Marcin Tkaczyk

The present essay is devoted to discussion of a possibility of solving the problem of future contingent events in its theological version by means of introducing the hypothesis of the reality of retroactive causation (that is causation working backwards in time). I have already devoted two works to the problem of future contingent events in its diverse versions.[1] They contain an attempt at a reconstruction and analysis of the antynomy of future contingent events, as well as an overview of possible directions to be taken by efforts to remove that antynomy. In the present work I focus on the theological version of the antynomy of future contingent events, which means that I have to include in my discussion divine foreknowledge, freedom of human will and also the concept of retroactive cause-effect relationship (backward causation), the possibility of such relationship in reality and, last but not least, I will have to address the question in what measure the concept of retrocausality may be helpful in providing a solution to the problem of future contingents in its theological version. In what follows I altogether omit or reduce to the necessary minimum historical comments and formal+logical considerations except for those points that are relevant for our consideration. The reader interested in a more comprehensive treatment of the matter is referred to the two works of mine mentioned above.

[1] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, Lublin 2015 and "The antinomy of future contingent events," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 65 (2018), 4 (English online version), pp. 5–38.

1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANTINOMY OF FUTURE CONTINGENT EVENTS

The antinomy of future contingents (*futura contingentia*), also known as the problem of tomorrow's sea battle and the master argument of Diodorus Cronus, reappears in the theological context as the problem of divine foreknowledge (prescience) and human free will; it is also referred to as the problem of logical determinism, and under a number of other names. This is so because this antinomy is related to a number of different contexts and in each of these contexts it reappeards in a different version. Thus it is important for the correct appreciation of this antinomy to grasp the basic unity of the fundamental problem underlying all these different versions.

In the discussion we present to the reader, the antinomy of future contingents is construed as a trilemma, that is a set containing three theses; these are the following: the *closed past* thesis, the *open future* thesis and a thesis that falls under a general scheme that could be called a thesis on *representation.*

The closed past thesis affirms that every past state of affairs is (completely) determined, the open future thesis affirms that at least one future state of affairs is contingent. These two theses are related to temporal and modal relations between states of affairs, they also concern anisotropy of time and are involved in the formulation of every version of the antinomy of *futura contingentia*.

The terms "state of affairs" and "event" will be regarded in what follows as synonymous. In what concerns existence, states of affairs are understood here according to thesis 2.06 of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*: "The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. (We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)" In the sense assumed in this quote, we admit positive and negative facts. In contrast to *Tractatus*, however, we do not think that the existence and non-existence of states of affairs is the whole reality. We hold that besides the existence and non-existence of states of affairs, for a complete description of the world necessity, contingency and impossibility of states of affairs are of crucial importance. Thus the existence and non-existence account for a *factual* description of states of affairs, while necessity, contingency and impossibility are elements of a *modal* description of states of affairs.

It is important to keep in mind that the modal description of a state of affairs is always relative; this means that strictly speaking necessity, contingency, and impossibility are attributable only to pairs of states of affairs $\langle x,y \rangle$, and not to states of affairs on their own. Therefore a state of affair x as taken simply in itself is neither necessary, nor contingent, nor impossible in the sense we are here concerned with; it may only be necessary, contingent or impossible from the point of view of another state of affairs y, or, as we say sometimes, with respect to the state of affairs y, or simply within the state of affairs y.

A state of affairs x is necessary with respect to the state of affairs y if and only if the state of affairs x must be the case given that the state of affairs y is the case. The state of affairs x is impossible with respect to the state of affirs y if and only if x cannot be the case if y is the case. The state of affairs x is determined with respect to the state of affairs y if and only if x is either necessary or impossible with respect to y. The state of affairs x is contingent with respect to the state of affairs y if and only if x can either be the case or not be the case given that y is the case. Thus it follows that the state of affairs x is contingent with respect to the state of affairs y if and only if x is not determined with respect to y.

As an example of what is meant by necessity, contingency and impossibility of states of affairs (events), let us consider the case of the twins Jacob and Esau from the Bible, Genesis 27. As is stated in the Genesis, Isaac, the twins' father, had the right of conferring only once a special blessing, which carried with itself special investiture and made the blessed God's favourite. Isaac intended to confer that blessing upon Esau, who was thought to be the firstborn (as he had been the first of the twins to emerge from the womb), yet as a result of Jacob's ruse, he unwittingly gave the blessing to Jacob, whom he thought to be his younger son. Before Jacob thus obtained his blessing by deceit, Isaac could confer the blessing on Esau and he could confer the blessing on Jacob, so the conferment of the blessing on Esau and the conferment thereof on Jacob were both possible future contingent events, they were contingent (with respect to Isaac's present lack of decision) states of affairs. However, when Isaac had already blessed Jacob, the conferment of the blessing on Jacob became a necessary event (a necessary state of affairs). As this blessing could be conferred only once, the conferment of it on Esau became, as a result, an impossible event (state of affairs). In the state of affairs in which Isaac did not yet bestow his blessing on anyone, the conferment of his blessing on Esau and its bestowal on Jacob

are both possible contingent states of affairs; yet once Isaac had given his blessing to Jacob, the conferment thereof on Esau had become an impossible state of affair (an impossible event), and by the same token the fact of the blessing having been bestowed on Jacob had been made a necessary state of affairs.

The necessity, possibility and impossibility here considered are often described as *temporal* or *causal* modalities. Temporal, because their extension can and will change with the flow of time. Obviously, it can be the case that a given state of affairs x is possible at an instant t, and the very same state of affairs has become impossible (or necessary) at a subsequent instant t'. These modalities are also called causal, because they are sometimes conveniently characterised in terms of cause and effect. When characterized in these terms, a state of affairs x is regarded as possible with respect to another state of affairs y if and only if there exists some cause, whose activity within the state of affairs y would result in the state of affairs x coming into being.

The open future thesis begins with the existential (particular) quantifier (e.g. Some future events are not determined), so the conception of open future requires only that at least one future state of affairs (event) should be contingent; this, of course, does not rule out some future states of affairs being already determined. We might, therefore, more exactly characterize the open future thesis as an at least partially open future thesis.

By contrast, the closed past thesis is headed by the universal quantifier and thus requires that all past states of affairs be determined. Any contingent past state of affairs of whatever nature is strictly ruled out. What has been done, cannot be undone, as the proverb goes.

Some observation concerning the present is still needed. It has usually been acknowledged that the present, on equal terms with the past, falls under the closed past rule, thus, given the present state of affairs x, all states of affairs contemporaneous with x are determined. Contemporary physics, on the one hand, appears to confirm this view, since according to physics physical signals can only be sent into absolute future (with the obvious exclusion of the boundary zero interval). On the other hand, however, the very notion of the present in physics is complicated, since the relation of contemporaneity is always local. Fortunately for our present purpose this complication is not essential and its discussion can be left out of considerations leading to a solution of the antinomy of *futura contingentia.* All the conclusions reached in these considerations on the basis of the assumption

that the present, from the point of view of modal analysis, belongs with the past, can also be arrived at without that particular assumption. The reverse is also true: any important statement for the solution of the problem of future contingents legitimately inferred without the assumption of the necessity of present events can just as well be deduced granted that assumption.

The representation thesis affirms that whatever state of affairs x can be *represented* in any state of affairs y (at any time). Speaking more precisely we can say that for any states of affairs x, y there exists a state of affairs z which is contemporaneous with the state of affairs y and is a representation of the state of affairs x.

In this more precise formulation of the representation thesis, besides the notions we have already characterized, comes the notion of a *representation* of a state of affairs. Generally one can say a representation of a state of affairs x is a state of affairs in which x is reflected. By *reflection* here is meant copying the original state of affairs in some definite respects; thus when one says that a state of affairs y is a representation of a state of affairs x, one thereby affirms that, firstly, *in some definite respects* the state y is like the state x (in some respects y is similar to x), secondly, in some respects y is an effect of x.

Not every state of affairs can be a representation of other states of affairs, only such that has an ability to reflect or copy other states. Such an ability is possessed, among other things, by statements, prepositions and beliefs, therefore these typically, though by no means exclusively, fulfil the role of representing states of affairs.

The term "representation" usually implies fulfilment of both conditions of representing mentioned above (being like in some respects and being caused in some respects). Yet in many cases it is enough to focus on the first condition (being like in some respects) and leave out of consideration the causal aspect of representation. In these cases it is allowable to use the term "correspondent" instead of "representation"; the advantage of the former term over the latter is that it points to a symmetrical relation between what is represented and what represents: thus the represented original state of affairs and its representation are mutual correspondents (in some definite respects).

In the context of the problem of *futura contingentia* it is required that a representation has to agree with the represented original in respect of modality. Thus if a state of affairs x is a representation of a state of affairs y,

then the pairs $\langle x,z\rangle$ and $\langle y,z\rangle$ of states of affairs belong to the same modal relation for any state of affairs z whatever. In other words: if a state of affairs x is a representation of a state of affairs y, then for any state of affairs z the following holds true: x is necessary, impossible or contingent with respect to a state of affairs z if and only if y is, respectively, necessary, impossible or contingent with respect to the same state of affairs z. Thus the state x agrees with the state y as for its modal description with respect to every state of affairs z. This condition can be fulfilled by many different kinds of states of affairs; therefore the problem of *futura contingentia* can appear in many different versions.

2. DIVERSE VERSIONS OF THE ANTINOMY OF FUTURE CONTINGENTS

There are three versions of the representation thesis, and by the same token of the antinomy of future contingents that are better known and of more significance than others. These are: Aristotle's version, known as the problem of tomorrow's sea battle, Diodorus's version usually referred to as his "master argument" or κυριεύων λόγος, and the theological version, that is the problem of foreknowledge or prescience (*praescientia*).

In Aristotle's version the assumption is made that for any state of affairs x and any instant t the representation of x in t is a state of affairs which consists in the fact that a proposition that correctly reports of x is true at t. These two states of affairs (x and its representation at t) occur at different instants, nevertheless they are mutual modal correspondents. For instance: the state of affairs which is the sea battle going to take place tomorrow is represented today by the state of affairs which consists in the proposition "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" being a true proposition today; these two states of affairs correspond to each other. Essential for this version of the antinomy is an assumption that enables the construction of such correspondences. This role is fulfilled by the bivalence principle, which lays down that every proposition is either true or false, or by the law of excluded middle, which states that for any proposition either that proposition or its negation is true.

The version formulated by Diodorus Cronus is close to Aristotle's, but it is consistently formulated in metalanguage. The correspondences in this formulation hold between true propositions reporting at different points of

time the same state of affairs; for example: the state of affairs consisting in the proposition "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" being true today is represented, among other things, by the state of affairs consisting in the proposition "Yesterday there was a sea battle" being true the day after tomorrow. Thus purely objective states of affairs are represented only indirectly, via linguistic propositional utterances.

In the theological version any state of affairs x is represented by God's knowledge of that very state x, so every state of affairs x is represented by a definite state of affairs which is a certain cognitive state in God. For instance: the state of affairs consisting in the fact that Peter will be saved at some time in the future is represented by the state of affairs consisting in God's knowing that fact at present (always, eternally).

All these versions of the antinomy of future contingents, as well as other ones, have been for ages an object of discussion. In some of my earlier work[2] I have shown that the antinomy (contradiction) is generated in every formulation of the problem of future contingents. I have also shown that in every formulation the antinomy is true and not merely apparent contradiction, which means that the theses of the closed past, open future and representation when taken together form an inherently contradictory set, yet are non-contradictory when taken in pairs (each two of them do not form a contradiction). Thus it takes all the three theses together to produce a contradiction and each of them is indispensable to form the antinomy.

3. SOLUTIONS OF THE FUTURE CONTINGENTS ANTINOMY

In my earlier studies[3] devoted to this problem I tried to show that numerous attempts to remove the antinomy of future contingents by revising the representation thesis are doomed to failure. This is because the representation thesis is very weak and any revision of it in its diverse versions either fails significantly to modify the nature of representation or does it in such a way as to destroy cognitive thought and speech in general. At best revising the representation thesis enables some local solutions of some particular versions of this antinomy. This is also true of numerous attempts

[2] See previous footnote.

[3] As above.

at a revision of logic as a whole. The solutions of the problem of *futura contingentia* are only apparent and not real solutions.

Granted this conclusion, there remain two possible ways to remove the antinomy of future contingents globally, that is in its all versions: one can reconsider and modify either the open future thesis or the closed past (or past and present) thesis. A revision of the open future thesis ultimately reduces to accepting an extreme and universal determinism (fatalism). By contrast, the thesis of the closed past, being headed by the universal quantifier and being a very strong thesis, admits of various directions of modifications. A number of attempts at a modification of the closed past thesis are known, although none of them has won widespread acceptance. The revision suggested in the cited studies consists in a proposal to impose some limitation on the scope of the universal quantifier heading the closed past thesis. I propose to assume that every state of affairs which is a representation of a contingent state of affairs is contingent itself. Thus modified, the thesis concerning the modal character of past events can be renamed a *partially open past* thesis (or a *partially closed past* thesis). This thesis, the proposed modification included, should assume the following form: every past state of affairs, which does not represent any contingent state of affairs, is determined. The difference from the original form of the closed past thesis consists here in the inclusion of the clause "which does not represent any contingent state of affairs" that imposes a restriction on the scope of the universal quantifier heading the thesis. I have formally proved that the proposed weakening of the closed past thesis is enough to remove the antinomy, that is to say that the theory consisting of the cited theses on representation, open future and the closed past thesis weakened in the presented way is non-contradictory. Consequently, this theory represents a formally correct and global solution of the problem of future contingents.

It still remains to see, whether this solution, formally correct as it is, fits the intuitive content of the problem. For there is a price to be paid for acceptance of it in granting the counterintuitive assumption that not only future, but also the past (and perhaps also the present) remains partially open. Thus, besides future contingent events (*futura contingentia*) one has to admit that there are also past contingent events (*contingentia praeterita).* Even though this required opening of the past is very restricted, minimal, and concerns exclusively a very special kind of states of affairs, namely those that represent other states of affairs, it may be perceived as paradoxical and counterintuitive. A number of my opponents believe this too

high a price to pay for a solution of the future contingents problem. There are some, in whose opinion (to my astonishment) this cost is higher than that of acceptance of universal determinism or fatalism, that is a theory ruling out whatever contingent states of affairs. A however limited opening of the past appears to them as a breaking of some ontological taboo, even though such attempts have been made several times since antiquity.

Now it seems that this somewhat prejudicial opposition to the thesis of partially open past stems from the fact that this thesis requires admission of the reality of retroactive causal connections, that is cause-effect links in which the effect precedes the cause in time. Now, it is widespread opinion that existence of such retroactive causal connections is not only empirically, but also logically impossible.

For my own part, I hold that the belief that there obtains a logical connection between causality and temporal primacy of the cause with respect to the effect is entirely mistaken. What is more, not only are retroactive causal connections possible as such, but they appear in fact, be it only in some special domains. The principal objective of this study is to provide an analysis and justification of this claim.

4. CAUSAL CONJUNCTION AND CLASSICAL CONJUNCTION

From the point of view of logic the problem of possibility of some types of cause-effect connections occurring in reality reduces to the question of some sets of propositions being contradiction-free. The elementary situation in which causal relationship appear is described by the causal conjunction, that is by the expression:

4.1) ϕ and because of that (for this reason) ψ,

in which ϕ and ψ are expressions (propositions). The expression (4.1) is true if and only if the following three conditions are met: (a) expression (proposition) ϕ is true, (b) expression (proposition) ψ is true and (c_1) the state of affairs reported by ϕ is the cause of the state of affairs reported by ψ. Naturally, the condition (c_1) can freely be replaced by an equivalent condition (c_2): the state of affairs reported by ϕ, is the effect of the state of affairs reported by ψ. The difference between the conditions (c_1) and (c_2) is purely verbal, as the relation of cause to its effect and that of effect to its cause are

mutual converses, so it is legitimate to assume that the conditions (c_1) and (c_2) are different formulations of one and the same condition (c). This condition demands that the state of affairs reported by ϕ, and the state of affairs reported by ψ, should be connected by a cause-effect link in which the former state is the cause and the latter state is the effect.

Even more often used formulation in specialist literature to refer to basic causal connection is the following expression called causal implication:

(4.2) If ϕ, then and because of that ψ

in which ϕ and ψ are expressions (propositions). Most likely, the difference between (4.1 and 4.2) is not essential for either expression is derivable from the other within the framework of classical propositional calculus:

(If ϕ, then and because of that ψ) $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ (ϕ → (ϕ and because of that ψ)),
(ϕ and because of that ψ) $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ (ϕ ∧ (if ϕ, then and because of that ψ)).

Causal implication is a handy tool of analysis if the object are general causal laws. General causal laws state that any state of affairs of a given kind is the cause of another state of affairs of a definite kind; e.g. If salts of sodium have been introduced into a flame, the flame, because of that, will assume yellow colour; If it rains, the street, because of that, is wet. On the other hand, causal conjunction is more convenient for an analysis of particular instances of causal relationships; e.g. Salts of sodium have been introduced into the flame on this burner and because of that the flame has taken on yellow colour; It has rained this morning and because of that this street is wet.

The conditions (a), (b), (c) formulated above of the truth of causal conjunction (4.1) make causal conjunction a logically stronger affirmation than classical conjunction, in other words, from any expression of the form (4.1) logically follows the expession (ϕ ∧ ψ), but not the other way round. This is in fact uncontroversial relatedness that bears witness to the underlying assumption that causal connections can obtain exclusively between existing (and not merely possible) states of affairs. If one state of affair is the cause of another, then both states of affairs must be the case; on the other hand it is perfectly possible that some two states of affairs obtain yet are not connected by any causal link; in this case classical conjunction of propositions reporting these existing states of affairs will be true, but the corresponding causal conjunction remains false. To give an example: the sentence "Louis XIV was a good actor and France became the main power in Europe at the end of the 17$^{\text{th}}$ century" is a true conjunction, but the sentence: "Louis

XIV was a good actor and because of that France became the main power in Europe at the end of the 17th century" is (probably), despite its likeness to the previously quoted one, false.

5. CAUSAL AND TEMPORAL CONJUNCTIONS

MUCH MORE PROBLEMATIC is the logical relation obtaining between causal conjunction and temporal conjunction. Typically, contemporary theories of causal relations contain the assumption to the effect that in any cause-effect relation the effect is always preceded in time by the cause. This means that from the condition (c) of the truth of the expression (4.1) follows the condition (d) which states that the state of affairs re-ported by the proposition ϕ precedes in time the state of affairs reported by the proposition ψ, or at the least the weaker condition (d′): the state of affairs reported by ψ does not come earlier in time than the state of affairs reported by ψ. The difference between the severe condition (d) and the gentler condition (d′) obviously consists in that (d) rules out simultaneity of cause and effect while (d′) allows it. If the condition (d) or, at the least (d′) is the consequence of (c), then from the expression (4.1) follows the expression:

(5.1) ϕ and subsequently ψ,

or, for the condition (d′) :

(5.1′) (ϕ and subsequently ψ) $\vee$ (ϕ and simultaneously ψ).

Thus from causal conjunction (4.1) follows temporal conjunction (5.1) — or at least its more liberal version (5.1′). It is obviously beyond dispute that from temporal conjunction (5.1) or (5.1′) follows the appropriate classical conjunction, which means that classical conjunction also follows from causal conjunction (4.1).

It ought to be stressed here that the way temporal conjunction can be construed is not as straightforward as it may seem. In his significant works Georg Hendrik Von Wright construed (5.1) in a way that is characteristic of modal logic, namely: (5.1) is true at an instant *t* if and only if the expression ϕ is true at this very instant *t* and the expression ψ is true at some instant subsequent to the instant *t*. On this construal (5.1) means: now it is the case that ϕ and at some time in the future it will be the case that ψ. For instance, the statement "Halley's Comet is visible in the sky and subsequently Earth is

the third planet from the sun in the Solar System" is true at every moment at which Halley's Comet is visible in the sky. It is necessary to note that this is not the way we construe (5.1) in the present study: on our reading the conjunction (5.1) is true (at a given moment) if and only if both ϕ and ψ are true (at this very moment) and the state of affairs reported by ϕ antedates the state of affairs reported by ψ. On this reading reading the statement "Halley's Comet is visible in the sky and subsequently Earth is the third planet from the Sun in the Solar System" is no longer true, since the permanent state of affairs described by the statement "Earth is the third planet from the Sun in the Solar System" is not antedated by the state described by the proposition "Halley's Comet is visible in the sky." The here accepted way of construing temporal expressions is based on the physical sense of time as defined by the assumptions of the special relativity.[4]

6. THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CAUSAL, TEMPORAL AND CLASSICAL CONJUNCTIONS

The concepts we have introduced in the previous section enable a precise definition of the object of the controversy concerning retrocausality. Whoever affirms that existence of retroactiv causal connections is logically impossible, accepts as laws of logic the following four theses:

(6.1) (ϕ and because of that ψ) $\rightarrow$ ($\phi \wedge \psi$),
(6.2) (ϕ and subsequently ψ) $\rightarrow$ ($\phi \wedge \psi$),
(6.3) (ϕ and because of that ψ) $\rightarrow$ (ϕ and subsequently ψ),
(6.4) $\neg$((ϕ and subsequently ψ) $\wedge$ (ϕ and subsequently ψ)).

The two first theses (6.1) and (6.2) are entirely uncontroversial and simply restate the fact we have already discussed in the above, namely that causal and temporal conjunctions are logically stronger than classical conjunction. Notably, the thesis (6.1) is deducible from the theses (6.2) and (6.3) and could be simply left out of the list of basic assumptions if it were not for our concern with the possibility of rejecting the thesis (6.3) altogether. The last thesis, namely (6.4) concerns the ordering of states of affairs in time. The thesis (6.3) is the focus of the controversy.

These four these, let us repeat, have to be construed as universally valid laws of logic, thus we could say in the context of the debate over the

[4] M. Tkaczyk, *Logika czasu empirycznego*, Lublin 2009.

problem of *futura contingentia* that the theses (6.1) — (6.4) define the minimal logic of a proponent of conditionless validity of the closed past thesis. However, if anyone admits the thesis of partially open past, he is not thereby committed to rejection of any of the theses (6.1) — (6.4) except for the thesis (6.3) and this only in some specific domains. He is thus free to accept the theses (6.1), (6.2), (6.4) and even the thesis (6.3) provided that he restricts the validity of the last named to some domains, as, for example, the realm of physical events.

It seems that a proponent of the thesis of partially open past would readily accept the thesis:

(6.3′) $\neg((\phi \text{ and because of that } \psi) \wedge (\phi \text{ and because of that } \psi))$

instead of the thesis (6.3) as universally valid. He might also accept some other theses concerning causal conjunction and analogous to theses defining ordering of states of affairs in time. On the other hand he would not accept in advance any theses defining logical relations between causal and temporal conjunctions. He would thus accept the existence in the universe of events of some temporal order and also the existence of some causal order, but would refuse to decide in advance in what measure these two orders mutually correspond or even identify with each other. He would regard any decision concerning this matter as a problem to be discussed in a technical, e.g. empirical way.

If the thesis (6.3) is valid, then, of course, temporal conjunction as formulated in (5.1) or (5.1′) follows from causal conjunction (4.1) and retrocausation in any form is not possible logically, as it would inevitably introduce contradiction into the system. This is easily made evident: suppose that some propositions ϕ i ψ are accepted alongside the thesis (6.3) and also propositions of the form (ϕ and because of that ψ) and (ϕ and subsequently ψ); then, from (6.3) and (ϕ and because of that ψ) one directly deduces (ϕ and subsequently ψ), and from this and the assumption (ϕ and subsequently ψ) one obtains the expression ((ϕ and subsequently ψ) $\wedge$ (ϕ and subsequently ψ)) which directly contradicts the proposition (6.4).

If, however, the expression (6.3) is not assumed as a universally valid axiom, the expressions (ϕ and because of that ψ) and (ϕ and subsequently ψ) can coexist within one set of propositions without generating contradiction, which can easily be demonstrated by means of an inter-pretation of this set in a system of modal logic. If such be the case, however, one obtains a system of logic that allows one to consistently speak about and explore the

concept of retrocausality, which in turn opens the way for application of that concept to discussion and solution finding of diverse problems, including the problem of future contingents.

One more remark: when we speak here about logical relations between causal conjunction and other types of conjunction, we mean "causal" and "causality" in the strict sense, that is as related to what has traditionally been referred to as efficient causality. We leave out of consideration logical aspects of final causality (teleology) or any other relationships that can be described as causal only in a very loose and imprecise sense. On the other hand, we think it not legitimate to decide in advance (that is, without proper philosophical consideration) about the nature of causality strictly conceived, in particular we do not assume that strictly conceived causality must be physical in nature nor that causal relations *sensu stricto* have to obtain between physical events.

7. THE EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS OF TEMPORAL PRECEDENCE OF THE CAUSE WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECT IN CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS

The classical justification of the closed past thesis was presented, among others, by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 2 (1139 a-b); his is typically empirical argument. In this place the Stagirite discusses specifically human action and its results, he affirms that any action in man is a result of a decision taken (choice made), and the decision itself is an efffect of definite cognitive and desiderative states in a human being. Aristotle emphasizes in this context that no decision whatever has for an object any state of affairs that antedates that very decision: "It is to be noted — affirms the Stagirite — that nothing that is past is an object of choice. e.g. no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying "For this alone is lacking even in God, to make undone things that have once been done." (1139b).[5]

Contemporary versions of this kind of reasoning can be found in works by many philosophers and physicists. One example of an argument of this

[5] Por. M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 52–53.

sort has been presented by Igor D. Novikov. He identifies three separate realms of experience that are universally recognized by scientists; all these domains, he affirms, point to the fact of the irreversible flow of time. Let us quote a passage from I.D. Novikov's work:

> We have made a survey of the three types of natural phenomena, which are evidently asymmetric with respect to time and develop exclusively in one direction in time, at least this is the case in this actual universe of ours. The first identified type of natural phenomena is that which includes thermodynamic processes. All thermodynamic processes develop in such a way as to increase chaos and entropy. These processes determine the "thermodynamic time arrow."
>
> Another distinct type of natural phenomena is the phenomenon of the expansion of the Universe, which produces the "cosmological time arrow." And the third class of identified phenomena is the class of our psychological processes which produce our subjective experience of time flow. Our memory of the past coupled with our ignorance relative to the future provide the "psychological time arrow." The puzzling aspect of all that is the fact that all the three "arrows" point in one and the same direction in our contemporary Universe.[6]

Thus, as we see, it is significant that all basic phenomena in the world we know show the existence of an irreversible time arrow, but even more significant, as Novikov stresses, is the fact that all identifiable time arrows point in the same direction, they agree as to the fundamental aspect of the direction of time flow. As a result, the thesis affirming temporal anisotropy has been firmly and universally rooted in our interpretation of experience at diverse levels; one might say that the whole of experience speaks firmly in favour of that thesis.

For his part, Leon Brillouin maintains that the perfect and ultimate determination of the past is indicated not only or not so much by particular theories and isolated physical laws, but the scientific knowledge of nature as a whole, as well as ordinary common experience as a whole. Like Novikov, Brillouin points to the second law of thermodynamics among all the many physical laws, in other words to the thermodynamic time arrow, as the one that makes that point in a particularly clear way.[7]

Another confirmation of the closed past thesis comes from theory of relativity, in particular from the thesis that all physical signals spread with finite speed. Now, since all causal actions and relations known to science are essentially bound up with emission of energy, that is with sending out

[6] Por. M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 52–53.

[7] L. Brillouin, *The Arrow of Time*, in *Time in Science and Philosophy*, ed. J. Zeman, Prague, 1971, pp. 101–102, 110.

some physical signals, it does not seem to be possible to dispatch physical signals to past events. Moreover, in the principal model of special relativity which is Minkowsky cone, any past event is defined by means of the physical signal it sends out. Thus the implication is that if a physical signal can be sent from an event *a* to an event *b,* the event *a* is by this very fact defined as occurring earlier in time than the event *b*.[8]

Thus one can, without more ado, grant that the thesis (6.3) is firmly grounded in experience. As far as one can ascertain, in the physical world cause always precedes its effect in time. This affirmation, however, need not form an unsurmountable obstacle to accepting the thesis of the partially open past. The assumption that, given the fact that physical causality does not allow any backward causation, no backward causation whatever is admissible in any realm seems to be one of the misconceptions that stand in the way of arriving at the solution of the problem of future contingents which we propose to discuss here. What we propose to consider is that a solution of this problem need not exclusively rest on a discussion of *physical* causal relations involved in the generation of contingent states of affairs, that is the kind of cause-effect connections in which the cause always precedes the effect. We think it legitimate to assume that other than merely physical causal relations may be invoked in the thorough discussion of this problem and we also think it admissible to assume that in causal relations other than physical it is possible for the effect to precede its cause in time. There are no compelling reasons for extrapolating the ascertained laws governing causation in the empirical domain onto causal relationships that do not belong to the physical realm

8. THE A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION OF THE THESIS OF TEMPORAL PRECEDENCE OF THE CAUSE WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECT

Yet, all empirical considerations apart, the overwhelmingly prevalent view in scientific literature holds retroactive causal relations and thereby any kind of open past for absolutely impossible for decisive *a priori* reasons. In most cases it is simply assumed that the very notion of an effect that comes in time before its own cause is inherently contradictory.

[8] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 385–387.

This view apparently derives from works of David Hume, who sought to define cause and effect in purely observational terms. Consequently, he introduced a definition of the cause-effect relation as a connection consisting in a constant succession in time of cause and effect. Hume's influence in contemporary philosophy is so strong that his definition has gained widespread acceptance. In contemporary discussion existence of retroactive causal relations is regardedv as inherently contradictory and, thereby, logically impossible by a such philosophers as, to name but a few, Anthony Flew, William Lane Craig, Michael Dummet, Richard Gale, and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.[9]

This widespread assumption that retroactive causal connections are logically ruled out, that the very notion of retrocausation is inherently contradictory, forms, as it seems, a major obstacle in the way of development of theories of cause-effect relations and application of potential results of such theories to philosophical analyses.

And yet this assumption is almost certainly false. Possibly, causes acting backwards do not and cannot occur in many domains, but it is important to note that it is not logic that prevents them from doing so: there is nothing contradictory or illogical in the concept of retroactive causation. If causal activity directed backwards in time is impossible in a given domain, this is for other than logical reasons. The principles that rule out retrocausation in a domain may belong to technology, psychology, physics, perhaps even to ontology, but in no wise to logic. Let us repeat; retrocausation is not impossible for logical reasons; if it be so, it is for other than logical reasons.

The arguments one finds in literature against logical possibility of retroactive causes always rest upon some arbitrary definition of cause-effect relation. One introduces (often unwittinly) a definition of the causal relation according to which the cause always precedes its effect in time; then it turns out — what a surprise! — that an assumption of a cause acting backwards introduces contradiction into the reasoning. Moreover, philosophers who rule out retrocausation typically concentrate, like Hume, on relations

[9] M. Dummett and A. Flew, "Can an Effect Precede its Cause?," in *Belief and Will*, London, 1954; M. Dummett, "Bringing about the Past," *Philosophical Review* 73 (1964), 3, pp. 338–359; idem, "Causal Loops," in *The Nature of Time*, ed. R. Flood and M. Lockwood, Oxford, 1986; W.L. Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. The Coherence of Theism. Omniscience*, Leiden, New York, København, Köln, 1991; R. Gale, *On the Existence and Nature of God*, Cambridge, 1991; L.T. Zagzebski, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge*, New York, 1991.

between physical phenomena alone. This accounts for the fact that attempts to justify the thesis of logical impossibility of retroactive cause-effect connections typically have the form of an extrapolation of the empirical arguments ruling out retrocausation from the domain of physical events onto other than physical domains. That this kind of argument is, to say the least, of little value.

As a consequence, one ought to acknowledge that despite the fact that many arguments against *existence* of retroactive cause-effect connections are to be found in literature, what has really been successfully established is the thesis affirming physical impossiblity of retractive causes, that is ruling out retroactive causation in the domain of physical events. What has not been presented so far are any decisive arguments against *logical possibility* of retroactive causal connections. On the contrary, good reasons are readily available that speak in favour of real possibility of retroactive causes, that is which vindicate non-contradictory nature of the concept of a cause acting backwards.

Let us make a brief survey of reasons in favour of retroactive causality.

Firstly, there is no necessity for temporal relations, temporal features or, indeed, temporality itself to be included in the concept of the cause. As already indicated above, defining causal relations in terms of temporal concepts has been arbitrarily introduced by Hume and his followers. Although doubts as to existence of retractive causes have always been present, the conceptions of simultaneous occurrence of cause and effect or of wholly atemporal nature of cause-effect relations have been often accepted by philosophers before Hume. According to Stefan Swieżawski, the traditional and very widespread view had it that "the cause can come earlier in time than the effect, yet it is also possible for cause and effect to occur simultaneously or wholly to transcend temporal order."[10] This conception of cause-effect relations existing beyond time was directly related to the assumption that God exists and acts beyond all time, and also to introspective observation of the subject's own mental states that may instantaneously produce effects of spiritual nature.[11] That is why scholastic philosophers taught that "beginning in time is not included in the concept of causality" (*in conceptu causalitatis non includitur initium in tempore*).[12]

[10] S. Swieżawski, *Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej*, Kraków 1999, p. 320.

[11] Ibid., pp. 319–320.

[12] Ibid., p. 320.

Secondly, despite the fact that philosophical mainstream majority always readily ruled out backward causation, records survive of some theories that admitted instances of causes acting backwards. These theories were usually unanimously rejected by the philosophical opinion, yet they were not criticised as inherently contradictory. In an earlier study of mine I discussed examples of theories that assumed or suggested as a viable option limited occurrence of retroactive causes in some special domains.[13] In this work of mine, however, I failed to take notice of and include in my survey one of the most thought out, elaborate and interesting theories of this sort. Thomas Bradwardine, one of fourteenth century Oxford scholastic philosopher-theologians, in his criticism of the Pelagian doctrine from an extreme Augustinian position, expressly acknowledged ability to act backwards in time as one of God's powers.[14]

All the mentioned theories admitting some restricted form of retrocausation were invariably voices of (somewhat excentric) philosophical minorities in their times, yet none of them bears any marks of internal contradiction and no criticism of them was ever able to show them up for self-contradictory.

Thirdly, although all available evidence points to the fact that in the domain of nature and, consequently, of natural sciences, the cause always precedes its effect in time, yet the past development of these sciences presents many examples of surmises concerning instances of backward causation. Up until now all the alleged cases of backward causation have been proved erroneously construed and the phenomenon of backward causation involved merely apparent. However these examples show clearly enough that it is possible in scientific theories to put forward a hypothesis assuming reality of retractive causation and that such hypothesis is as legitimate as other hypotheses and open to the same procedures of testing and evaluation as other theories. This strongly indicates that the assumption of universal temporal anteriority of cause to its effect is very firmly rooted in our understanding based on experience, but not in logic as such (a very good survey and discussion of hypotheses assuming alleged cases of backward causality as found in history of natural sciences can be found in Craig[15]).

[13] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 365–375.

[14] T. Bradwardine, *O sprawie Boga przeciwko Pelagiuszowi i o mocy przyczyn*," transl. E. Jung, in *Jeżeli Bóg istnieje… Wolność człowieka a hipoteza teistyczna*, ed. A.P. Stefańczyk, Lublin, 2018, pp. 325–367.

[15] W.L. Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom*.

Also I.D. Novikov, whom we have quoted above, mentions long-lasting debates among physicists concerning alleged possibility of travel to the past. Journeys to the past would have to pass through two spatially close black holes and follow the route along a curve of spacetime resembling the curve of the sign "⊃." Such theorizing about time travel seems groundless, yet it has never been objected to as self-contradictory, only as lacking foundation in empirical data. What is more, Novikov himself presents a model of theory allowing for backward causation in the strictest sense, namely movement back in time. This model consists of a likeness of a billiards table with two holes which have the property that a ball falling into one of them at an instant t falls out of the other at another instant earlier in time than the instant t. The supposed paradoxes of backward causation, and in particular the grandfather paradox are easily solved in this sort of a model. It turns out that models like the one described by Novikov allow for emergence of a causal order that is in part independent of temporal order.[16]

Fourthly, examples of retroactive causes are easily found and shown, and existence of a model proves conclusively that the model in question is non-contradictory. Retroactive causes do exist, albeit beyond the domain of physics and natural sciences in general. They exist in the domain of culture, which is a creation of human minds and therefore not restricted by actual laws of nature.

The first obvious example of retroactive causation taken from the domain of human culture is that of an *ex post facto* law, that is a legal norm that is retroactive (the concept of the retroactive legal norm is discussed in detail in Juratowitch[17]). Naturally, Ben Juratowitch makes the observation that the intention to avoid retroactive laws has always been one of the leading concerns of jurists and legislators throughout history of law. [18] While this concern seems right and reasonable, it bears witness to the fact that retroactive operation of law is possible and, occasionally, is the case. On the other hand, opinions favouring legal retroaction were time and again expressed, for instance William Crosskey shows that at the moment of the forming of the constitution of the United States views on this subject were divided and there were proponents of limited legal retroaction for socially important reasons. The final victory of the opponents of legal retroaction was decided by the widespresd abuse of the possibility to enact

[16] I.D. Novikov, *The River of Time*, pp. 230–250.

[17] B. Juratowitch, *Retroactivity and the Common Law*, Sydney, 2008, pp. 5–8.

[18] Ibid., p. 27.

retroactive laws in many of the states of the nascent USA.[19] Establishing retroactive laws systematically takes place in the legal systems based on the principle of legal precedent. Promulgations made in these systems have binding force affecting the past.[20]

The question here is not whether or not it is permissible to promulgate retroactive laws, nor whether operation backwards by the law is praiseworthy or reprehensible. What we mean is simply to point to the fact that legal retroactivity is possible and occurred in the past.

Let us consider an imaginary case of a retroactive law being enacted and coming into effect. Suppose some legislator promulgated in 2018 a regulation forbidding trucks to enter towns from January 1, 2017. This regulation would have an effect antedating its cause. In this case the cause would be the enactment of the regulation in 2018, while the ban on trucks entering towns binding in 2017 would be the effect. If any written or unwritten constitution forbids promulgation of retroactive laws or automatically annulls such laws, it remains nevertheless true that this very constitution acknowledges possibility of them. If a law operating backwards was inherently inconsistent, there would be no need to forbid its promulgation. A ban on cars entering some area is not a physical state of affairs, still it is *some* state of affairs. Thus, it is clear that in the domain of culture states of affairs can be effected in the past and, consequently, backward causation is not intrinsically contradictory nor logically impossible.

Another example of a retroactive causal connection in the sphere of human culture is provided by historiography. While reconstructing past events, as, for example, those involved in the Second World War, a historian forms some entity functioning within the cultural domain, some representation of the second world war and doing so may affect the entity named the second world war, so to say, from his standpoint that comes in time after the events he treats about. For instance, he can decide in the 21st century when World War II began; he can choose between years 1936, 1938, 1939 or 1941 AD as the date when it started. This is how one can project effects of one's activity backwards in time.

Still another example of causation directed backwards in the domain of culture is provided by employing the performative function of language. For instance: at the Catholic University of Lublin the normal university work

[19] W.W. Crosskey, "True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws," *University of Chicago Law Review* 14 (1947), pp. 539–566.

[20] B. JURATOWITCH, *Retroactivity and the Common Law*, s. 37–42.

after summer vacation starts on October 1, yet the official opening of the academic year only takes place on October's third Sunday. By ceremonially opening the academic year the rector of Lublin Catholic University performs an action which has its effect in the past, as its efffect is to make the work that has been done at the university since October 1 into the material constituent of the culture entity called an academic year.[21]

These examples suffice to show that in domains where physical laws do not hold, causes acting backwards can obtain. Projections of human mind constitute such a domain, and in particulat those creations of collective mind that constitute our culture world. If such domains depend on human will or human convention to a sufficient degree, they can admit occurrences of retroactive cause-effect connections.

I will give here one more argument for possibility in principle of backward causation, an argumentn that is missing in my earlier works on this subject, as in writing them I did not yet realise its meaning and importance; at present I consider it the most significant of all. It is an argument in favour of logical consistency (lack of inherent contradiction) of the concept of retroactive causation, and not in favour of physical possibility of backward causation, still less for its actual existence or empirical confirmation thereof. For ou theoretical purposes here it is only vindication of logical possibility of retractive causation, not its actual existence, that is indispensable. Here I will only formulate the basic, general outline of this argument, which I will develop in more detail in paragraph 9 in the context of discussion of God's foreknowledge. In my opinion this argument indicates very strongly that backward causation cannot be ruled out on the basis of logic alone, which means that the thesis (6.3) is not a universally binding law of logic.

Now the argument develops as follows: it seems to have been sufficiently confirmed that time as such is a physical entity and not an absolutely necessary reality. First, since very far back in the past timeless objects have been contemplated by philosophers, e.g. mathematical objects. Suffice it to name Plato, who thought that true beings have to be atemporal and eternal and who considered time to be a constructed element of the material world that was itself constructed. Most philosophers in all times associated the flow of time with occurrence of change. Since whatever is free of change is thereby free of contradiction, timeless being must be eminently free of contradiction.

[21] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 393–400.

Second, and even more compellingly, contemporary physics and cosmology points to time as an intrinsic feature of the physical world and every physical entity has its own time, and it is altogether likely that time did not exist at all at earliest stage of the history of the universe. Thus, if the effect has of necessity to come after its cause in time and this be ensured by the laws of logic, this means that logical laws rule out other cause-effect links than those obtaining between physical events. For this would imply that cause-effect relations only exist in time and the time we know does not flow beyond the domain of physical events; quite the contrary: the existence and nature of time essentially depend on the nature of physical events. So if temporal priority of the cause with respect to its effect is set down by laws of logic alone, it is logic alone that rules out existence of other causes and corresponding effects than physical ones. This, however, is manifestly false, for the laws of logic we know, even very broadly conceived, say nothing about existence of anything, be it physical events or other entities than physical, nor do they say aything specific about causal relations in the physical world or beyond. It follows clearly that retroactive causation cannot be ruled out on the strength of logic alone; if they are disproved, this is on the basis of empirically grounded consideration. The thesis (6.3) cannot be considered a law of logic.

To sum up: there appear to be no grounds for *a priori* rejecting possibility of causal action operating backwards in time. The question is not whether instances of backward causation could be found anywhere in the world, the simple point we make is that there is nothing illogical in the concept of such causation. An effective *a priori* justification of the thesis affirming the supposed necessary temporal anteriority of the cause with respect to its effect simply does not exist. Retroactive causes may be disproved by experience, but not by logic.

9. RETROACTIVE CAUSATION, DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM OF WILL

Granted that the concept of retroactive causation is not inconsistent, it can legitimately be employed in the efforts to find a solution of the problem of *futura contingentia.* In my earlier works on the subject[22] I argued that the notion of retroactive causation provides the means of finding an effective

[22] See footnote 1.

and comprehensive solution to that problem, that is one solution equally effective for all the variants of the future contingents riddle. This means that this solution is equally applicable to all relevant versions of the thesis on representation, that is to all relevant ways of constructing states of affairs representating other states of affairs.[23]

The solution of the future contingents problem I proposed in my previous studies on this subject can be summarized in the central thesis for my reasoning, which is the thesis on the partially open past: "Every past state of affairs that does not represent any contingent state of affairs is determined."[24] The partially open past thesis is based on the assumption of possibility of limited retroactive causation. I produced a proof that the partially open past thesis, the open future thesis and the representation thesis taken together form a theory that is free of contradiction.[25] This amounts to the claim that if the closed past thesis is weakened to the partially open past thesis and conjoined with the open future and representation theses, what will be obtained is an effective and comprehensive solution of the antinomy of future contingents.

Such a general and comprehensive solution is by nature technical. Instead of reproducing its formalized version, I intend here to make it more intuitive by showing how the theological variant of the *futura contingentia* problem can be solved by means of applying the concept of retrocausation. In particular I will show how this general solution of the future contingents problem can be applied to the theologically sensitive problem of (human) free will and (divine) foreknowledge.

This theological problem arises when two theses are jointly accepted:

(9.1) Any act of free will remains indeterminate until the very moment of its performance,
(9.2) God possesses knowledge in advance of acts of free will.

Neither thesis is universally accepted. Whoever rejects at least one of these theses, avoids confronting the problem of future contingents.

The thesis (9.1) affirms that freedom entails a moment of contingency. This means that (a) a subject endowed with free will determines all by himself his choices, and (b) any act of free will, before it is done, may be or may not be performed. The thesis (9.1) is rejected by, among others, proponents

[23] Cf. paragraph 1.

[24] Cf. paragraph 3.

[25] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 405–407.

of mechanical determinism, pantheism and fatalism. A leading contemporary Calvinist theologian, Charles Hodge interestingly defends the position that freedom need not entail contingency, only determination by oneself (1871–1873); in this way he accepts part (a) and rejects part (b) of the thesis.[26] Hodge divides all theories of free will into three classes: theories in the type of necessity, those in the type of certainty and those in the type of contingency. An act of free will conceived of in terms of contingency is a mental act wholly determined by a previous non-mental state of affairs. The subject has a feeling of making a choice, but in reality he/she acts mechanically like a machine. According to theories in the type of certainty a presumed act of free will is also predetermined, but not by anything extramental but by a prior mental state of that subject him/herself. In theories belonging to either type acts of free will are as surely predictable as events occurring as parts of natural processes. The type of certainty differs from the type of contingency in that the former represents the subject and its acts as determined by the subject's internal make-up, whereas the latter shows the subject as determined externally; thus in the type of certainty fulfilled is the condition (a) of the thesis (9.1) while the condition (b) remains unfulfilled. In the type of necessity neither the condition (a) nor (b) is met by the act of free will. As already mentioned above, Dodge in an interesting way defends the theory of free will in the type of certainty as correctly expressing the true sense of freedom. This view of freedom is shared by the classical authors of Calvinist theology, Molinists, some extreme Augustinians, Willard Van Orman Quine as well as others.

Nevertheless a considerable number of students of this problem regard the thesis (9.1) in its entirety as indispensable for a correct theory of freedom. They object that both according to the type of necessity and the type of certainty theories the supposedly free subject is reduced to the status of "a puppet either of God, or nature, or fate" (as Prosper of Aquitaine was wont to say), and no longer remains a free being. For all the theories considered by Dodge converge in the affirmation that the subject performing an act of free will must perform precisely this act and not other. And yet it is self evident that an act is truly free only when the subject does not have to perform this act, although he/she can perform it. This means that one and the same subject, finding itself twice in exactly the same circumstances, both external and internal, could each time perform a different act; e.g. make a left turn in the one instant and a right one in the other. Indeed, this

[26] C.D.D. HODGE, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1–3, New York, 1871–1873.

feature constitutes the essence of will as considered in the type of contingency. Proponents of this conception of will are committed to acknowledging a moment of contingency in any act of free will and thus accepting the thesis (9.1) in its entirety. In contemporary literature theories in the type of contingency are known as libertarian, while those in the types of necessity and certainty as compatibilist (comparatist) theories of free will.

The thesis (9.2) affirms the existence of a subject which is possessed of sure and accurate knowledge of acts of free wills of other subjects before these acts are actually performed. Naturally, the knowledge possessed by this subject is a superior kind of knowledge. If free will is construed in the types of necessity or certainty there is nothing, in principle, to prevent existence of such a subject. If, however, free will, is considered in the type of contingency, the problem of *futura contingentia* inevitably emerges. For on the assumption of the closed past, foreknowledge of future contingent events is impossible, as it is of the essence of a contingent event that it can take place but does not have to. Consequently, one cannot *know* beforehand whether it will or will not take place.

The thesis of theism affirms the existence of God, who by nature possesses some kind of superior knowledge. God's superior knowledge is often characterized as all-knowledge (omniscience), that is knowledge about everything there is to know, and its characterization typically includes the universal quantifier. Universal quantification, however, can itself be qualified, that is the universal quantifier can have a restricted scope. For instance, one can assume that God knows everything that can be known, and not absolutely everything (this kind of qualification is accepted by Richard Swinburne). Many metaphysical systems, mostly those that are not closely related to the orthodox theology of a definite religion, assume some restrictions on the extension of God's knowledge; these include Marcus Tullius Cicero's system, open theism, processual theism and a number of theological systems, e.g. some systems propounded by islamic theologians. In these metaphysical systems the problem of future contingents need not arise at all.

The case is different for the theologies of Judaism and Christianity, which do not admit any restrictions on God's superior knowledge (even though they admit certain qualification of God's all-power). In an earlier work of mine[27] I demonstrated that the thesis affirming that God eternally possesses unlimited knowledge of absolutely everything, including all future contingent acts of the free will of every created subjects. Thus, whoever

[27] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*.

constructs a metaphysical system in the context of orthodox Judaism or Christianity, must incorporate the thesis (9.2) in his construction.

Yet whoever incorporates in one system both the (9.1) and the (9.2) thesis, is confronted by the antinomy of future contingents. For the thesis (9.1) entails the closed past thesis and the thesis (9.2) is a version of the reprezentation thesis.[28] The knowledge in which future contingent events are reflected is the representation of these events in the sense we accept here. This knowledge is attributed to God, who is a necessary being. This conception of representation combined with the closed past inevitably generates contradiction, as has been formally proved. One cannot conjoin the closed past thesis and the theses (9.1) and (9.2) without falling into contradicting oneself.

And yet there is a remedy: it is enough slightly to weaken the closed past thesis by replacing it with the partially open past thesis[29] we have discussed in the above. Instead on imposing a restriction on the universal quantification in the thesis concerning God's all-knowledge, we restrict (minimally) the scope of the universal quantifier in the closed past thesis. As I already proved in a previous work of mine, the theory we obtain as a result is perfectly free of contradiction.[30]

To build such a contradiction-free theory including both God's absolute foreknowledge and human free will, we assume the following:

(9.3) God's knowledge of temporal events antedates these events (in fact it does it eternally), but is not determined *in so far as* the object of that knowledge remains non-determined.[31]

This kind of solution requires presupposing some possibility of retroactive causation. Therefore one could state the following:

(9.4) It is possible for God to possess accurate foreknowledge of future contingent events if and only if God has the power of causing effects backwards in time.

The statement (9.4) is a particular version of my general thesis applicable to all versions of the antinomy of *futura contingentia*, which I formulated and proved in my book *Futura contingentia*.

[28] Cf. paragraph 1.

[29] Cf. paragraph 3.

[30] M. Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia*, pp. 405–407.

[31] Cf. ibid., pp. 405.

The publication of that book sparked off numerous debates, both public and private in which I had the honour and pleasure to participate and for which I am much indebted to my disputants. These debates convinced me nevertheless that the thesis (9.4) proposed in that book stands in need of three elucidating comments

First, whoever absolutely (on logical grounds) rules out backward causation and acknowledges the thesis (6.3) as universally binding law commits him/herself to rejection of the solution proposed in my book. For if the thesis (6.3) is valid universally and applies to God as it does to anything else, the use of the conjunction "in so far as" in the statement (9.3) is absurd and obviously leads to contradiction.

In response to this let me repeat the point I made above in this text: there are no objective grounds for regarding the thesis (6.3) as a logical law or as a universally valid truth. This thesis is strongly confirmed, but the confirmation it can claim is exclusively empirical in nature and thus only valid for the domain of physical states of affairs.[32] No physical event can be the cause of any physical event that comes earlier in time than itself (nor can it be the cause of any simultaneous event) — this is exactly the meaning and scope legitimately ascribable to the thesis (6.3). This is so because, and exclusively because, physical signals travel at a finite speed and causation in the domain of physical events is always bound with emission of a portion of energy. Valid as this principle remains throughout the domain of physical events, there are no reasons to think it also holds beyond the realm of physics. There are absolutely no logical nor other objective reasons to rule out retroactivity on the part of a subject possessed of so great power over the world as must be at the disposal of someone who created this world out of nothing by his sheer act of will. Nor does an ascription of such power to God pose any threat of circularity in the causal order. Leaving out of consideration the problem of transitivity of causal relations, let us remark briefly that it suffices to include the thesis (6.3′) in the system to establish some causal order in the domain of all events. Such inclusion leaves enough ground for working out the solution of the problem of future contingents while providing an effective safeguard against the paradoxes of backward causation. In my work on this subject of 2015 I proposed to name the universal causal order entailing restricted retrocausality a generalized Minkowski cone. In the domain of physical events this generalized cone would be coextensive, or even identical, with the classical light cone, while beyond

[32] Cf. paragraphs 7 and 8.

the real of physics these two cones could be different from and independent of each other.

So much for the first elucidating comment. The remaining two will, hopefully, make it clear, that the theory I propose is much closer to the classical orthodox view than it might seem at first sight and does not involve any significant costs as far as the content of the established view is concerned.

To pass to the second comment: the action directed backwards in time God must undertake to win the foreknowledge of future contingents is very restricted indeed. The thesis (9.4) only requires that every contingent state of affairs *x*, at the very instant of its occurrence (no-occurrence or determination) should produce a result in God's mind, backwards in time, in the form of God's perfect knowledge of that very state of affairs *x*, its occurrence (non-occurrence or determination). This is the only kind of retroactive causation needed for the working out of the solution of the problem of future contingents in its theological guise.

Perhaps in my earlier works on this subject I failed to make this point clearly enough. As a result, the theory I defended was grossly misconstrued: it was suggested that according to my view God would have retrocatively to annihilate all states of affairs failing to correspond with His knowledge and go on this way until He obtained the desired effect. For instance, let us imagine that God foresees that the pharaoh will refuse to let the Israelites out of Egipt, yet despite God's expectation the pharaoh allows the Israelites to depart for the Mount Sinai. In this situation God annulls the pharaoh's free act and events continue to develop as though nothing happened, until, after a certain (finite? infinite?) number of trials, the pharaoh's behaves exactly according to God's prediction, the plagues follow, and so on. This curious misrepresentation of my theory makes human history resemble a game of chance, except for the fact that the gambling device has to be restarted many times over until the drawn numbers are exactly those foreseen by God. A truly frightening vision, even more so than extreme determinism, to say nothing about the caricature of God's knowledge it contains.

Misrepresentations and caricatures apart, let me stress once again that the proposed solution of the problem of *futura contingentia* requires attribution to God of the power to act backwards in time, but only within one specific context, namely with respect to cause-effect relations in which the cause is a contingent event and the effect is God's knowledge of this

event. The *macabre* gambling game described above has no place in the proposed solution.

As already mentioned, the theory I propose is closer to the classical view than it could appear at the first glance. In many respects it resembles the most often espoused view according to which God's knowledge remains motionless in the eternal present (in the eternal "now"); for God every moment in time remains eternally present and God is present whole at every event in time. I do not reject this theory, yet I must observe that this theory on its own does not suffice to form the ground for an effective solution of the *futura contingentia* riddle. It still leaves open the point that if God exists in some eternal present, His knowledge of contingent events must be a result of states of affairs that are not eternal and this is the crux of the problem. Now, whether God exists in an eternal present, in an everlasting time of His own, or in still another way, is irrelevant for the problem of future contingents.

To pass to the third and last comment; in discussing our earlier comments on the justification of statements on retroactive causation,[33] one can easily come by the observation that in the theological context causation directed backwards in time should be admitted quite independently of the requirements of the discussion of future contingents and God's knowledge thereof. In my earlier works I did not mention this observation because I failed to realize its importance.

Let us consider two of the classical attributes traditionally ascribed to God: all-knowledge (omniscience), and all-power (omnipotence). As already mentioned above, in Judaism and Christianity God's omniscience is free of any restricting qualification; while God's omnipotence is regarded as circumscribed in a way, namely by God's own nature. God's nature is, in a way, given even from the point of view of God Himself and does not depend on God's will. This point has to do with the dogma that God creates out of nothing all things except Himself. This dogma belongs to the core of the Jewish and Christian conception of God. Consequently, God has the power of doing everything except what His own nature forbids Him to do. For example: God cannot lie to His creatures, not because there is some external obstacle to Him lying, but because lying as such is contrary to His nature

I believe that it follows from the assumption of divine omnipotence that God can acts backwards in time. Let us attempt a *reductio ad absurdum*

[33] Cf. paragraphs 7 and 8.

argument in favour of this statement and as the starting point assume that God can in no way act backwards in time. This would imply that action backwards in time is contrary to His nature. It follows from this that time and the temporal order is somehow constitutive of God's nature and binding on His will. However, if this be so, time would have to be regarded as uncreated, as divine in nature. But this would stand in gross contradiction not only with other dogmas of faith, but also with all we know about the nature of time. In particular, according to contemporary cosmology time came into being an instant later than cosmos itself; consequently, according to the scientific view the temporal dimension of reality is not as necessary as it might seem to someone enclosed in time. It may thus appear as a legitimate conclusion from a consideration of God's attributes that the ability to act backwards in time is one of God's features. This, of course is not tantamount to affirming that God makes use of that ability as a matter of course).

All these considerations point to the fact that the theory I defend is far less outlandish and costly than its opponents make it to be. To round off our discussion let me add a remark that completes the considerations contained in paragraph 8: the agreement of the theory assuming an ability to acts backwards in time in God with the classical theory of divine attributes means that what we have here is an interpretation of one theory (namely the one allowing for the power of retrocausation in God) in other theories (the classical orthodox theologies of Judaism and Christianity). The interpretation is an ascertainable fact even though neither of the concerned theories is formalized. If this is so, however, than the following reasoning is legitimate. If the theologies of Judaism and Christianity are free of contradiction, than the proposed solution of the future contingents problem (which is a theory interpretable in either theology) is free of contradiction. This confirms our earlier conclusion that the concept of retroactive causation involves no inherent contradiction and the thesis (6.3) is no law of logic and thus cannot claim universal validity.

Although the solution of the problem of *futura contingentia* by restricting the closed past thesis, the defence of which formed the subject of this paper, may appear as odd and unusual at first, yet after a careful consideration it seems to acquire some air of interest and perhaps even attractiveness.

Translated by Roman Majeran

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Strict determinism or fatalism as a theory of reality can be suggested by diverse considerations: natural, theological, ontological or logical. The logically generated problem of fatalism arises when the assumption is made that true propositions concerning temporal events remain always true regardless of how they are indexed with respect to time; in particular, propositions correctly describing future contingent events are true even before the described events take place; in fact they have always been and will always remain true, even though their tense index changes in the course of time. However, if this assumption is true, contingent temporal events appear to have already been determined before their actual concurrence, since it has always been true that they should happen thus and so and, consequently, they cannot happen otherwise. Yet if all apparently contingent facts are in fact predetermined, there is no true contingency in the world and thus no freedom (since contingency is a necessary precondition of freedom). The great concern of philosophers in various historical contexts was the question how to reconcile true, and not merely apparent, human freedom with the apparently plausible assumption that propositions correctly describing future contingent states of affairs possess the value of truth. On the other hand, the same conclusion appears to follow if God's omnipotence and omniscience are assumed as the point of departure of our investigation: if we presuppose that God has complete knowledge about every particular aspect and detail of the world He creates, we must assume that He possesses complete and infallible knowledge about what appears to us as future contingent events, including all human seemingly free acts of decision. If God's foreknowledge of future contingents is necessarily true, the outcome of our apparently free decisions cannot be other than that eternally foreseen by God, but if this is so, our apparently free decisions are in fact predetermined by God's foreknowledge of them. As the absolutely perfect God cannot be wrong, His knowledge concerning future events ensures that these future events will be exactly as God foresees them to be. But this means that, in point of fact, we are not masters of our own decisions: at the moment of making them they have already been decided by what God thought of them.

The volume we present to the reader contains studies and essays concerning the problem of human freedom within the context of theism. Careful study of these essays will introduce the reader to an area of fascinating metaphysico-theological and logical speculation and will allow him or her to appreciate the intrinsic interest of the discussed puzzles and relevance of the whole debate to our contemporary outlooks and thinking. It is to be hoped that the publication of this volume may help the reading public better to appreciate the importance of this seemingly removed and abstruse metaphysical speculation to the vital moral and intellectual concerns of our lives and make the intellectually minded aware of the undying value of the intellectual work done in the past by some of the outstanding minds of our cultural past.

Andrzej P. Stefańczyk (*Introduction*)

e-ISBN 978-83-7306-843-8

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TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE
KATOLICKIEGO UNIWERSYTETU LUBELSKIEGO
JANA PAWŁA II